TELOS

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THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY*

by Norberto Bobbio

While lecturing on the philosophy of history at the University of Berlin, Hegel was asked by a student if the United States ought to be considered the country of the future. Obviously irritated, he answered: "As the country of the future, America does not concern me . . . Philosophy deals with the eternal, or with reason, and with that there is enough to do." In his famous lecture on science as a vocation, addressed to students at the University of Munich at the end of the First World War, Max Weber responded to insistent questions on his views as to the future of Germany: "The classroom is neither for demagogues nor for prophets."

Even those unsympathetic towards Hegel's and Weber's positions will agree that the prophet's trade is dangerous. The difficulty of grasping the future emerges also from the fact that we all project onto the future our particular aspirations and anxieties, while history follows its own course indifferent to our preoccupations — a course so directed by millions of minuscule human acts that no mind, even the most powerful, has been able to assemble them into a credible view of the whole. For this reason, predictions of the world's course by the great masters have almost always turned out to be mistaken, beginning with those of the man who some believe to have founded a new and infallible science of society, Karl Marx.

If someone was to ask me whether democracy has a future and what this future might be, I would calmly answer that I do not know. Thus, what follows is a number of observations on the current state of democratic regimes. If these observations point toward a tendency in the development (or involution) of these regimes, so much the better.

A Minimal Definition of Democracy

The only way of understanding democracy, in counterposition to all other forms of autocratic government, is to consider it characterized by rules which establish *who* is authorized to make collective decisions and under what *procedures*. Every social group must make decisions binding on all members for purposes of internal and external survival. But even group decisions are made by individuals (the group, as such, does not decide). Given, then, that individually made decisions may be accepted as collective decisions, they must be made on the basis of either written or unwritten rules which establish who is authorized to make binding decisions for all group members, and through what procedures. Now regarding the subjects called upon to make (or to

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collaborate in the making of collective decisions, a democratic regime is characterized by the ascription of this power to a great number of group members. A "great number" is vague. But, aside from the fact that political discourses refer to a universe which varies from "the very few" to "the most," one cannot really say "all" because even in the most perfectly democratic regime individuals who have not reached a certain age do not vote. Omnicracy, or a government of all, is a limiting concept. Precisely what the number of those having the vote must be to begin talking of a democratic regime cannot be established in principle, i.e., independent of historical circumstances and comparative judgement. One can only say that a society in which only adult male citizens vote is more democratic than one in which only property owners can do so, and, at the same time, less democratic than one in which women also have the right to vote. To say that during the past century there has been a continual process of democratization, means that the number of those having the right to vote has progressively increased.

As for the modality of the decision, the fundamental rule of democracy is majority rule, i.e., the rule whereby collective decisions binding on the whole group are decisions approved by at least the majority of those expected to make the decisions. If majority decisions are valid, then even more valid are those decisions taken unanimously. But this unanimity is possible only in a restricted or homogeneous group. It can be required in the extreme and opposite cases of very serious decisions where every participant has a veto right, or of relatively unimportant decisions where those not explicitly in opposition are considered to be in favor (the case of tacit agreement). Naturally, unanimity is necessary when those deciding are only two, which sharply distinguishes consensual from legal decisions (which are usually approved by the majority).

On the other hand, even for a minimal definition of democracy it is not enough simply to have the direct or indirect participation of a very great number of citizens in the making of collective decisions or the existence of procedure rules such as majority rule. A third condition is necessary: that those expected to decide or to elect those who decide confront real alternatives and can choose between them. For this to happen, it is necessary that those expected to decide be guaranteed so-called rights of liberty, opinion, expression of their own views, assembly, association, etc. In short, the rights which form the basis of the liberal state, i.e., of the state which not only exercises power *sublege,* but exercises it within limits derived from the constitutional recognition of so-called "inviolable" individual rights. No matter what philosophical foundation these rights may have, they are the necessary presupposition for the correct functioning of those very procedural mechanisms characterizing a democratic regime. Constitutional norms spelling out these rights are not simply rules of the game: they are preliminary rules which permit the very playing of the game.

Thus, the liberal state is not only the historical, but also the juridical presupposition of the democratic state. The liberal and the democratic state are inter-

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dependent in two respects: in the direction that goes from liberalism to democracy, where certain freedoms are necessary for the correct exercise of democratic power; and in the opposite direction, from decocracy to liberalism, where democratic power is necessary to guarantee the existence and persistence of fundamental lberties. Historical proof of this interdependence is in the fact that, when they fall, the liberal and the democratic states fall together.

Ideals and "Coarse Material"

This reference to principles opens the way for some observations on the current situation of democracy. It is the one often referred to as the "transformations of democracy." If one sought to assemble all that has been written about the transformations of democracy or about democracy in transformation, a library could be filled. Yet, the word "transformation" is sufficiently vague to lend itself to various interpretations: from the right[1] democracy turns into a semi-anarchistic regime which leads to the disintegration of the state; and from the left[2] parliamentary democracy turns increasingly into an autocratic regime. More than "transformation" for our purposes it may be more useful, therefore, to focus on the divergence between democratic ideals and "real democracy" (understood here in the same sense as when one talks about "real socialism"). A little while ago, someone called my attention to the concluding words that Pasternak put in the mouth of Gorden, the friend of Doctor Zhivago: "It has happened many times in history. That which had been conceived as noble and high has become coarse material. Thus, Greece became Rome, and Russian enlightenment became the Russian revolution." Here one might *also* add: the liberal and democratic thought of Locke, Rousseau, Tocqueville, Bentham, John Stuart Mill has turned into the actions of . . . (one can place here whatever name one wants, and there will be no trouble finding more than one). This "coarse material" is what must be discussed rather than its "notable and high" precursor or, better, the contrast between what had been promised and what has been actually delivered. Of these unkept promises, let me list six.

The Birth of Pluralist Society

Democracy is born from an individualistic conception of society, i.e., from that conception which, contrary to its organic counterpart predominant in antiquity and the middle ages where the whole is prior to the parts, society, and especially political society, is an aritificial product of individual wills. The formation of the individualistic concept of society and of the state, and the dissolution of the organic conception was precipitated by three phenomena which characterize the social philosophy of the modern age: (1) sixteenth and seventeenth century contractualism based on the hypothesis that before civil society there was a state of nature characterized by sovereign single, free, and

1. I am thinking here of Parato's book on *The Transformation of Democracy* (1920) — the initiator of a long and uninterrupted series of complaints about the crisis of civilization.

2. I am thinking here of extra-parliamentary critiques such as can be found in Johannes Agnoli's *Die Transformationen der Demokratie* (1967).

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equal individuals who agreed among themselves to give life to a common power charged with guaranteeing their life and liberty (no less than their property); (2) the birth of political economy, i.e., an analysis of society and social relations whose subject once again was the single individual, *homo oeconomicus*, and not the *politikón zôon* of tradition, who had no identity other than that of a community member — the single individual who, according to Adam Smith, "in pursuing his proper interest, often promotes that of society in a more effective manner than really intended" (one should note, of course, the recent interpretation of Macpherson, according to which the state of nature in Hobbes and Locke is a prefiguration of a market society); (3) Bentham's and Mill's utilitarian philosophy whereby the sole criterion for an objectivistic ethic able to distinguish between good and evil without recourse to vague concepts such as "nature" and the like is based on essentially individual states like pleasure and pain, and the traditional problem of the common good translates into the sum total of individual goods or, according to Bentham's formulation, in the happiness of the greatest number.

Departing from the hypothesis of an individual sovereign who, in agreement with other individual sovereigns, creates political society, democratic doctrine imagined a state without the intermediate bodies characteristic of the corporative society of medieval cities and of the state of status groups or orders which preceded the consolidation of absolute monarchies. In other words, liberal doctrine imagined a political order in which there would be none of the particularistic societies deprecated by Rousseau and juridically abolished by the *loi Le Chapelier* (abrogated in France only in 1887) between the sovereign people composed of so many individuals (one head, one vote) and their representatives. What actually happened in democratic states, however, was precisely the opposite: politically relevant subjects became increasingly grouped into great organizations, associations of the most diverse natures, trade unions of the most diverse professions, all believing in the most diverse ideologies, while solitary individuals declined in importance. Organized groups, and not individuals, are the protagonists of political life in a democratic society. In this society there is no longer a sovereign, the people or the nation, composed of individuals who acquired the right to participate directly or indirectly in government ("the people" understood as an ideal or mystical unity), but rather the people divided into counterposed groups which compete among themselves, relatively autonomous from the central government — an autonomy which single individuals have lost or only really had in that ideal model of democratic government which has always been refuted by facts.

The ideal model of democratic society was that of a centripetal society. The reality is that of a centrifugal society, having not one center of power (Rousseau's general will) but many, meriting the names preferred by scholars of politics: polycentric or polycratic society. The model of the democratic state founded on popular sovereignty, which in its conception resembled the sovereignty of the Prince, was the model of a monistic society. Real society,

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under democratic governments, is pluralistic.

The Revenge of Interests

From this first transformation (in terms of the distributions of power), derives a second, relative to representation. Modern democracy, born as representative democracy (as distinct from the democracy of the ancients), should have been characterized by political representation, i.e., a form of representation in which the representative, called upon to pursue the nation's interests, cannot be subject to a binding mandate. Political representation is founded on a principle which is the exact antithesis of that on which the representation of interests is based. In the latter, the representative, having to pursue the particular interests of the represented, is subject to a binding mandate. One of the most celebrated and historically significant debates at the French Constituent Assembly which generated the 1791 constitution was that which resulted in the triumph of those who argued that a deputy, once elected, became the representative of the nation and no longer that of the electors, and, as such, was bound by no mandate. The free mandate had been a prerogative of the King who, in convoking the Estates-General, had claimed that ordinary delegates were not sent to the assembly with *pouvoirs restrictifs*. Evident expression of sovereignty, the free mandate was transferred from royal sovereignty to the sovereignty of the assembly elected by the people. From then on, the prohibition on an imperative mandate has become a constant rule of all the constitutions of representative democracy, and the ultimate defense of political representation has always found principled support among the advocates of representative democracy against attempts to either substitute it for or integrate it with the representation of interests.

Never has a constitutional norm been more violated than the prohibition of an imperative mandate. Never has a principle been more disregarded than that of political representation. But in a society composed of relatively autonomous groups which struggle for supremacy, could such a norm or such a principle ever be implemented? Aside from the fact that each group tends to identify the national with its particular interest, is there some general criterion which might allow one to distinguish the general interest from the particular interests of groups which agree among themselves as against others? He who represents particular interests always has an imperative mandate. And where can we find a representative who does not represent particular interests? Certainly not in trade unions who are responsible for the stipulation of agreements (like those concerning the cost of living) which have enormous political relevance. In Parliament? But what is represented by party discipline if not an open violation of the prohibition of an imperative mandate? Are not those who escape from party discipline, profiting from a secret vote, branded as "snipers," i.e., as reprobates to be singled out for public disapproval? The prohibition of an imperative mandate above all is a rule without sanction. Thus, the only sanction feared by a deputy whose re-election depends on party support is that which comes from a transgression of the opposite rule,

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one which forces him to consider himself bound by the mandate he has received from the party.

Confirmation of the seemingly definitive revenge of interest representation over political representation is the type of relation which has come to be established in most democratic European states between major counterposed interest groups (representatives respectively of industrialists and workers) and parliament — a relation which has given way to a new type of social system that has been called, rightly or wrongly, neo-corporative. Such a system is characterized by a triangular relation in which the government, ideally representative of national interests, intervenes only as a mediator between the parties and furthermore as guarantor (generally impotent) of an agreement's compliance. Those who for the past ten years or so have elaborated this model, which today is the focus of debates concerning "transformations" of democracy, have defined neo-corporative society as a type which resolves social conflicts by making use of a procedure, that of agreement between major organizations. This has nothing to do with political representation, but is, rather, a typical expression of the representation of interests.

The Persistence of Oligarchies

The third promise not kept is the defeat of oligarchic power. There is no need to stress this point too strongly since it is a well-treated and uncontroversial theme — at least since the turn of the century when Gaetano Mosca laid out his theory of the political class which was called, through Pareto's influence, the theory of elites. The main inspiration of democratic thought has always been liberty understood as autonomy, i.e., as the capacity for self-government, according to Rousseau's famous definition. This ought to have as its consequence the perfect identification between those who impose and those who receive a rule of conduct, thus eliminating the traditional distinction between rulers and ruled — the distinction on which all political thought had been based. Representative democracy, which is the only existing and functioning form of democracy, is already itself a renunciation of the principle of liberty as autonomy. The hypothesis that a future computercracy, as it has been called, would allow for an exercise of direct democracy, where each citizen would have the possibility of transmitting his own vote to an electric brain, is puerile. To judge from the laws which are passed each year in Italy, a good citizen would have to be called to vote at least once a day. Excessive participation, resulting in the phenomenon Dahrendorf has disparagingly called "the total citizen," can have as its effect the satiation of politics and a rise in voter apathy. The price that one must pay for the commitment of the few is often the indifference of the many. Nothing risks killing democracy more than having too much of it.

Naturally, the presence of elites in power does not cancel the difference between democratic and autocratic regimes. Even Mosca, a conservative who described himself as a non-democratic liberal, knew this. He devised a complex typology of forms of government in order to show that, even with oligarchies always present in power, different forms of governments could be

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distinguished on the basis of their diverse formation and organization. Since I began with a prevalently procedural definition of democracy, it should not be forgotten that one of the proponents of this interpretation, Joseph Schumpeter, hit the nail perfectly on the head when he argued that the characteristic of a democratic government was not the absence of elites but the presence of many elites in competition among themselves for the conquest of the popular vote. In Macpherson's recent book *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy,* four phases in the development of democracy from the last century to the present are distinguished. The current phases, called "democracy of equilibrium" corresponds to Schumpeter's definition. (A Mosca and Pareto scholar has, in my judgement, incisively distinguished between elites who impose themselves from those who propose themselves.)

Limited Space

If democracy has not been altogether successful in defeating oligarchic power, even less has it succeeded in occupying all the space in which power is exercised by making binding decisions for the entire social group. At this point, the distinction which is at play is no longer that between power of the few and power of the many, but that between ascending and descending power. Nevertheless, one ought to speak here more of inconsequence than of non-fulfillment, since modern democracy is born as a method of legitimation and control of political decisions in the strict sense, or of "government" properly so-called, whether national or local, where the individual comes to be taken into consideration in his general role as citizen and not in the multiplicity of his specific roles (member of a church, worker, student, soldier, consumer, etc.). If one can still speak of an extension of democratization after the conquest of universal suffrage, it would have to focus not so much in the shift from representative to direct democracy, as is often argued, as in the passage from political to social democracy — not so much in the answer to the question "Who votes?" as in the answer to this other question "Where does one vote?" In other words, to know whether there has been a development of democracy in a given country, is not enough to check whether there has been an increase in the number of those who have the right to participate in decisions regarding them, but in the spaces in which they can exercise this right. Unless advanced societies' two great power-blocs from above, the enterprise and the administrative apparatus, are breached by democratization — independently of whether this is possible or even desirable — the process of democratization cannot be considered complete.

It is relevant, however, that in some of these non-political (in the traditional sense of the word) spaces such as the factory, there has been a proclamation of some rights within the framework of a specific system of power, similar to what happened with the declaration of citizen rights with respect to the system of political power.[3] Even with regard to the prerogatives of the citizen *vis-à-vis*

3. What I have in mind here is such a thing as the *Statuto dei Lavoratori* granted in Italy in 1970, and recent efforts seeking the proclamation of a charter of health rights.

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the state, the concession of freedom rights has preceded that of political rights. As already indicated in connection with the relation between the liberal and the democratic state, the concession of political rights had been a natural consequence of the concession of freedom rights, because the sole guarantee of respect for freedom rights resided in the right to control the power connected with this guarantee.

Invisible Power

The fifth promise that had not been kept by real democracy, as opposed to its ideal, is the elimination of invisible power. Unlike the relation between democracy and oligarchic power concerning which there is an extensive literature, up to now the theme of invisible power has not been discussed sufficiently (partially because it escapes the research techniques usually employed by sociologists, e.g., interviews, opinion polls, etc.).[4] It is well known that democracy was born with the prospect of forever dispersing invisible power and giving life to a government whose actions are to be taken in public *au grand jour* (to use Maurice Joly's expression). The model here for modern democracy was the democracy of the ancients, particularly the little city-state of Athens, in the happy moments when the people assembled in the *agora* to freely, under the light of the sun, make their own decisions after having heard orators illustrate the various view points. In order to denigrate it, Plato who was anti-democratic, called it *theatrocracy* (a term which, not surprisingly, one also finds in Nietzsche). One of the reasons for the superiority of democracy in relation to absolute states which restored the value of the *arcana imperii* and defended with historical and political arguments the need to make major political decisions in secret, far from the public's indiscreet eyes, was the conviction that democratic government could finally render power transparent and give life to "unmasked power."

In the Appendix to *Perpetual Peace* Kant announced and illustrated the fundamental maxim according to which "All actions relative to the rights of other men whose underlying principles are not susceptible to public scrutiny are unjust," meaning that an action I am forced to undertake in secret is not only obviously unjust, but such that, were it made public, the reaction would render its realization impossible. What state, to use Kant's own example, would be able to declare publicly, when it signs an international treaty, that it will not observe it? What public functionary could declare in public that he will use public money for private interests? From this it follows that the obligation to make acts of government public is important not only, as it is usually claimed, to provide citizens with knowledge of the acts of those in power and thus enable citizens to control them, but also a means to allow us to distinguish what

4. On this question, I may be particularly influenced by what happens in Italy where invisible power (mafia, camorra, peculiar masonic lodges, uncontrolled secret services which protect the subversives they are supposed to control, etc.) is, maybe to use the wrong words, all too visible. At any rate, the most extensive account of the subject I have found is in Alan Wolfe's book *The Limits of Legitimacy* which devotes a well-documented chapter to what he calls the "double state" when, next to a visible state, there is an invisible one.

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is legitimate from what is not. It is not by chance that the politics of the *arcana imperii* developed along with the theory of "reasons of state," i.e., the theory whereby what is permissible for the state is not permissible for private citizens so that, in order to avoid scandal, the state is forced to act in secret.[5]

It is unnecessary to add that public control of power is even more necessary in an age such as ours, when the technical means to know in detail what citizens do, which are at the disposal of those who hold power, have been enormously increased and are practically unlimited. If I have expressed some reservations concerning whether a computerocracy might help govern democracies, I have no doubts concerning the service it could render to governing democracies. The ideal of those in power has always been to be able to see every gesture or hear every word of their subjects (and, if possible, without themselves being seen or heard). This ideal is now attainable. No ancient despot, no absolute monarch of the modern age, even by using thousands of spies, has ever succeeded in having all that information concerning his subjects which the most democratic of governments can now obtain through the use of electronic brains. The old question which ran through the whole history of political thought, "Who watches after the watchmen?," today can be asked in another way: "Who controls the controllers?" If an adequate answer to this question is not found, then democracy, as the advent of visible government, is lost. More than a promise not kept, it would be a tendency running totally contrary to democratic premises: the tendency not toward maximum control of power on the part of citizens, but an opposite tendency toward the maximum control of subjects on the part of those in power.

The Uneducated Citizen

The sixth unfulfilled promise regards citizen education. In apologies of democracy written during the past two centuries, one always finds the argument that the only way to make a citizen out of a subject is by giving him those rights which last century's writers on public law have called *activae civitatis*. Thus, education for democracy was to take place simply through the exercise of democratic practice, and not before, unlike in the Jacobin model where first there was the revolutionary dictatorship, and only subsequently the reign of virtue. For the good democrat, the reign of virtue (which for Montesquieu constituted the principle of democracy, as opposed to fear, the principle of despotism) is that very democracy which cannot do without virtue — understood as love for things public — and at the same time promotes, nourishes and strengthens it. One of the most exemplary passages in this regard is found in the chapter on the best form of government in John Stuart Mill's *Considerations on Representative Democracy*, where he distinguishes between active and passive citizens, noting that, in general, rulers prefer the latter because it is always easier to control docile or indifferent subjects, but democracy needs the former. If passive citizens prevailed, he concluded, rulers would gladly

5. To provide an example of the tyrant's exceptional power, Plato argues that only the tyrant can undertake in public scandalous acts that common mortals imagine only in dreams.

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make of their subjects a flock of sheep concerned only with grazing on the grass next to each other (and not complaining, I would add, even when grass is scarce). This led Mill to propose an extension of suffrage to the popular classes, on the ground that one of the remedies for the tyranny of the majority was precisely the participation of the popular classes in addition to the well-to-do classes which always constitute a minority of the population and naturally tend to look after their own exclusive interests. He claimed that participation through the vote had great educational value. It is through political discussion that the worker, whose work is repetitive and limited within the confines of the factory, succeeds in understanding the relation between distant events and his own personal interest, establishes contact with citizens who are different from those with whom he has daily relations, and becomes a conscious member of the community. Citizen education had been one of the preferred themes of American political science during the 1950s — a theme dealt with under the label "political culture" about which rivers of ink were poured, but only to rapidly fade. Among many distinctions, I can recall one made between the culture of citizens oriented toward the outputs of the system, i.e., toward those benefits which electors hoped to actually draw from the political system, as opposed to the participatory culture oriented toward the inputs — a culture typical of electors who consider themselves potentially included in the articulation of demands and in the making of decisions.

Look around us. In the more consolidated democracies, one stands impotent before the phenomenon of political apathy which often includes roughly half of those having the right to vote. From the viewpoint of political culture, these people are oriented toward neither outputs nor inputs. They are simply uninterested in what is happening. I know perfectly well that one can also provide positive interpretations of this political apathy. But even the most positive interpretations cannot overlook the fact that the great democratic writers would have hardly recognized in the refusal to use this very right, a positive fruit of citizen education. In democratic regimes where the percentage of voters is still very high, there are good reasons to believe that while the "vote as opinion" decreases, the "vote as exchange" increases. To use the aseptic terminology of political scientists, the vote here is concerned with outputs or, to use a cruder but less mystifying terminology, the vote is clientelistic, i.e., based, even if mistakenly, on the *do ut des* (political support in exchange for personal favors). Even for this "vote as exchange" one can provide positive interpretations. Here I am reminded of Tocqueville who, in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies on January 27, 1848, lamented the degeneration of public customs, whereby "for opinions, sentiments, and common ideas are being evermore substituted particular interests." Addressing his colleagues, he wondered whether the number of those who vote for personal interest had increased, and the number of those who vote on the basis of political opinion had decreased, attacking this tendency as the expression of "base and vulgar ethics," according to which he who enjoys political rights thinks he can instrumentalize them for his own interest.

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Government of Technocrats

Promises not kept. But were they promises which really could have been fulfilled? I would say no. Even leaving aside the earlier distinction between what was conceived as "noble and high" and the "coarse material," the democratic political project was imagined for a society much less complex than today's. The promises were not fulfilled because of obstacles that had not been anticipated or which overtook us in the wake of the "transformations" of civil society. I will indicate three.

The first: slowly, as societies have changed from a family-based economy to one based on the market, and then from a market economy to one which was protected, regulated and planned, the number of political problems requiring technical competence has increased. Technical problems require experts, an ever larger group of specialized personnel. Already a century ago, Saint-Simon had become aware of this and had anticipated the substitution of a government of scientists for a government of lawyers. With the development of calculating instruments which not even Saint-Simon could have begun to imagine, and which only experts are capable of using, the need for a so-called government of technocrats is immeasurably increased.

Technocracy and democracy are antithetical: if the expert is the protagonist of industrial society this rules out a central role for ordinary citizens. Democracy is based on the hypothesis that everyone can decide everything. Technocracy, to the contrary, claims that those allowed to decide be the few competent ones. As I have already recalled, during the time of absolutist states the mob had to be kept away from the *arcana imperii* because it was believed to be too ignorant. Now, the common folk are certainly less ignorant, but the problems to solve — problems such as the battle against inflation, for full employment, for a more equitable distribution of income — have become much more complicated. Are not these problems such that their solution would require a scientific and technical knowledge no less arcane for the average man of today, even if better educated?

The Growth of the Apparatus

The second obstacle not anticipated has been the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus — an apparatus of power hierarchically-ordered from top to bottom and thus diametrically opposed to the system of democratic power. A political system shaped like a pyramid presupposes that there are differential gradations of power in society: in democratic society power goes from the base to the vertex; in a bureaucratic society, on the contrary, from the vertex to the base.

The democratic and the bureaucratic state are historically much more related to each other than their counterposition might suggest. All the states which have become more democratic have also become more bureaucratic, because the process of bureaucratization, to a great extent, has been a consequence of the process of democratization. Proof of this may be that today the call to dismantle the welfare state which requires such an unprecedentedly extensive bureaucratic apparatus, conceals a similar intention to, if not dis-

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mantle democratic power, reduce it within very circumscribed limits. It is by now well known why democratization and bureaucratization have gone hand in hand, as Max Weber already noted. When only property-owners had the right to vote, it was natural that they asked public power to exercise only one primary function: the protection of property. From here was born the doctrine of the limited state or, as one would say today, the minimal state, and the understanding of the state as an association of proprietors for the defense of that supreme natural right which, for Locke, was precisely the right of property. From the moment the vote was extended to the illiterate it was natural that they would demand free education from the state, adding a burden which was unknown to the state of traditional oligarchies and of the first bourgeois oligarchy. When the right to vote was also extended to non-proprietors, to those who owned no property other than their labor power, it followed that they would ask the state for protection against unemployment and eventually social insurance against sickness, old-age, maternity benefits, cheap housing, etc. Thus it happened that the welfare state or the social state became, like it or not, the response to a demand coming from below — a demand which was, in the full sense of the word, democratic.

Low Efficiency

The third obstacle is closely connected with the theme of the efficiency of the whole democratic system — a problem which recently has given life to a debate concerning the so-called "ungovernability" of democracy. What does this mean? Roughly, first the liberal state, and then its broadening into the democratic state, led to the emancipation of civil society from the political system. Such a process of emancipation has contributed toward civil society's becoming an ever more inexhaustible source of demands *vis-à-vis* the government which, in order to perform its function, must provide adequate responses. But how can the government respond if the demands coming from a free and emancipated society are ever more numerous, pressing, and burdensome? I mentioned earlier that the necessary precondition of any democratic government is the protection of civil liberties. Well, freedom of the press, freedom of association and assembly, are also means whereby citizens can address those in power to ask for favors, benefits, accommodations, and a more equal distribution of resources. The quantity and rapidity of these demands are such that no political system, however efficient, is capable of satisfying them. This leads to the so-called problem of "overload" and the necessity for the political system to make drastic choices. But one choice excludes others. Those unsatisfied create discontent.

Furthermore, there is a stark contrast between the rapidity with which demands on the government are made by citizens, and the slowness with which the complex procedures of a democratic political system constrain the political class from making adequate decisions. Thus, what is created is a genuine uncoupling between the mechanism of input and that of output; the first taking place at an increasingly faster rhythm, accelerated, the second ever more slow. This is just the opposite to what happens in an autocratic system

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which, having suffocated the autonomy of civil society, is capable of controlling demands, and which, not having to observe complex decision-making procedures, (such as those of a parliament), can be much quicker in responding. In short, democracy has easy demands and difficult responses; autocracy, on the contrary, is capable of making demands far more difficult and moving with greater facility in providing responses.

All that Notwithstanding

Given all this, one might expect a catastrophic vision of democracy's future. Not at all. With respect to the years between the first and second world wars, which were labelled in Elie Halévy's famous book *L'ère des tyrannies* (1938), during the past forty years democratic regimes have progressively expanded. Juan Linz's book *The Fall of Democratic Regimes* is mainly about the years immediately after World War One; that of Julian Santamaria, *Transition to Democracy in Southern Europe and in Latin America,* deals with events after World War Two. When the First World War was over, all it took was a few years in Italy and ten in Germany to topple the parliamentary state. After the Second World War, where democracy was restored it has not subsequently been toppled, and in other countries it was authoritarian governments which fell. Even in a democracy ungoverned or poorly governed like Italy, democracy as such is not in any serious danger, even if I say this hesitantly.

Of course, I am referring to internal dangers, dangers which can come from the extremism of the Right or that of the Left. In Eastern Europe, where democratic regimes have been suffocated at birth or never succeeded in being born, the cause has been and continues to be external. My analysis has focused on democracy's internal difficulties, not those which depend on the location of various countries in the international system. Still, my conclusion is that, unkept promises and unanticipated obstacles notwithstanding, they have not been such as to "transform" democratic into autocratic regimes. The substantial difference between the two remains. The minimal content of the democratic state has not diminished: guarantee of the main rights of freedom, existence of various competing parties, periodic elections and universal suffrage, collective or consensual decisions either based on the majority principle or, in any case, always following a free debate among the parties or among the allies of a governing coalition. There are more and less solid democracies, more and less vulnerable ones; there are various degrees of approximation to the ideal model, but even the one furthest from the model can in no way be confused with an autocratic state and still less with a totalitarian one.

I have not mentioned external dangers because my focus in on the future of democracy and not that of humanity. However, at least one final point, even if a bit risky, can be made: no war, until now, has broken out among states having a democratic regime. That is not to say that democratic states have not made war; but they have not made war *among themselves.* The observation is rash, but it still awaits a repudiation. Might Kant have been correct in proclaiming as the first definitive article of a possible treaty for perpetual peace that "the constitution of every state must be republican?" Of course, Kant's

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"republic" does not coincide with today's "democracy," but the idea that an obstacle to war among states might be the internal constitution of the states was a powerful and suggestive idea that inspired many pacifist projects during the past two-hundred years, even if in practice they have remained a dead letter. The objections raised against Kant always have derived from not having understood that, as a universal principle, this could work only if *all* states, and not just some, assumed the form of government necessary for attaining a perpetual peace.

Appeal to Values

In closing, it is necessary to answer the fundamental question which I have often heard asked especially among young people who tend to be easily swayed by illusions as well as delusions. If democracy is basically a collection of procedural rules, how can one begin to rely on "active citizens"? To have active citizens, are not ideals needed? Of course, ideals are needed. But how can one not take into account which great ideal struggles produced those rules? Let us try to enumerate them.

First, above all, comes the struggle between centuries of cruel religious wars and the ideal of tolerance. If today there is a threat to peace in the world, it comes once again from fanaticism, i.e., from the blind belief in one's own truth and in the force necessary to impose it. It is not necessary to provide examples; they are all around us. Then there is the ideal of non-violence. I have never forgotten Karl Popper's teaching whereby what essentially distinguishes a democratic from a non-democratic government is that, in the first, citizens can rid themselves of their rulers without spilling blood. The often derided formal rules of democracy have introduced, for the first time in history, techniques for co-existence meant to resolve social conflicts without recourse to violence. Only where these rules come to be respected, the adversary is no longer an enemy to be destroyed, but an opponent who tomorrow might take our place. Third, the ideal of a gradual renewal of society through the free exchange of ideas and the change of mentalities and of life-styles: only democracy allows the formation and expansion of silent revolutions, like that which has taken place during the past ten years in relations beteen the sexes — perhaps the major revolution of our time. Finally, the ideal of brotherhood: the French Revolution's *fraternité*. Much of human history is the history of fratricidal struggles. In his *Philosophy of History* (and thus I close with the author with whom I began), Hegel defined history as an "immense slaughter-house." Can we say he was wrong? In no country of the world can the democratic method continue without becoming a custom. But can it become a custom without the recognition of that brotherhood which unites all people in a common destiny? The recognition of this common destiny is ever more necessary today when each day we become more conscious of it, and through that small light of reason which illuminates our path, we should act accordingly.

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NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, POLITICAL CULTURE, AND DEMOCRACY: BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA IN THE 1980s

by Scott Mainwaring and Eduardo Viola

One of the most important phenomena in contemporary South America has been the tendency towards more democratic systems. After protracted periods of authoritarian rule, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Bolivia appear to be heading in a more democratic direction. This process has awakened political hopes and attracted intellectual reflection, especially regarding Brazil and Argentina, the largest and most influential nations of South America. Both countries are in different moments, with different timings, in transitions which could lead to the establishment of stable democratic regimes.

The following will discuss a number of new social movements which have emerged under the military regimes and have been significant in the struggle for democracy. We focus on five "new movements": ecclesial base communites, neighborhood associations, and the feminist movement in Brazil; human rights groups in Argentina; and ecological associations in both countries. These social movements have contributed to the erosion of military rule, and they may also play a role as bearers of a more democratic political culture. These new social movements are an important and generally underexamined actor in the transition to democracy. They question the semi-democratic political culture of Brazil and Argentina and bring new values, perspectives, methods, and approaches to the political arena. In countries which have an authoritarian political tradition, these movements could be a democraticizing force. While the movements have grown quickly in recent years, however, they face many obstacles and problems.

Defining Some Basic Concepts

By political culture, we mean the political values which are the basis of political discourse. Political values are basic orientations which determine the way reality is comprehended. They are embodied in political discourse and in the style of doing politics. This definition assumes that actors are not always conscious of their political values. In this sense, political values cannot be equated with ideology, even though both express elements of values. Discourse reflects an actor's conscious or instrumental attitude towards politics and is therefore a key element in understanding aspects of values. Nevertheless, actors do not have full consciousness of the factors which form their world-view and orient their action, and in this sense their discourse does not perfectly reflect that world-view. In addition, they may create a discourse for instrumental purposes, which would therefore not even reflect their values as self-perceived.

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Our understanding of political culture differs from that employed by modernization theory.[1] We place the notion of political culture in a more historical perspective, underscoring the potential for development or erosion of democratic values at a particular juncture. Thus, the development of a democratic political culture is not seen as a unilinear process, nor is the presence of an authoritarian political culture seen as inhering in Latin traditions.[2] Furthermore, in contrast to the early 1960s discussions concerning political culture, we link the concept to socio-economic life. Political cultures represent configurations of values which are formed historically, not value choices for autonomous individual actors, as suggested by most modernization theorists. Furthermore, modernization theory failed to take behavior into account or to consider the possible gap between verbalized citizen attitudes and behavior. Finally, it failed to recognize the extent to which new behavior patterns may create new values. Thus, whereas modernization theory assumed that political values determined political behavior, we see a mutual interaction between the two.

The emphasis on political culture breaks with the Marxist tradition since Marxism reduces political values and culture to questions of class interests, which are seen as determining political interactions. By contrast, we believe that values are a crucial part of the political interactions in a society. Values are related to class, but cannot be reduced to class; they are related to economic patterns, but have autonomy with respect to economics. Political culture, then, is not the same as ideology as conceived by Marxism.

We differentiate political cultures along two main parameters, democratic or authoritarian political values and elitist or egalitarian social values. The work differentiates five main political cultures: right authoritarians, left authoritarians, semi-democratics, liberal democrats, and radical democrats. This conceptualization distinguishes principally between democratic and authoritarian values and only secondarily on the classical left/right divisions.

The right authoritarians combine political authoritarianism and social elitism. They do not believe in political democracy, and they see force as a legitimate and necessary political instrument. Although some right authori-

1. The classical 1960s studies on political culture were Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). For especially useful critiques of this approach to political culture, see Richard R. Fagen, *The Transportation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), especially pp. 5-6, pp. 149-158; Carole Pateman, "Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change," *British Journal of Political Science* I (July 1971), pp. 291-306; Lucian Pye, "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of Political Culture," *Social Science Quarterly* 53 (September 1972), pp. 285-296; Robert Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society," *Political Science Quarterly* 88 (June 1973), pp. 173-190.

2. Most of the political development literature of the early 1960s assumed a linear path towards more democratic regimes. Among the most important contributions to questioning this assumption were Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism* (Berekely: Institute of International Studies, 1972); Juan J. Linz, *Crises, Breakdown, and Reequilibration*, Vol. I of Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978).

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tarians prefer non-interventionist social and economic polities, they are statist in the political realm; they limit the scope and/or autonomy of civil society in relation to the state. Right authoritarians percieve some political actors as delegitimate. Whereas liberal and radical democrats accept a level of uncertainty as part of the democratic struggle, none of the authoritarians do.

Left authoritarianism combines social egalitarianism and political authoritarianism. It usually is linked to Marxist-Leninist thought, the vanguard party, the ideology of the party-state, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. While Marxism-Leninism is the most important example of left authoritarianism, there are others, including Islamic Revolutionaries and some Black African revolutionary movements.

Semi-democratic political actors have an instrumental attitude towards democracy. They do not reject democracy (like the left and right authoritarians) nor do they pursue it as vigorously as the liberal and radical democrats. Depending on the circumstances, they could favor representative democracy, restricted democracy, or authoritarianism. In terms of social values, the semi-democrats encompass a wide ideological spectrum, of which the semi-democratic left, the populists, and conservatives are the most significant.

The liberal democrats are committed to representative democracy in a non-instrumental way. They embrace a wide ideological spectrum, from relatively conservative ideologies to social democrats. The issue of social equality is secondary to institutional values, even though progressive democrats are concerned with overcoming some inequalities. They perceive the political struggle principally as a series of negotiations among elites. In contrast to the radical democrats, liberal democrats believe in expertise and technocracy. They are pluralistic yet believe that the masses necessarily have a limited role in politics. Like the radical democrats, the liberal democrats believe in the value of diversity and have more open mentalities.

Radical democrats combine a belief in political democracy whh a concern about social egalitarianism. The radical democrats agree with the liberal democrats about the importance of institutional mechanisms and basic civil liberties. However, unlike liberal democrats, they insist on the transformation of institutions so that society can become more fully democratic. The radicals place a high value on participation and on public spaces of normative communication. They are critical of technocratic approaches to modern life, including technocratic, elitist styles of doing politics. They stress socio-economic equality more than the liberal democrats; for some liberal democrats, out of the Touqueville tradition, high levels of equality are seen as eroding freedom.

We are exclusively concerned with a number of social movements which have a relatively new value pattern. "New" social movements are inclined towards affective concerns, expressive relations, group orientation, and horizontal organization. Old social movements are inclined towards material

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concerns, instrumental relations, orientation towards the state, and vertical organization. The distinction between new and old movements is an ideal type; all social movements with a vision of social change combine some elements of the values of the "new" and "old" movements. While there is a tendency towards coherence in the clusters of values, any given movemem could combine some values characteristic of new movements with others characteristic of old ones. In addition, a particular movement can change its values over time towards becoming closer to the opposite ideal type. Finally, the term "new" is relative; the values of the movements are not absolutely novel, and some of the movements have precursors. What is new is that vlaues which were relatively weak or absent in the past are now embodied in movements which were also weak or inexistent. With the exception of neighborhood associations, which have more elements of old movements, the movements we study approximate the ideal type of new movements.

The new social movements do not fall within the traditional interest group pattern of politics. Most conventional interest groups focus on negotiable demands, usually material in nature, which they attempt to win from the state. By contrast, the new social movements focus to a large extent on social relations, sometimes to the point of being relatively apolitical. To the extent they deal with the state, the demands are frequently symbolic and moral in nature, and non-negotiable. One of the paradoxes of these new movements' work is that part of their political impact derives from this new, "apolitical" way of doing politics. But this very aspect of their political impact is also linked to a significant limitation and internal contradition, for the "apolitical" means of doing politics may curtail their ability to transform political regimes. In this case, even though they represent something new in terms of political culture, they may ultimately be marginalized as small alternative cultural movements with limited capacity to transform the whole society. This relation between the "apolitical" and political character of the movements, between impact and limits of the movements, forms one of the major questions of this article.

While the basis of classification of new and old movements depends on values, there is some rough fit with historical origin. The four movements we discuss as being characteristic of "new" social movements have emerged in the last two decades. It should be noted, however, that other movements which have emerged during this time do not embody these values. The neighborhood associations represent a case of some transformation of values, from the constellation associated with old movements towards the constellation associated with new ones.

The most important defining characteristic of liberal democratic regimes is the existence of free competitive elections without major proscriptions, in which there is universal adult suffrage. Democratic regimes afford freedom of political association, freedom of the press and speech, and individual guarantees. They have a division of powers, with autonomy of the executive, judiciary, and legislative branches. Stable democracy does not require all citizens to have democratic values, but most major political actors must share such values.

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While this definition suffices to characterize a liberal democracy, democracy as a political regime can always be expanded, both in competitiveness and participation. According to different levels of competition and participation, we can differentiate between restricted, liberal, and radical democracy. Restricted democracy would limit the forms and/or levels of participation and competition while nevertheless observing some important aspects of democratic rule. Radical democratic regimes would respect the institutions of liberal democracy but combine them with elements of direct participation, such as referendum by popular initiative. Although no regimes in the world are radical democracies, some liberal democratic regimes, most notably the Scandanavian ones, have components of radical democracy. All of the regimes with more radical democratic components involved an expansion of participation and competition from liberal democracy, but a revolution could also conceivably create a regime with strong radical democratic elements.

The distinctions between restricted democracy, liberal democracy, and radical democracy are important in analyzing the relation between current political transitions and the new social movements in Brazil and Argentina. Both countries have had difficulty in moving from authoritarian or restricted democratic to stable liberal democratic regimes; contemporary political struggle revolves around the attempt to do precisely that. Although a radical democracy seems unattainable, it is the objective of the new social movements.

Our analysis of the role of new social movements in the transition to democracy draws upon the European discussion of social movements, the Latin American discussion of authoritarianism and democracy, and the Latin American discussion of social movements, but in all cases we diverge somewhat from the predominant focus. While the Latin American discussion about democracy has focused on the bipartite distinction between authoritarians and democrats, the European discussion about new social movements has focused on a different bipartite distinction, between frozen (or limited or conventional) liberal democracy, and radical (or particapatory) democracy.[3] The European discussion has taken as it starting point and object of criticism a liberal democracy which is precisely one of the major objectives of South American movements. Clearly, in discussing the South American movements, the resilience and strength of authoritarian elements remains a major factor. Nevertheless, even allowing for the sharp differences between Europe and South America, the European emphasis on the potential significance of the new social movements in producing a new political culture raises interest-

3. An extensive literature has emerged on these social movements and their potential for invigorating democracy. Among the most important contributions are Alain Touraine, *La Voix et le Regard* (Paris; Seuil, 1981); A. Touraine, Z. Hegedus, F. Dubet and M. Wieviorka, *La prophétie anti-nucléaire* (Paris: Seuil, 1980); Alain Touraine, *et, al., Solidarité: Analyse d'un mouvement social, Pologne 1980-81* (Paris: Fayard, 1982); Johan Galtung "The Blue and the Red, the Green and the Brown! A Guide to Movements and Countermovements" (Geneve: Institut Universitaire d'Etude du Development, 1981); Pietro Ingrao *Tradizione e Progretto* (Bari: de Donato, 1982); Alberto Melucci *L'invenzione del presente, Movimenti, identita, bisogni individuali* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1982).

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ing questions about the potential of South American movements.

We also draw somewhat upon the Latin American discussion of social movements, but again with some divergences. Most of the Latin American discussion has fallen into two main tendencies. On the one hand, a number of non-critical studies have exaggerated new social movements' capacity to create a new society. Without ignoring the innovative elements of these social movements, it is important to be aware of their limitations.[4] Many works have failed to analyze the political efficacy of the movements and other considerations in the political struggle. It is easy to imagine a scenario in which democratically oriented social movements are expanding, but in which the political system as a whole is moving in a more authoritarian direction. Ultimately, the change in political regime affects the social movements more strongly (by repressing them, for example), than the social movements affect the state. On the other hand, some critical studies have emerged which emphasized the movements' limits, but which understate the extent to which they are important elements in the transition to democracy or can help create a more democratic political culture. These more critical studies have made interesting contributions, but in neglecting political values and political culture and in focusing exclusively on empirical questions, they have understated the potential of the social movements.[5]

Finally, we also draw upon the current discussions about transition to democracy in Latin America — and hope to add to this discussion. Most of the discussion about the transition has focused on political blocks and alliances; it is equally important to think about political values, for although democracy may be possible for a short term in an authoritarian political culture, the consolidation of a stable democratic regime probably requires a transformation of political values. Furthermore, discussions about the transitions to democracy have focused on four blocks (right authoritarians, left authoritarians,

4. Many of the ideologues of the different social movements have been excessively optimistic, as were several European authors who influenced the Latin American discussion; see especially Manuel Castells, *Movimientos sociales urbanos* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1974); Manuel Castells, *Cidade, Democracia e Socialismo* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1980); Jordi Borja, *Movimento sociales urbanos* (Buenos Aires: Siap, 1975); and Jean Lojkine, *Le Marxisme, l'Etat et la Question Urbaine* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970) Among the best works which are optimistic about the movements yet are aware of some limitations are José Álvaro Moisés, "Classes Populares e Protesto Urbano" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of São Paulo, 1978); José Álvaro Moisés, "Experiência de Mobilizacão Popular em São Paulo," *Contraponto* III, No. 3 (1978), pp. 69-86; Paul Singer, "Movimentos de Barrios" and "Movimentos Sociais em São Paulo: Traços Comuns e Perspectivas," both in Paul Singer and Vinicius Caldeira Brant, eds., *São Paulo: O Povo em Movimento* (Petrópolis: Vozes/CEBRAP, 1980), pp. 83-108, pp. 207-230.

5. Among the most important critical studies are Luiz Antonio Machado da Silva and Alícia Ziccardi, "Notas para uma Discussão sobre Movimentos Sociais Urbanos," *Cadernos do Centro de Estudos Rurais e Urbanos* 13, first series (1980), pp. 79-95; Renato Boschi, "Movimentos Sociais e a Institucionalização de uma Ordem," (IUPERJ, July 1983); Renato Boschi, ed., *Movimentos Coletivos no Brasil Urbano* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1983); Ruth Cardoso, "Movimentos Sociais Urbanos: Balanço Crítico," in Sebastião Velasco e Cruz, *et. al., Sociedade e Política no Brasil Pós-64* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1983), pp. 215-239; Vanilda Paiva, "Anotações para um Estudo sobre Populismo Católico e Educação Popular," Kellogg Institute Working Paper No. 4 (December 1983); Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Regime Político e Mudança Social," *Revista de Cultura e Política* 3 (November 1980/January 1981), pp. 7-25.

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semi-democrats and liberal democrats) to the exclusion of radical democrats. The discussion has thereby excluded analysis of the new social movements and has subsumed the radicals in either the liberal or the left authoritarian categories.[6] A minimalist conception of the transition, focusing on institutional questions and the strengthening of the liberal democrats, has prevailed. This minimalist perspective may safeguard democracy, but it also tends to overlook important questions posed by the radical democrats related to the normative content of the kind of democracy which is emerging. The radical democrats are committed to working for forms of democracy which differ markedly from liberal democracy: more participatory, less statist, and more concerned with the popular classes. To the extent that the radical democrats affect the transition, new questions will emerge, new answers will be given to some problems, and a new political culture may develop.

The Semi-Democratic Political Culture in Argentina and Brazil

Democracy is a relatively uncommon form of political regime in the world, and both Argentina and Brazil have had difficulty in creating stable, democratic regimes. Both countries have experienced only occasional and unstable periods of democratic rule in the twentieth century. Since 1930, Brazil has enjoyed only 18 years of democratic rule, 1946 to 1964. Argentina has had an even higher propensity towards authoritarian regimes. No government which was democratically elected in open elections finished its mandate, except that of Juan Peron (1946-1952), who became one of the few examples of an authoritarian ruler who was elected in competitive democratic elections.

One of the consequences and causes of the absence of democratic political regimes has been the formation of a semi-democratic political culture. In both societies, important sectors of the population have manifested an indifference to institutional pluralism and have sought short term benefits (material or political) even at the expense of subverting a democratic order. Authoritarianism has not only been a characteristic of political life, but has also marked many elements of social relations.

While both countries have some similarity in their difficulty in establishing democratic political regimes and in the authoritarian political culture, there are marked differences in the way the political culture is authoritarian. Brazilian authoritarianism has been characterized by a high degree of elitism and considerable consensus. The affirmation of social difference and hierarchy has led to a marginalization of the popular sectors from all major institutions — political, religious, social, economic. The dominant ideology legitimates

6. A major forthcoming contribution is Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe and Latin America.* See also Guillermo O'Donnell, "Notas para el estudio de procesos de democratización política a partir del estado burocrático-autoritario," *Estudios CEDES* II, No. 5 (1979); Guillermo O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy," in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 285-318; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Autoritarismo e Democratização* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1975); Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, *Poder e Política: Crôdo Autoritarismo Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitá1978); and Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* II (April 1970), pp. 337-363.

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and even demands this popular marginalization and subordination, as well as sharp inequalities in the socio-economic plane (or sphere).[7] The elitist, authoritarian, and hierarchical character of social life has cut across various forms of relations. Relations outside the home have been so elitist and authoritarian that a leading Brazilian anthropologist has argued that the expression "Você sabe com quem está falando" (Do you know whom you are speaking to?), widely used to establish social differentiation and hierarchy, captures the essence of Brazilian social life.[8]

Argentina's history of social and political authoritarianism differs in significant regards. By 1930, Argentina had one of the highest standards of living in the world, a lengthy tradition of constitutionalism, and a significant degree of social egalitarianism. In terms of political presence of the popular sectors — especially the working class — Argentina is the opposite of Brazil. There is a much stronger history of populist mobilization of the masses as part of intra-elite struggles and also a stronger history of autonomous popular mobilization and organization. Where the poor Brazilian accepts the social differention implied by "Você sabe com quem está falando," the Argentine is known for insolent rejections of similar attempts at creating social hierarchy: "A mi que mierda me importa" (What the hell do I care who you are).[9] Because of the dominant ideology established through the educational system and the legal framework, Argentina formed a unified conception of citizenship, more similar to the North American and European pattern of citizenship than to the Brazilian.[10]

Corresponding to these differences in social relations and culture are equally marked differences in political patterns in the two countries. The Brazilian political system has always been elitist, and the elites have manifested an exceptional capacity to expand the system when necessary, while always maintaining its basically closed nature. Elites established basic rules of the game, limited attempts to change society, and coopted new sectors as part of the system. The only moment when this pattern seemed threatened was 1963-1964, when the elites and military responded with a coup. This well established elitist pattern has allowed considerable political stability.

In Argentina, the political struggle has been less elitist than in Brazil. Since 1930, the political system has been characterized by a high level of factionalism, i.e., the tendency to privilege short term self-interest at the expense of long term social concerns, including institutional questions like democ-

7. On these general patterns in Brazilian political culture, see Raimundo Faoro, *Os Donos do Poder* (Porto Alegre: Globo, 1958). On the weakness of liberal institutions, see Wandeley Guilherme Dos Santos, *Ordem Burguesa e Liberalismo Político* (São Paulo: Duas Cidades, 1978).

8. Roberto Da Matta, *Carnavais, Malandros e Heroís: Para uma Sociologia do Dilema Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1979).

9. See Guillermo O'Donnell's excellent article, "A mí que me importa: Notas sobre sociabilidad y politica en Argentina y Brasil," Kellogg Institute Working Paper #9 (January 1984).

10. Among the classic studies on the question of citizenship are T.H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Garden City: Doubleday-Anchor, 1965); and Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Cisizenship* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1969). Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos has written a fundamental book about "regulated citizenship" in Brazil. See *Cidadania e Justiça: A Política Social na Ordem Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1979).

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racy. Both the intermittent attempts to create a more elitist system (1930-1943, 1966-1973, 1976-1983) and other endeavors to more fully include and incorporate the masses (1943-1955, 1963-1966, 1973-1976) have failed. Traditional sectors have destabilized the political system in their attempts to exclude, while those who have favored a more open political order have also failed, partially because of sharp divisions (Peronists vs. Radicals) about how to establish rules for a democratic system.

One of the peculiarities of Argentine politics is the high level of polarization which occurred during the Perón presidency (1946-1955), and which continued to characterize the political system during subsequent decades. This polarization exists in a society in which until the late 1960s there were no major demands for radical socio-economic change. Different parties, social classes, and interest groups formed alliances with sectors of the military and supported coups as a way of defending their immediate interests. The militarization of politics produced much higher levels of political violence than in Brazil, especially from the early 1970s until 1983.[11]

Despite marked differences, the military regimes in both countries (Brazil, 1964-present; Argentina, 1976-1983) attempted to reshape the political culture in a more authoritarian direction. The Brazilian regime consciously encouraged political demobilization and passivity, and was quite successful in attaining this objective over a substantial period of time. It reinforced authority patterns in a wide range of social relations, including the educational system. The repression against popular movements had the effect of encouraging fear of challenging the owners' authority. The military government also attempted to partially change political identities. This effort was especially clear — and successful — in the attempt to restructure the party system. The party system which emerged after 1980 had little resemblance to that which existed prior to 1964.[12]

The Argentine regime was far more radical in its attempts to change the previous political culture. The level of terror helped reinforce extremely hierarchical authority relations, from the elementary school system to the universities, from the work place to the jails. The most extreme example of hierarchical authority relations occurred in the concentration camps; no relation

11. A number of studies deal with the general characteristics of the Argentine political system in recent decades. See Guillermo O'Donnell, *El estado burocrático-autoritario, 1966-1973: Triunfos, derrotas, crisis* (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Belgrano, 1982); Alain Rouquié, *Poder militar y sociedad política en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Emece, 1981); Eduardo Viola, "Autoritarismo e Democracia na Argentina Contemporânea," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of São Paulo, 1982); Marcelo Cavarozzi, *Autoritarismo e Democracia, 1955-1983* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor, 1983); Gary Wynia, *Argentina in the Postwar Era* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978); Guillermo O'Donnell, "Democracia en la Argentina: micro y macro," Kellogg Institute Working Paper #2 (December 1983).

12. The most important works on the military regime include Maria Helena Moreira Alves, "The Formation of the National Security State: The State and the Opposition in Military Brazil" (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982); Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Politics, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Peter Flynn *Brazil: A Political Analysis* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978); Cardoso, *Autoritarismo e Democratização;* Bolivar Lamounier, ed., *Voto de Desconfiança; Eleições e Mudança Política no Brazil* (Petrópolis: Vozes/CEBRAP, 1980).

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could be more unequal than that between torturer and prisoner. However extreme this example is, the social psychology of imposing absolute obedience to authority was pervasive. All forms of "non-conforming" behavior were subject to punishment: homosexuality, long hair for males, beards and mustaches, pants for women, unmarried men and women living together. The regime wanted to implant a more nationalist, militarist political culture, based on values of machism, female subordination, heroism, and patriotism. It attempted to destroy the most important previous political identities, especially aiming at unions and political parties. Like the Brazilian regime, but in more extreme and self-conscious ways, it attempted to destroy knowledge and concern about democracy.[13]

One of the dilemmas the transition to democracy poses is how to transform a semi-democratic political culture. While the military regimes collapsed (Argentina) or initiated a gradual transfer of power (Brazil), the values which made possible support for authoritaian rule have not disappeared overnight. Indeed, one could easily surmise that the advent of long term authoritarian rule could reinforce authoritarian aspects of political culture.[14]

At the same time, a central theme throughout this paper is that the new social movements may help challenge and counteract authoritarian tendencies in political values and behavior. Because the nature and cause of authoritarianism differs between Brazil and Argentine, the challenges to new social movements in creating a democratic order are somewhat different. In Brazil, the primary challenge in creating a more democratic order is eroding the social elitism, while in Argentina it is overcoming social-political factionalism. Significantly, the movements which have assumed the greatest importance in the respective countries, the human rights organizations in Argentina and the ecclesial base communities in Brazil, have addressed exactly those issues.

Five New Social Movements

The ecclesial base communities of the Catholic Church, found in many

13. At least 10,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands emigrated or went into exile. The arbitrarity character of repression was comparable to Russia (1929-38) and Germany (1933-45). Important components of the logic of total power (Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*) were present, especially from 1976 to 1978. On this question, see Juan Corradi, "The Mode of Destruction: Terror in Argentina," *Telos* 54 (Winter 1982-83), pp. 61-76. A few works have been published about the 1976-83 military regime in Argentina. Among the most important are Eduardo Duhalde, *El Estado Terrorista Argentino* (Buenos Aires, 1983); Guillermo O'Donnell, "Argentina: La cosecha del miedo" in *Alternativas* 1 (1983); Oscar Landi "Conjeturas Políticas sobre la Argentina post-Malvinas," *Revista Mexicana do Sociologia* 44 (1982); Alain Rouquié, ed., *Argentina hoy* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1982); Peter Waldmann and Ernesto Garzón Valdéz, eds., *El poder militar en la Argentina, 1976-1981* (Buenos Aires: Galerna, 1983).

14. While little work has been done on the impact of authoritarian rule on political culture in South America, some evidence suggests that long term authoritarian rule did effect political culture in southern Europe. For example, José Maravall argues that four decades of authoritarian rule in Spain bred political passivity and apathy. See *The Transition to Democracy in Spain* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), pp. 75-117. In a similar way, R.D. Putman, emphasizes the long term impact of Fascism on Italian political culture, including the level of political tolerance and trust, in *The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 84.

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Latin American countries but strongest in Brazil, first emerged in the early 1960s in response to the Church's attempt to create more effective linkages to the popular classes. During the early 1960s, particularly in rural areas, progressive priests who could not say Mass every Sunday began to encourage their parishoners to meet for a religious service in community groups of approximately twenty people. These religious services came to focus on Bible reading and reflections on local social reality. The Second General Assembly of the Latin American Bishops Conference, held in Medellín, Colombia, in 1968, affirmed that the base communities were one of the most promising innovations in the Latin American Church. They became known for pedagogical approaches which emphasized participation, egalitarian ideals, and community. During the most repressive period of the Brazilian military regime (1968-1974), they were virtually the only popular organizations which developed critical political perspectives. Of the movements under consideration here, the base communities are the numerically most widespread; by the early 1980s, some people estimated that there were 80,000 communities involving 2 million people. The base communities have helped transform Brazilian Catholicism, which is by far the society's predominant religion. The communities are very heterogenous according to regions, local reality, and the local Church. Even though the great majority of participants have a relatively rudimentary political consciousness, the base communities have played a major role in Brazilian politics. They have also become the center of the controversy regarding the political role of the Latin American Church.[15]

Of the Brazilian movements, the base communities have had the most national impact and received the most international attention. In a society which has traditionally marginalized the popular sectors, base communities represent a new space in terms of democratic, participatory practices. They were initially part of the Church's efforts at creating community and at encouraging lay responsibility. Only when the political repression became more significant (1968-1974), closing other channels of popular mobilization, did the base communities begin to take on political significance.

Neighborhood associations are nothing new in Brazilian history; some associations date back to the 1940s.[16] Nevertheless, since around 1974 some

15. On the base communites see Scott Mainwaring, *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming). See also Thomas Bruneau, "Basic Christian Communities in Latin America: Their Nature and Significance (Especially in Brazil)," in Daniel Levine, ed., *Churches and Politics in Latin America* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 111-134; Frei Betto, *O que É. Comunidade Eclesial de Base* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1981); Clodovis Boff, *Comunidade Eclesial, Comunidade Política* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1979); Affonso Felippe Gregory and Maria Ghisleni, *Chances e. Desafios das Comunidades Eclesiais de Base* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1979); Segio Torres and John Eagleson, eds., *The Challenge of Basic Christian Communities* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1981).

16. Among the most important works on neighborhood associations are Moises, "Experiência de Mobilização Popular em São Paulo," *op. cit.* Singer, "Movimentos de Bairros," *op. cit.*; Boschi, ed., *Movimentos Coletivos no Brasil Urbano;* R. Cardoso, "Movimentos Sociais Urbanos," *op. cit.*; Anna Luiza Souto, "Movimentos Populares Urbanos e suas Formas de Organização Ligadas à Igreja," mimeo, October 1979.

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of these associations have changed enough that they share some values of the new social movements. In general terms, the contemporary neighborhood associations maintain a higher degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the state and traditional clientelistic relations, and they emphasize community and human relations more than in the past. There are significant differences between middle and popular class neighborhood associations. The latter frequently sprung from the ecclesial base communities and have been oriented towards basic urban services such as sewers, electricity, transportation, health posts, and schools. The more innovative middle calss associations have been interested in breaking down traditional communication barriers, encouraging new patterns of communication, and developing an ecological consciousness.

The neighborhood associations are the furthest from the ideal type of a new social movement. Again, however, there is a great deal of internal heterogenity. A limited number of middle class associations have been oriented towards developing a sense of neighborhood and towards the affective dimensions of life, with little concern about obtaining material goods from the state. Associations whose primary purpose is to extract resources from the state are close to the paradigmatic old movements.

The women's movement in Brazil has a long history, but it received a new specifically feminist infusion during the mid 1970s. The first leaders of the movement were university educated women who, in many cases, had lived abroad and brought a foreign influence to the movement. After an initial period of relatively few and small collectives, concentrated in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the movement began to expand and to produce some journals with restricted circulation yet significant influence. During the late 1970s, the movement grew to all of the major cities. Despite the fact that the movement has had trouble reaching broad sectors of the population, it helped create more democratic relations within the left and within most intellectual circles.[17] Where the ecclesial base communities and neighborhood associations have derived part of their influence through the number of participants, the feminist movement has influenced Brazilian social and political life through elite means such as political parties, the mass media, and cultural associations. Like the other movements, the feminist movement is internally heterogenous, with some elements closer to our liberal democratic and others to our radical democratic ideal type.

Since the late 1970s, one of the major concerns of the feminist movement has been to strengthen linkages with the popular classes. Middle class feminists recognized that in a society of great poverty, their concerns could not be

17. The first journals, *Brasil Mulher* (Londrina) and *Nós Mulheres* (São Paulo) were published in the second half of the seventies. In 1981 *Mulherio* (São Paulo) started to be published bimonthly, responding to high intellectual standards. Among the most important works about feminism and politics in Brazil are Marianne Schmink, "Women in Brazilian Abertura Politics" *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* (Autumn 1981); Eva Blay "A Participação das Mulheres na Redemocratização; Aspectos das Eleições de 1982" (ANPOCS Congress, São Paulo, 1983); Sílvia Pimentel, "A Mulher e as Eleições de 1982" (ANPOCS Congress, 1983); Paul Singer, "O Feminino e o Feminismo," in Singer and Brant, eds., *São Paulo: O Povo em Movimento,* 109-142.

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translated directly into the popular class world. At the same time, they believed that their questioning of male dominance had relevance for popular class women. The attempt to develop linkages with the popular sectors ran into many difficulties. There were profound cultural barriers to communication, and in some cases popular women rejected feminist ideas, especially those linked to the family. Despite these points of tensions, however, there *has* been some communication between feminists and popular class women. Women from the middle class and popular classes have worked together at congresses, and through feminist television shows, the intellectual women were able to penetrate the popular class world.

Ecological associations have had some impact in both countries despite the relatively small number of participants. In Brazil, the movement began in the early 1970s with the emergence of middle class rural communities committed to simple, healthy life styles. A majority of the participants were young people frustrated with the low quality of life in urban areas and with the political repression of means of expression. The associations wanted to create new linkages to nature, and while some were relatively traditional in terms of human relations, others broke from the dominant Brazilian norm. Towards the end of the '70s, in urban areas the ecological movement grew, and by the early 1980s some national level associations and journals emerged. The movement's major concerns have been to question the devastation of the natural environment produced by the industrialization process and to introduce discussion of post-materialistic values. The movement has a limited number of people and thus far has had limited impact on public policy.[18] In a society where basic survival issues remain central for major parts of the population, ecological questions have a tendency to remain subordinate. Nevertheless, the movement has put new questions on the agenda, and given the international character of the ecological movement and the severe pollution problems in Brazil, its chances for growth are good.[19]

In Argentina, ecological associations emerged during the military regime. The movement focused on questions of health and life style and was "apolitical" because of the severe repression. The collapse of the authoritarian regime permitted the rapid politicization and growth of the movement, which was

18. The most significant exception was the ecology movement's ability to transform the question of the vast deforestation of the Amazon into a national level political debate. On this question, see Roberto Santos, "Para Deter a Calamidade ou uma Alternativa ao Projeto Oficial sobre a Floresta Amazônica," in *Encontros com a Civilização Brasileira* 23 (May 1980), pp. 65-86; and Pandolfo Clara, *A Floresta Amazônica Brasileira: Enfoque Econômico-Ecológico* (Belem: SUDAM, 1978). For an excellent article by one of Brazil's outstanding intellectuals and leaders of the largest opposition party on the linkages between the environmental issue and different models of development, see Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Perspectivas de Desenvolvimento e Meio Ambiente: O Caso do Brasil," *Encontros com a Civilização Brasileira* 20 (February 1980), pp. 31-70.

19. The journal *Pensamento Ecológico* came out in 1979 (São Paulo) and had published 20 issues by the end of 1983. It represents the more innovative wing of the movement. *Comunidade,* which represents a more traditional part of the movement, was first published in 1981. By the middle of 1982 the group "Desobedeça," inspired by the European ecological parties (mainly the Italian Radical Party) became established within the Workers Party in São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Rio de Janeiro. In the November 1982 elections, Desobedeça elected one representative in the state House of Rio de Janeiro.

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planning to discuss the creation of a Green Party at the first national conference of ecological associations in August 1984.[20]

The ecological movement in both countries must be differentiated from the environmental movement, which has focused on more specific concerns related to the preservation or protection of the environment, such as pollution, protection of forests, or land conservation. The ecological movement shares these concerns about the natural environment, but also proposes and practices alternative forms of social organization. The ecology movement has generally raised questions about forms of human interaction, relation to one's work, and other questions about life style.

Although the ecology movement has been strongly influenced by the interantional ecology movement, there are also some differences. The movement in Brazil and Argentina faces the dilemmas produced by attempting to deal with ecological concerns in societies which still have significant levels of poverty. This raises questions about the linkages to the popular classes and their need to *increase* rather than diminish consumption levels.

The human rights organizations have been the most significant of Argentina's new social movements. Like the feminist and ecological movements, the Argentine organizations for the defense of human rights involved a relatively small number of middle class individuals. They appeared in direct response to the state terrorism of the post-76 military regime, specifically the widespread practice of illegal kidnappings and long term disappearances of individuals, who were usually held in concentration camps, tortured, and killed. The best known movement was the "Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo," a movement of mothers of disappeared victims who appeared every Thursday in front of the government house to protest terrorism. These movements were isolated for several years, and the discussion of human rights did not become widespread until after the Malvinas-Falklands debacle. In fact, for several years they had a stronger impact internationally than in Argentina. With the collapse of the military regime, these organizations encouraged a national political debate about state terrorism, human rights, and the disappeared victims.

The human rights movement was both a direct product of the nature of the regime and also the most important attempt to challenge and limit the regime at its core — the terror. The novelty of the movement was the absolute, nonnegotiable character of its major demand — protection for human rights, especially the right to live. This demand entered into contradiction with a state predicated upon determining who was allowed to live. Without international support for the human rights organizations, the Argentine state could have — and probably would have — destroyed the human rights organizations. Thus the limits to state terror were set in part by the international community to which the regime itself aspired to become a more central part. The military

20. The journal *Mutantia*, expressing the viewpoint of ecological groups, appeared in 1980 (Buenos Aires). By the end of 1983, 17 issues had been published, and the journal began to promote discussion about the creation of a Green Party.

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regime was successful at destroying most of its targets, including the "subversives" (in the regime's all encompassing definition) and the political parties, but in doing so it created a new kind of challenge and enemy. The human rights organizations became the non-negotiable memory and conscience of a claim to the right to life which the state attempted to destroy. Whereas other social movements did not attempt to frontally challenge the authoritarian regimes, the *raison d'être* of the human rights organizations was to oppose the logic of state terror. Other social movements did not constitute an immediate, direct threat to the regimes, even though in Argentina the definition of "subversive" was so wide as to include any social movement. Consequently, the human rights movement immediately entered the macro-social debate about the nature of the political regime. Thus, a movement with relatively few participants had a significant international impact and became the major challenge to a regime with an immense capacity to control civil society.[21]

The differences between the base communities, the most significant new social movement in Brazil, and the human rights movement, the most important in Argentina, are noteworthy. Whereas the human rights organizations involved limited numbers of mostly well educated people, the base communities are a mass movement drawn from the popular classes. The human rights movements challenged state terror, while the base communities challenged primarily the elitism and authoritarianism of Brazilian social relations and only secondarily the authoritarian political regime. In contrast to the Argentine human rights organizations, the base communities only indirectly and after a period of time began to challenge the authoritarian regime. Thus, the reasons why the base communities became important differed markedly from the Argentine case; they challenged social elitism in Brazil and became a major influence in the international Catholic Church.

Although all of these movements have some common characteristics, there are also marked differences. It is important to differentiate the movements according to their public policy impact (significant vs. weak), their social base (popular class or middle sectors), the number of participants, and the country where they are strongest.[22]

One further differentiation is essential. All of the movements have some leaders who can discuss the global nature and goals of the movements and can articulate a sophisticated vision of society and social transformation, including an awareness of the movement's importance in the contemporary Western world. By contrast, most of the grass roots participants are committed to specific, short term, or more local or immediate objectives, but lack a sophisticated political vision. Grass roots people may reject traditional poli-

21. In 1983 the Peace and Justice Service began publishing the journal *Paz y Justicia*.

22. Some analyses of social movements, including the influential formulations by Castells, failed to differentiate them sufficiently. For example, middle class and popular class movements were considered in the same category. For criticisms which insist on differentiating movements according to class, see Machado and Ziccardi, "Notas para uma Discussão," and Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form," *Political Power and Social Theory* 1 (1980), pp. 67-115.

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tics so much that they avoid political participation. The difference between the leadership and the grass roots participants is sharpest in the ecclesial base communities, where some of the advisors are among Brazil's most sophisticated intellectuals. Most grass roots participants have relatively rudimentary visions of society, are not very aware of the movement as a whole, and do not understand mechanisms of political power. The feminist movement is the most homogenous of the five movements; almost all of the participants are well educated and have an awareness not only of immediate concerns, but also of the overall process of social change.

Conditions of Emergence of the Movements

The new social movements have emerged relatively recently, since 1964 in Brazil and since 1976 in Argentina. Their emergence and development is linked to the failures of three of the previously discussed domestic political cultures — left authoritarianism, right authoritarianism, and populism — as well as to the stimulus provided by an international radical political culture. Despite the differences between the movements, four common conditions help explain their emergence and values; the adverse political consequences of the military regimes under which they emerged, the crisis of the traditional left, the questioning of the populist style of politics which preceded the military regimes, and the development of new social movements in the North, especially Western Europe and the United States.

In both Brazil and Argentina, in sharp contrast to the Eruopean cases, the new social movements emerged under an authoritarian regime. Despite the marked differences between the Brazilian and Argentine regimes, in both countries the authoritarian experience was a major factor in the emergence and organization of the new social movements. Both regimes produced a rupture in political life by limiting the available channels of political expression and dissent. Under the authoritarian regimes, traditional political institutions were suppressed or greatly limited. During the most repressive phases, both regimes severely limited popular mobilization, freedom of the press, and all forms of political opposition. In Argentina, political parties were legally suspended and in practice prohibited, and in Brazil the only two parties which were allowed to exist were both created by the regime. Because of the restrictions placed on politics in societies which had a history of political mobilization, there was a sense of impoverishing not only political life, but also social life in general. This feeling was especially acute in Argentina because of the severe repression against any forms of unusual behavior. In combination with the impossibility of doing politics in a traditional way, which encouraged new forms of sociability, the impoverishment of social existence stimulated thinking about different dimensions of social life (community, relations between men and women, etc.) which became central concerns of the new social movements.

The new movements responded to the dual closing of political and social space by attempting to find forms of protection against the authoritarian abuses and new forms of sociability. They contained both a defensive side in

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the response to the authoritarian regimes, most clearly expressed in the human rights organizations in Argentina, and an attempt to find new dimensions of social life. They tried to recover some of the space "lost" because of the closing of civil society, yet they also tried to create some new spaces. In this sense, the suppression of some traditional rights produced a redefinition and expansion of the understanding of rights. Thus, whereas in Western Europe and the United States the new social movements attempted to conquer new rights in a democratic expansion, in Brazil and Argentina they attempted to check the power of authoritarian regimes and discover new forms of sociability which would not be repressed by the state. In advanced Western societies, the new social movements attempted to expand a basically accepted and institutionalized set of rights. In Brazil and Argentina, they have attempted to reconquer rights which traditionally existed and to fight for new rights.

A second major element which helps explain the emergence of new social movements in both countries was the crisis of the traditional left under the military regimes.[23] Parts of the left in both societies had an impeccable democratic heritage, but especially under the military regimes, the Leninist left predominated, with its elitist, authoritarian, and often militaristic profile. The failures of the traditional left forced progressive sectors of the two societies to re-examine both the viability and the desirability of Leninist revolution as a path to social change. The left's dismal military defeat and failure to develop popular support led to a profound re-evaluation of methods of doing politics. Violence had not only failed to overthrow the capitalist order and generate popular support, it had also led to the destruction of the left. Along with the re-evaluation of methods of effecting social change came a critical reconsideration of the problems of revolutionary societies. As the newly emerging radical democrats reflected on the kind of society which was possible and desirable, they became more critical of the repressive, technocratic, and elitist elements of Leninist revolution. This tendency was reinforced by the international questioning of Marxism and Communism. The Western European left became increasingly critical of Marxism, and the Eastern European efforts to resist Communist domination called attention to adverse effects of Marxist-Leninist systems. The traditional left revolutionary paradigm was rejected as unviable and undesirable, while the traditional liberal paradigm was not sufficient. The paradigm which emerged, democratic

23. On the evolution of various factions of the Brazilian left, see among others Denis Moraes and Francisco Viana, eds., *Prestes: Lutas e Autocríticas* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1982); Moisés Vinhas, *O Partidão* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1982); Wladimir Pomar, *Araguaia: O Partido e a Guerrilha* (São Pualo: Brasil Debates, 1980); Leandro Konder, *A Democracia e os Comunistas no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1980); Artur José Poerner, *O Poder Jovem: História da Participação Política dos Estudantes Brasileiros* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilizaçao Brasileira, 1979); Herbet José de Sóuza, "Betinho," in Pedro Celso Uchoa Cavalcanti and Jovelino Ramos, eds., *Memórias do Exílio: Brasil 1964/19??* (São Paulo: Livramento, 1978); Alfredo Sirkis, *Os Carbonários: Memórias da Guerrilha Perdida* (São Paulo: Global, 1980). Among the most imporatnt sources dealing with the evolution of the Argentine left in the seventies are Viola, "Democracia e Autoritarismo na Argentina Contemporânea" *op. cit.*; Richard Gillespie, *Soldiers of Peron: Argentina's Montoneros* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); Peter Waldmann, "Anomía social y violencia," in Rouquié, ed., *Argentina, hoy, op. cit.*, pp. 206-248.

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revolution, responded to the new commitment to transforming social life and the political order in non-violent ways. Influenced by these changes in Europe, in Brazil and Argentina, parts of the left remained traditional or became semi-democratic leftists; others converted to liberalism or became apolitical; and many became radical democrats.[24]

A third factor which helps explain the emergence and orientation of the new movements was the failure of populist style politics in both countries. In both countries, though to varying extents, the new social movements have responded to a tradition of populism. Populism, as used here, refers to a heteronomous mobilization of the popular classes. This mobilization is controlled and limited by charismatic leaders who use popular support for their own political ends. While populism rejects traditional authoritarianism and purports to respond to popular demands, it reflects and perpetuates the social elitism and the huge gaps between the popular classes and elites.[25]

The crisis and collapse of the populist regimes led to new perspectives on both the right and the left. On the right, more explicitly authoritarian ideologies and practices became predominant, and for much of the left, the failure of populism initially led to a growing radicalization. However, other sectors of the left — those identified with the new social movements — responded differently to the failures of populism, developing the values of radical democrats. Especially in Brazil, where it has resurged with remarkable resiliency, authoritarian populism is one of the major targets of the new social movements.

The fourth major factor which helps account for the emergence of the new social movements is the development of similar movements in the United States and Europe. The new social movements of Brazil and Argentina are part of a world wide phenomenon and have been influenced by movements in the Northern countries. In the United States and Europe, the student, feminist, minorities, anti-nuclear, and ecology movements, have been among the most important. These new social movements in the North influenced the emergence and development of movements in the South. This influence was especially clear in the feminist and ecology movements because many activists in the South had been exiles in the North. The new social movements of Brazil and Argentina have strong international networks, but in contrast to Marxist internationalism, these networks reject strong centralized, hierarchical organizations and emphasize coordination and sharing of experiences among equal local units. The leaders of the movements have international profiles, travel a lot, and have influenced movements in the North. The Northern movements generally have a global perspective and have been con-

24. The reappraisal of political democracy in Brazil is discussed in Bolivar Lamounier, "Representação Politica: A Importância de Certos Formalismos," in Bolivar Lamounier, Francisco Weffort, and Maria Victoria Benevides, eds., *Direito, Cidadania Participação* (São Paulo: Tao, 1981) pp. 232-257. Among the most important works by well known members of the left on the question of democracy are Carlos Nelson Coutinho, *A Democracia como Valor Universal* (São Paulo: Ciências Humanas, 1980); and Konder, *A Democracia e os Comunists no Brazil.*

25. On the populist tradition see Francisco Weffort, *O Populismo na Política Brasileira* (Rio: Paz e Terre, 1978); and Ernesto Laclau, *Populism and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (London: NLB, 1977).

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cerned with developing solidarity with the South, while the Southern leaders have been concerned with encouraging the North to become more involved in South/North questions. There has also been a reciprocal influence in thinking about the meaning of life and about new paths to social transformation. The reciprocal influence is stronger in countries like Brazil and Argentina because of their close linkages to Northern Occidental culture.

In the case of the base communities, the nature of international linkage was especially important but differs markedly from the linkages of the other movements. The emergence of the base communities was linked to the international transformation of the Catholic Church without the development of new theological conceptions which emphasized the connections between faith and social justice and which encouraged greater lay participation, the CEBs would have been unthinkable. At the same time, however, it is important to note that the international character of the Catholic Church does not result in similar pastoral initiatives in all countries. In fact, the Brazilian and Argentine Churches have evolved in very different ways. While in Brazil the Church has produced some of the most important movements working for change, in Argentina it produced one of the most significant pillars of support for the military.

Despite the fact that the social movements form an international network, there are differences between the most important movements in Brazil and Argentina and those in the United States and Europe. These differences reflect the cultural, economic, and political situations of the respective countries. In Argentina and especially Brazil, poverty and social inequality remain salient issues for large sectors of the population. Both countries are characterized by authoritarian social and political traditions which are much weaker in Western Europe and the United States.

These differences in situations have generated different kinds of movements. Especially in Europe, the new social movements consider themselves part of a "post-materialistic" culture. Post-materialism involves several dimensions, including anti-consumption values, simple life styles, ecological concerns, and new forms of human relations. The social movements of Brazil and Argentina share similar perspectives about human relations but differ on the issue of reducing consumption. The ecolgical movement has addressed the question of excessive consumption and simplified life styles as a central issue in much the same fashion as in the United States and Europe. To a lesser extent, the feminist movement and human rights organizations have also demonstrated some concern with post-materialistic values. In the base communities and popular neighborhood associations, however, the basic issue is the opposite: how to consume enough to be able to survive. Even the leaders of these movements have not addressed the issue of post-materialist values, although they are generally critical of the consumption patterns of advanced industrial societies. Conversely, social movements of Brazil and Argentina have been more concerned with basic civil liberties and socio-economic equality than movements in the Northern countries. While in the Northern

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movements the nuclear issue has become a major focal point, raising the question of global survival, in the South the issue of immediate survival continues to have priority, and the debate about nuclear energy and armaments has not gone as far.

Values of the New Social Movements

It is important to note that the various movements have placed primary emphasis on different values. Some of the values are stronger in Brazil, others in Argentina; some are stronger among popular class movements and others among middle class movements. At times, there have been conflicts between different movements; for example, the base communities and the feminist movement have clashed over the issues of abortion and divorce. Feminists are frequently critical of the traditional values most base community women share regarding the family, divorce, and abortion. Conversely, many popular class women who participate in neighborhood associations or base communities feel that feminism rasies "middle class" issues relatively unimportant in their lives.

Despite the great heterogeneity between the five movements, they share some important values. Perhaps the outstanding characteristic which links all movements is a strong emphasis on democratic, participatory practices. This emphasis cuts across different levels of social reality, from internal group processes, to local social reality, to political regime. The movements value high levels of participation in internal decision making and seek consensual (as opposed to majority) bases of decisions. They reject elitist, hierarchical modes of relations, value solidarity, prefer personal expression over instrumental relations, and favor cooperation over competitive relationships. In the base communities, this solidarity and cooperation is expressed through the emphasis on respecting different viewpoints and through community work projects. This pattern represents a difference from the prevalent norm among the popular classes since most peasant families were generally isolated, and in urban areas patterns of solidarity coexisted with significant difficulties in establishing ongoing forms of communication and organization.[26] In the ecological movement, the search for cooperative relations has taken the form of communal living arrangements. The movement rejects the prevalent middle class view of time, linked to productivity, and values interpersonal relations. The feminist movement has created collectives and women's groups similar to those in the United States and Europe, which emphasize personal sharing. All of the movements have emphasized the affective dimensions of life.

In contrast to the general pattern of authoritarian leadership, whether expressed through populism, right wing authoritarianism, or left wing vanguardism, the new social movements value equal social relations. They at-

26. The subject of patterns of isolation and solidarity among the popular classes has been addressed by many social scientists, including Anthony Leeds and Elizabeth Leeds, *A Sociologia do Brasil Urbano* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1978); Janice Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Renato Ortiz, *A Consciência Fragmentada* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz a Terra, 1980).

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tempt to develop leadership as *animador* (facilitator) and supercede leadership as *dirigente* (director). The animador stimulates autonomous popular action and mobilization. The logic of the social movement is not pre-established according to the animador's orientation. The animador respects and values the logic of the movement and attempts to establish a relation of mutuality and respect with the members of the movement.[27] By contrast, the dirigente attempts to control the nature of popular mobilization and to orient this mobilization towards his/her objectives. The dirigente believes in expertise and technocracy.

The movement's attitude towards leaders is fraught with a permanent and inevitable tension which can be conceptionalized as the conflict between freedom (autonomously established rules), order (heteronomously established rules), and anarchy (anomie) which confronts any innovative social movements. Progressive social movements seek to reorder social relations in order to maximize freedom in the form of autonomously established rules of the game. But this serach frequently produces a fear of breakdown of social norms leading to anomie. Despite efforts to develop leadership as animador, charismatic leaders provide answers at a time when movements need stability. In the base communities, for example, the attempt to give more responsibility to lay leaders has sometimes led to the creation of "mini-priests," lay leaders who are as domineering as priests traditionally were. And, as Max Weber emphasized, social movements frequently arise because of charismatic leaders, whose authority must then be challenged if the movement is to create the kind of egalitarian social relations they purport to seek.[28]

In all the social movements, the emphasis on participatory democratic relations has led to valuing local reality and community. Small autonomous groups are a major focus of social life. The emphasis on small groups and the local level leads to ambivalent attitudes towards big, centralized bureaucratic organizations. A significant number of people within all the movements reject large scale organizations, sometimes with a high degree of self awareness (as in the ecological communities which made a self-conscious choice to live in rural areas), other times out of unconscious preference (as in the case of most base community participants). Other individuals, who do not go so far in their rejection of large organizations, *prefer* small groups but are aware of the significance of large organizations in contemporary society. Consequently, they opt to work within large organizations (like political parties) in order to transform them.

The emphasis on grass roots democracy has led to new thinking about the

27. The best known articulator of these positions is Paulo Freire. See *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), and *Educação como a Prática da Liberdade* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1980).

28. On the capacity of charismatic leaders to provide stability, see Serge Moscovici, *L'age des Faoules* (Paris: Fayard, 1981). On the tendency for lay leaders to develop domineering qualities, see Eduardo Hoornaert, "Communidaes de Base: Dez Anos de Experiência," *Revista Eclesiastica Brasileira* 38 (1978), pp. 474-502; and Beatriz da Costa, "Para Analisar uma Prática de Educação Popular," *Cadernos de Educação Popular* 1 (1981), 7-48. By Weber, see especially *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Free Press, 1964), 358-392.

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role of local government. In Brazil, the new social movements have inspired some attempts to encourage high levels of grass roots participation and communitarian control in local government.[29] Although Argentina lags behind in this process, progressive parties and groups raised the question of province and municipal autonomy in the 1983 elections.

Alongside the innovative elements in the experiences of local participatory democracy have been some important limitations. First of all is the difficulty of beginning such a process; even at the local level, participatory democracy depends on changing the state so that it supports the innovations and, as we have emphasized, the attitude of the new social movements towards the state (sometimes even at the local level) is ambivalent. Second, these experiences *can* contain elements of traditional populism disguised in a participatory democratic discourse. In fact, the traditional left tends to dismiss local experiences of community participation as a means of diverting attention from the true issues (i.e., political power). Third, even where these experiences have demonstrated significant innovative capacity, they have a limited diffusion in an authoritarian system. Especially in Brazil, where the federal government controls so much, the experiences of participatory local government have had very limited capacity to encourage other similar experiences, notwithstanding the considerable interest they have aroused. Finally, these experiences have been somewhat fragile. In Lages, Santa Catarina, where the best known Brazilian case occurred, the group responsible for the innovations lost the 1982 municipal elections. Middle and upper class opposition, traditional forms of clientelism resurfaced within the PMDB, and the massive support the state government gave to the local PDS helped defeat the previous leaders.

Attitudes towards democracy as political regime have ranged from skepticism or indifference to strong commitment. Some participants of the new social movements are involved exclusively in questions concerning the local community or the group itself, to the point of being "apolitical." By contrast, most leaders have been deeply concerned about the state and political regime. They are aware of the limits of local level democracy and of the importance of democratizing the state in order to further enhance prospects for grass roots democracy. Even the most politically indifferent participants in the movements reject political authoritarianism, though they may not actively engage in efforts to construct democracy or even believe that the macro level of society is important.

In different ways and to varying extents, the movements have emphasized human rights. Under a regime where the right to life was determined by the

29. In Lages, Santa Catarina, the innovative thrust came principally from above, whereas in Boa Esperança, Espírito Santo, and Diadema, São Paulo, new social movements played a key role in generating more innovative local governments. On these experiences, see Márcio Moreira Alves, *A Força do Povo: A Democracia Participativa em Lages* (Rio de Janeiro: Brasiliense, 1980); Herbert José de Souza, "Município de Boa Esperança: Participação Popular e Poder Local," in José Álvaro Moisés, et. al., *Alternativas Populares da Democracia* (Petrópolis: Vozes/CEDEC, 1982), 99-120; Maria Helena Moreira Alves, "Diadema: An Experience of Popular Government within an Authoritarian Context," (XI International Congress of Latin American Studies Association, 1983).

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state, the human rights associations rejected terror of both the right and the left. They were "apolitical" in the sense of understanding their defense of human rights as above politics. They considered this right to life an absolute, not subject to political bargaining, nor to be limited by the state coercion, whether through torture, arbitrary searches, or imprisonment. The base communities have also emphasized the right to life, though from a different perspective, focusing principally on socio-economic needs, protection from the police brutality which has been so common in Brazil, and the right to employment. These rights seem closer to the Marxian emphasis on socio-economic rights, but the base communities differ from the Marxian conception in emphasizing the affective dimensions of life and in perceiving political rights as significant.

Linked to the emphasis on human rights is a rejection of militarism. The military is perceived as responsible for committing authoritarian abuses, leading an unjust society, and perpetuating violence. In most cases, the emergence of these movements was linked to an opposition to the military regimes which ruled and attemted to militarize the respective societies. There is a sharp opposition between military values and the values of the movements.

Although in different and sometimes contradictory ways, all of the movements have questioned macho values. This questioning has gone farthest in the feminist movement, where it is the primary focal point. Most participants in the ecological movement also question traditional male/female relations and emphasize an equal division of labor and equal opportunities between the sexes. While the issue of relations between men and women arises because of a commitment to a different life sytle, in the rejection of dependency on domestic servants, the ecology movement has gone *farther* than the feminist movement. Although the relation between men and women was not a focal point of the human rights organizations, the dominant presence of women has produced reflection about this question. The participants in the human rights movements did not consciously intend to question macho values, but the majority participation of women had an impact on the social psychology of the opposition to state terror. In the ubiquitious threat of repression and death, the women became known for remarkable courage and heroism which dramatically reversed the traditional concepts of courage, linked to violence and macho values rather than affirmation of life and feminine presence.

Women participants in neighborhood associations and base communities are not part of the feminist movement and question many feminist ideas. Nonetheless, popular class women have rejected violence against women and have insisted on the right of women to leave the household in order to participate in the neighborhood association and base community. The leadership role women have played in neighborhood associations and base communities has affirmed their potential in a public arena which was traditionally an exclusively male domain.

While not all of the participants would be able to articulate this fact, the

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movements have embodied values which question the basic meaning of life. They have emphasized community, sociability, friendship, and the affective dimensions of life. In doing so, they have challenged both the conventional liberal and Marxian notions of human needs. The liberal notion focuses mainly on the need for freedom and assumes that through market mechanisms and personal initiative, most individuals resolve the basic questions of their lives. The Marxian notion focuses on socio-economic needs, arguing that the foremost needs in life are material, and that other questions are secondary. The social movements have not *rejected* either of these conceptions; rather, they have incorporated them and attempted to go beyond them by including the affective dimensions of life.

The new social movements also raise important questions about the nature of a good social order. Here again the contrast to conventional liberalism and Marxism is indicative. Liberalism considers the question of the meaning of life an individual matter; the important thing is to ensure that the state does not impinge on individual consciousness. For this reason, a democratic political order which ensures individual freedoms is essential. Within this order, individuals determine and pursue their objectives. Marxist theory subordinates the question of the meaning of life to the emphasis on basic socio-economic needs. Marxist theory generally assumes that a revolution which restructures the socio-economic order will resolve basic questions about the meaning of life. The new social movements are part of a tradition which questions that *any* political order, whether liberal democracy or socialism, resolves basic human needs along the affective dimensions of life.

The more sophisticated leaders of the movements have articulated a vision of radical social transformation which rejects both capitalism and communism. They criticize capitalism because of its failure to resolve basic material needs, its propensity to generate great social inequalities in the Third World, and its tendency to promote an individualistic ethos. Because of their emphasis on individual freedoms and liberties, they also reject communism as a statist, totalitarian system. These leaders are committed to pluralism, and while they do not prescribe any particular forms of socio-economic organization, they frequently favor small property and generally promote cooperatives and participatory forms of management and control. They also criticize the Leninist emphasis on violence as a means of effecting social transformations. At a metaphysical level, the movement leaders believe that non-violence does not imply a rejection of political activism, and many have been leaders in active non-violent movements. In societies where politics was conventionally channeled through legality or through violence, some leaders introduced civil disobedience as a means of expressing dissent.

The theoreticians of the new social movements are critical of imperialism. On this score, there is a continuity with the traditional left. But among the traditional left, anti-imperialism was associated with statism and nationalism, ideologies which the leaders of the new social movements oppose. The movements shift the primary concern from imperialism's economic conse-

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quences to cultural effects of dependency. The movements value indigenous culture. The traditional left focused principally on U.S. imperialism and secondarily on Western European imperalism, and had a relatively uncritical view of real socialism. By contrast, the intellectuals of the new social movements, while sharing a critical view of the United States, are critical of the Soviet Union and generally perceive some positive aspects in Western Europe. The questioning of nationalism is linked to the fact that the movements do not perceive the nation-state as the most important unit of social life.

The rejection of capitalism and communism and the commitment to nonviolent transformation place the leaders of the new social movements within a tradition of "third paths," of which the Catholic Church has historically been the most articulate advocate. However, while significant segments of the Catholic hierarchy traditionally used this discourse in a relatively conservative way, as an anti-Communist ideology, most leaders of the new social movements are committed to radical social transformation. This search for a third path to social transformation places the new social movements of Brazil and Argentina in an international network, some of whose outstanding examples include the Green Party in Western Germany, the Solidarity movement in Poland, the Italian Radical Party, and Scandinavian ecologism.

While the rejection of communism and capitalism is clear, the leaders of the new social movements are less than clear about *how* to promote social change and even about some characteristics of the society they envision. The new movements challenged aspects of authoritarian domination, but their capacity to construct a "new society" is far less clear. In this sense, it is important to note that it is always easier to criticize existing forms of social and political organization than to construct proposals for new forms. Without dismissing the importance of the emphasis on the local level and on grass roots participatory practices, the absence of a proposal about the how to change the state also implies a certain vagueness — and sometimes even paralysis — regarding how to effect political change.

To state that these movements offer new innovations in their way of doing politics does not address the question of how influential these innovations will be in societies traditionally marked by a prevalent semi-democratic political culture. Will the new social movements effectively encourage the transformation of this semi-democratic political culture? Or will they remain isolated romantic movements which reject the prevalent order and have limited impact upon that order? The answers to these questions and the capacity of the movements to affect political culture will depend on their efficacy and on the political struggle as a whole. This then poses the question of the movements' ability to help work towards democratic regimes.

Impact and Limits of the Movements

The social movements have had a clear impact in creating more democratic social relations in societies in which authoritarian practices have predominated. The democratizing impact on social relations is especially signifi-

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cant in Brazil, where the movements have helped erode the elitism which is an essential bulwark of authoritarianism. The human rights organizations in Argentina have helped increase toleration in social relations, thereby potentially contributing to the creation of a more democratic political culture. However, the relation between democratizing social life and creating a more democratic political order in unclear. In this regard, the development of the feminist movement in the United States is instructive. The women's movement has grown during the past decade and has contributed to democratizing social relations, but the political order has become more conservative, with some authoritarian tendencies.

Despite the fact that many movement participants are relatively unconcerned with political parties, the movements have also influenced parties in both countries. In Brazil, the new social movements have helped erode the legitimacy of authoritarian populist discourse. Notwithstanding the continuation of populist practices, even the government party has felt obliged to promote some discourse about egalitarian, democratic values.

The impact of social movements on the parties has varied according to region and party. The movements have been strongest in the states of Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, where they have helped produce a well developed party system with high levels of participation. In Rio Grande do Sul, for example, where the ecology movement is strongest, ecological concerns became an issue among political parties. The movements have had the least impact in poor rural areas, especially in the Northeast.

The political party most influenced by the social movements is the Workers Party, PT, which has a self-perception of embodying a new political culture closely linked to the social movements. The PT was influenced by all four Brazilian movements and has attempted to be responsive to their demands. A large number of PT leaders participated actively in new movements, and the party's platform emphasized the outstanding demands of all the movements. In São Paulo, where it is strongest, the PT has been closely linked to the base communities. A small party, it has nevertheless had a major impact on the debate in Brazil. In a less profound way, other parties have also been influenced by new social movements.

In Argentina, the human rights organizations raised a number of questions which became central in the party debate in 1983 and which are at the center of the attempts to create a more democratic political culture: human rights, the question of the "disappeared" people, tolerance for political opposition, non-violence, basic democratic freedoms. Two minor parties, the Christian Democratic Party and the Intransigent Party, largely ran on banners first launched by the human rights movements, and President Alfonsín himself participated peripherally in the human rights movements. The greatest influence of the human rights organization on public life occurred when the Radical Party adopted some of the human rights banners in the electoral campaign. By the time the military regime fell in 1983, political actors at least temporarily tended to leave behind the factionalism which had characterized the

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past. The campaign and elections proceeded without violence, the discourse about the importance of democratic rules of the game was stronger than in the past, and the tendency to perceive electoral opponents as enemies were weakened. The campaign was marked by a self-critical awareness of the extent to which factionalism had supported military regimes and by a commitment to avoid future military takeovers. In the current political conjuncture, social movements are likely to emerge and expand, and they may have some impact in democratizing parties and unions, which were notorious for their past authoritarian tendencies.

Finally, the new social movements have strengthened other movements in civil society. In Brazil, in many regions of the country the base communities became the springboard from which neighborhood associations emerged. Both base communities and neighborhood movement have had an impact on the new labor movement in Greater São Paulo, which has been the most significant union movement in Brazil. The base communities and other grass roots Church organizations, especially the Pastoral Land Commission, have also been closely linked to peasant unions in the Amazon and in parts of Northeastern Brazil.

In Argentina, this influence of new social movements is more embryonic, given their limited character during the authoritarian regime. The Justice and Peace Service influenced a number of neighborhood associations in Greater Buenos Aires and Córdoba, most notably in Quilmes, where a strategy of civil disobedience similiar to that favored by the Justice and Peace Service appeared. However, the most significant potential impact of the new social movements on existing movements may occur in the labor movement, traditionally characterized by indifference or rejection of political democracy, authoritarian internal organization, high capacity to mobilize, pervasive linkages to the Peronist Party, and an orientation towards the immediate material interests of the working class regardless of the political costs. During the 1983 presidential campaign, one of the major issues was this authoritarian character of the labor unions. Developing themes which emerged in the social movements, the opposition to the traditional labor leadership has emphasized internal democracy, rejection of violence, and democracy as a political regime.

The social movements have already had some impact in encouraging democratic values, but they also have significant limits. The participants in social movements are a small minority of the population in societies with deeply entrenched authoritarian traditions. The extent to which any small minority can change an entire society is open to question. Social movements which attempt to democratize society can coexist with the perpetuation of mechanisms of authoritarian domination.

The lack of political sophistication of many participants is a second limitation the movements face. The movements sometimes overlook the complexity of translating local level democratic practices to the national state, where there is a greater need for expertise and efficienty. While the values of the

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movement are clear, the mode of constructing a new society is far less so.

This lack of sophistication can lead to withdrawal from the political arena and to political inefficiency. The question of political efficiency becomes particularly acute during democratic periods. During the authoritarian regimes, even relatively unsophisticated movements which defend human rights can have a democratizing influence. However, as the political arena opens up, the question changes from challenging authoritarianism to constructing a democratic system. The movements need to define their place in a system which, in contrast to the authoritarian regime, allows their existence. In the process, new questions such as the role of parties and linkages to other social movements come into play. At this point, the rejection of politics and the lack of sophistication can be very limiting.

All of the social movements have faced new dilemmas during the process of political liberalization.[30] The issue about political parties is likely to be divisive along two lines: how much distance to maintain *vis-à-vis* the parties, and which party to support. With the re-emergence of political parties, social movements face the question of autonomy versus participation in a given party. If they opt for greater autonomy, the question of political efficiency arises, and if they decide to actively participate in a party (or create a party, as has frequently occurred in Europe), the social movement is channeled through the party and runs the risk of cooptation. This gives rise to a paradoxical situation: new social movements embody democratic values, but they emerged in a authoritarian situation which continues to define their approach to politics. The democratization process they help encourage creates conditions for internal division and competition.

The problems generated by political liberalizaion can be exemplified through the Brazilian CEBs and the Argentine human rights organizations. During the most repressive period, the base communities were virtually the only opposition popular organizations in Brazil. Despite the relatively rudimentary political consciousness of most participants, they became an essential part in the opposition efforts to rearticulate civil society because the regime perceived any popular organization as a challenge. With political liberalization, this monopoly of popular organization changed as neighborhood associations, unions, and political parties re-emerged. The base communities then faced the difficult question of what their role in the new political conjuncture should be, and specifically of their relations to parties, unions, and neighborhood associations. While they were committed to working towards a new society, base communities remain part of an ecclesial institu-

30. A significant literature on social movements emphasizes their cyclical character or potential for decline. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Albert Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements: Private Interests and Public Action* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Boschi, "Movimentos Sociais e a Institucionalização de uma Ordem" *op. cit.* However, it should also be noted that the value orientation of the new social movements has specifities which could produce different dynamics. The dynamic of the new movements should not be confused with that of social activation. As O'Donnell and Schmitter note, social activation is likely to decline after the initial mobilization period.

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tion which maintains a distinction between religion and politics. The question, then, became how to encourage political change while preserving the specifically ecclesial identity of the communities.

The human rights organizations in Argentina face equally difficult dilemmas resulting from the democratization process. The movements now function in a far more favorable moment, with a president responsive to human rights issues. Nevertheless, since Alfonsín assumed office in December 1983, they have had difficulty in developing strong linkages to the state. The future of some human rights organizations remains in question because their existence was so closely linked to issues which arose specifically because of the terrorist state. For example, because the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo limited their movement to protesting the issue of the disappeared victims and other elements of state terror, it seems likely that the movement will decline.

Conclusion: The New Social Movements and Prospects for Democracy

Both Brazil and Argentina are undergoing democratization — though at different paces. In this process, a struggle about the normative content of democracy is taking place. The critical question is what conceptions of democracy will prevail. The new social movements, as the major art of the block of radical democrats, could help promote the participatory components in democracy.

During the period of authoritarian rule, there was some convergence between radical and liberal democrats in the opposition to the authoritarian regime. This convergence did not crystallize immediately, but as the liberal democrats became more disenchanted with military rule, they allied with the radical democrats in their opposition to authoritarianism. The radicals consequently enjoyed the sympathy of liberals in critical times of the struggle against authoritarianism.

With political liberalization, a redefinition of positions occurs, and the differences between the radical and liberal democrats surface more clearly. The convergence in the opposition to authoritarianism does not lead to a convergence in the construction of democracy. In Brazil, in 1980 with the party reorganization, these differences between liberal democrats and radical democrats became more significant. There was, however, some convergence again in early 1984 because of the campaign for direct elections. In Argentina, the tempo was different: the strongest alliance between liberals and radical democrats existed between May and November 1983, and immediately after Alfonsín assumed office marked differences emerged. At the same time the semi-democratic sectors, which had supported authoritarianism, become proponents of limited democracy. This support of semi-democratic sectors for a democratic regime reinforces the liberals' position in the struggle to define the normative character of democracy.

At this moment of defining the nature of the emerging democratic regime, the new social movements face four broad possibilities. The first is an authoritarian involution, which is a distinct possibility in both countries. The fall of an authoritarian regime does not inherently, or even usually, imply the con-

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struction of a stable democratic regime. Indeed, both Brazil and Argentina are characterized by cyclical fluctuations between authoritarian and democratic regimes, even though these cycles are much shorter and involve more rapid alterations in Argentina.[31] Although a temporary transition to democracy could occur in either country without changes in political values, a stable democratic regime will require a transformation in political culture. In the event of an authoritarian involution, the social movements would again be sharply repressed. Some of the movements might survive at the expense of becoming depoliticized, and others would have extremely limited impact.

The second possibility is that the movements will be isolated, repressed, or marginalized within a restricted democracy. Despite their dynamism and political impact during the authoritarian period, these movements have involved a small part of society. This minoritarian character and the sharp differences between their objectives and those of most proponents of liberal democracy places the movements in a difficult position. On the one side, the semi-democrats and some liberals, especially those who had supported the authoritarians earlier, will attempt to marginalize the radicals. On the other side, the social movements themselves may tacitly encourage their isolation by withdrawal from political struggle. Among movement participants, this pattern will produce frustration and disappointment, leading either to apathy or to sectarian radical opposition and isolation. This possibility implies the most conservative redefinition of the democratic regime. Indeed, many conservative advocates of liberal democracy consciously believe that the radicals need to be marginalized as a way of creating a more stable democratic system. The support by semi-democratic actors which backed the military regime and by some liberals for a conservative, elitist democracy, and the concomitant attempt to marginalize the new social movements have been clear in Brazil.

The third possibility is cooptation. In this scenario, the new social movements would be incorporated into the democratic system and partially lose their autonomous identity, thus giving up their radical criticisms of the system. In this scenario, the democratic regime would incorporate some peripheral demands of the new social movements on its own terms. The system would change in marginal ways, but it would eliminate what some elements perceive as a radical threat. For the new social movements, this outcome will produce ambivalence and accommodation. The redefinition of democracy will depend on the extent to which the liberal democrats and the radicals make accommodations. In any case, the changes will be limited. The social movements might become stronger, but they would have limited impact on the parties and limited linkages with other movements. Whereas the second

31. On these oscillations movements between authoritarianism and democracy see Albert Hirschman, "The Turn of Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for its Economic Determinants," in David, Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 61-98; and Douglas Chalmers, "The Politicized State in Latin America," in James Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), pp. 23-46.

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possibility involves an elitist conservative democracy, this scenario implies the construction of a liberal democracy.

The fourth possibility is that the radicals would establish strong alliances with the liberals, but maintain a separate identity while changing the liberals' identity in a progressive direction. In this scenario, existing social movements will grow and new ones will emerge, sometimes undergoing redefinition as the political and social struggle evolves. This alternative implies the relative marginalization of semi-democratic actors. For both the strength and autonomous identity of the new social movements and the redefinition of democracy in a more progressive direction, this is the most favorable outcome. This possibility would imply a significant social and political space for the movements, even though they would not accomplish all of their objectives. Whereas the second scenario implies an alliance between the semi-democrats and liberals and the third a clear hegemony of the liberals, this final possibility would mean an alliance between radicals and liberals. It would mean the construction of a progressive, more participatory democracy.

This fourth outcome faces significant obstacles. The authoritarian and semi-democratic forces remain strong; in Brazil, they continue to control the state. This means that social movements need a high level of creativity to form a decisive alliance with liberal democrats. The model of this fourth scenario would be the Scandinavian countries. But whereas Scandinavian countries went through a lengthy process of eliminating authoritarian elements before the appearance of new social movements, in Argentina and Brazil these movements emerged during an authoritarian period whose impact will not disappear overnight in the process of political liberalization.

We have stressed that the potential of new social movements is closely linked to the potential for democracy in both countries. What outcome, then, seems most likely for social movements and for democracy in the two countries? In Brazil, social movements have influenced the liberalization process, but this influence remains limited. These social movements are better established than in Argentina and have been working for democratization for many years, yet without producing dramatic results in what remains an authoritarian society and political regime. In much of the country, the traditional pattern of elitist domination and marginalization of the popular sectors continues to prevail. The elitist, authoritarian political style also remains characteristic of the national state. Despite political liberalization, there has been a strong continuity in the military regime in terms of leaders and style of doing politics. Power is highly centralized in the federal state, especially the executive. The content and decision making of economic policy is closely controlled by the military regime; the significant changes in the political arena have thus far produced few concessions in economic policy.[32]

32. On the political liberalization process and its limits, see among others Paulo Krischke, ed., *Brasil: Do Milagre à Abertura* (São Paulo: Cortez, 1983); José Álvaro Moisés, "Crise Política e Democracia: A Transição Difícil," *Revista de Cultura e Política* 2 (August/October 1980), pp. 9-37; Sebastião Velasco e Cruz and Carlos Estevam Martins, "De Castello a Figueiredo: Uma Incursão na pre-História," in Velasco e Cruz *et.al., Sociedede e Política no Brasil Pós-64* op, cit.; Bolivar

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Despite the fact that Brazil's most modernized states have changed their political style markedly, at the federal level the changes are slow in coming. The federal bureaucracy, where the authoritarians and semi-democratic conservatives still prevail, retains a high degree of autonomy. The radical democrats have failed to penetrate the federal state in what is still a highly centralized system. In much of the country both radical and liberal democrats remain weak. The regime as a whole has displayed a remarkable ability to continue the Brazilian tradition of coopting and accommodating some sectors while preserving an elitist system.

A full democratization in Brazil will have to challenge several pillars of the authoritarian system. First, it must change the style and content of economic policy in a period when maneuvering space is limited because of the external debt. Despite political liberalization, the regime has maintained a closed process of economic decision making. In fact, economic policy has less legitimacy than it ever did during the twenty years of military rule. Second, the sharp gap which characterizes the differences between federal politics and the politics of the most developed states will have to diminish. The impact of liberalization will remain limited if the opposition cannot influence the federal state. This will also entail strengthening parliament and curtailing the executive's authority. Third, a full democratization which would create a more significant space for social movements would need to challenge the dominant pattern of social elitism. The huge gap between the marginalized masses and the technocratic, modernized sectors of society would have to diminish. In this regards, the liberalization process has been very limited, even in states where the opposition has controlled the government since early 1983. Some inroads have been made against elitism in the southern states, but the limited nature of the opposition governments underscores the remarkable resiliency of the elitist system. Finally, a full democratization would need to find means to submit the armed forces to civilian control. Since the beginning of the liberalization process, the separation between the military institution and the government has been more clear. The armed forces control far less of the political process today than a decade ago. Nevertheless, they continue to be a very important political force, with significant autonomy. The paramount example is the high level of autonomy the National Information Service enjoys.

Despite the regime's capacity to perpetuate important mechanisms of authoritarian control, the Brazilian transition is still an open ended process. The space for social movements and radical democrats seems smaller than it was at the beginning of the 1980s. Nevertheless, some cracks remain in the authoritarian system, and social movements may be able to exploit them. In

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Lamounier, "O Discurso e o Processo: Da Distensão as Opções do Regime Brasileiro," in Henrique Rattner, ed., *Brasil 1990: Caminhos Alternativos do Desenvolvimento* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1979), pp. 88-120. On the continuation of highly repressive styles of politics in rural areas, especially the Amazon, see José de Souza Martins, *Expropriação e Violência: A Questão Política no Campo* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1981); José de Sousa Martins, *Os Camponeses e a Politica no Brasil* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1981).

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the Center-South and South, the liberal democrats remain opposed to key elements of the authoritarian system, opening up the possibility for alliance (realized in the campaign for direct elections) with the radical democrats.

Of the four outlined scenarios, the last one is almost impossible to imagine in Brazil, given the regime's high capacity to marginalize radical elements and uphold elements of authoritarian rule. The current struggle is to define the combination of elements from the second and third scenarios while attempting to avert an authoritarian involution. Although the first three scenarios are possible, the most likely appears to be the second. The system will probably continue to evolve in a more democratic direction, but it will probably also reproduce some of the traditional Brazilian patterns of elite accommodation.

Where the Brazilian transition is already a decade old and has some relatively well defined features which make possible some reasonable guesses about the future, the Argentine transition is much younger, has proceeded more quickly, and is more difficult to foresee. The role of social movements; the relation between authoritarians, semi-democrats, liberal democrats, and radical democrats; and the possibilities for developing a democratic political culture are all open questions. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify four general and related conditions which will play a significant role in determining the outcome of these questions.

The first is the future of the movements themselves — whether they will grow, and, if so, in what direction. Before the Malvinas/Falklands war, the human rights organizations were virtually the only major social movement in Argentina. After the war the process of rebuilding the social web began, but until the 1983 elections this process was channeled largely through the electoral campaign and the party system. After the elections, particularly when a president relatively sympathetic to the demands of the human rights organizations was elected, new possibilities for social movements opened up. A society which had been severely repressed for eight years began to organize and experience new forms of associative life. Although it is far too early to tell how far this process will go, the first year of the Alfonsín presidency has suggested a potential for growth of new movements. Since the elections, the feminist movement, the ecology movement, and neighborhood associations have expanded, while the human rights organizations have encountered greater difficulties than they expected. Another important development has been the emergence of elements in the labor movement committed to political democracy. Although the labor movement itself cannot be considered a new social movement, some of the features of this opposition union movement are new, specifically, the commitment to political democracy and the questioning of the unconditional linkages to the Peronist Party.

Excluding the human rights organizations, which have a clearly established presence, social movements in Argentina still do not have a clear profile. Nevertheless, the chances for growth seem reasonably good, given the reaction to eight years of severe repression, the traditional Argentine tendency to high levels of political involvement, and the incipient changes towards a more

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democratic political culture — changes which social movements could significantly influence.

A second major question which will affect not only social movements, but also the quality of democracy which emerges in Argentina, is the relation between new social movements and political parties. Despite the fact that social movements have become an important element in the political struggle of many countries, their linkages to parties remains a critical issue in defining how far they influence the political system. For it is through the party system that social movements can directly affect the state, and even though a major objective of social movements is to define new, non-statist arenas of politics, the state (whether federal, provincial, or local) remains the most important arena of politics. If the social movements are to have a stable and significant impact, they must encourage some parties to take up the issues raised by social movements. Otherwise, a possible scenario would be the proliferation of atomized social movements which have little connection with each other and little capacity to change society.

The Argentine new social movements were fairly closely linked to the Christian Democratic Party and the Intransigent Party, and they had some influence in the Radical and Peronist Parties. Nevertheless, all of these parties are characterized by some limitations in relation to these social movements. At this point, there is no Argentine equivalent of Brazil's Workers Party or Germany's Green Party. The Christian Democratic Party, while a strong supporter of human rights demands, has limited capacity to channel the demands of other social movements, in part because it has defined itself as a Christian Party. Although the Intransigent Party attracted the support of many parts of the new left, the leaders themselves are part of a traditional democratic left. Finally, despite the support of some elements of the new social movements for Alfonsín before the elections, since December 1983 conflicts have emerged between the new government and the human rights organizations. Thus, there is a relative vacuum in the party system, with no clear options for the radical democrats. In responce to this vacuum, an inchoate debate about creating a Green Party has appeared, but thus far the party system is relatively insulated from these social movements.

A third major issue which will affect both new social movements and the transition as a whole is the extent to which the authoritarians are effectively marginalized and the semi-democrats are converted. Some positive signs exist in this direction; Alfonsín's election represented an unequivocal victory for the liberal democrats, and during his first months in power, the radical democrats (through the human rights organizations) rather than the authoritarians presented him his greatest challenge. The military, the outstanding authoritarian actor, and the unions, the most vociferous element of the semi-democrats, suffered a major temporary setback with Alfonsín's election. In fact, during the campaign Alfonsín made it clear that he intended to attack the authoritarian elements in the armed forces and labor unions. Furthermore, the Peronists' stunning defeat could encourage a conversion in a more demo-

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cratic direction; the party's debates in the aftermath of the defeat clearly raised this question.

The marginalization of the authoritarians and semi-democrats is essential if Argentina is to develop a stable democracy. While the first year of Alfonsín's government has produced some promising signs, nobody knows how far the democratic transformation of different social actors will go. Other traditional bastions of authoritarianism, dominant class institutions such as the Argentine Rural Society (SRA), the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), the Stock Exchange, the Argentine Rural Confederation (CRA), and the Bank Association of Argentina remain intact.

Finally, the extent to which the factionalism which has been the core of Argentine authoritarianism will erode remains undetermined. The military regime fell into disgrace, but the values it embodied — authoritarianism, militarism, violence, homogenization of society, lack of tolerance for different points of view — have not disappeared. It is impossible to determine how deeply military rule affected the formation of social and political values among the population. The new democratic regime is fragile and faces many difficult problems; if the traditional pattern of factionalism prevails, present authoritarian tendencies could re-emerge stronger than ever.[33] To some extent, this level of factionalism will depend on the marginalization of the authoritarians. Alfonsin's skills as a political leader could play a major role in this regard.[34] Finally, it should be noted that the movements' future is not only affected by, but also influences, the level of factionalism. Strong social movements could help change the factionalism by legitimating diversity and overcoming the idea of cultural homogeneity which has inspired various authoritarian experiments.

Having outlined some of the major factors which will determine the future correlation between authoritarians, semi-democrats, liberal democrats, and radical democrats, we must emphasize again that the outcome of this struggle is open ended, even more so than in Brazil. As in Brazil, the fourth scenario, radical democracy, seems out of the question, but any of the other three alternatives are realistic possibilities. Paradoxically, Argentina's great hope lies in the fact that its history has been so tragic. The catastrophic episodes of the recently deposed military government, in combination with the country's long-term problems, may encourage different political forces to develop more democratic values. In this sense, Argentina is in a unique historical moment, for alongside the formidable obstacles to creating a democratic regime, there seems to be a democratic temper which the country has not known in the past. It is important to note that democracy does not require that

33. The possibility of the re-emergence of a more radical authoritarian or totalitarian regime is discussed in José Maria Gómez and Eduardo Viola, "Transición desde el Autoritarismo y Potencialidades de Invención Democrática en la Argentina de 1983," in Oscar Oszlack, ed., *El 'Proceso,' Crisis y transicion democratica* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor, 1984).

34. In our emphasis on political leadership, we follow Linz, *Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration op. cit.*; Viola, "Autoritarismo e Democracia na Argentina Contemporânea" *op. cit.*; and Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 124-188.

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all citizens and political forces be committed to democracy; for if this were the case, no democratic regime would have ever emerged.

The second scenario, restricted democracy, would imply that unions and the Peronist party retain semi-democratic values. There would be a limited challenge to the big bourgeoisie and a limited transformation of the military. In this case, social movements would be marginalized or isolated. In the third scenario, liberal democracy, the liberal penetration of the unions, Peronists, bourgeoisie, and armed forces would be significant. The social movements would be largely coopted or isolated, but they would still have limited impact on the political system. In this scenario, the traditional parties (Radical and Peronists) would dominate the political arena, the Peronists would become clearly committed to democratic rules of the game, and the armed forces would be under strict civilian control. This possibility would mean the development of a stable liberal democracy. Although this scenario faces many obstacles, it is possible for the first time in Argentine history, and would represent a qualitatively different style of democracy than Argentina has known in the past.

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

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

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

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

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LEFTIST STUDENTS OF THE CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION: NEUMANN, KIRCHHEIMER, & MARCUSE*

by Alfons Söllner

To discuss under this title the early writings of authors, who a few years later would be numbered among the members of the exiled Institute for Social Research, is a kind of provocation. The political culture of the Weimar Republic was initially re-appraised in West Germany primarily in light of totalitarian theoretical principles. Later this picture changed to the extent that research abandoned the right-left equation.[1] Should this progress, in view of a new wave of nostalgia, be undone? Can anything other than a scandal result if one considers the fact that prominent representatives of the leftist intelligentsia — the jurist Fritz Neumann, the political scientist Otto Kirchheimer, and the philosopher Herbert Marcuse — had been students of even more well-known representatives of the academic right?

Questions of the above nature are justified, for they make one aware that the return of the repressed does not always mean progress toward self-enlightenment. However, they need not disturb intellectual historians who advocate separating the instrinsic analysis of a creative work from its political significance, that is, to differentiate between the analytical capacity of an author and his political stance, so that one can recognize what scholarly means were employed to arrive at a particular political judgment. One may then ask whether the intellectual movement which was set in motion by the writings of Neumann, Kirchheimer, and Marcuse was only a contrast movement, or whether the leftist students of Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger learned something from their teachers. The first justification of the legitimacy of this question can be found in the noteworthy fact that for all three of the young authors, whom one — with a view toward their later development — can call the political theorists of critical theory,[2] substantive analysis ranks ahead of political polemics. Explicit political critique appears more as a consequence of than as a prerequisite for theoretical criticism. For this reason, it becomes worthwhile to include episodic biographical data in the evaluation of a phase of radical change in intellectual history which culminated in the

* Translated by Alfred L. Cobb.

1. See Klaus Megerle and Peter Steinbach, "Politische Kultur in der Krise. Neuere Beiträge zur Bedeutung der politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, No. 2 (1981).

2. See my introduction to *Zur Archäologie der Demokratie in Deutschland. Analysen politischer Emigranten im amerikanischen Geheimdienst, 1942-1945* (Frankfurt/Main: Europäische, 1982).

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crisis of the Weimar Republic.

That the political culture of the Weimar period was ruled by a global contrast, and that its poles were rationalism and irrationalism, has not just been discovered by recent scholars. On the contrary, the most prominent representatives of Weimar intellectual life articulated their positions in full awareness of these alternatives.[3] Still, today the discussions at the end of the Weimar Republic serve as a suitable reference point for determining the meaning of rationalism and irrationalism as well as the basic alternatives to modernism.[4] This contrast sounds — today as then — equally global and ambiguous. Therefore, if there is a genuine task for intellectual history, it is to limit the ambiguity of these alternatives by determining what the discussion actually concerned. In my analysis, I shall limit my comments to a small area of socialist political theory at the left periphery of the SPD, which derives its dynamics from the integration of several completely contradictory tendencies: with regard to the subject-area, it was a question of political theory with extensions into both political philosophy and jurisprudence. Methodologically, it was a question of the relation of different approaches to theory as they were represented via judicial normativism, Marxist functionalism, and phenomenological philosophy. Politically, it was the question of the establishment of an authoritarian or socialistic solution to the crisis of the Weimar state after the crash of 1929.

To name Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger in one breath and to label them as the intellectual spokesmen of the conservative revolution will raise objections. Was the writer of *Being and Time* a political thinker at all? Was he not simply a contemplative compatriot, a role proposed by Thomas Mann in his essay, "Observations of an Unpolitical Man"? Conversely, did the Prussian councilor and conservative constitutional specialist have any philosophical ambitions? Was not his legalistic deduction of the authoritarian dictatorship more the result of purely judicial thinking? These questions must be answered, in the affirmative, for a criticism of radical conservatism is only valuable if critical fusion of theory formation and political posture can be shown to be not simply a superficial, empirical engagement. The latter is, however, well-known and has been adequately proven: Heidegger, as rector of the University of Freiburg, as well as Schmitt, the legal advisor of the Papen government in the Prussian coup, expressed their contempt for the Weimar "system" by emphatically greeting the Nazi rise to power. However, in order to comprehend the internal relation of authoritarian theory and politics at the end of the Weimar Republic, one has to transcend disciplinary limits and uncover the philosophical basis of Carl Schmitt's legal reasoning and the political sense of Heidegger's philosophical discourse.

This is easier to accomplish for Carl Schmitt than for his philosophical contemporary. His work can be divided into philosophical and judicial areas.

3. See, for example, Karl Jaspers, *Die geistige Situation der Zeit* (1931; rpt. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1979).

4. See Jürgen Habermas, ed. *Stichworte zur "Geistigen Situation der Zeit"* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1979).

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While *Der Hüter der Verfassung* and *Legalität und Legitimität* present the programs of a radical conservative change in the simple form of a constitutional construct, Schmitt's political option in *Politische Theologie* and in *Begriff des Politischen* are expressed in a way which one — analogous to Heidegger's "fundamental ontology" — could label as "fundamental political science."[5] Law, state, and politics are reduced to an ultimate foundation which has been classified as political decisionism. While Schmitt avoids the linguistic magic of *Being and Time*, the themes in his intellectual historical treaties are equally fundamental. Thus, in *Politische Theologie* it is maintained that the typical idea of sovereignty for the modern state is nothing less than a secularization of the theological transcendence of God. "Sovereignty means controlling the state of emergency,"[6] — this formula, which describes modern state practice, implies that legitimacy lacks a rational foundation, drawing much more on irrational elements with a quasi-religious nature. In *Begriff des Politischen* an explicitly existential turn is given to this mode of thinking; according to Schmitt, beneath the surface of the bourgeois life style, the homo-homini-lupus of the natural state continues undiminished: the existential condition of threat by an enemy. If, therefore, there is in the modern state a rationalism of irrationalism, it lies in the power of definition which allows the sovereign to differentiate between friend and enemy.[7]

In the crisis conditions of the Weimar Republic, this sort of political philosophy had to become a theoretical justification of the events after Brüning became chancellor. Theories indeed do not cause coups d'état, but they lend the means, which necessity apparently irresistibly dictates: the aura of legitimacy. In this external sense and even more in the intrinsic sense, Schmitt's constitutional political arguments after 1930 are to be understood as the legal execution of his fundamental political views. Political decisionism represented a definite and very ambitious formulation of the program of a conservative revolution.[8]

To point to a similarly stringent connection between philosophy and politics for the philosophical leader of the Weimar period is impossible. One reason lies in the fact that with Heidegger there is no direct reference to political questions or even to institutions, neither in the foundation of his thinking nor in the diagnosis of the "spiritual situation of the age," to draw on Karl Jasper's account of 1929. In the narrow sense of the history of philosophy Heidegger is usually located in the tradition of modern critique of metaphysics. *Being and Time*,[9] which appeared in 1927, was a point at which the humanistic value system, which has been radically dissolved by Nietzsche, again touched on firm

5. Carl Schmitt, *Der Hüter der Verfassung* (Tubingen: Mohr, 1931); *Legalität und Legitimität* (München: Duncker & Humblot, 1932); *Politische Theologie* (1922; rpt. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1979); *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1932).

6. Schmitt, *Politische Theologie, op. cit.*, p. 6.

7. Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen, op. cit.*, pp. 26ff.

8. Compare the newest interpretation by Volker Neumann, *Der Staat im Bürgerkrieg. Kontinuität und Wandlung des Staatsbegriffs in der politischen Theologie Carl Schmitts* (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1980).

9. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (1927; rpt. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979).

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ground. which, no matter how fragile, appeared accessible to genuine philosophical discourse. If Heidegger was praised, especially in contrast to the methodologism of the neo-Kantians, as the re-discoverer of a concrete philosophy, one must not forget that this was at the same time a return to an eminently traditional posture.

Heidegger asks in *Being and Time* about being as a whole,[10] treated dictotonously in terms of both a transcendental structure and the concrete existence of man. His philosophy presents a simultaneity of fundamental ontology and a phenomenology of concrete daily existence. While the first, the ontological concern, leads to an explication of the structure of historicity or temporality, the second consists of the phenomenological analysis of existence by a concise examination of basic existential experiences, which are symbolized in the terms *Angst, Sorge, man,* and *Geworfenheit*.[11] This is not the place to examine the systematic train of thought of *Being and Time*. For my short interpretation a single reference must suffice which, however, elucidates the problem both intrinsically and politically associated with existential ontology. The key problem rests with the connection between the transcendental dimension of historicity and the manifestly negative, that is, crisis-filled fact of the analysis of being. What is the political content of the mediating categories if one views them against the background of the political and economic crisis of Weimar.[12]

Already in *Being and Time* it is clear that the connection between historical objectivity and a subjective feeling of crisis is conceived in concepts which appear equally exhortative and abstract, voluntaristic and empty. These apply to categories such as *Ruf, Sorge, Schuld,* with which the structure of consciousness is conjured up more than described.[13] Where this leads becomes eminently clear in the essay, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in which appears what one could call the philosophical decisionism of Heidegger — analogous to Carl Schmitt's political theory. Because the form in which history is thematized remains highly abstract, its subjective acquisition which is symbolized by the concept of decision, can be nothing more than an objectless decisiveness, and this all the more as the experience of *Angst* and *Geworfenheit* have been radicalized. Thus, history becomes fate, an anonymous process, before which a keenly emphasized freedom pales, reduced to tragic agreement. Nothing less than voluntaristic is the figure in which Heidegger embodies the historical overcoming of fate: it is, in imitation of Nietzsche's superman, the heroic individual who, in a lonely decision, brings himself to a deed by which fate is mastered.

Heidegger's philosophical decisionism characteristically avoids concrete reference to authoritarian institutions and practices. Its political sense is

10. *Sein und Zeit, op. cit.,* p. 2ff.
11. *Sein und Zeit, op. cit.,* pp. 144ff.
12. See Alexander Schwan, "Zeitgenössische Philosophie und Theologie in ihrem Verhältnis zur Weimarer Republik," in *Weimar. Selbstpreisgabe einer Demokratie,* ed. Karl V. Erdmann and Hagen Schultze (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1980), pp. 259ff.
13. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit, op. cit.,* pp. 267ff.

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nevertheless an authoritarian one, evident in the abstract form in which individual and history are thought together.[14] To view this solely as a failing, however, would be misleading, for it is related to the qualities which have been responsible for the enormous attraction Heidegger had for intellectuals in the Weimar Republic and later. It is the gesture of founding meaning, which the philosophical leader assumes in the face of the absurdity of human existence. This corresponds to a philosophy, whose evocative linguistic magic leads to a mimesis of fate rather than to an analysis of concrete social causes of the feeling of crisis. Now the paradoxical relation between intrinsic analysis and political meaning becomes comprehensible; this can be methodically controlled in the case of Heidegger: immanent criticism leads back to the external fact, as it were, that the authoritarian sense or non-sense of Heideggerian philosophy lies in its jargon and its linguistic gestures.[15]

To call the trade union jurist Franz Neumann a student of Carl Schmitt, with no qualification, would overlook historical facts. First of all, Neumann was influenced by the Frankfurt labor lawyer, Hugo Sinzheimer. All of Neumann's Weimar writings are conceived as a continuation of Sinzheimer's idea of a collective law. Nevertheless, Neumann not only worked intensely with all of Schmitt's writings, which one can deduce from his own statements, but he attended Schmitt's seminar in 1931, and there he lectured on important passages from his own book, *Koalitionsfreiheit und Reichsverfassung,* before it appeared in print in 1932.[16] Yet, this book would have little bearing on our investigation, if Neumann had not based the central point of his constitutional-judicial foundation of an economic democracy on legal categories which were typically Schmitt's.

In order to evaluate the Weimar writings of the young lawyer, it must be pointed out how very much the strategy of legal grounding dominates all its elements. In *Koalitionsfreiheit und Reichsverfassung,* as in other short treatises, it is primarily a question of the dogmatic deduction of the trade-union conception of an economic democracy from the basic rights section of the Weimar Constitution; both the rudiments of a historical sociology of coalition freedom and a political theory of a reformist social transformation serve this important purpose. One could therefore be inclined to deny Neumann's early writings the character of political theory, if one did not know from the history of Weimar reformism that its political theory as well as its practice were fully legalistic. If Neumann's works are worth treating in the context of rationalism/irrationalism, it is because they demonstrate the naiveté that one could pick out concepts from a thoroughly authoritative construct of ideas and because, due to a methodological self-limitation, which the right-wing intelligentsia avoided, they tended to be blind to the teleological indifference inherent in·

14. Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (1930), in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1967).

15. See Theodor W. Adorno, *Jargon der Eigenlichkeit* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1964); Pierre Bourdieu, *Die politische Ontologie Martin Heideggers,* trans, from the French by Bernd Schwibs (Frankfurt/Main: Syndikat, 1976).

16. Franz Neumann, *Koalitionsfreiheit und Reichsverfassung* (Berlin: C. Heymann, 1932).

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every legal discourse. In addition to the factual powerlessness, this gullibility can be seen as a cause of the decline of the worker's movement at the end of the Weimar Republic.[17]

For his construction of the "legal concept of an economic constitution," Neumann borrows two categories from the legal writings of Carl Schmitt: the category of the institutional guarantee and the definition of the state as the ultimate decision-making authority. In contrast to the simple basic-right guarantee, the institutional guarantee[18] plays a decisive role, because only with its help can it be explained how the participation of trade-unions in economic leadership is to be possible without the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production. It is noteworthy here that Neumann appears not to notice the ambivalence embedded in institutional legal thinking. If socialist reformism considered the institutional guarantee of the ownership of the means of production to be a compromising limitation of the dictatorship of capital, the institutional concept simultaneously implied the exact opposite: the institutions as "concrete orders" become the means to bring the right of participation, and beyond that, disruptive individual rights, to an end. National-socialist legal development, in which concrete concepts of order always remained part of the dictator's decisionism, shortly thereafter also went in this direction. An intermediate step to that manifest dissolution of legal rationalism began after 1930 in the one-sided legal decisions, oriented toward monopoly interests, in which institutional arguments played a role. Neumann did not acknowledge the irrational dialectic of institutional forms, although it had already become a reality — and he could do this because to him the limitation of the legal view had become dogma, which the prevailing theory and practice had left behind long ago.

The problem of the state monopoly on decision-making leads to a more complex question, because the neutrality of the state and with it the conditions of the legitimacy of the economic-democratic compromise between capital and labor are at stake. Neumann stumbles upon it in an innocent and legalistically limited form, when he considers the possibility of separating the economic and political functions of unions.[19] His answer that unions cannot be seen as political organizations depends on a concept of state sovereignty which he arrives at through an argument with Carl Schmitt's ideas in *Begriff des Politischen.* He agrees with Schmitt that in conditions of state intervention, the political dimension becomes a total concept. This, however, does not mean, as Schmitt believes, that politics constitutes an ontological or existential priority above the given legal and state order or that state and law are defined through such a political concept. On the contrary, the state defines what is political and what is not. Sovereignty is not the extra-legal determination of the legal norms but rather, the legalization of the political. The state decision-making power may not be separated from its legal form.

17. See my introduction to Franz Neumann, *Wirtschaft, Staat, Demokratie, Aufsätze 1930-1954* (Frankfurt/Main: 1978), pp. 12ff.
18. Neumann, *Koalitionsfreiheit und Reichsverfassung, op. cit.,* pp. 22ff.
19. *Koalitionsfreiheit und Reichsverfassung, op. cit.,* pp. 122ff.

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It is important to note that this argumentative strategy, which is considered a criticism of Carl Schmitt's political ontology, has a circular character; it starts by rejecting political decisionism but falls back upon it in the end. In Schmitt's concept of sovereignty, the dichotomy of justice and power is fundamentally dissolved into the state of emergency and the enemy projection, while the inversion of the process, in the case of Neumann, is only possible to the extent that the normal condition of legal adherence to the power of the state is raised to a norm. This changes nothing in the fact that sovereignty in the last analysis is defined by decision and its enforcement. Neumann's position can be labeled as a legal decisionism, which attempts to nullify the analytical potential of the political theorist Schmitt against the normativeness of jurisprudence. In this sober form of a social democratic interpretation of the Weimar constitution, which emphasizes the superiority of the social legal state over the liberal legal state, the domestication of the state power monopoly by law and constitution is presented as reality.

When one considers the reality of the Weimar legal state, which was exposed to a systematic undermining after Brüning's rise to power, and especially through the intense use of the emergency powers of the Republic's president, one can only label Neumann's argumentation highly ambivalent. This ambivalence is part of every purely legal discourse, for its normativism naively underestimates the power inherent in state rule. Yet, in the indisputable crisis of the Weimar system, this naiveté obscured the fact that the state of emergency had become the norm of administrative and legal practice. The theoretical work of the trade-union lawyer and SPD-advisor Neumann had another side to it, which should not be overlooked, marked by the privileging of the political before the legal. The lawyer reveals himself as a political writer who turns to the political culture of the reform worker's movement and advocates the seizure of power by the reformists.[20] Yet again Neumann provides no realistic evaluation of the political strength of the worker's movement which would have to be seen in contrast to the anti-democratic tendencies in the state apparatus itself.

If one interprets Neumann's Weimar writings against the background of the crisis in the Weimar state, their core turns out to be a legalistically limited concept of social reality. In his later self-criticism, which can be viewed as a coming to terms with reformism, Neuman makes a distinction between two aspects: he identifies the subjective condition of legalism before 1933 as the cowardice and the self-inflicted blindness of the power elite of the worker's movement who underestimated the seriousness of the situation.[21] The theoretical political inferences from this diagnosis were drawn earlier in his book of 1932, *Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes*,[22] interesting in view of the political theory of Carl Schmitt. Neumann here does not suggest simply rejecting the sovereignty

20. See, for example, "Die politische und soziale Bedeutung der arbeitsgerichtlichen Rechtsprechung" (1927), in *Arbeitsrecht und Politik*, ed. Thilo Ramm (Neuwied: 1966).

21. Cited in my monograph, *Neumann zur Einführung* (Hannover: "SOAK," 1982), p. 5.

22. Franz Neumann, *Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes* (1936; rpt. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), pp. 45ff.

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concept of Schmitt, but transforming it, purified of all normative implications, which reckons systematically with the mutual incompatability of law and power. Such a purely descriptive, left-oriented Schmittism proved itself splendidly in the analysis of National-Socialist dominations and also led to consequences for Neumann's evaluation of the chances of democracy in the post-fascist era.

The notion of a Left Schmittism appears problematic, for it evokes associations with the right-left equation of the totalitarianism theory. Yet, it is intriguing to examine the Weimar writings of Otto Kirchheimer under this label, for their high level of analysis of the crisis is indebted to a combination of methods borrowed from such diverse theoretical sources as Marxism and the theories of Carl Schmitt. The substantive basis of this label must be clarified. Concepts and theories are not complexes without contexts; moreover, they change their meaning and function, if they are taken out of one context and placed into another. Such a process of re-evaluation can be studied in Kirchheimer's Weimar writings. They offer the fascinating drama of an academic father-son conflict, in which the pupil commits a symbolic parricide with his teacher's legacy and in which the teacher must learn that inferences can be drawn from his own conclusions about the conservative revolution, which are diametrically opposed to his intentions.[23]

If one rejects the simplistic claim that Kirchheimer, as a member of the Young Socialists, opposed Carl Schmitt from the beginning, then a rather confusing picture appears. In his revealing analysis of the moribund Weimar state, Kirchheimer followed a method typical of Carl Schmitt: legal facts and their transformation possess immediate political significance, since legal and political analysis are simply two aspects of the same type of criticism. In addition, Kirchheimer uses the same metaphors and theories as his teacher to underscore the development of the crisis in the Weimar state and the direction it was to take. Thus in his well-known 1930 essay "Weimar — und was dann?", he characterized the Weimar assembly as "indecisive."[24] In 1932, he analyzed the contradictory nature of the Republic's principles of legitimacy, and thereby anticipated Schmitt's thesis in his "Legalität und Legitimität" concerning the total weakness of the Weimar constitution.[25]

What does all this mean in terms of a rational connection between theoretical analysis and political posture? Was Kirchheimer engaged in a masquerade? One is first inclined to answer the question negatively: like Franz Neumann, Kirchheimer was totally uninterested in the fundamental political writings of his teacher. He suspected that they replaced rational analysis with ultimate metaphysical grounding in order to present political solutions as empirically grounded. Apart from the political metaphysics, Kirchheimer

23. For a detailed analysis, see Volker Neumann, "Verfassungstheorien politischer Antipoden: Otto Kirchheimer und Carl Schmitt," *Kritische Justiz*, No. 3 (1981), 235ff.

24. Otto Kirchheimer, "Weimar — und was dann?" (1930), in *Politik und Verfassung* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1964), pp. 52ff.

25. Otto Kirchheimer, "Legalität und Legitimität," in *Politische Herrschaft* (Frankfurt/Main: 1967), pp. 7ff.

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nevertheless identified in Schmitt's thinking an unusually astute instrument, with which to approach and analyze the fine points in such a convoluted process as the Weimar crisis, which was ultimately the expression of a total social crisis. First, however, this instrument had to be integrated into the corpus of a rational social theory. In Kirchheimer's case this is a kind of Marxism, which had become flexible enough through the acceptance of certain analytical elements of the conservative state and constitutional theory, in order to comprehend the changes in the social and political forces expressed by the system's legal changes. This is evident in the discussion of the contradictions between a legal state and a democracy, found in the writings of both Kirchheimer as well as Schmitt.[26]

In 1932, Kirchheimer and Schmitt were confronted with a condition in which parliamentary democracy turned into a dictatorship. The system, which depended on the cooperation of parliamentary democracy and a legal state, was suspended, and the old legitimacy of a legal democracy was replaced by the authority of the plebiscitary president. How and why did the transformation take place? Schmitt and Kirchheimer offer fundamentally different answers because their theoretical presuppositions are fundamentally different. While Schmitt sees in these events the confirmation of basic political assumptions, as a consequence of which the state of emergency is the ultimate source of politics and the uncompromising legitimacy of a dictatorship by plebiscite is the basis of all state sovereignty, Kirchheimer insists on the necessity of considering the concrete social and political causal relations, out of which the dictatorship resulted. This becomes clear in the discrepancy between their concepts of democracy, which contribute to the individual analyses of the situation.[27]

At the center of Schmitt's criticism of the Weimar constitution is the idea that democracy must not exhaust itself in legal procedure, but must be the expression of the homogeneous will of the people. If after 1930 he presents the authoritarian state as the necessary and desirable product of its crisis, this conclusion is not drawn from a study of social and political forces, but from a utopia of a popular *Gemeinschaft.* Kirchheimer specifically contradicts Schmitt on this point. The seizure of power by the president and administration and the concomitant violation of the rationality of a legal state resulted from a pact of the social power-brokers with the political ones, whose goal was the prevention of the threatening socialist solution to the crisis. This emphasis, which demands that the normative concept of democracy be replaced by the sociological study of political and social power relations, apparently changes the diagnosis of the crisis very little, but yet completely. While Schmitt uses his normative concept of democracy to demonstrate, within constitutional reality, the inevitable death of legal democracy, Kirchheimer points to the suggestive character of this deduction: the post-democratic state will solve none of

26. For a more detailed analysis, see my *Geschichte und Herrschaft. Studien zur materialistischen Sozialwissenschaft, 1929-1942* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), pp. 119ff.

27. *Geschichte und Herrschaft, op. cit.,* pp. 104ff.

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the problems which express themselves in the crisis of state, but Schmitt eliminates the last opposition to the formation of parliamentary compromise and overlooks the fact that a revolutionary change represents the only possibility by which the Weimar state could find its way back to a new and lasting synthesis of democratic legitimacy and legal state.[28]

Kirchheimer's analyses of the crisis prove to be significant historically, if one compares them not only with Schmitt's political decisionism, but also with Neumann's judicial normativism. While Neumann suppresses central elements of Schmitt's fundamental political theory, such as the foundation of sovereignty in the exceptional condition or the dichotomy between legal state and democracy, Kirchheimer does not shy away from using them, by simultaneously transforming them into instruments of sociological analysis. Worthy of examination in this context would be Kirchheimer's theory of the "two-step legality,"[29] which takes its point of departure from Schmitt's theory that legality and legitimacy of a ruling system are not the same, and which transforms this fundamentally understood thesis of Schmitt into an explanatory sociological hypothesis. In this way, it becomes the explanation of a total social crisis theory, in which a legal, political, and sociological level are distinguished from one another. The contradiction between legality and legitimacy, between justice and power as such, which for Schmitt has an ontological status is no longer decisive. More important is the determination of the political reaction-potential inherent in this dichotomy. For Kirchheimer this potential is released in the context of a total social disintegration first triggered by the social and political elite and then to be resolved in a revolution from above.

If a normative world view, which supported the authoritarian tendencies at the end of the Weimar Republic, on the one hand, or misjudged them on the other, was at the heart of political decisionism on the right and the legalism of social democracy on the left, then by comparison Kirchheimer appears to be a realistic thinker. His diagnosis of the crisis, of course, could do nothing against the irrationality of political relations. In any case, it appears as if his political option, buried in his understanding of the crisis, which encouraged the workers' parties to action and reminded them of their actual goal (the creation of social democracy as the only guarantee of political democracy),[30] seems so rational, just because he took the political crisis of the Weimar state as seriously as those who had an active interest in the deterioration of the state. Kirchheimer could defy the representatives of the conservative revolution, because he dared to think what they themselves had thought and because he did not shy away from stepping on their home ground in order to attack

28. Otto Kirchheimer, "Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitts Legalität und Legitimität" (1933), in *Von der Weimarer Republik zum Faschismus* (Frankfurt/Main, 1976).

29. Kirchheimer, "Legalität und Legitimität," *op.cit.*

30. Kirchheimer, "Marxismus, Diktatur und Organisationsform des Proletariats" (1933), in *Funktion des Staates und der Verfassung* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1972); see also Wolfgang Luthardt, "Bemerkungen zu Otto Kirchheimers Arbeiten bis 1933," in *Von der Weimarer Republik zum Faschismus, op. cit.*

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them.

If it makes sense to examine academic developments in terms of the student-teacher relation, the case of Marcuse may prove more spectacular than that of Kirchheimer. In his relation with Heidegger, as Marcuse later noted, it was "not a personal problem but a generational one."[31] From the start, he understood the recourse to Heidegger's philosophy as a criticism of Marxism. In Heidegger's concrete philosophy, as he labelled the account in *Being and Time*, he found both a revolutionary overcoming of bourgeoise philosophy as well as a program through which he hoped to overcome the methodological objectivism and the political indecisiveness of Marxism. He postulated nothing less than an integration and reciprocal correction of phenomenology and dialectic, of existential analysis and historical materialism.

The idea of an integration of Marxism and existentialism was based on a diagnosis of two deficits.[32] In Marxism, to the extent that it is a study of social structure (that is, historical facts primarily related to structures and not to human existence), the danger of objectivism is implicit. This can be corrected through the concreteness of experience articulated by the Heideggerian concept of existential analysis. Only to the extent that historical facts are articulated in terms of the experience of existential reality can historical development be understood as the alienated product of man himself. Conversely, Heidegger is hampered by the level of abstraction with which he views this development as fate. Thus, he speaks of historicity instead of real social conflicts. He must learn from historical materialism that historical destiny is carried out by concrete social relations, i.e., in relations of production and domination.

The consequences of these considerations are evident in detailed reviews which Marcuse published, beginning in 1930, in the theoretical organ of the Social Democrats, *Gesellschaft*. They suggest a political criticism of Marxism by questioning its philosophical roots. The key ideas are those Marcuse developed in his attempt to fuse Marxism and phenomenology. Thus, he criticizes Max Adler's transcendental-philosophical grounding of Marxism,[33] counterposing it with the concept of life, borrowed from Dilthey, as the basis of intellectual historical research.[34] In the case of Hans Freyer's essay, "Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft," he again makes clear that the first obligation of a self-criticism of sociology is to break through its own conceptual abstractions and to let concrete historical experience come to the fore.[35] Here, however, it becomes evident how ineffectual Marcuse's criticism of sociology

31. Thusly, Herbert Marcuse in Jürgen Habermas, et al., ed. *Gespräche mit Herbert Marcuse* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), p. 10. Translated in English as Habermas et al., "Theory and Politics," in *Telos* No. 38 (Winter 1978-79), p. 125.

32. Herbert Marcuse, "Beiträge zu einer Phänomenologie des historischen Materialismus" (1928), in *Schriften* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), I, 347ff. English translation in *Telos* 4 (Fall 1969), pp. 3-34, as "Contribution to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism."

33. Marcuse, "Transzendentaler Marxismus?" (1930), in *Schriften*, I, 445ff.

34. Marcuse, "Das Problem der geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit," in *Schriften*, I, 469ff.

35. Marcuse, "Zur Auseinandersetzung mit Hans Freyers 'Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft' " (1931), in *Schriften*, I, 489ff.

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and Marxism is. The philosophical impulse, understood as a corrective, suddenly turns out to be a formula more suited for hindering concrete social-scientific research than fostering it.

Marcuse's dependence on his teacher becomes clear when one considers the political theory which follows from the programmatic confluence of Marxism and phenomenology. Of course, Marcuse complains that Heidegger's analysis of crises in terms of *Geschick, Sorge* and *Geworfenheit* remains purely philosophical and abstract. Yet, Marcuse himself hardly goes beyond the idea of a philosophy of deed, when he replaces the Heideggerian call for decisiveness with the call to revolution.[36] Marcuse lacks a precise analysis of the crisis that could generate a highly developed political strategy. This problem and its cause contrasts sharply with Otto Kirchheimer's Weimar writings: a rational mediation of social analysis and political action in a complicated "bourgeois" political system is only possible, if a detailed analysis of the political is provided. Marcuse ignores this mediation and applies the phenomenological classification of alienation directly to a philosophy of the revolutionary deed, to the revolutionary decisionism of an otherwise unknown proletarian subject.

A noticeable shift in this constellation, which is reminiscent of the problematic gap between existential analysis and historical ontology in Heidegger arises in 1932 because of Marcuse's reaction to the publication of Marx's Paris-manuscripts.[37] He designated them immediately as a "decisive event in the history of Marx studies." The concept of work takes on central importance as all-inclusive, human practice, and it takes over the role of mediator, in order to close the gap. In this way objectivism, both in the economistic understanding of the history of Marxism as well as in the existential history, of fundamental ontology, appears avoidable. Furthermore, an ahistorically subjective analysis of existence, stressing a philosophy of the deed, can also be rejected. Work, as the "ontologically basic category,"[38] provides a concept in which the history of the human species is thematized under the double aspects of self-production and self-alienation. Revolutionary decisionism can be overcome in a complex of human and social practice, and the interpretation of the historical situation becomes the study of the given social and political relations.

One may view the Marxist-Heideggerian beginning of Marcuse's political theory as a passing phase, but it need not be depicted as a youthful sin.[39] If one examines how in 1934 Marcuse distanced himself from Heidegger's flirting with National Socialism, it becomes clear that he wanted to separate the political side of the problem from the theoretical concerns of Heideggerian

36. Marcuse, "Beiträge zu einer Phänomenologie des historischen Materialismus," *op. cit.*, I, 364.

37. Marcuse, "Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des historischen Materialismus" (1932), in *Schriften*, I, 509. Translated in English as "On the Philosophical Foundation of the Concept of Labor in Economics," in *Telos* 16, (Summer 1973), pp. 9-37.

38. "Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des historischen Materialismus," *op.cit.*, I, 532.

39. Thus, Alfred Schmidt in "Existential-Ontologie und historischer Materialismus bei Herbert Marcuse," in *Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse*, ed. Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), pp. 17ff.

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philosophy.[40] Of course, Heidegger's historicism has been replaced and transformed by the Marxist category of human experience. Yet, the double-sided ontological question remains. On the one hand, Marcuse holds fast to the opposition inherent in Heidegger's phenomenological analysis *vis-à-vis* the methodology of academic philosophy as well as the economic aspect of established Marxism. On the other hand, Marcuse claims that it is still possible after the collapse of an idealistic world view to bring the disparate elements of philosophy, science, and politics into a cohesive whole. He sees the Paris manuscripts as a model in which "philosophical criticism and the foundation of a political economy" can be considered together "in the sense of a theory of revolution."[41]

It is doubtful whether Marcuse succeeded. His Weimar writings lack not only a well-defined political theory but also a sufficiently clear and methodologically useful understanding of how philosophical reflection, historical development, and political theory can be mediated in the present. This becomes clearer when compared to the programmatic pronouncements with which Max Horkheimer[42] established himself in 1931 as the new director of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, and to which Marcuse, after his emigration, remained so loyal that for the next ten years nothing was seen of his Heideggerian-Marxist origins. Yet, this does not mean that the ontological core of his thinking, as one might call it, fully disappeared. With the abandonment of the Institute, dominated by "Horkheimer's Marxism" and its paradigm of an interdisciplinary Marxism in 1942, and especially after 1955, with the publication of *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse's ontological core reappears in a form clearly reminiscent of Heidegger, despite the integration of psychoanalysis. The key concepts include the thesis of the political character of technology, which shows parallels to Heidegger's metaphysics and the inversion of Freud's pessimistic philosophy into an ontology of the liberation of the libido.[43] Both theories and their combination predestined Marcuse to become the philosophical father of the Student Movement, and a politically symbolic figure who, in subcutaneous but definite ways, has influenced the alternative movements of the more immediate present. This influence was due in part to the substantial ontological bias, philosophically speaking, which ties the thinking of the theoretical foster-father with the cultural-revolutionary practice of his children and grandchildren. Marcuse remained a politically engaged thinker because of his resistance to scientific rationalism, implicit in the fusion of existential analysis and crisis interpretation from the beginning, and which had found in Heidegger's *Being and Time* the right

40. Marcuse, "Der Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der totalitären Staatsauffassung" (1934), in *Schriften* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), III, 44ff.

41. Marcuse, "Neue Quellen zur Grundlegen des historischen Materialismus," I, 509.

42. Max Horkheimer, "Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung" (1931), in *Sozialphilosophische Studien*, ed. Werner Brede (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1972).

43. Marcuse, "Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft," in *Schriften* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), V; "Industrialisierung und Kapitalismus im Werk Max Webers" (1964), in *Schriften* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1965), II.

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expression for the Weimar period. How explosive this mixture was is demonstrated by none other than Jean-Paul Sartre, whose thinking displays many parallels to Marcuse's early works.[44]

What does it mean to presume in the development of theories indebted to irrationalism a progress of rationalism? The question only makes sense if one is willing to acknowledge that the difference between rationalism and irrationalism is itself enormously problematic. It is a question of drawing a boundary, which has the effect of rationalization rather than enlightenment if pursued from the narrow perspective of rationalism. Such rationalization is not avoided if one introduces criteria whereby the rational is equated with progress and the irrational with regression. It is more honest to understand the relation of rationalism and irrationalism as a dialectic and to thematize the irrationalism of rationalism itself.[45] It would be important to ask where the irrational blind spots of rationalism lie at certain points in its historical development and, more concretely, where such blind spots can be located in the political culture on the eve of National Socialism.

Since it is impossible here to detail the intellectual-political fronts in the Weimar intelligentsia, a reference to the author, who embodied in his person the contradictions of the period in a most remarkable way, has to suffice. It was none other than Walter Benjamin, who in his little-known essay, "Zur Kritik des Gewalts,"[46] pointed out that neither the liberal legal normativism nor the Marxist criticism of the bourgeois state was sufficient to domesticate the latent violent potential of the legal state. The reason he gave remained equally foreboding and vague; for Benjamin, it lay in irrational mythic origins, which perpetuated themselves in the life of the modern state. One has to uncover them in order to illuminate the subliminal dynamic which was about to overthrow Weimar's enlightenment political culture. One can interpret this reference as a challenge to political theory to shift the enterprise of criticism on to that dubious terrain which was occupied by the modern obscurantists, and at the same time, to defeat them there.

Neumann, Kirchheimer, and Marcuse followed this direction a bit, and they could do so because the unconscious orientation derived from their status as students protected political theory from premature proscriptions. In the Weimar Republic they had neither the goal nor the theoretical means to examine more substantially what the assimilation of conservative theorems meant for critical theory. Nor did this happen during the next phase of their intellectual biography, which led all three authors to the exiled Institute for Social Research. In this new working environment, research on National Socialism was done from the perspective of the crisis of Weimar, in the context of the division of disciplinary labor, based on Horkheimer's materialist paradigm. While the ideological-critical distancing from the representatives of

44. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Marxismus und Existentialismus* (1960; rpt. Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1964).

45. See Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (1947; rpt. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1971).

46. Walter Benjamin, "Zur Kritik der Gewalt" (1921), in *Gesammelte Schriften, Werkausgabe* (Frankfurt/Main: 1980), IV, 179ff.

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the conservative revolution who stayed in Germany remained dominant, the problem of rationalism and irrationalism was not an issue. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that studies of National Socialism by Kirchheimer and Neumann in the early forties were implicitly inspired by the idea of a dialectic of rationalism. One could name here Kirchheimer's thesis of the transformation of legal rationalism into technical rationalism and Neumann's views on the differentiation of the power monopoly under National Socialism. They represent the political corollaries to the social-psychological studies of fascism which, through their dependence on Freud's theory of the subconscious, had taken up the question of the rationality of the irrational much more directly.[47]

Not until the middle 1940s was the question generalized in terms of the tradition of Western rationalism as such. In Horkheimer's and Adorno's *Dialektik der Aufklärung,* which radicalized the criticism of instrumental reason historically and philosophically, it became evident that the contact with conservative thought had meant more than a simple parallel and belonged to the constituents of critical theory itself. The central reference figures were no longer enlightenment thinkers such as Kant and Marx but the "dark" writers of bourgeois modernity, de Sade and Nietzsche. The question whether the enlightenment substance of critical theory as such has been betrayed continues to fuel contemporary social philosophical discussions. Habermas has recently questioned the theoretical validity of older critical theories as a whole, arguing that their shortcomings can only be overcome if critical social theory is placed in the context of a communication theory rather than in the critique of rationality.[48] While Habermas clearly indicates the social areas in which the costs of rationalism are too high, one can ask whether the causes of such defects are adequately explained in his theory of modernism or whether his diagnosis is not subject to a rationalistic short-coming because of a social theory which must accept the central tenets of functionalist-system theory, i.e., of the social-scientific-conservatism, in order to militate against the normative bias of communication theory. Thus, the formation of Habermas' theory would be an appropriate object for the sort of investigation that has been directed at the Weimar writings of Neumann, Kirchheimer, and Marcuse.

The theoretical basis of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* may be problematic,[49] but this cannot mean, as Habermas himself admits, that the radicalism of a social philosophy concerned with the irrationalism of modern rationalism, would be abandoned. On the contrary, if the achievement of neoconservative politics in the progressive Western democracies is more than a wrinkle in the world spirit, if, as several observers maintain, it indicates the end

47. See also Helmut Dubiel's and Alfons Söllner's introduction to *Wirtschaft, Recht und Staat im Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Max Horkheimer et al. (Frankfurt/Main: Europäische, 1981).

48. Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handels* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), es. I, 489ff; II, 548ff.

49. Habermas, "Die Verschlingung von Mythos und Aufklärung, in *Mythos und Moderne*, ed. Karl Heinz Bohrer (Frankfurt/Main: 1983), pp. 405ff.

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of growth-directed late capitalism, then important findings of older critical theories, which one can reconstruct under the label "political dialectic of enlightenment,"[50] could regain credibility. This fact appears to stand counter to Habermas's formulation of social-scientific enlightenment. This concluding remark should not be seen as a contribution to the dogmatization of older critical theory; it is a challenge to understand not ony modernization itself as an "unfinished project" (Habermas), but also the tradition of its criticism.

50. See my essay, "Politische Dialektik der Aufklärung," in *Sozialforschung als Kritik*, ed. Wolfgang Bonss and Axel Honneth (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), pp. 281ff.

TERRORISMES

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CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT*

by Claude Karnoouh

Most works dealing with Third World development have been carried out by using Western demographic and economic concepts. Moreover, ethnologically-oriented analyses focusing on the dynamics of development have had little effect on development programs. Finally, a good number of these studies did not go beyond a well-meaning but uncritical empiricism regarding the analytical grids to be applied to new post-colonial and cultural forms. Today no one denies the impact of modernity on the social life of developing countries. Technology, science and economics create social, ideological and cultural models which tend to identify these new nations with the purely Western source that invents and propagates them. It is no longer wrong to speak of a gigantic homogenization of the planet through the flood of commodities transported and distributed by industrial countries: from transistor radios to the military rifle.

Yet, long before the current economic crisis, experts had already expressed reservations concerning development policies whose painful failures they foresaw. Enunciated at a time of rapid growth in industrial countries, their warnings were rejected: capitalism and socialism agreed at least on the objectives of development. Why, then, have Third Worlders been incapable of applying effectively the ready-made solutions proposed by experts from the industrialized countries? Why have they not achieved that society of abundance and consumption which so fascinates them?

Surely, one could have foreseen that the famous "savage thought" that Lévi-Strauss once characterized as "*bricolage*" would not be able, in so few years, to adopt Western modes of reflection governed by a scientific thought that aims at dominating the natural world. When put bluntly in this fashion, two interconnected questions arise. First, are we so sure that "savage thought" is just a lawless aggregation? Must we not try to understand its laws and the values that legitimate it? Such questions can be answered only if we try to understand native societies on their own terms. To avoid this approach leads only to imposing by force solutions which native peoples will divert from their initial objectives. Understanding, if not explaining, failures in development requires a reflection on social otherness and its cultural values.

Savage versus Scientific Thinking

To identify "savage thinking" with "*bricolage*": is this not our usual way of diverting attention from our ignorance of other societies? Real understanding presupposes knowledge of their languages, their conceptual frameworks and especially their symbolization procedures. What can we expect from a very

* Translated by David Parent

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brief encounter with languages whose phonological, lexical and grammatical systems do not belong to the Indo-European universe? How can we comprehend native thinking and the categories which express its transcendental values when these are inconceivable within our conceptual framework? It was Nietzsche who spoke of unconscious affinities of grammatical categories in Indo-European philosophies: "We have invented, as so many fictions, cause, sequence, reciprocity, relativity, obligation, number, law, liberty, reason, goal; and when we falsely introduce into 'things' this self-invented world of signs, when we incorporate them in things as though they belonged to their essence, we create a mythology."[1]

How can we understand and decipher the ambiguities of native statements? How can we fathom not only the extra-linguistic reason for the myth or rite, but any human action that is thought before acted? The self-assurance that many show with regard to native languages after spending two or three years, at most, in those countries is astonishing. When we compare the seriousness with which specialists of classical European languages pursue their studies, still adding glosses to Latin, Greek, or Slavonic works, the fate reserved for native languages seems quite unenviable: African, Melanesian, or Indian dictionaries contain but shadows, approximations, total absences.

Obviously, to produce exact translations is less important than to penetrate, as much as possible, conceptual enigmas that threaten to escape us. Treating native languages lightly, however, we set about our business too quickly, translating native concepts with terms from the positive sciences and thereby devaluing those concepts. Seen from this angle, Lévi-Strauss's "*bricolage*" is merely the structuralist version of Lévy-Bruhl's functionalist "pre-logical mentality."

Derrida writes: "Is not ethnocentrism always betrayed by the haste with which it is satisfied with certain translations or certain domestic equivalents?"[2] To renounce "domestic equivalents" implies that we must think the native world within its language. Does this not postulate, however, the impossibility of ethnological and all other scientific discourse, including that on development? Everyone knows that ethnological discourse lies at the heart of ambiguities in translation, of approximations and equivalences which are never identities. Whatever our familiarity with an exotic culture may be, we very quickly become aware of the apparently unsurmountable conceptual discrepancies. Without a precise delimitation of the equivalences we propose, we risk introducing generalizations that merely project our own conceptual field upon that of the other society.This risk applies equally to the ethnology of Europe, where the spatial proximity of Otherness led to the idea that even the most traditional peasant societies could be interpreted within the framework of social theories of the modern state. Thus was an identification forced between the heirs of a trans-national scholarly tradition and exemplars of local and popular cultures.

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (Paris: 10/18, 1975), p. 54.
2. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Paris: Minuit, 1969), p. 180.

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To conceive the direct application of Western technical procedures without *a priori* questioning their compatibility with the recipient cultures is to deny Otherness and its manifold cultural manifestations. What to a superficial observer might appear as a lack of desire for technical change on the part of inexperienced and indifferent peoples recently promoted to the rank of nations, seems rather to result from the rejection of native thought in the name of an illusion: namely, the universality of positive causality. To rely solely on positive science and techniques tested by almost two centuries of industrialization is to exclude Otherness — which cannot be reduced to an economic, demographic or sociological category — from the field of comprehension.

The West does not have a monopoly on Thought; thought belongs to humanity, since behavior or behaviors are never originally just action, but above all thought, and hence concept. Thus essential differences in activity stem less from action (the action of techniques operative in social reproduction) than from the thought that invests these techniques (or other more traditional ones) with ideas embodying transcendental principles and values. If we forget this old Platonic postulate in the name of the positive sciences, we are vulnerable to the same critique that Hegel addressed to the phrenologists of his time, who believed that they could discover the secrets of intelligence by measuring the shape of the cranium. Cross-examining them, he asked "whether thought can be reduced to a bone." However antiquated they may be, indigenous populations also think the world; and their action, however feeble it may seem, cannot be considered negligible; for, despite the more than precarious conditions in which they face the world, the survival into "post-industrial" society of their radical differences is striking proof that material prosperity and economic and social security are not absolute pre-conditions for the flowering of thought. Just to recall this instills a salutary, and perhaps saving, skepticism *vis à vis* the arrogant authority of our technological, economic and military power.

The Blindness of the West

What a strange idea the West had to think that it could transform the modes of thought, behavior, and beliefs of peoples in a few decades! Why not apply to the native peoples the patient research in the history of ideas which shows how slowly conceptual, social, and economic changes came about in Western Europe? It took no less than three centuries after the Galilean-Newtonian revolution to share this knowledge! Who today, among the masses of the developed countries, understands the theory of relativity and the cybernetic logic of genetics? The West's desire to initiate change in developing countries with quick modern solutions seems to stem more from a politico-economic will based on a quasi-religious conception of positive science than from an effort of reason moved by the desire to understand another "reality." For, to rely on the exclusive merit of models provided by the positive sciences amounts to believing, among other things, that their practical realization could transform them directly into categories of native understanding directed

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toward their original ends. When we assume this, we are no different from African sorcerors who believe their incantations have the power to stop the will of the white engineer whose highway is destroying a ritual site or an ancestral altar. The force of persuasion with which we invest the positive sciences and their techniques betrays a mental stance akin to magic; we seem to feel that the mere display of our industrial products will deeply modify, if not revolutionize, conceptions and ideas. Never did the consumption of technical objects imply that their user knew the theoretical principles that made their realization possible. It is, then, not enough to sneer at the natives' clumsy appropriation of Western techniques: failures in development (as well as the extension of the West's economic and social crisis) should make us modest, for the ineffective solutions we propose for the tragedy of underdevelopment remain, to a considerable extent, the product of our own deficiencies.

Certainly, no one should rejoice at the impasse into which many development policies have fallen, but some of these failures do have a positive aspect, insofar as they articulate native thought's resistance to Western models. In the majority of cases, resistance takes the form of a misuse of techniques and institutions rather than a clear apprehension of the dangers that threaten tradition. To divert the object-signs of modernity from their intended use does not immunize one (any more than it does Western man) to the fascination they exert; yet, the diversion of ends is the only means whereby native thought can "internalize" the strangeness of the event, pacifying it and integrating it into the field of its cognitive system. The time for absolute rejection has long since passed, and except for a few rare groups of marginalized humans, the current epoch generates compromise: syncretism.

We need no longer feign condescending surprise on finding an African herdsman carrying a transistor radio dangling from his staff, nor mock the Polynesian fisherman eating Japanese sardines from a can while sitting on the sandy shore of a lagoon teeming with fish. For us, of course, such behavior is strange, since we long ago destroyed our ecological sites and now seek in peasant simplicity the illusion of paradise. Instead, we should question the strangeness and so overcome the naive surprise and tawdry exoticism of tourists (no longer relevant anyway now that Western power has extended the market economy on a planetary scale, filling any lacunae left by the old colonialism). Nor should it be forgotten that this badly integrated modernity, misused and diverted, entails an absolute pauperization of countries that have only raw materials to sell in a market over which they have no control. This gigantic disorder is not a loss for everyone: how many factories and multinational corporations prosper in the wake of this dysfunction?

An example from France at the dawn of rural industrialization will illustrate this. Toward the end of the 1940s, after the interruption of growth due to World War II, France promoted a vast agricultural modernization campaign. Aided by numerous advisors and an economic policy of low interest loans, modernist propaganda penetrated the French fields in the form of the tractor, needed to meet a growing demand for agricultural products. Very quickly

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French farmers abandoned animals for tractors, buying the most powerful engines without worrying too much about the profitability of their investments. The size of the farms often called for smaller tractors, or even simple motorized cultivators, but it was quickly realized that a son or daughter could not marry if the farm did not have a tractor worthy of the name. Thus, the tractor was integrated into village relations and traditional values in a way that disregarded its intended function. This diversion of functions and the resulting over-consumption had a great impact on traditional rural society, for, by means of the tractor, it was integrated — via credit, post-sale maintenance, new sources of energy, and cultural adjustments — into the general economy. Moreover, the entire local socio-economic structure was turned upside down: the blacksmith was replaced by the garage mechanic and jobbers by franchisers of competing national and international trademarks. A technical innovation thus broke a global tradition and brought about the regrouping of lands, the increase of tilled acreages, and the gigantic rural exodus which sealed what Henri Mendras has called "the end of the farmers."[3]

But we speak of the France of the late sixties, after eighty years of free, secular, and mandatory education, after two highly technological world wars, of a society creating techniques conceived in a language more or less shared by all its citizens. Nonetheless, the relevance of our thesis is underscored by the problems that this labor force of rural origin, still attached to some of its most fundamental values, posed for rapid industrialization. Barbichon's work on the sociology of labor and migration clarifies the peasant-craftsmen's difficulties in adapting to the modalities of industrial labor, to the division of labor, and the attendant work tempo.[4] Yet, what characterizes the transition from tradition to modernity in industrial countries is precisely its rapidity. Thanks to the extension of higher education, urbanization, massive consumerism, social welfare policies, and the politics of leisure, traditional rural values were transformed in less than one generation into a new system of references, no longer bourgeois and elitist, but rather based in mass democracy. In brief, we have here the evolution of a society which, confronted with tradition, abolishes that tradition by its own dynamism stemming from a movement peculiar to its own history. It was thus the mass of immigrant workers, attached both to the most devalued work and to traditions alien to French customs, who would create, on the very soil of the metropolis, cultural syncretisms.

But Third World societies, including those in which independence was achieved after tragic colonial wars, have never known such a dynamism. The Indian ethnologist Dumont has stressed the sometimes insurmountable difficulties toward which every modernist hurdles when faced with tradition: "We believed naively that an energetic and generalized action would in a few years transform Indian agriculture. Now we know, from an abundant literature, how difficult the enterprise is, how existing social relations restrain pos-

3. Henri Mendras, *La Fin des paysans* (Paris: S.E.D.E.I.S., 1967).
4. G. Barbichon, *Migrants ruraux et travailleurs de l'industrie* (Paris: D.G.R.S.T., 1975).

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sible progress, and that it is easier to dig pits and to construct highway ramps than to change a peasant's mentality and to get him to become an agent of change in his own interest."[5] What Dumont says of India can be applied to all developing countries, with this additional remark: change is sometimes detrimental to the interests of the new state. As soon as we interject factors linked with social relations into development problems, we inevitably question the legitimating values on which they are based, values that are the very essence of cultural difference, of Otherness. The Indian caste system, the great variety of lineage systems, the various modes of relation in more restricted kinship groups, these elementary social relations cannot be captured by such essential determinants of Western social modernity as the conjugal family and the individual.

We are not proposing as alternative to Third World change a harmonious peasant throwback culture, happy in its poverty. Traditional culture has its own struggles and mortal conflicts, but the advances resulting from these battles are not identical with those which the West has invented in its extension of the market economy.[6] They are linked with different stakes, with kinship, ancestry, ritual initiations or mastery. As Dumont shows, the difference stems not just from a practice or from social relations, but from their founding principles. For example, the caste system produces a rigid equilibrium that results in an immobile social structure, and the system always works for the benefit of the upper castes. For this reason, this mode of exploitation, which is now adapting to capitalist exploitation, cannot really identify with capitalism, for social mobility is excluded from its principles derived from a totally different conception of Being. Whereas in the West ontological Being stems from a unique and irreducible conception of the individual, in Indian civilization it follows from a bipolar conception "within an infinitely divisible hierarchical whole." Once this no longer structural but ontological composition is made clear, the two universes of thought are seen to be irreconcilable, despite sometimes identical practices. This is again the problem posed by the attitude of elites who, nourished on Western thought and faced with tradition, find themselves torn between two mutually exclusive reference systems.

Any development policy which does not take into account these differences is destined to failure, turmoil, and even catastrophe. When the majority of Third World countries gained independence and gave themselves, or were given, constitutions and institutions copied from the old sovereign states, no one was surprised to see them fail in a few years, or even months. Very quickly the beautiful edifice of Western and Eastern European style governments crumbled and, except for monolithic powers, all or nearly all Third World nations were transformed into authoritarian or dictatorial governments based on the power of the police, the army, a single party (able to practice a liberal type of economy), an ethnic group, the dominant religious groups, or a caste. A prerequisite for understanding this failure is an analysis of the specificity of the idea of democracy in the West.

5. L. Dumont, *La Civilisation indienne et nous* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1975), p. 88.
6. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1944).

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How can European thinkers forget the slow gestation of European democracy? How many decades were necessary to realize a mass democracy based on universal suffrage, economic expansion, consumption, and mastery of the contingencies of fortune by diverse institutions that compensate for individual error? Modern democracy, stemming from the 19th century industrialization process, represents both the power of producers and the omnipotence of the State, which integrates and controls the citizens in the name of their own security. Any reference to Greek democracy is thus an illusion that obscures the radical mutation undergone by the concept during twenty-five centuries of practice. Whereas among the Greeks democracy implied the absence of participation in productive work for those who thought up and implemented the laws, contemporary democracy presupposes participation in the production process.[7]

Given democracy's long evolution in the West, its failure in the Third World was foreseeable. Other illusions, too, joined the naiveté, the generous and simplistic enthusiasms, or the cynical calculations of the West. For instance, the struggles for national independence were wrongly identified with the establishment of Western (liberal or socialist) democracy, despite the absence of a strong working class and of a powerful middle class; both urbanized and integrated into a whole, both sharing the awareness of belonging to one same cultural entity. European social integration was the result of many violent internal conflicts, of the slow construction of unions in an economic and cultural process which gradually eroded regional particularism. Political modernity was not realized in a few years, nor was it imposed (or imported) by powers foreign to those which had developed in France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain or the United States. Each state invented its own version of mass democracy in conjunction with its particular historical dynamics. None of the traits that characterize European modernization exists in Third World countries, which, for the most part, were kept in a state of dependence, either by stabilizing their traditional political organizations despite the transformation of productive forces, or by destroying traditional society for the benefit of a colonial society based more or less implicitly on separate development.

Why, then, feign astonishment at the failures that are making a mockery of democratic tradition? Political democracy is not a reward offered to a deserving pupil; nor is it a technical object which can be started merely by pushing a button. Democracy is an inter-subjectivity, a representation of the world which, prior to all action or any particular institutional form, presupposes not only a conception of the relations between humans, but above all an ontological vision of humans in Humanity. To cite Rousseau, it involves an ontology of Being as a unique and irreducible individual, equal and free in essence prior to any historical formation. Stemming from the Enlightenment, these ideas slowly penetrated the European masses. They did not succeed, as shown in the nationalist xenophobias of World War I and the totalitarian messianisms of World War II, where the Western democratic ideal met an irremediable

7. Hannah Arendt, *La Crise de la culture* (Paris: Gallimard, 1972).

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defeat: "the defeat of reason" (Stefan Zweig). The lesson was not lost on the new powers, which now prefer the virtue of violent constraint to the slow and difficult route of democratic compromise.

In Third World countries, the intrinsic weakness of the state, the artificiality of political institutions open the way to solutions based solely on coercion by the group in power, since these weaknesses leave room for all the external interventions that trifle with this or that competing group. The sense of the state, of public service, of national unity, of the citizen's rights and duties presupposes an experience of which the majority of developing countries are unaware, save those which, having the tradition of an ancient learned culture, were concurrently subjugated by the West: in this sense, China and Zaire are as different as Egypt and Vanuatu.

How, then, can we expect a rapid acculturation to Western norms? How, without violating subjects, can we promote the material prosperity that would lead to a more or less representative democracy? Before presenting possible answers, we must once more emphasize this strange blindness of Western Reason, this mystique of the saving power of technology. A belief certainly, but also a will to economic and political power that hides behind a humanism with little respect for Otherness!

How difficult these answers are, since so much disarray and cynicism, ignorance and Malthusianism, hope for possible prosperity, and anguish over future apocalypses are intermingled in them. The West forgets the Other because it forgets its own self in the obsessive and permanent nihilism of its technical innovations. Western man forgets himself, for he is caught in the bottomless whirlpool of infinite growth. As he hesitates between different possible complementary or contradictory solutions, Western man achieves amnesia regarding a precarious past by incessantly rewriting his history, casting into oblivion his errors and those courses of action that do not conform with the humanism he never ceases to proclaim (especially for the use of others), magnifying his present will by casting it is a determinist and purely causal logic of the past. Forgetting his past, Western man necessarily ignores the people of other societies by assigning his own future to them. This is where technical and positivist thinking rejoins the mythic thinking which it had hoped to abolish. But whereas myth insists on reinterpreting the present in the light of prior perfection, positivist thinking, once the original fall into alienation has been posited, drunkenly pursues an endless race toward a limitless ideal society of consumerism, a society without government and without communism — both negations of a prior plenitude. It is already a century since Nietzsche vigorously denounced the spiritual mediocrity of our "world of grocers" in the name of a pre-Platonic Greece where he discerned fullness and authenticity. He enjoined us to rediscover the meaning of our life — or rather of our survival. But we turned a deaf ear, preferring dissipation in the liberating mirages of consumerism and genocidal messianisms. When the Others, the primitives, refuse to submit to this program mapped out for them, they remain "savages" to be exterminated.

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Primitiveness as Ideology

No approach to the primitive can avoid the problem of history or rather that of the historicity of Western culture, for without distorting the evolution of Western ideas, it is clear that our history is none other than that of development. Beyond a chronological chain of discrete events, we establish a causal chain entailing "a complex of significant changes."[8] A causal conception gives a positive meaning to time; to the idea of scientific and technical progress, we give the status of an absolute and universal standard for measuring the value of a society. Dumont defines this as "a gradual eschatology." Following Nietzsche, I prefer to call it "the nihilism of progress." But in postulating the non-temporal truth of this version of time, which is again a conception of history, we obscure both its recent genesis and the originality of its implications. Temporal causality is a new concept in the history of human thought; for a long time it remained marginal. The conception that prior events produce effects whose results must necessarily create a new social state and a new value system has revolutionized the entire history of European ideas.

This revolution overturned not only ideas, behaviors and attitudes, it eliminated every other view of the past that did not correspond to its categories of knowledge. Theories of progress have made us forgetful and blind, eliminating the possibility of perceiving the degradation of modernity, which, originally a global social project, was gradually transformed into economic and bureaucratic management. While, at the beginning of the 19th century, progress, i.e. modernity, posed the essential question of liberty, at present it demands primarily the maintenance of chaotic economic systems to which liberty is subjugated.

It is, after all, this universality of progress which establishes the possibility of anthropoligical discourse, whatever the latter's subsequent theoretical references may be. Anthropological discourse requires at its origin a "pure" primitiveness conceived as man-prior-to-alienation. This primitiveness cannot, however, be compared with Rousseau's "good savage"; the primitiveness studied by anthropology is already a society, with rules, laws, norms, beliefs. "Pure" primitiveness without alienation always emerges at the origin, whatever one's theoretical framework: primitive communism in the eyes of Marxist or Freudian evolutionists; society without history in Lévi-Strauss's neo-Kantian framework; poverty and abundance by restriction of needs for Marshall Sahlins; or absence of authoritarian constraints for Pierre Clastres. Primitiveness never knows alienation, that stigma of "evil" which is the exclusive fate of modernity. Here we have a generous design on the part of scholars confronted with the murderous derelictions of a modernity which did not bring the anticipated happiness; to what extent is this primitiveness adorned with our own unrealized and unrealizable dreams?

Despite the changes evident in the Third World and errors in development policy, and perhaps even because of these failures, tradition haunts the West like a screen filtering out the gigantic homogenization process of which we are

8. Dumont, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

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the principal agents. Confronted with our anguish for similarity, primitiveness resists the modern Holy Trinity of science, technology and progress. This resistance gives rise to a frequent error: we exclude from our conception of primitiveness those traditions that survive in renewed forms, as cultural syncretisms. Anthropological discourse has established an equivalence between primitiveness and relics of the past, forgetting on the one hand that primitiveness cannot be a relic, for it is "life," and on the other that the relic can quite easily incorporate itself into modern forms that distort modern functions and transform their objectives. To speak of relics already presupposes a total adherence to the idea of progress assumed by anthropological theories that issued from evolutionism and functionalism. Complementary to the concept of relics is the possibility of a more perfect social state, more harmonious than any prior states except for the ideal state that preceded the fall. There is thus a sharp contradiction between the primitiveness postulated outside alienation and a teleological future that promises happiness in an ever receding future. It is this contradiction that Lévi-Strauss thought to eliminate, thirty years ago, in a report on race and history commissioned by UNESCO, in which he denounced the evolutionistic constructions of prior anthropological theories. For the author, the error of evolutionism was that it "treated human societies as strata of one sole line of development."[9]

His alternative was supported by contemporary physical and biological theories based on the laws of probability. Both evolutionism and probabilism, however, are plausible. Western history confirms the first, while our ignorance of the internal dynamics proper to primitive societies before our contact with them leaves open the possibility of the second (without, however, responding to factors created by colonization and de-colonization). In short, Lévi-Strauss was pleading for "a coalition between cultures, a pooling together . . . of the potentialities of each culture for our own historical development . . . to equalize each player's resources." It is indeed a question of postulating equal chances for each culture — equality between cultures because each one of them represents just one form of alienation. But formal analogy here ignores the West's world conquest. This hypothetical equality is as much an illusion as the fall of man into alienation, for relics of the past have long been subjected to models imposed by the West. On contact with the West, tradition changes into folklore commercialized for tourist consumption, or an ideological instrument in the service of a nationalism, or it gets lost in other syncretic forms.[10] The West swallows up everything and leaves the other players no chance to develop an autonomous will: the Beatles appropriate Indian music to sell it to enthusiastic Western masses, and the art market transforms ritual effigies into objects of speculation. All the chances

9. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Le Racisme devant la science* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960).

10. Alain Babadzan, "Remarques sur la construction d'un objet anthropologique dans l'étude des sociétés acculturées," in *Observation in Anthropology* (Gand, 1981), pp. 85-97. Concerning an identical phenomenon discovered in Central and Eastern Europe, see my "National Unity in Central Europe, The State, Peasant Folklore and Mono-Ethnism," in *Telos*, No. 53 (Fall 1982), pp. 95-105.

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are on our side. It is within these constraints that the world of Otherness must operate, and it does so by constructing syncretisms, which form as many relations to Western culture as there are cultural traditions on this planet. Neither an identical copy of the West, nor primitiveness free of all alienation, Otherness, oscillating between archaic traditions and the spawling shanty-towns of the Third World, poses dangerous questions which reflect back our own image unmasked of all humanitarian verbiage.

The appeal to tolerance implied in Lévi-Strauss's theoretical propositions hides an essential truth with which the social and cultural homogenization of our planet confronts us. Derrida put it thus: "Western thought, this thought whose destiny consists in extending its rule to the extent that the West withdraws its own."[11]

Today the appeal to tolerance must not be masked behind brilliant screens; on the contrary, we must be fully aware of all the identities, analogies, and inequalities which drag the Third World along in the wake of the West:

1. The Westernization of the world has been achieved; not a single home resists it, and even when tradition seems to come flooding back violently, as is presently the case with Islam, this return is indissolubly attached to modernity. Fundamentalism, which is surely an archaic manner of opposing the West's political and ideological will, cannot escape the fate which gave rise to it: it is with modern means provided by us and in the name of values which are ours — the state, the integrating unity of the nation — that it tries to combat the Western "Satan." If there exist today some margins of primitiveness (Latin America, Oceania), this situation must not be regarded as due to any forebearance on the West's part, but simply as a zone of marginality within a total space of economic and political profit.

2. But homogenization does not mean equalization of resources and of human development. The discrimination established by this extension of Western values and practices cannot be treated only in anthropological terms, it must also be dealt with in political terms.

3. Finally, homogenization does not mean the disappearance of traditional forms, the abolition of annihilation of transcendent cultural principles; these adapt for better or worse to technological innovation by creating new cultural forms no less authentic than archaism.[12]

It is not an illegitimate anthropological project to try to recover the traces of primitive thoughts in order better to understand the new Othernesses being elaborated today behind the scene of international relations. Made of scraps and scattered parcels (the situation was not radically different just a century ago in the Pacific and in certain equatorial zones of Latin America), primitiveness has long been mortgaged by its old encounter with the West. Thus, an approach which refuses the dangerous simplifications of a positivist human

11. Derrida, *L'Ecriture et la Difference* (Paris: Seuil, 1967), p. 11.

12. Remo Guidieri writes: "From this point of view the contemporary non-Western world is an enormous storehouse of relics still needing study," "Les sociétés primitives aujourd'hui," in *Philosopher* (Paris: Fayard, 1980).

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science must also avoid the illusions of a "pure" primitiveness. We refuse to construct the allegory of primitive man prior to alienation, for, to rig out this primitiveness with a concept derived from our own modernity is to invest it with a value of which it had no conception and to ascribe to it intentions which are merely our own, those of our time, of our anxieties. In such guises, primitiveness serves both as the peaceful El Dorado and as the recurrent referent to the legitimacy of scientific explanations. As Guildieri wrote: "Ethnology has constructed a phantom, the primitive, which it disguised as the bearer of values which it itself fosters and defends: moderation, order, secularism, thrift, well-being, passivity in the solid social mould."[13]

Alienated amid the perils of its daily survival, menaced and transitory, primitive society thwarted the snares laid for its precarious existence with violent, often cruel rites, which, through the spectacle and hypertrophy of the sensations which they produced, opened vistas to eternity by portraying the transcendental values embodied in its conception of life, death, and reproduction. However, in our quest for order and prosperity we have burdened primitiveness with all our dreams and have subjugated it by making it the image of a happiness lost forever.

Today anthropological theories are being elaborated, developed and deployed on foundations produced by this "phantom"; and, indeed, many Western institutions ensure that the phantom survives beyond all disputes of the various schools. At the juncture between political powers (which provide its financial means, however modest) and the places where the canons of knowledge are articulated, anthropology arrogates to itself the right to judge the Other by concealing from it the time and the society which are its possibility. Neither a "bourgeois" nor a "proletarian" science, anthropology appears less as an axiological approach to Otherness than as the will of Western society (with no distinction between East and West as political entities) to impose our values on the world.

13. Guidieri, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

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ELIAS' THEORY OF CIVILIZATION

by Helmut Kuzmics

Civilization, Bourgeois and Courtly Society

The concept of "civilization" is likely to call to mind the "Great Civilizations" of world history. There is an inseparable conceptual link between the latter idea and that of "development" — an evaluative standard which is applied to societies and their material and cultural achievements, whether explicitly or implicitly. In this sense, Parsons talks about development towards Western modernity, thus adopting an explicitly evolutionist perspective;[1] the West appears as one of a variety of great civilizations. The central variable in the process of social evolution is 'adaptive capacity,' defined at the macro-level. This alleged capacity to adjust to changing environments (or should we speak of a capacity to *dominate the rest of the world?*) is more likely to refer to the economically or politically productive dimension of societies than to the behavior of individuals[2]; still less will it be related to the consumptive dimension of individual lifestyles. Apart from that, it does not seem highly plausible that the concept of "adaptive capacity" would crop up in a description and characterization of individual agents' social environments, were one to elicit such accounts in order to check on these agents' interpretations of their life-worlds. The concept of "modernization" focuses on economic progress, either as an explanans or as an explanandum, and definitions[3] attempt to capture, besides the developmental mechanism of a modernization which is thought to be continuously self-reinforcing, the contrast between developed and traditional societies (or nations) mainly with reference to their adaptive capacity. This adaptation is achieved by the creation of economic wealth, as well as by the guaranteeing of political stability, perhaps via a conception of "democracy" of the American brand.

Compared with this conception of civilization, Norbert Elias' work embodies a concept of civilization which starts from quite different premises: first, he asks how people experience something as "civilized" or "uncivilized," and he goes on to question this way of perceiving by relating it to the self-conception of the West: how, he asks, would members of the West see mediaeval times, if a time-machine were to take them there? According to Elias, the traveller's impression would be ambiguous: some features would be attractive, others repulsive, and the character of the observer would certainly

1. Talcott Parsons, *Societies. Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 3.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 21. Parsons thinks of himself as completing Weber's universal-historical interpretation of the development of "Western rationalism."

3. Cf. Marion J. Levy, "Social Patterns (Structures) and Problems of Modernization," in Wilbert E. Moore and Robert M. Cook, *Readings on Social Change* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967), pp. 189-208, p. 190.

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make a difference. Life in the past would seem free, unfettered, and adventurous on the one hand, barbaric, uncouth, and squalid on the other. The concept of "civilization" can refer to a variety of phenomena, among them what Weber thought to be characteristic of Western rationalism[4]: the state of technology, the type of manners, the stage of scientific development, of religiousness, of the cohabitation of spouses, of forms of cooking and living and punishing. Elias points to a kind of social perception which turns observed "civilizing" achievements into achievements of a civilization: what is civilized is a standard of housing, or of technological development, judged from the standpoint of the civilized, who are anxious to demarcate themselves from the "primitives,"[5] being westerners themselves.

Elias' starting point is a reconstruction of the semantic history of words for "civilization" and similar phenomena. Mediaeval precursors of "civilization" are *"courtoisie"* and *"civilité"*; a competitor can be found in the German concept *"Kultur."* which marked a distinction between different social strata and even national characteristics: eventually, French and English "civilization" were opposed to German *"Kultur."* Right from the start, Elias avoids the danger of ethnocentric generalization; a danger to which Western theoreticians of modernization found they had to pay lip-service long after the damage had already been done.[6] A genetic reconstruction of the concept of Civilization within the framework of the sociology of knowledge takes Elias through several stages to a position where he takes the social modelling of affects in everyday life (initially with reference to the aristocratic upper classes from the 9th to the 18th Century) to be the most important explanatory issue of the process of civilization: How did the social standards of people's dealing with each other in everyday life develop? How did agents' conduct and experience change in the course of history? How does the civilized adult of today differ from mediaeval man? The most important elements of this concept of "civilized" behavior are the degree of pacification, the refinement of customs, the degree of restraint in social interactions and in the (reflexive) dealing of individuals with themselves. (Already at this stage, the difference to Weber's *methodically rational conduct* becomes obvious; the same goes for the concept of instrumental reason, which inspired Horkheimer's and Adorno's critique).

How, then, does Elias arrive at his concept of civilization? Through the analysis of changing linguistic usage, the underlying forms of life become visible: in 18th Century Germany, a politically impotent and economically not very deeply rooted bourgeoisie; in France, during the same era, we find a bourgeoisie of steadily growing influence, increasingly striving for social reform, which occasionally even turns revolutionary; which despite the struggle for political power finds the time to blend, as far as outlook and life-style

4. Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1972), vol. 1, see "Vorbemerkung," pp. 1-15.

5. Cf. Norbert Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchen.* 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), vol. 1, pp. 1-2.

6. Cf. Samuel N. Eisenstadt, *Tradition, Change and Modernity* (New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), Chapter I/3 and I/5.

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are concerned, with the aristocratic world. In the process, members of the aristocracy (e.g., Mirabeau) undergo to some extent what is called *"embourgeoisement."* To this corresponds the fact that the French bourgeoisie managed to incorporate courtly elements into their concept of "civilisation" to a much larger extent, while the dichotomy of culture vs. civilization of non-centralized Germany contrasts the "falsity" of formal superificial courtly behavior with true culture and virtue: here, culture is the world of spiritual, artistic and religious achievement, seen to be at odds with politics, the economy and society. The French notion of "civilisation" is able to refer to social qualities, to furniture and clothes, to language and manners. No stigma is attached to them, by conceiving of them as purely "external" as opposed to 'inner' values. It is worth remembering, though, that Rousseau's critique of civilization, as a counterpart of German Romanticism, was based on a similar contrast.[7] Mirabeau's concept of civilization, on the other hand, marks a distinction between true and false civilization, and integrates concepts which often do not sit very well with each other into the perspective of the Enlightenment: in his *Amy des Femmes ou Traité de la Civilisation* (1766) civilization means "refinement of manners, of worldly wisdom, of politeness, and the spreading of knowledge and good behavior."[8]

Mirabeau, whom Elias invokes as the first literary witness for the further development of the word "civiliser" into "civilisation," characterizes the latter intuitively in categories which are wholly courtly: *"adoucissement des moeurs,"* and *"politesse"* play a central role; civilization appears as cognate to the Enlightenment, but also, being a bourgeois phenomenon, as deeply rooted in a courtly tradition of etiquette. Yet, the concept of civilization goes on to attain a reformist countenance of ever-increasing prominence: the Physiocrats added the idea of the free interplay of economic forces conceived after the model of natural science. Insight into the orderly cosmos of these natural laws of society becomes constitutive of the new concept: "true" civilization occupies a place between barbarism and "false" civilization, which springs from too much money and too much intervention from the outside. From then on, the French concept of civilization is wedded to the bourgeois notion of progress, knowledge turns into a central category, and the concept of "being civilized" is transferred from the behavior of individuals to the state[9] and the constitution, the educational system and access to that system by the populace, and to a penitentiary system which is seen to be barbaric. Social inequality, anchored in feudal barriers, appears as barbaric and unreasonable and the same perspective is brought to bear on the lack of economic freedom imposed by centralized trade restrictions. The refinement of manners and the pacification of

7. Honneth and Joas have emphasized this as an alleged shortcoming of Elias' analysis. Axel Honneth, Hans Joas, *Soziales Handeln und menschliche Natur. Anthropologische Grundlagen der Sozialwissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main, New York: Campus Verlag, 1980), p. 117. See, however, the reference to Rousseau in Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation, op.cit.*, vol. 1, p. 49.

8. Cf. Friedrich Jonas, *Geschichte der Soziologie*, 4 vols. (Reinbek b. Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1976), vol. 1, p. 58.

9. Cf. Elias, *op.cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 60-61.

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society are supposed to be followed by this kind of civilization in a wider sense.

In spite of all the differences between the face-to-face society of the courtly aristocracy and the world of the more abstractly interrelated working bourgeois, we can diagnose — above all in France — an evolutionary continuity of the concept of civilization; there was a steadily flowing under-current which survived even the political ordeal of the bourgeois revolution.

It is from these premises that Elias arrives at the most important elements of his concept of "being civilized," which focuses on indivual behavior and its affective situation, where the transfer to macrophenomena is of secondary importance, where there is greater emphasis on consumption than on production, more stress on politics than on economics. In acknowledgement of the courtly heritage, refinement of manners, pacification[10] and an intensified inhibition of affects are deemed to be central. Being civilized then comes to mean that the emotions become rationalized and psychologized.

The Civilizing Process as the Development of Stronger Affective Controls

It is Elias' theoretical achievement to have linked changes in agents' experience, which accompany the degree of civilization, with both a psychological and macro-sociological model of their joint development. He is not after static comparison, but rather attempts to trace the social determination of the emotional and instinctive life as an historical process.

This attempt was guided by the presumably decisive basic insight that "spontaneity of bodily expression," "self-control" (or "self-restraint"), and in general the concept of a self demarcating itself from its environment (a process called "individualization"), are the result of a specific historical circumstances, ("figurations"). The nature of self-interference changes with these figurations, a process which is not to be thought of as the unfolding of an immanent spirit. The developmental process involving socially determined personality structures extends from the comparatively loosely regulated ways of dealing with one's own body and that of others, as exhibited before the age of the Crusades even in the highest strata of society, to the already very complex differentiation of rules and patterns of behavior in the age of the absolutist state. Elias tries to describe the sociogenesis of the civilized character structure, by elaborating both the continuous and the novel elements in the process of the inter-generational development of the "apparatus of self-restraint." In this, civilized man is sharply distinguished from the uncivilized through the extent to which the former is able to suppress the affective impulses of pleasure and pain and to transform and incorporate them into extended sequences of action. It is decisive here that these "self-restraints" can no longer be seen for the "restraints by others" which they are, restraints which can be sociogenetically derived and which gave rise to "self-restraints" in the first place: this phenomenon has often been labelled "reification"

10. This concept, of course, figures prominently in a whole series of other famous evolutionary theories, for example in Spencer's notion of a transition from a militaristic to an industrialized society, or in Buckle's theory of civilization.

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— man-made social rules appear to be no more changeable than capricious nature of inanimate things. Thus, Elias' approach amounts to an historical sociology of knowledge as well, concerning "recipe-knowledge" about rules of interaction in the intimacy of everyday performances, when people eat, drink, dance, and play together, in aggressive behavior, as well as in the area of sexual relations.

His theoretical model is based on the assumption of an interlocking of the development of the Ego and the Super-Ego with the relevant parameters of macro-social development: "From restraint by others to self-restraint" (accompanied by a raised threshold of shame and embarrassment); the idea that external restraints imposed on individuals become less direct, which, combined with a growing amount of control over nature, foster a more differentiated and rationalized perception of the psychological nature of man; that growing demands from an increasingly complex social environment necessitate a more subtle tuning of behavior: in such environments, individual civilization takes place. As they become more common social civilization ensues; the courts were environments of this kind.

A selection of the areas in which these processes occur looks as as follows: table manners (*how* people eat, what dishes — carved or uncarved — are served *in what manner,* what bodily utterances, such as smacking one's lips or belching, are permissible, the changing use of cutlery — the fork was imported — shared or separate use of crockery, etc.). The conventions of interpersonal interaction also changed: bodily utterances in these situations were suppressed and controlled; the relations between the sexes were regimented, from conceptions as to what counts as 'seemly' to sexual and erotic relations in the narrower sense. But Elias was not merely concerned with "peaceful" occupations and interactions; he also dealt with the transformation of aggressiveness: it is a long way from the unchecked "joy of killing" to the orderly martial conduct of "civilized" armies who are subject to the Geneva Convention.

Elias illustrates these processes of change by analyzing books of etiquette from various epochs, thus making visible the stages of affective regulation. He assumes that the ever tightening net of regulations concerning the instinctive and bodily utterances of the members of the secular upper classes, from the Middle Ages up to the courtly absolutist era, indicates an historical process at the behavioral level as well. Many rules become transformed from obvious restraints by others (one must not spit in front of superiors, one must not, when at table, blow one's nose without a handkerchief, one must not belch) into self-restraints, due to the increasing interdependence of actions of an ever increasing number of people. Eventually, people control themselves not only in front of persons of higher rank, of strangers or just somebody, but even when they are alone (as the example of daily hygiene shows). In the books of etiquette, this kind of normative change is marked by a process of inverted trivialization: as the threshold of shame and embarrassment steadily advances, not only does the body become the subject of ever expanding taboos, but

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those rules pertaining to the "most natural" needs receive less and less mention. One is embarrassed to even talk about "it"; on the other hand, it is not necessary any more either.

The macro-structural conditions of the process of civilization as a continuous modification of behavior in a certain direction (namely of increasing average affective control) are the phenomena of the monopolization of power resources, of centralization, of the creation of a "monopoly of force," all of them set within the concrete historical contexts of Western feudalism.[11] Contemporaries experienced these processes, but did not understand them: the social dynamics, which can be defined as competition for land, power and influence within the aristocratic anarchy of Western feudalism around the 12th and 13th Century, are beyond the cognitive grasp of contemporaries, and even further beyond their control. Nevertheless, one of its results is a form of rationalization: long-term perspectives are adopted and a detached stance is taken towards all kinds of changes of mood — from darkest fear to ecstatic joy. But this rationalization is an unplanned result of blind forces, which can, however, be rationally studied and explained.

From the assumption of an "affective household," partially amenable to individual planning and subject to historical change, we can derive the idea of planned economy of affects: as sequences of action grow longer, there are gains (higher economic profits, more security through an Ego and Super-Ego in tune with reality), but also losses for the economy of drives. When spontaneity is replaced by strategy, there is a trade off between the uninhibited joy of the moment and the security of controlled planning. Prudence and the social conditions enabling it are subtly rewarded: not only is spontaneous pleasure made impossible or at least delayed, but swift and total terror is inhibited as well — "where Id was, Ego shall be" means to have a realistic chance of action. Hence, the strengthening of inhibiting factors involved in the shift from restraint by others to self-restraint is an irreducibly ambivalent process. This is Elias' variation on the theme of the *Dialectics of Enlightenment;* it centers round the agent, and in spite of the possibility of a certain amount of tunnel vision deals with the traditional topic of Western sociology, the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* (Tönnies) or from the life-world to the system (Habermas), thought to be a permanent problem of modernity. Elias, however, tackles the matter in an empirical spirit, with reference to selected historical environments, which he attempts to conceptualize in terms of his figurations.[12]

11. According to one critic, we are dealing with a "theoretically informed case study" relying on the example of France. Cf. Samuel F. Sampson, "The Formation of European National States, The Elaboration of Functional Interdependence Networks and the Genesis of Modern Self-Control," *Contemporary Sociology* 13 (1984), vol. 1, pp. 22-27.

12. His "figurations" develop within the context of those phenomena that are usually called macro-sociological processes and structures: the monetary economy, the division of labor, the formation of the state have to be seen as a lengthening of chains of actions and interdependence. But the concept of "web" or "net" is associated with a different conception of the causal connection between macro- and micro-phenomena: Elias would accept the physicalistic language of "variables" at best as a necessary simplification, and would argue that this kind of language is hardly

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At the level of figurations the social formation of the figurations of affects mentioned above takes place: at the feudal court of the High Middle Ages we can see a kind of tightening of social relations, compared to earlier stages of social development. This is combined with a change in the balance of power between the rulers and the ruled, between men and women (indicated, for instance, in the *courtesie* of the minstrels). From the baronial court to the absolutist royal court, there is a steady intensification of contacts, a continuous increase in the number of significant others, to use G.H. Mead's term, and a proliferation of restraints by others, as well as of self-restraints. Over this period, the balance of power shifts from those leading groups that could be called society towards the central overlord, a movement that is independent of the personal attributes of the monarch; it is in his interest — and that of the state — to ban dueling among the members of the higher aristocracy, and thus to interfere with the once sacrosanct prerogatives of the armed aristocracy. These "micro-environments," which successfully regulate affects, can clearly not be understood in isolation from the economic and technological developments that gave rise to them; after all, the courts have to be financed. The results of this sudden thrust of civilization that befell the previously independent warrior caste are: pacification, refinement of manners, increase of effective control, and mental reservation. In many situations where the feudal lord would have used his fist or his sword, the courtier keeps quiet, pondering little schemes and counter-schemes.

The courtly code, however, once developed, continues to be a formative force and partially filters into the lower ranks of society. But only partially: the courtier and the working bourgeois are worlds apart.

The Theory of Civilization and Industrial Civilization

Is there, then, any credit in a concept of civilization derived from courtly face-to-face society for an appreciation of the problems of modernity? Some critics have spotted considerable difficulties here. Within the present framework, it is not possible to deal with all the relevant arguments; one would hope that it is not necessary either. We will develop and discuss just one such argment, which will prove to be quite complex: if Elias is measured against the aspirations and achievements of Critical Theory, then — it is claimed — he will be found wanting. The core of this criticism is the contention that Elias is unable to capture the specific nature of capitalism as a system of market forces and of class domination, continuously in danger of lapsing back from barbarism.[13]

It has to be granted that Elias' analysis of the process of civilization should throw some light on modern society, otherwise it would be no better than a

appropriate to social subject matter. Cf. his pertinent methodological observations in Norbert Elias, *Was ist Soziologie* (Munich: Juventa, 1970), pp. 119-125; esp. p. 124. This point was thoroughly missed in the naively positivist critique by Henk Flap and Yme Kuiper, "Figurationssoziologie als Forschungsprogramm," in *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, n. 33 (1981), pp. 273-301.

13. Cf. Susan Buck-Morss, review of Norbert Elias, *The Civilization Process, Telos,* 37 (1978), pp. 181-198.

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History of the Great Deeds of Kings. So let us face the argument: the theory of civilization is unable to account for the permanent threat of modern society falling back into barbarism: the Nazis were sticklers for table manners, and we are all familiar with the gruesome stereotype of the SS officer listening to classical music, but this did not prevent them from committing these acts of barbarism, which made Adorno claim that no more poems could be written after Auschwitz.

There is a misunderstanding here. Mass-produced death, to its victims, means what it always means (and perhaps a bit more: it makes it difficult to die a dignified death, or to see others die in a dignified way). But just the ritualized and bureaucratic character of this monstrous administration of murder makes clear that the motivation of those who *performed* the murders was comparatively irrelevant — a fact that has been pointed out by many who survived the camps and wrote about them; from which follows that they usually had little in common with the spontaneity of knightly lords, with their "lust" for murder. Elias can be criticized only if one ascribes to him a unilinear evolutionary assumption of a correlation of individual affective control and structural peacefulness; but the difference between aggressiveness within an interactional field and structural mechanized aggressiveness at a distance — for example between nations — was perfectly clear to Elias. But that the former has decreased since the days of the robber-knights, that violence does not involve the body to the same extent any more, is surely connected with the process of civilization and does not militate against the latter's Janus-faced nature, when set within the context of an evaluative conception of progress, which Elias (like Weber in this respect) wants to ban from his descriptive analysis. Calculated, unemotional barbarism has in the past been part of the *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, and it is to be feared that we have not seen the last of it.

We could now conclude that, judged on its own terms, the theory of civilization does not fail. But does it not have objective limitations? Elias can be charged with having eliminated from his investigation of the regimentation of the body and of domination within interpersonal relations the kind of domination we find in the area of *production*. This raises the problem of what standards to apply to theories just as much as the issue of the criteria for evaluating the evaluator's pretensions. Is it impossible to say something interesting about capitalism without confronting it directly? Or might it not be the case that there are elements in this type of society that point beyond themselves to their origin in more ancient historical formations? Are there not remarkable similarities between different social processes at different times? And, lastly: is it not possible that a certain perspective might prove fruitful for our understanding of societies that are or seem to be wholly different and of their associated personality structures?

Buck-Morss wants to answer all these questions in the negative. To her, there is a discontinuity between the feudalistic and the capitalist era.[14] This

14. Elias, of course, would disagree with such a polarization — feudal vs. capitalist — by

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break can only be grasped if one introduces the concept of "mode of production" and thus resorts to economic categories.[15] But what was it Elias wanted to explain? A specific thrust of civilization, into absolutism and courtly society. In this, the development of the state and the pacification resulting from the monopoly of force are institutional constraints on a later development, which brought the well-known unfolding of the productive forces. There is no more ambitious aim to the analysis. The social character of the bourgeois does not develop from scratch (or from the Protestant ethic alone) but incorporates courtly patterns. The only question we can raise here is: how many and to what extent. Elias certainly does not overlook the economic process that strengthenes the bourgeoisie: "The development of barter and monetary exchange, together with the social formations supporting it, is in incessant interaction with the form and development of the monopoly of power within a certain area; both developmental series are permanently interlocked, and one reinforces the other."[16]

The many misunderstandings that have plagued the reception of Elias' work rest on the difficulty posed by a theoretically ambitious approach based on an empirical "case," where social history, a psychological, and a macro-sociological theoretical model are linked. 'Historical interactionism' would be a suitable label for Elias' conception; and in this area lies its strength. These problems usually arise from illegitimate generalizations from his theoretical macro-model (misunderstandings for which occasionally Elias has to take at least some of the blame); his interpretation of history — a pre-history of modernization — is not affected by this.

For this reason, since Elias wants to explain only this one thrust of civilization, there is no chapter in Elias' book dealing with the economic class struggle of the 19th century. Of course, the economic and technical transformation of society that led to capitalism has amounted to qualitative change [17] and has created a dramatic new situation. But Elias adopts a conflict perspective throughout; he merely acknowledges, apart from antagonistic interests, the mutual interdependence of the different classes (as in modern war, the

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denouncing it as an unrealistic simplification. He argues along these lines when he points out the changing composition of 'aristocratic' and 'bourgeois' groups over time. Cf. Elias, *ibid.* (vol. 2), p. 244, concerning the relationship between the *noblesse de robe* and the *noblesse d'epée*.

15. In this connection, but also on grounds of principle, Elias is taken to be a representative of an 'evolutionary gradualism' by some critics. Cf. Honneth and Joas, *op.cit.*, p. 120. Sampson, however, disagrees, having noticed Elias' conscious demarcation from A. Weber. Cf. Sampson, *op.cit.*, p. 22. The charge of 'gradualism' is in itself rather implausible, cf. Elias, *op.cit.*, vol. 2, especially pp. 231 f., where the concept of the monopoly of power and force is explained, along with the role of conflicts, antagonisms of interest, discontinuities. It is just his theory of the formation of the state that merits — as Sampson has emphasized — much more attention than has been devoted to it by contemporary theorists.

16. Elias, *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 224-225. Compare Honneth's and Joas' claim to the effect that Elias' conception of the formation of the state is restricted to the political realm, while an economic materialist perspective is alleged to be lacking. Honneth and Joas, *op.cit.*

17. Here, too, Buck-Morss charges Elias with "gradualism"; the metaphor of money as a web of actions is claimed to be unable to capture the exploitative character of domination based on capital. Buck-Morss, *op.cit.*, p. 191.

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winning nation has to accept a severe disruption of its social system, because of its social system, because of the close entanglement of nations in the contemporary world).

Domination through capital is less direct domination (less direct than the physical threat posed by the Lord of the Manor gone haywire), but it does not stop being domination. Yet, in the final analysis, this form of exploitation is based on the monopoly of force itself, which seems to have vanished behind the veil of monetary exchange. True, the exercise of power has become less physical; but civilized manners remind us again and again of their less civilized predecessors. To uncover what has been forgotten is the achievement of a deep history of civilization.

The claim that Elias has neglected the relevance of economic categories for an understanding of modern industrial civilization, and especially of the concepts necessary for a critical analysis of modernity, is then specified in the following way: granted that the ascetic capitalist has to delay a good deal of gratification for the sake of untroubled accumulation of capital (that is to say that restraints by others are transformed for him into self-restraints). Granted, too, that the courtier has to curtail his drives and emotions to some extent, be it because he is engaged in some cabal, or for aesthetic reasons, which are embodied in the courtly code of morality. But are such phenomena not wholly trivial, in view of the dark Satanic mills of industry? Do they not pale against the temporal rigor of the assembly line, which has no counterpart at the court; is a subtle analysis of the process of civilization, which focuses on the problem of ever expanding self-restraints, not irrelevant in view of this massive kind of restraint by others?[18]

And, so the argument continues, is not modern marketing responsible for those restraints based on a systematic distortion of needs? How do the codes for modern behavior develop in the face of industrialization and urbanization? What is the *contribution of the lower classes?*[19] What was the role of marginalization in the development of Western civilization through the labelling of deviant behavior, from sick through mad to criminal?

Against these anguished questions, it makes sense to present the problem of rationalization at two different levels: rationalization as an increase of the subjective rationality of an agent, which takes place at the level of individual consciousness and its corresponding affective economy; and rationalization as the establishment of objective rationality,[20] in terms of institutionalized norms. The costs of the development of rationality have to be computed on both these levels. At the macro-level, these costs can be manifold; they may, for example, arise when a degree of social complexity is created that turns out to be beyond the control of agents. The critique of the market system (or capitalism) and of bureaucracy is inspired, again and again, by the remarkable

18. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

19. Sampson, *op.cit.*, p. 25; Honneth and Joas, *op.cit.*, p. 121.

20. Cf. Donald N. Levine, "Rationality and Freedom: Weber and Beyond," in *Sociological Inquiry* 51/1 (1981), pp. 5-25; and Joachim Israel, *Alienation: From Marx to Modern Sociology* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 971), pp. 98-121.

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paradox of small islands of extreme rationality combining into a vast continent of problems. The agents of the modern era, on the other hand, have to face the consequences of this complexity and its results, which can be experienced in everyday life: they are not *allowed* to be flexible and autonomous any more, they rather *have* to be. They have to cope with normative conflict and accept new responsibilities.

Range and Limitations of the Theory of Civilization

We have to confront the claim that the theory of civilization is unable to explain the simultaneous appearance of civilization (in a narrower meaning of the term than is presupposed by the noble values of the enlightenment) and of barbarism: Elias' evolutionary gradualism is alleged not to provide for this. Especially the kind of massive and unemotional barbarism produced through new coping mechanisms (the market or the national state) is claimed to be a much more important problem than the courtly etiquette of Versailles and to completely transcend the horizon of a face-to-face society and its degree of affective refinement and repression. Thirdly: what is the critical import of a theory that computes the costs of civilization with reference to the upper classes, which are usually thought of as privileged? Above all, the question of the explanatory relevance of Elias' theory of civilization for the civilization of modern mass society is raised, considering that Adorno and Horkheimer have emphasized that the dialectics of enlightenment consist in the permanent threat of a relapse into barbarism, in latent exploitation and veiled domination.

Faced with these questions, it is necessary to closely examine the explanatory aspirations of the theory of civilization, its manner of explanation and its intended range. Elias himself has identified the differences between courtly and bourgeois society very sharply:

— Courtly man entertains much more than the bourgeois; the working bourgeois spends much less time on social contact.[21]

— Courtly society has a much more closely woven net of relationships; among the working bourgeois, interactions mediated by *occupation, goods* and *money* predominate, interactions which usually are more matter-of-fact and abstract.

— There is a contrast between the bourgeois preoccupation with saving and the conspicuous consumption of the aristocracy. Both are shaped by social constraints: the aristocrat has to obey the imperatives of a rank that has to be demonstrated.[22] High status creates the obligation of social generosity.

— The gap between the private and public domain is narrower in aristocratic society than in the bourgeois world. The privatization and intimization

21. For this and the following observations, see Norbert Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft* (Neuwied, Berlin: Luchterhand, 1969), pp. 91f.

22. Especially members of the French aristocracy. As Barrington Moore points out, the English gentry differs as to their function in some respects (the position of the English aristocrat is based to a lesser extent on political factors than on economic conditions). Cf. Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon, 1966).

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of the latter, with its distinctive emotional culture, has frequently been emphasized. Elias perceives this rift as well: there are discontinuities in the developmental curve of civilization, or in the respective curves for each class. The aristocrat's house, for example, is so important because it is a direct indicator of his place within the structure of power, and because the networks of communication impart a practical function to these symbols.

— In consequence, bourgeois society with its emphasis on *privacy* allows for a partial disengagement of occupationally determined rank and social status within the sphere of leisure and consumption.

Elias later returns once more to these distinctions between the two strata;[23] he adds further differentiating characteristics that are in part consequences of those already mentioned:

— The society of the working bourgeois adopts the rituals of courtly society, for example, the courtly modelling of speech, without however developing them further: they are incorporated into leisure interactions, to a lesser extent into the occupational sphere.

— As industrial capitalism — the concept is not used by Elias — develops, a growing differentiation involves an increase in the standard of living, which is, in turn, a condition for a more stable Super-Ego; the social world gets fragmented into the upper and the lower classes. Within each stratum, there is internal competition, and there is continuous pressure from "below."

— For those on the way up, special problems arise, since they are beset by feelings of shame and embarrassment as soon as they have adopted the norms and strategies of the upper classes.

— For the lower classes, civilization frequently turns into colonization; the internalization of the norms of the upper classes turns out to be a strategy belonging to the exercise of power.

— In the second phase of their upward mobility, bourgeois groups manage to distance themselves: they create their own signposts to indicate what is permitted and what is prohibited.

— Work is contrasted with idleness, virtue with frivolousness, nature with etiquette, knowledge with manners.

— The rise of the bourgeoisie is completed when control over the "key monopolies" (the taxation system and the exercise of force) has been achieved.

— Eventually, the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie have become amalgamated.

This list makes clear that it was perfectly obvious to Elias that he merely described and made intelligible part of the prehistory of bourgeois man when he analyzed the civilized conduct of courtly man. But courtly etiquette, just as much as the previous shaping of civilized behavior (with its distancing of man from man, of the Id from the Super Ego, of moral persons from their bodies), has left its powerful imprint on bourgeois man, traces which it would be difficult to understand without this prehistory. Of course, the court is not the only mint where good manners and correct behavior are coined; the working

23. Cf. Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation, op.cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 416-426.

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bourgeois is rooted in a whole series of further relevant environments, a prehistory that incorporates the history of the city and the rationality of merchants and artisans. But the competences of the bourgeois era that the individual has to develop can be found, *in nuce*, in the rationality of the court.

It should have become clear now that Elias is familiar with the discontinuities, the abstractness, and the coercive nature of the capitalist market system. The workers have just come on to the stage of this society.[24] It is not surprising that the modelling of their affects will obey different laws from those we found among the bourgeois of the 19th century. There is no reason to assume, however, that the social character[25] of workers on the assembly line could not also be described within Elias' conceptual framework; this would obviously involve a thorough investigation of their work situation in its biographical context, in order to capture the more extrinsic virtues of the factory, such as punctuality, obedience and diligence. The result might strongly resemble Thompson's.[26]

Let us return to the critical function of social science. If one assigns to it the task of calling relations of exploitation by their name, to explain them and to evaluate them with reference to possible historical alternatives, then an analysis of the dependence of aristocrats from Louis XIV seems to be off the mark. There is some difficulty in interpreting these relations of dependence as a system of exploitation; but to conclude from this that Elias is not familiar with those restraints which frustrate human basic needs is a misunderstanding.

In general, several interpretations of the descriptive and explanatory claims of Elias' approach offer themselves. One could attempt such an exegesis on two levels:

— One can use the common distinction between individually rational behavior and the establishment of purposive rationality at the institutional level as a starting point for an appreciation of Elias' theory of civilization as a theory of rationalization.

— Elias' approach can be seen as a (sub-)history and/or as a theory; the theory can again be divided into historical generalizations and those parts that are more strictly a priori.

Elias' approach can be seen as a relevant prehistory of modernity. As a history of the body and the development of the visible results of the modelling of affects and its underlying rules (a development that is — individually and collectively — frequently unconscious, but amenable to a coherent description), insofar as the development up to the manners of the court is relevant to the preparation of modernity, and to modernity itself. As a "prehistory of modernity," insofar as courtly absolutism has led to the development of struc-

24. Elias has tried to deal with the issues of the class struggle and of workers' emancipation in *Was ist Soziologie?* pp. 156-158.

25. Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), p. 78. A social character is "the nucleus of the character structure which is shared by most members of the same culture."

26. Cf. E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp. 385-410.

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tures which make modernity *possible* (from the knock-out competition of the landed nobility to the state with a monopoly of force and taxation); this would not dispose of the need for a continuation of the story! As a theory of individual civilization and rationalization: through a combination of historical interpretation, sociology of knowledge and Freudian psychology, Elias manages to make intelligible rationalization as a phenomenon in the sense of both Weber and Freud (as a conceptual twin of repression). As a developmental theory, Elias' approach is evolutionary, but not teleological. It incorporates not only the aspect of differentiation and growing entanglement, but also the element of discontinuity and, to a marked extent, the notion of the unintended consequences of intended or semi-intended social developments, which create consequences in the form of "social costs." These militate against the intended rationality, if we interpret the latter term as an evaluative concept.

The concept of social costs as social externalities, arising out of the clash between individual and collective rationality, is implicitly contained in Elias, with the move from restraint by others to self-restraint as its counterpart at the level of the individual affective household. However, the "theory" as a historical theory has to be considered to be a theory of no more than feudal society, till it slips into centralistic absolutism. In order to understand the institutions of the modern era (the market system, bureaucracy in the narrower sense), one has to extrapolate.

Taken as very general theoretical assumptions, Elias' categories can be criticized with some justification. Like all such polarizations, the dichotomy of restraint by others/self-restraint has its limits, and the macro-laws of differentiation and competition, of centripetal and centrifugal tendencies (a theory of equilibria and disequilibria) share the weaknesses of objectivist approaches of the 19th century (and, of course, of those of the 20th).

Against the interpretations of some adherents of Critical Theory (Buck-Morss), it must be insisted that the theory of civilization is not incompatible with a radical conflict perspective, nor with an interpretation of class antagonisms under the heading "exploitation." There is room for such interpretations; it must be admitted, though, that the idea of the civilizing process as a process of the blending of the norms of the upper and the middle classes allows for harmonizing assumptions as well.

What, then, are the problems of modernity that have come closer to a solution through Elias' thought? (1) All critics of the modern era deplore the affective neutrality of many roles. Rationalization, in the area of communicative action as well, amounts to a lengthening of sequences of action and to increased complexity of cognitive structures (in the sense of Schutz's recipe-knowledge). We can draw valuable lessons here from courtly society: far away from the world of production, there exists nevertheless a sphere of social relevance, with the court appearing as half bureaucracy, half permanent feast. (2) Building up bodily control involves social learning, depending on the degree of restraint by others and self-restraint. The acquisition of competence requires the effort of learning and is fostered by sanctions; above all, social

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competence cannot be acquired unless individuals have access to resources that are unevenly distributed among the social strata. Here is one of the roots of the marginalization and criminalization of certain parts of the populace. (3) Modern patterns are often grounded in the old ones: courtly behavior has left its imprint on the specialist of the catering professions, on the behavior of tellers in the bank, on all those roles where there is a personal front. (4) The concept of unintended externalities — for example, increased interdependence creating restraints by others and self-restraints — can be applied to many historical situations, including today's. Elias describes the automatic and unconscious internalization of norms, a topic for the historian who has to investigate the archaeology of these rules, and highlights the hidden consequences of any intensification of a regimentation which is less concerned with physical or non-physical restraint by others than with intrinsic self-restraint.

Restraint, Self-Restraint, and State Control

The transformation of the medieval society of Western Europe into the industrial society of the modern era usually brings to mind a whole series of problems: the violent consequences of the revolutionary change of the economic and social division of labor which, in the market system, acts on a man's inner and outer nature (exploitation and environmental pollution are the prototypes); moral and legal anomie, which in modernity calls into question the very meaning of life; the disenchantment through a non-sacred world view, which exposes the individual to the desolate coldness of truth. We owe to Marx the insight that new technologies and factories do not automatically promote the happiness of all, but rather exclude many from it: Durkheim and Co. can be credited with the idea that economic transformations have comprehensive preconditions and consequences, which affect the area of law and morality as well. That many promises of the Enlightenment were not kept became all too transparent.

These perspectives have recently been joined by a variation on them. One has begun to reappraise the role fo the state in this development and widened the economic perspective of those subject to macro-developments. What is added is a point of view that focuses on the psychological reality of individuals, in a more comprehensive and individualistic way: the immiserated proletarian is joined by the madman, and the icons produced by the industrial division of labor and the apparatus of state control are *not* seen to be *restricted* to the world of industry; body and soul are dismembered in other areas as well. Many of Foucault's observations would have fit into Weber's conceptual framework — compare the latter's remarks on the barracks-existence of Roman slaves. While Foucault's perspective is not new in principle, his phenomenology of a "micro-physics of power" for the era beginning with early modernity is novel insofar as the maltreated body and the (temporally) tortured soul have never been discussed in such detail; the mangled individuals talk to us as agents, and are not hidden behind the institutional characteristics of an expanding rationality of the system, which also crops up as the rationality of the state.

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How are these developments connected with the process of civilization? Elias' concept of civilization takes three forms: (1) 'Civilization' as a product of social definition, based on the perceptions of those who were involved in the civilizing process; (2) refinement, pacification and 'inhibition' as attributes of customs, behavioral patterns and personalities, and (3) a reformulation in terms of Freud's conceptual apparatus: the economy of drives and social structure are shown to intermesh. The parameters mentioned merge in the concept of "affective household" and Ego, Super Ego and Id become transformed and channelled. This conception of the "affective household" of the individual is linked with a specific ontology of society and nature.

Society is portrayed as originally aggressive and brutal, nature as cold and cruel. While in the course of the civilizing process, a partial reflexive overcoming of and distancing from nature and from a society analogous to nature is achieved, this has its price. The battlefield shifts from the outer to the inner world and restraints by others turn into self-restraints. The relative "barbarism" of the Middle Ages at least allowed for an affective spontaneity: but as individuals plan and scheme to an increasing extent, their lives become more regulated. Alongside the strengthening of self-restraints, which manifests itself in a raising of the threshold of shame and embarrassment, and which finds its social counterpart in a "vanishing behind the props" as an institutional feature, there is room — and if there is none, room is made — for a psychological and rational reconstruction of the "affective," whether in one's dealing with oneself or with others.

If we compare these remarks with the perspective of *Surveiller et Punir* a parallel appears: there, too, a development is being described that starts with the body and ends with the soul. And a second parallel seems to result from the fact that in both cases, whether we look at Elias' concept of civilization or at Foucault's "micro-physics of power," the political, exemplified by the person and the function of the king, is of more direct importance than the economical.

The differences are just as conspicuous. The clever courtier, bored to tears in the Versailles of Louis XIV (and to death under his successors) seems to have little in common with the criminologist who wants to administer psychological treatment to the law-breaker. Nor is there an obvious route from the peasant who eats in an uncivilized manner to the soldier who becomes one with his rifle.

We have here two developmental series with different principles: those of a face-to-face society subject — for whatever reasons — to a refinement of its table manners and rules of interaction, where aggressive behavior becomes less and less physical, characterized by a privatizaton and intimization of needs, including "natural activities," at the expense of the spontaneity of emotional expression and the satisfaction of drives. The complex "etiquette" circumscribing all this can properly be called a "code": it is structural knowledge which, in suitable environments, can be copied and applied again and again; for some aspects of this etiquette you can be 'trained.' Much of it,

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however, can only be applied if the reflexive "self" of a person is engaged.

The second developmental series also incorporates a lengthening of sequences of action: the realm of the normative consists of all kinds of coercion, which becomes more and more serial, concentrated and subject to a division of labor. Monasteries, armies, factories, asylums — all these places of surveillance and regimentation are geared to a division of labor, function in accordance with it and are coordinated by force. Disciplinary measures range from the taming of the body to the control of activities through time-budgeting, and the power of the administration relies on these methods to separate lepers, victims of the plague, beggars, madmen and criminals from society. The "code," of course, is not that of etiquette anymore; recipe-knowledge about discipline is handed down within armies, monasteries, asylums and factories, with many similarities. The code comprises techniques of punishment, rules of drill, plans for the construction of buildings and the allocation of time, thus enabling the authorities to "manufacture"; but it is a code of power, of the restraint by others, as Elias would put it. The two developmental series are not parallel, neither temporally nor as far as their object is concerned. Elias' "restraints by others" are replaced in Foucault's thought by an economization of oppression.[27]

To the extent that medicine, psychology, education and social work take over more and more powers of control and punishment, the legal machinery in turn can become more medical, psychological, pedagogical. This idea of Foucault's reflects a growing complexity that increasingly has to rely on the cooperation of the ruled. The religion of work is something quite different from taming somebody with the help of the whip; the morality of criminals, which becomes a topic when the question is raised whether they can be reformed, matters only when the opportunities for control have become more comprehensive.

Is it then possible to say that the organization of prisons, factory work or mental institutions become more civilized? Have there not always been two meanings encapsulated in the word "pacification": peace, to be sure, but a 'pax romana' rooted in the asymmetry of subjugation? More directly, Elias links pacification to the central accumulation of power, only indirectly to peaceful economic competition. In the present, economic coercion is the visible expression of those restraints that operate between people, but behind these, even today, physical violence has the final word: "it is actually a whole mixture of different types of violence and coercion which remains in human spaces, when physical acts of repression slowly retreat from the open stage of everyday social life and continue to cooperate in the breeding of habits only in a mediated form."[28]

27. Here, an analytic distinction has to be made between the liberalization of restraints by others and their transformation into self-restraints, even if they, as historical processes, frequently go hand in hand. What Elias insists on is the general widening of areas of regulation. The transformation of this regulation into self-restraints is, however, the most important aspect. Cf. Foucault, *Surveiller et Punir. Le Naissance de la Prison* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975).

28. Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation, op.cit.*, p. 321.

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SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION IN GREECE

by Adamantia Pollis

While not a coherent body of thought, the socialist ideology of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and its leader, Andreas Papandreou, diverges from the socialist principles of post-World War II social democratic parties of Western Europe. The latter spoke for the working class in advanced industrialized societies. These social democrats accepted the legitimacy of capitalism and, assuming continued economic growth, advocated reformist policies. Such programs were meant to strengthen the welfare state and bring about a more equitable distribution of income. As social democracy began to falter, its Keynesian theoretical presuppositions became transparently inadequate. Social democracy's ideological moorings were adrift, while its policies became barely distinguishable from those of its conservative political opponents.

By the mid-1970s, traditional social democracy was being challenged by a left movement within its own ranks: democratic socialism. Among the European socialist parties, PASOK rejected social democracy and identified itself with democratic socialism. Greece's position as a semi-peripheral state, however, resulted in ideological differences with other democratic socialist parties. Principles that appeared identical often had different objectives. For example, the democratic socialist principle that state structures needed to be transformed, radically counteracting the state's centralized power in favor of the workers, had profoundly different implications for Greece.[1] Greek social structure was different than that of advanced capitalist states. There was no proletariat, nor were state-society relations comparable to those in advanced capitalist states.

The Greek state is neither bourgeois nor precapitalist; it is semi-peripheral.[2] Yet, there is little clarity about the nature of a semi-peripheral state. PASOK does not use the term semi-peripheral to describe Greece's position. It uses the term peripheral, but the former seems more appropriate. Greece's social formation and its relation to the core differs significantly from that of most Third World countries. As a semi-peripheral state, it contains a limited technologically advanced sector within its economy. The Greek state is effectively integrated within the world economy, making possible the maintenance of Western intellectual and political hegemony. Internally, it perpetuates a

1. Most discussions of democratic socialism are considered in the context of advanced capitalist states. See, for example, Mark Kesselman, "Prospects for Democratic Socialism in Advanced Capitalism: Class Struggle and Compromise in Sweden and France," *Politics and Society,* II/4 (1982), p. 400.

2. There is a paucity of theoretical literature on the semi-peripheral state. One interesting article of some relevance to Greece is Hamza Alavi's "Peripheral Capitalism: Nature of State and Class," *State and Society,* II/2 (April-June, 1981), pp. 38-43.

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social order that, regardless of the formal constitutional system, maintains a distinctive social structure through many mechanisms that have thwarted meaningful socio-economic change. Thus, socialism in Greece is not designed to transfer power to a working class. Instead, it aims to modernize Greek society in a democratic manner. By creating the necessary framework to adopt the appropriate "socialist" economic, social and foreign policies, Greece has sought to extricate itself from its semi-peripheral position in the world system and to become autonomous.

Organized in 1974 after the collapse of the Greek military junta (1967-1974), PASOK campaigned during the 1981 elections on a program of *allagi* (change). Party theoreticians, however, have not developed a systematic approach to semi-peripheral states such as Greece. PASOK has barely formulated a tentative analysis of Greece's economic, politico-military and cultural dependence on the West from which its policies flow.[3] The failure of post-World War II mainstream theories of modernization to propel less developed countries into modernity led to their rejection. Dependency theories, while informing the Greek socialist perspective, were an inadequate and insufficient guide for policy. Similarly, the Spanish and Portuguese socialist parties have little experience in governing. Likewise, they have few original theoretical insights and consequently are of little use. The Greek socialists, therefore, are following an uncharted course.

Despite their superficial similarity, parallels with the policies of the French socialist government, particularly on the issue of restructuring the state institutions through decentralization, have vastly different significance in the French and Greek contexts. In France, the restructuring of the state through decentralization was intended to transform the bourgeois state and institutionalize procedures for broader participation. The historical socialist principle of nationalizing industry and state ownership of the means of production was to give way, in part, to notions of self-management and participatory decision-making.[4] In Greece, workers control, or any variant thereof, is of limited importance, given the country's narrow industrial base and foreign ownership of the more technologically advanced sectors. In reducing the power of the privatized state, decentralization in Greece would loosen impediments to development. The formation of mixed public and private bodies at

3. There are numerous documents setting forth PASOK's ideology and programs. The most important are the "3rd of September Proclamation of Basic Principles and Goals of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement," PASOK, International Relations Committee, Series A, Publication No. 1 (Athens, 1975); and "Katenthintiries Grammes Programatos Kivernikitikis Politikis Tou PASOK" (Guiding Programmatic Directions of PASOK's Political Rule, Athens, 1977; PASOK, "Metropolis, Periphery, Independent Development and Socialist Change," International Relations Committee, Series B, No. 2 (September 1977).

4. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with the relation between Mitterrand's program of self-management and the nationalization of some sectors of the French economy, such as banking and high technology industries. For a summary of the French socialist program after their election, see Tony Daley and Jonas Pontusson, "The Left Victory in France," *Socialist Review*, No. 60 (November-December, 1981), pp. 28-53; and the special issue of *Telos*, No. 55 (Spring 1983), for articles on numerous aspects of French socialism.

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the local level is designed to facilitate local economic planning and encourage the growth of productive facilities. In the process, as the economy changes, so will the social structure, while Greece's dependence on the core would diminish. In other words, Greek policy centers on becoming autonomous from external forces. This goal is manifested in official political rhetoric seeking popular support and mass mobilization. Thus, some observers have labeled Papandreou's rule populism plus socialist rhetoric. On another level, autonomy provides the context for a strategy of development by increasing the state's autonomy *vis-à-vis* both its international linkages and domestic economic elites.

The Greek state was established by the United States in cooperation with its conservative Greek allies during the Greek civil war (1945-1950).[5] The political elites governing Greece since then can be traced back to the same oligarchic class of the pre-war years. Many of them had been active during the fascist Metaxas dictatorship (1936-1940). Their return to power was insured by the United States through the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), which operated as an "advisory" body to the Greek government during the civil war. AMAG determined the shape of the Greek state as well as political and economic policies, while Washington selected the Greek political leadership. At first, British pressure, then pressure from the United States, reimposed the Greek monarchy despite the opposition of all Greek political groups,[6] except for the extreme right wing. American power was decisive in setting up Greece's constitutional framework, determining the electoral system, and selecting its political leaders. These pressures culminated in 1955 with the selection of Constantine Karamanlis as premier. With Karamanlis' rise to power, Greece was firmly positioned as a semi-peripheral state. Direct intervention by the United States was replaced by continuing covert influence and more indirect intervention. Thus, during 1964-1967, when the elected Greek political rulers were perceived as failing to contain new domestic pressures for reform, U.S. support was trasnsferred to the colonels with the military coup in 1967.

Since the end of World War II, on the one hand, the Greek state has served the interests of NATO, more particularly the strategic interests of the United States. And, on the other hand, the Greek state — a massive bureaucratic apparatus — has served domestically to perpetuate a non-capitalist social order. Papandreou's impressive electoral victory in 1981 on a platform of anti-Americanism, against a background of subservience to the United States, affirmed the Greeks' political determination to alter their country's dependent position. More significant was the attempt to enhance Greece's self-reliance and transform state structures.

5. For an exhaustively documented account of U.S. activities in Greece, see Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1945* (Columbia University Press, 1982). There is no comparable volume for later years.

6. Initially, the United States, and in particular the U.S. ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, opposed the return of the monarchy, in contrast to Winston Churchill, who insisted on it. For a discussion of this critical period, see John O. Iatrides, *Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist "Second Round," 1944-1945* (Princeton University Press, 1972).

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Numerous observers have pointed out the difference between PASOK's program and its rhetoric from 1974 to 1977. Once in power, its policies diverged from its principles[7] and it undertook dramatic reversals, particularly in foreign policy. The political leadership contends that these are strategic moves. Hence, they do not signify abandonment of PASOK's socialist principles or long-range goals. It is, Papandreou contends, a straegy of gradualism. The critical issue raised by this strategy, however, is whether this policy signals the abandonment of autonomy as a goal. If the decision to postpone implementation of PASOK's pre-1977 program is not dismissed simply as an opportunistic move to gain broad electoral support, then an examination of the constraints on the pursuit of policies of self-reliance and autonomy may help explain PASOK's reversals.

The socialist program, adopted after the formation of the party, proposed a radical transformation of Greek society: a loosening of military ties with Western alliances, disassociation from the European Community, encouragement of investment by Greek capital in domestic industry with state support, a democratization of state and society, and sweeping changes in social policy including legal reforms aimed at the equality of women, changes in the penal code, the introduction of health care and day care centers. Yet, for these policies to succeed, the Greek state must be restructured.

The Greek bureaucracy has been permeated and consequently undermined by traditional cultural norms adapted to a modern institutional framework. This privatization of the bureaucracy has obliterated the boundary between the public and private spheres. "Civil" society and the state bureaucracy are intermeshed through the mechanism of extensive clientelist networks. The bureaucrat, beholden to his patron — a political leader or military officer, depending on the political regime — is in turn a patron to the clients he acquires among the citizenry. The interests of the citizens are served by the bureaucracy, not by the impartial application of universalistic norms, but by satisfying particularistic interests. In a society such as that of Greece, which lacks an industrial base but has undergone extensive urbanization, there are limited domestic opportunities for employment outside the bureaucracy. Consequently, it has become a main channel for employment and upward mobility.

At the upper echelons, the bureaucracy is also privatized and instrumentalized by the Greek economic oligarchy, with its ties to foreign economic interests. Its control over the apex of the bureaucracy, such as the recently abolished Currency Committee (which made decisions on foreign investments and set preferential exchange rates for favored investors), enabled them to set fiscal and monetary policy.[8] This power has enabled the economic

7. The program of the newly elected socialist government was set forth in the Legislative Programs presented to the Greek Vouli by Prime Minister Papandreou on Nov. 22, 1981, published in English as *Greek Government Programme,* presented by Prime Minister Andreas G. Papandreou, General Secretariat for Press and Information (Athens, 1981).

8. For a discussion of the fiscal and monetary powers of the Currency Committee and its power over foreign exchange, see D.J. Halikias, *Money and Credit in a Developing Economy* (New York, 1978), pp 28-33.

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oligarchy to thwart reforms.

Radical transformation of the bureaucracy is a necessary condition for Greek modernization. It was the highest priority of the PASOK government immediately after its electoral victory. There were efforts to streamline and rationalize the bureaucracy in Athens. But two years after the socialist victory, these efforts are at a stalemate. Perceiving their power threatened and their traditional authority dwindling, the bureaucrats themselves have undermined the reforms. Both clientelism and the bureaucracy's role in providing employment remain strong. Illustrative of this perceived role of the bureaucracy was a strike during the summer of 1982 by college graduates. Having passed an entry examination for the civil service, they claimed that their proven qualifications automatically entitled them to appointments. One consequence of this resistance has been an intensification of pressures from party cadres. The bureaucracy has been urged to replace employees with party loyalists regardless of their technical or professional competence. The tension between party cadres, professionals and technocrats became so acute that, on several occasions, Papandreou spoke out on the need to differentiate the role of the party from that of the government.[9] The emerging pattern is the replacement of traditional clientelist networks controlled by the conservative parties with new ties established by PASOK.

Similar difficulties have been encountered in decentralizing and delegating power to municipal governments. Failure to provide for fiscal autonomy has facilitated the perpetuation of clientelism. Local authorities continue to be dependent on the center, thus strengthening the power of party loyalists. Clientelism has served a utilitarian function while enabling the ruling class to maintain power. Moreover, unlike France, Greece does not have a legacy of indigenous socialist thought nor a broadly based socialist movement. It also has not experienced the anarchist movements that have characterized Spanish history. Consequently, efforts to decentralize remain formal unless accompanied by more deep-seated transformations in rural life and social structure.

Transformation of the bureaucracy was only one of several reforms in the socialist program. As with all non-industrialized Third World countries, the modernization of Greece is a major goal. The Greek economy is not predominantly capitalist except in a small, technologically advanced sector, which is export-oriented and foreign-owned. This sector is separated from the more traditional peasant and artisan sector.[10] The conditions for entry of foreign capital into Greece were set by a 1953 law, drafted by the United States, which guaranteed foreign firms special tax privileges, loans below prevailing bank rates, and repatriation of profits. Beginning in the mid-1960s, joint

9. This issue was first raised by Prime Minister Papandreou at a meeting of the Ministerial Council on Nov. 20, 1982, that members of PASOK should not interfere in the affairs of government. See *Proini,* Nov. 27-28, 1982. The situation did not improve and the warning was repeated at a meeting of the executive committee of PASOK in July 1983.

10. Nicos P. Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment* (London, 1979), chapters 3 and 4 in particular.

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public and private ventures financed by both Greek and foreign capital were formed. An interlocking power elite composed of foreign multinationals, their domestic compradores and the upper echelons of the Greek bureaucratic apparatus regarded the Greek state as their personal domain. Particularly during the years of military rule (1967-1974), the tension between the indigenous national bourgeoisie and the foreign capital over control of the Greek state was resolved in favor of the latter.

In contradistinction to the profits of the economic elite, Greece's prosperity has been a function of the services Greece has provided core countries: tourism, shipping and, in the affluent years, "guest workers" for Western European factories. Despite the rise of a technologically advanced sector, approximately 30 percent of Greece's labor force remains agricultural even though massive urbanization has taken place, particularly in Athens.[11] Despite the large farm population, the crops produced are largely for export, necessitating new food imports to meet Greece's needs. The composition of Greece's exports, however, has shifted. The percentage of exports of agricultural produce began declining in the 1960s. By 1981, over 65 percent of Greece's exports consisted of basic metals, aluminum, petroleum products, chemicals, and textiles, while exports of citrus fruit, wine and dates continued.[12]

This overview of Greek economy highlights one of its dominant features: dependence on external markets and structural integration in a subordinate position within the world economy. Socialist goals notwithstanding, there has been little production for the domestic market. Thus, the consumer remains dependent on imports of both food and consumer goods. the level of Greece's national income, in turn, has been contingent on non-productive service sectors, such as tourism, shipping, and remittances from overseas Greeks, particularly the emigrants — all of which are declining. The structure of the Greek economy is characteristic neither of an advanced capitalist nor of a precapitalist economy. Rather, it is one that has developed on the context of economic dependence, external penetration, and the adaptation of Greek society to these conditions.

Greece's economic dependence, coupled with the failure of new policies such as import substitution and an open economy to trigger industrialization, has led PASOK to search for alternatives. Its initial development strategy assumed that a committed political leadership could overcome structural constraints, formulate new economic policies, increase domestic production for the home market, redistribute income, diversify trade patterns, and regulate foreign investments. This strategy derives from PASOK's analysis of Greece as a semi-peripheral state. The social democratic principle of nationalizing industry as a development strategy and a means for redistributing

11. OECD, *Labor Force Statistics Report* (Paris, OECD, 1982), p. 249. The figure for 1981 was 30.7 percent.

12. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1982*, p. 406. The 1981 agricultural exports were 14.7 percent.

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income was seen as inappropriate in a society with a limited industrial base and privatized state structures. The penetration of the Greek state by domestic and foreign economic interests and the resulting blurring of distinctions between public and private spheres did not lend itself to further expansion of the state sector under socialism. It was simply too closely identified with monopoly state capitalism.

In particular, since the mid-1960s, foreign and domestic capitalists invested in a variety of ventures, often borrowing from Greek banks, thus minimizing their risks by using Greek savings to finance enterprises of little benefit to domestic consumers. In fact, during the military rule, Greek capitalists who supported the military regime obtained large governmental loans for housing projects under very favorable conditions. They made a quick profit, defaulted, and then abandoned the unfinished, shoddy construction. Poor management, inefficiency, and unprofitability characterized many endeavors. Inability to meet their indebtedness led to bank takeovers by the state, which expanded the public sector.[13] The privatization of the state bureaucracy insured that the many forms of state encroachment on private enterprise served the interests of the economic oligarchy.

Given its identification with state capitalism, nationalization could not be incorporated in Papandreou's socialist program. It was replaced by the vaguely defined concept of socialization, which meant decentralization, community control and local ownership. Initial efforts to organize formal self-management councils were abandoned and replaced by "advisory" councils in a wide range of public and private institutions.[14] Inevitably, the principle of local control and participation was diluted. Despite opposition to nationalization, both the pharmaceutical and the embryonic defense industries have been nationalized. Moreover, in cases of private firms that the government deems "problematic," i.e., heavily indebted to the state and on the verge of bankruptcy, but considered essential to Greece's economic development, the state will nationalize and assume their outstanding debts.[15]

The decentralization plan encourages the establishment of local productive facilities as determined by the needs of local communities. The redistribution of income through taxation reform and wage increases was designed in part to increase consumer demand and encourage production for

13. It was in part the new incentives, including ease in obtaining loans, which set the stage for the later bankruptcies of many firms. See Tassos Yianniotsis, *I Elliniki Biomihania: Anaptixi Ue Ksisi* (Greek Industry: Development and Crisis, Athens, 1983), pp. 66ff.

14. Initially there were to be supervisory councils for all private enterprises composed of representatives of labor, owners, Municipal Councils, and consumers. The socialization law was enacted in June 1983. Following an outcry of protest from the Federation of Greek Industries, Papandreouu interpreted the councils' function as "advisory" rather than "supervisory." The various pertinent legislative enactments and decrees appear in the issues of *Efimeritha Tis Kiverniseos* (Government Gazette) in 1982 and 1983.

15. The laws on "problematic" firms were adopted in July 1983. In accordance with the opinion of a committee established to evaluate the viability of these firms, several have been deemed both potentially profitable and valuable to Greece's economic development and have been nationalized.

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the domestic market. And foreign investment would be encouraged only inasmuch as it conforms to the guildelines of Greece's development goals. Unfortunately, the prospects for successful implementation of this strategy has encountered both international and domestic resistance. The world economic crisis, in conjunction with the austerity programs pursued by Western conservative governments, have created insurmountable obstacles. The international recession and the failure of core countries to harmonize fiscal policies precipitated reversals not only in Mitterrand's program, but in Greece as well.

The international economic crisis and its domestic repercussions destroyed the transition period deemed essential for the success of Papandreou's gradualism. Critical sources of Greece's national income, such as shipping, tourism, and immigrant remittances, have been declining. Greece's workers are no longer in demand in Western Europe, fueling rising unemployment, now estimated at over 10 percent.[16] The rate of inflation, which has been over 20 percent for several years, seems to be declining. Moreover, efforts to encourage investments have not been successful, partly because of a fear of socialism, but more importantly, because prospects for profitable investment are dim. The rate of economic growth is stagnant. The deficit in the balance of payments is worsening, and foreign currency reserves are nearly depleted.[17]

The constraints faced by the Papandreou government have been compounded by domestic resistance. Redistributive policies not only failed to bring about the anticipated increase in production for the domestic market, but it also led to an increase in imports and a worsening deficit in Greece's balance of payments. These policies were thwarted by intensely negative reactions from Greece's wealthy classes. A drastic reform of the tax system, including a graduated tax on real estate holdings, generated such an outcry and refusal by property holders to comply with the registration requirement, that the measure was quickly withdrawn. Similarly, efforts to reduce the produce wholesalers' exorbitant margin of profit backfired. In the summer of 1982, a measure was enacted controlling and limiting price increases for produce purchased from farmers and sold to retailers. The middlemen boycotted the measure by refusing to supply the urban markets, particularly Athens, causing acute shortages. After an initial standoff, the government abandoned its efforts.

Within a year, world economic recession and the resistance of privileged

16. The official rate of unemployment for 1981 was estimated at 4.75 percent by Paris, OECD, *Economic Survey of Greece*, May 1981, an increase over the previous year. As the OECD report itself states, however, this is an underestimation, since it is based on half of the non-agricultural urban work force who are registered and meet certain qualifications. Young people among whom unemployment is high do not meet the qualifications and are excluded from consideration.

17. OECD, *Economic Outlook*, Paris, July 1983. According to their figures, GDP remained stagnant for 1981 and 1982, with an estimated increase of ½ percent for 1983; Gerasimos Arsenis, the governor of the Bank of Greece, estimates a decline of 0.2 percent for 1981 and an increase of 0.2 percent for 1982. *Annual Statement of the Governor of the Bank of Greece, 1983*, National Accounts Service, Ministry of National Economy (Athens, 1983).

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classes brought about a partial reversal of PASOK's policies. Efforts to redistribute income were slowed, and wage increases ended with the imposition of a freeze. Under the rubric of increasing workers' participation, the right to strike was curtailed and the restrictions on foreign investment were eased. The overarching goals of restructuring and industrializing Greek society appeared to have reached a stalemate. The political risks in terms of losing future electoral support from several sectors adversely affected by the socialist program have been a determining factor behind PASOK's caution.

In social modernization, which does not affect existing class interests, progress has been made. Over opposition from the powerful Greek Orthodox Church, family law has been drastically reformed. The dowry was outlawed, divorce made easier, penal codes were reformed, and the panoply of repressive police and gendarmerie forces has been reduced. A major aim of the socialist government is to change the status of women. Male domination of Greek society, even prior to the new legislation, had been eroded, but only minimally. Economic need, prompted by urbanization and consumerism, has resulted in an increase in the number of women entering the labor market. The marginality of women in the work force, however, is evidenced in their withdrawal from the labor market as soon as the economy declines. Moreover, working women are expected to retain their traditional responsibility for the household. Yet, clear legal rights for women have been established. With the restructuring of state and social institutions, fundamental changes in the role of women may be contingent on changes in the Greek economy. At any rate, much of this social reform legislation was prompted by the need to conform to European Community regulations.

An earlier cornerstone of PASOK meant to cut Greece's structural links to core countries was withdrawn from the European Economic Community. Membership in the EEC, it was argued by socialists, had further integrated Greece into the world economy in a subordinate position.[18] In fact, the European Commission's proposals for an integrated Mediterranean program recommended, with reference to Greece, the strengthening of those very sectors that would preclude future autonomous industrialization. Emphasis is placed on expanding the fishing industry without providing any concrete proposals for dealing with the massive pollution of the Mediterranean. Likewise, it recommended expansion of agriculture and increased productivity through adopting more rational modern technology, and the expansion of the tourist industry, particularly in rural areas.[19] Little consideration was

18. As late as October 1977, Papandreou was arguing in an interview given to *Economics Tachythromos* that entry into the EEC would be destructive to the prospects of autonomous development for Greece. In the 1981 electoral platform, PASOK still claimed that Greece was being exploited by foreign multinationals. PASOK, moreover, promised a referendum on continued membership if elected, *Diakirixi Kibernitikis Politikis: Symbolalo me to Lao* (Election Platform, Athens, 1981).

19. See "The Commission's Proposals for hte Integrated Mediterranean Programmes," Commisson of the European Communities, Brussels, March 23, 1983 (Brussels COM (83)24); "Greece in the Community — Assessment and Proposal," Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, March 29, 1983 (Brussels COM (83)134); and "Proposal for a Council Regula-

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given to crop diversification, which would have increased Greece's food self-sufficiency, as an alternative to continued specialization in a limited number of export crops that compete with similar products from the other Mediterranean countries. The question of developing Greece's industrial sector was largely ignored. Given the doctrine of comparative advantage, Community membership is both destructive to Greece's non-competitive industries and potentially beneficial to Europe's multinationals.

In January 1981, approximately ten months prior to the socialist election victory, Greece had become a full member of the EEC. During the electoral campaign, PASOK had already significantly modified its earlier stance of opposition to Greece's membership. PASOK's promise of withdrawal once elected was changed to a commitment to a referendum to determine popular desires on the issue. After the election victory, the referendum question became moot. The socialist government limited itself to submitting a memorandum to the European Community demanding minor revisions in the terms of Greece's accession to full membership.[20]

The Greek socialists' striking reversal on EEC membership dramatizes the impact of domestic and international constraints on Greece's options: withdrawal from the European Community was no longer viable. Such a move would isolate Greece by cutting off export markets at a time when there were few alternatives. Moreover, because of the European Community's Common Agricultural Program (CAP), several Greek farm crops were eligible for substantial subsidies, resulting in higher incomes for many farmers. As support for the Papandreou government was eroding, the backing of the traditional agricultural sector became politically crucial. In addition, foreign policy considerations further restricted the socialists' options.

The problems of the Greek socialists were not limited to the economic sphere. Things were not much better in foreign policy. Greece's main concern there is with Turkey, a fellow NATO member regarding the Aegean and Cyprus. Again, wider considerations led to PASOK's abandonment of its 1977 commitment to disassociate Greece from the Atlantic Alliance in favor of closer relations with the non-aligned countries.[21] The initial program for withdrawal from NATO would have left Greece isolated and vulnerable. Although NATO has refused to guarantee Greece's border against Turkey (which Papandreou periodically demands), the alternatives are alliance with the Soviet Union (which Papandreou rejects) or with the non-aligned bloc (which cannot offer Greece any protection). Thus, Greece remains in NATO, while refusing to participate in military exercises when Turkey is assigned functions threatening Greece's security.

tion (EEC) Instituting Integrated Mediterranean Programmes," Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, August 16, 1983 (COM (83)495).

20. Greek Memorandum, "Position of the Greek Government on Greece's Relations with the European Communities," EEC Commission *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 15/3 (1982), p. 91.

21. See Van Coufoudakis, "Greco-Turkish Relations and the Greek Socialists: Ideology, Nationalism and Pragmatism," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, I/2 (October 1983), pp. 373-392.

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Similarly, the seven U.S. military bases in Greece are considered an affront to Greek sovereignty and are meant primarily to defend American rather than Greek interests. After protracted negotiations, Greece signed a five-year renewal of the base agreement in July 1983. There was no alternative, given that Greece does not have a defense industry capable of producing the needed military equipment. Diversification of Greece's arms suppliers has begun and a more adequate defense industry is being built. So Greece remains primarily dependent on the U.S. for military supplies.

Thus, the socialist government's declaration of autonomy has consisted primarily of empty symbolic gestures. Both in NATO and in the European Community, Greece has voted against the general consensus on matters that are not crucial to either party. Greece refused to join the EEC in its condemnation of the Soviet Union after the military coup in Poland and has publicly supported the PLO. Yet, notwithstanding all this, Greece's political and military integration with the West remains solid.

So far the socialists' goals of increasing national self-reliance and modernizing Greek society have floundered. Greece remains a semi-peripheral state. The constraints that the socialist government has encountered raise two significant questions. First, whether democratic socialist principles can be implemented during international economic crises, when advanced capitalist states pursue austerity policies. Second, whether the semi-peripheral states can extricate themselves from their subordination to these advanced capitalist states simply through new policy choices.

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NOTES AND COMMENTARY:

Socialism and Modernization in France

by Dick Howard

Reality + Modernity = ?

No social movement carried the French socialists to power in 1981; and contrary to 1936, none emerged to support or push further its action. Three years and three policies later the government was confronted by the largest demonstration in post-war history. More than a million Frenchmen came in the name of freedom of education to protest against the modernization of an educational system whose foundation was laid by Napoleon! The protesters were not concerned so much with the details of the reform but its very principle: state controlled and uniform educational practices. That these millions misread the government's proposal is no more relevant than the charge that they were manipulated by the opposition (or the Church). This inability to build support for modernizing projects has roots that are French, others that are socialist, and still others that are found in all modern democracies.

The socialist victory was actually the defeat of Giscard. DeGaulle's long-time finance minister had been elected in 1974 on a platform of modernization with a human face. His early years were marked by impromptu suppers with modest families, visits to prisons and other bureaucratic institutions, and even — an ungallic first — a photo of the President in his swimming shorts. They were also characterized by a refusal to begin the adaptation to the post-1973 world economic slowdown. Giscard continued a policy of rapidly modernizing French industry in which the state played a key role. The inevitable reckoning with this reality replaced the human face; a new Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, replaced the gaullist Chirac. The new strategy was to force-feed *market-liberalism into the listless economy while Giscard, to avoid the heat,* assumed the Presidential distance that DeGaulle's institutions permit. The domestic repercussions of the return to the market were not long in coming. Two foreign policy incidents sealed Giscard's unpopular fate — the diamonds given him by the bloody African dictator Bokassa, and the meeting with Brezhnev despite the invasion of Afghanistan.

The phenomenon of election-as-rejection is not specific to France. But Mitterrand is not Reagan or Thatcher; he was elected as a socialist (and a non-appeaser). Still, the militant posturings and nationalizations of his first year in power gave way in June 1982 to a devaluation and wage freeze that was followed, in March 1983, by a politics of "austerity" (and another devaluation) that would surprise neither Reagan nor Thatcher (who find nothing to omplain about in Mitterrand's Atlanticism, either). This "Barreism without Barre" is directed since July 1984 by Laurent Fabius, a well-bred young technocrat (and Giscard look-alike) whose credo of modernity has replaced the old-style socialism of Pierre Mauroy. Eighteen months remain until the 1986 Parliamentary elections. Success depends on demonstrating a new equation: socialism = modernity + reality.

The French socialists do not put it quite this way. They are socialists. Austerity is said to be "conjunctural"; it is a "parenthesis" in a steady course. The party claims to have retained its socialist "essence" despite the difficulties of its dialectical "existence." The union with the Communist Party was the sign of this fidelity. Now that the Com-

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munists have left the government — as a result of their own internal power struggles following their fall to only 12 percent of the votes in the June European elections — the reshuffled cabinet returned Jean-Pierre Chevenement and his CERES-Marxist faction to play this symbolic role.

The socialists are also French. Bitter pills like the industrial restructuring in the Lorraine or the refusal to aid the bankrupt giant Creusot-Loire are justified by the rhetorical identification of the Left with French nationalism, which dates from the Revolution and the Resistance. The international struggle for markets has transformed the class struggle into the struggle for modernization. Again, if for different reasons, socialism = modernity + reality.

But the problem is not only French or socialist. This is apparent in the disarray among intellectuals. The socialist concern with equality has been replaced by a flirtation with freedom. One finds Hayek strewn together with Rawls and Nozick on the pages of erstwhile "Left" journals. Liberalism has become as confused and confusing a label as Marxism once was. Freedom tends to be identified with privatization. The appeal to the market covers the rise of technical managers whose power increases because their role cannot be admitted by the new rhetoric. The two most interesting journals, *Esprit* and *Intervention* seem to have made a virtue of necessity. Sociology and politics have been subordinated to philosophy. Debate focuses, for example, on the difference of "left- and right-wing liberalism," questions the relation of democratic and republican institutions, attempts to break free of the gallo-centrism typical of French thought. Probing received wisdom instead of dishing out new truths suggests that the search for questions has replaced the demand for answers. The French and the socialists are joining the rest of us.

The Road to Power

Mitterrand was an extraordinarily successful politician of the parliamentary IVth Republic whose stalemated system DeGaulle replaced in 1958. This (non-socialist) leader of a small party maneuvered himself into one ministerial portfolio after another in the rapidly changing governments of the IVth Republic. His career was not an unfamiliar pattern, in France or elsewhere. Mitterrand managed to shake his nickname, "Le Florentin," by his continual denunciation of the Vth Republic as "a permanent coup d'état," as he titled a 1964 book. He began a new career by adopting the ideology of socialism to the changin conditions of modernizing France.

French socialism had reached its nadir in the early 1960s. Local bastions remained, in the North (which produced Pierre Mauroy) and Marseille (whose mayor was Gaston Deferre), but the barons were feuding. Progressive Catholics were swept up in the Gaullist wave (Jacques Delors, for example, served in the Cabinet of Chaban-Delmas). The after-shocks of Budapest weakened the Communists, and the end of the Algerian War eliminated a unifying issue. Mitterrand set about rebuilding. The institutions of the Vth Republic served his aims. The opposition could triumph in the presidential Vth Republic only by rallying around a single leader. When the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia ended the hope for a Eurocommunist revival, socialism was the only game in town. Mitterrand had positioned himself well. He used the 1960s to create a new coalition.

The new Socialist Party was a coalition of leaders and factions divided by ideology but united by the quest for power. The founding Congress at Epinay in 1971 federated the remnants of Alain Savary's traditional socialists, the regional groups of Mauroy and Deferre, and the Marxist ideologues of Chevenement's *Centre d'etudes et de recherches marxistes* (CERES) under the direction of Mitterrand's *Convention des institutions repub-*

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licaines. The next step was to formulate a Common Program with the Communist Party. This permitted Mitterrand to make a credible showing in the 1974 presidential elections.

Mitterrand's electoral coalition was given a needed activist base when the "self-management" orientation from the small *Parti socialiste unifié* (PSU) led by Michel Rocard, joined it in 1975. At the same time, socially concerned Catholics, such as Delors' club "échange et projets," began to participate. This forged links to the CFDT trade union, which had been revived under the leadership of Edmond Maire. The 1977 municipal elections brought socialist victories and the expectation of left success in the 1978 parliamentary battle. The three currents that continue to exist formally within the party were now clearly defined. The majority Mitterrandists (including the Mauroy, Deferre, and Savary factions) were momentarily allied with the "self-management" orientation led by Rocard. The CERES was a minority representative of doctrinal orthodoxy.

There were two worms in this electoral apple. Michel Rocard identified the more fundamental problem in a speech to the 1977 Party Congress in Nantes. He spoke of a conflict between "two cultures" that divided French socialism, a centralist and a self-management orientation, and identified himself clearly with the latter, which has come to be known as the "second left" and includes the trade unionists of the CFDT. The immediate consequences of the presence of these two cultures was revealed by the second worm. The Communist ally had not profited as it expected from the coalition; it seized an occasion shortly before the parliamentary elections to reject the Common Program. This gave Mitterrand the occasion for a tactical maneuver to eliminate the threat to his personal power posed by the growing popularity of Rocard (who remains today the most popular politician in France). At the Party Congress in 1979, Mitterrand allied himself with the CERES-Marxists on the grounds that the Party needed to regain credibility on the left. The Rocardians were limited to 21 percent of the Party executive. The results were felt in the first year of socialist government.

As with Ronald Reagan, Mitterrand took his electoral victory for a popular mandate. To the surprise of many, his platform began to be implemented, literally. Communist support was not necessary, but four communist ministers were selected. Nationalizations, the reduced work week at no cut in pay, a fifth week of paid vacation, increased minimum wage and social benefits followed one another rapidly. The press spoke of a "state of grace," neglecting its own responsibility for the uncritical acceptance of this economic orthodoxy.

The results were not surprising: a temporary wage freeze in June of 1982 accompanied by a first devaluation, and the second devaluation in March of 1983, stressing the need for a "politics of austerity" for a France that could not deny that it is part of the world market. Much had been accomplished elsewhere, in judicial reform, cultural politics and especially decentralization, but the economy came to dominate the debate. Electoral defeat followed electoral defeat; municipal bastions conquered in 1977 and earlier, fell. Some, like the CERES and the Communists, said that the government should have stayed the course. But the French economy does not have the weight that supported Reagan's kind of economic voluntarism. Chèvenement left the cabinet when his protectionist-nationalist proposals were rejected; the communists remained.

The dilemma confronting the French socialists is how to translate the economics of austerity into a politics capable of mobilizing French opinion. Austerity means attacking entrenched positions — inflation-adjustments to wages, social security and health

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care benefits, decreased subsidies for public transportation and the like. France may or may not have more such bastions of privilege than other Western democracies; the problem, in any case, is familiar. Those who stand to lose from the changes appeal to "acquired rights" and to personal freedom of choice and contract. When it is socialists who are doing the cutting, this opposition rhetoric has a ready market. And so it was that millions were mobilized to demonstrate for freedom of (educational) choice on June 24.

Mitterrand had to regain the initiative. The Florentine reappeared. A thinly disguised attempt from the Elysée to float a center-left alliance in the European elections was roundly defeated, as were the socialists (and communists). The demonstration came a week later. Stone-walling did little good. Mitterrand unveiled the secret weapon of the Vth Republic: he called for a referendum! In fact, for a referendum permitting the president to go over the head of Parliament to propose to the people measures concerning "public liberties" such as educational reform. The strategem was apparently brilliant — how could the opposition object? — but potentially dangerous: could one imagine another president calling a referendum on imigration workers, for example? What are public as opposed to private liberties? Before discussion could begin, however, a second move offset the stratagem. The prime minister was replaced and the communists departed.

What next? The new government has pledged to continue the recovery-through-austerity, which has shown some results (despite unemployment figures of some 2,500,000). The communists' departure may bring more strike activity, but the power and support of the unions is limited. The opposition is divided among supporters of Giscard, Chirac, and Barre; more important, it is uncertain how to relate to the new right-wing National Front movement of Jean-Marie Le Pen, which received 11 percent of the votes in the European elections. The new dynamics of the situation were unintentionally revealed in the nearly identical headlines that greeted the new cabinet in the left-leaning *Libération* and the right-oriented *Le Quotidien*: "Mitterrand Prime Minister." Giscard reacted to adversity by withdrawing. Now, the Florentine has put himself on the line — but for what? For self-preservation, say the cynics. But the interplay of his socialist rhetoric, French politics, and a modernizing economy may produce unexpected results over the longer term.

The End of Marxism and the Possibility of Socialism

My Marxist friends are devotees of what Hegel called "the cunning of reason." They used to call it the logic of history or the dialectic, but that was refuted by the Gulag. Still, old habits die hard. Their temptation is to write off the French experience as another illustration of socialists doing the capitalists' dirty work. The working class is again victim of politicians who prefer power to principle. Socialist rhetoric, communist participation are the appearance; austerity politics, praise of the market and rehabilitation of the entrepreneur are the reality. And the frosting on this cake: Mitterrand's Bundestag speech in favor of the Pershing missiles and his unblushing Atlanticism.

The Socialist Party's Marxists take a different tack. Their attitude recalls the behavior that got the British Labor Party into trouble. The CERES-faction presented a counter-project at the Congress at Bourg-en-Bresse in October 1983. It warned against a free-market liberalism imported because of France's place in international competition and its internal backwardness. It condemned what it called the realism that simply "administers" the crisis on the grounds that this implies that the crisis is something inevitable. The CERES proposes a voluntarism that combines economic proposals with the necessity to prepare for the 1986 elections. France is said to need "a major pro-

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ject" that liberalism, realism or modernism cannot offer. A "competitive devaluation," protectionism, and a new "Saint-Simonian alliance" are the *projet* that will stimulate greater productivity in adversity while also bringing voters to the defense of the courageous but beleaguered party. The logic behind these proposals is very French if not particularly Marxist. Revolutionary images of the country in danger are evoked by this Jacobin appeal, with its Gaullist overtones.

The CERES analysis is revealing because it correctly notes that it is only restating the platform that brought the socialists to power. It highlights a neglected aspect of French-style socialist politics. French socialism had never confronted the difficulties of government. It participated in coalitions, had an occasional minister, and one brief moment of glory in 1936. Absolute powerlessness, like absolute power, corrupts. The victim loses touch with reality. He lives in a dream world where everything is possible. The political result is the voluntarism and nationalism that were apparent in the first year of socialist government. Socialist Keynesianism accompanied by nationalizations superbly ignored France's place in the world economy. Similarly, it expected the enthusiasm of the now-sovereign masses to pay for the new social measures gaily voted. The masses acted like modern consumers, spending their new benefits on goods that depressed French industry could not supply with sufficient speed. Inflation increased as the trade balance worsened and the franc weakened. This was not predicted by the socialist plans.

French socialism has been a culture of opposition since the foundation of the IIIrd Republic more than a century ago. This explains the ideological passion that characterizes French politics. The cultural attachment of the *peuple de gauche* is electorally crucial. This century-old tradition explains some of the incongruities of socialist politics, for example, the maintenance of Pierre Mauroy as prime minister despite shifting policies, or the abortive educational reform. The openly pragmatic horse-trading that characterizes American politics is inconceivable within the French socialist culture of opposition — although its practice is hardly unknown. The invocation of ancestors such as Jaurès or Blum has none of the ritual piety that characterizes the "party of Lincoln" or even the legacy of FDR.

But the very fact that the socialists are now in power means the symbolic end of the IIIrd Republic; it marks the irrelevance of the ideological passions that dominated French history. The situation is, classically, dialectical: the ideology that served for the conquest of power is no longer relevant once power has been conquered. The government needs a link between itself and the population in order to avoid the appearance of arbitrariness that made the issue of freedom an opposition theme. The "Union of the Left" was a political operation; it was not a "popular front." The parties to this union can either justify to the population the measures of the government, or they can attempt to represent the interests of their constituents. The trick would be to perform both functions simultaneously. The party majority (and CERES) are attempting this trick by appealing to "those on the Left." But the demographic change that has accompanied French modernization condemns this tactic to failure.

Socialist Rigor

Another solution has been proposed, taking into account the impossibility of recreating the old symbolic politics. Some 5 percent of the delegates at the 1983 Party Congress at Bourg-en-Bresse supported an alternative motion titled, "Regain Political Initiative by a Proper Use of Rigor." The thrust of their criticism is seen in a pre-Congress letter to the delegates from party secretary Jospin. He attacks particularly the proposal's suggestion that the crisis be treated as a positive lever to transform the pre-

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modern remnants blocking French development. Jospin worries about the electoral implications of the call for self-criticism and admission of error; this would dismay "those on the Left." Jospin also finds "false and caricatural" the assertion that the party has neglected its base in favor of internal power plans, and that "autonomous action other than propaganda work has been timid." The party secretary clinches his case with the suggestion that the proposal emanated from "another Left" whose vision might be laudable, honest and even interesting, "but since we are here in the First Left, there is a problem." To put the nail in the coffin, he added a footnote citation from Michel Rocard disavowing the proposal.[1]

The details of the motion are less important than its self-conscious attempt to force the party to recognize the new situation created by its own actions. Many of the proposals have a familiar ring, despite an occasional gallic flourish. The authors insist that the "reversal" in direction is not just a "parenthesis" in an otherwise steady course. They prolemicize against demands that the state intervene to aid "temporarily" weaker industries by financial or tariff policy. The French lack of entrepreneurial spirit is blamed on the expectation that the state will eventually come to the rescue. The "proper" use of rigor means attacking the legacy of corporatist privilege, entrenched position or "acquired rights." This creative-destruction will make possible applications of the socialist principle of self-management in an economy undergoing rapid modernization. Proposals for job-sharing and the reduction of the work-week (*not* with full compensation) highlight another aspect of the modernity neglected by the traditionalist socialists. Work is no longer definitional of character; nor is work in itself a social good. There is no reason to produce useless jobs; youth is as aware of this as is the bored typist. The problem is not unemployment *per se* but rather new kinds of employment. This aspect of the "proper" use of the crisis recalls themes that emerged in the critique of the society of abundance. The objection to that "new left" critique has to be answered here: can it be made *politically* feasible?

The Motion claims not to be an oppositional statement. Its purpose is not to propose another volley of new laws and institutional transformations from on high. The task, rather, is to give content to the legislation already initiated. For example, the laws on decentralization have only begun to transform the inherited jacobin tradition. This transfer of power meets resistance from entrenched privilege which can only be overcome by the mobilization of the new publics who will benefit from the new possibilities. Similarly, the Auroux laws giving workers a voice in factory life will degenerate into another source of union bureaucratic power unless those directly concerned are mobilized. The same is true concerning tenant rights, new measures permitting small cooperative industries, and the like.

The authors of the Motion know that they represent a small minority of the Party. Their proposal is clearly part of a longer term strategy discussed in their bulletin, AGIRS *(A Gauche pour L'Initiative, La Responsabilité et la Solidarité).* The fidelity to the government's program is the tactic of the Emperor's New Clothes. The appeal to new

1. Rocard's case would make an interesting study in itself. The representative of the "self-management" wing within the party opposed the electoral alliance with the Communists prior to the 1981 elections. Mitterrand outmanoeuvred him and won the Party designation. Rocard's popularity dictated that he participate in the new cabinet, but without real power to threaten Mitterrand and his allies. He was the powerless Minister of the Plan, and is now Minister of Agriculture. He seems to have decided to sacrifice principle to power, playing the waiting game rather than enter into opposition. His former intellectual allies drew the conclusion and founded the journal *Intervention.* Among his political allies, the 5% who supported the Motion at Bourg-en-Bresse have been excluded from the regular luncheon meetings at the Ministry.

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publics and a self-management politics applies a similar tactic. The first is directed down, the second up. But tactics are effective only in the service of a strategy. In the old days, this was the achievement of socialism. Modern French socialist power has put it into question. The seeds of a new definition are implicit in the intellectuals' gropings; Mitterrand's simple or cynical attempt to preserve power may make them explicit.

Modern Socialism?

The one point on which French socialists (but not Communists) agree is foreign policy. Americans are surprised to hear Mrs. Kirkpatrick's distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian governments in socialist mouths, and in socialist actions. The distinction is not without its use, in the proper context. It took the French a long while to realize what was self-evident to American democrats; the so-called "Solzhenitsyn shock" has been the butt of justified mockery. But the same concepts can conceal quite different interpretations because they are rooted in quite different experiences. French attitudes toward Russia (as they have insisted on calling it since DeGaulle taught them the relevance of classical diplomatic thinking) are not determined by ideology along.

The French concern with totalitarianism is based on an analysis of their own society. The numbers of Frenchmen who have passed throught the Communist Party is staggeringly high. This experience cannot be the result of a personal aberration or accident. If the "best and the brightest" of the French were drawn to the communist line, they conclude, this could only be because of some dangerous potential within democratic capitalist societies themselves. This is what concerns the socialists who, finally, came to understand the nature of totalitarianism.

The French was quickly philosophical, but the point is simple enough. Modernizing France will upset the life-patterns of millions. It will generate material as well as psychological insecurity. The Welfare State, socialist or capitalist, comes to the rescue. The danger, of course, is that its intervention creates a class of persons who will never be able to free themselves from what Kant liked to call "self-incurred tutelage." This danger is magnified when the state is controlled by a party which dispenses security in order to keep itself in power.

The influence of the critique of totalitarianism can be seen in the warnings of the oppositional Motion at Bourg-en-Bresse, as well as in the "silence of the intellectuals" from whom the Socialists expected ideological legitimation. The near-adulation of Raymond Aron by left-leaning intellectuals, and the popularity of the journal *Commentaire* which he founded are a sign of the times. Former socialists identify themselves as "lib/lib" — liberal libertarians. Historians who had searched for lessons in the phases of the French Revolution are now studying 19th century liberalism and its peculiar French variants. Régis Debray, former guevarist and now Mitterrand adviser, has just published *Power and Dreams* to justify *realpolitik* as real socialism. The recently deceased philosopher Michel Foucault published the continuation of his theory of sexuality eight years after the first volume. The new volumes reveal a new philosopher: it is as if, like the French socialist, the speculative dreams have learned the lessons of rigor and realism. The preservation of liberal democracy has become a prime value for these socialists who have learned that it can never be taken for granted. The question now is whether the defensive posture can become also a positive politics?

The implications of the critique of totalitarianism come together with the self-management orientation to define a political *attitude*. The attitude is defined negatively by the end of two great myths that paralyzed French political thinking. The end of the IIIrd Republic means the end of a religious-ideological quarrelsomeness that made

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France a caricaturely insular nation. Economic necessity and the internal political evolution point unavoidably outside of the hexagon. But the opening toward the world depends on overcoming the myth of a socialist utopia. The economy again favors this tendency, but politics is ambivalent. If the party persists in its appeal to "those on the Left," all bets are off . . . save the certain victory of the opposition in the parliamentary elections of 1986.

Two variables bear watching in the 18 months that remain until the elections. The 11% who voted for the right-wing National Front movement (whose slogan in the European election was *"Les Français d'abord!"* are not the renewal of a 1950's anti-modernism. They have two potential political roles: their threat could serve the socialists as an alibi for not reforming themselves; or they could serve the Florentine Mitterrand by driving a wedge between the honest center-right and the hard-right. This latter option would revive the failed attempt to create a center-left government in 1986; it would be a "left" variant of what Giscard had tried previously. Mitterrand would appeal to the European sentiment which has begun to take root in France, especially among the modernist, realist "second left." This strategy could also permit the Socialist Party to undertake the needed self-re-evaluation, paralleling *mutatis mutandis* the Bad Godesberg Program which brought the German SPD into modern politics.

The equation "socialism = modernity + realism" is not inspiring; it will not bring the masses into the streets. But it is just that conception of politics as militant demonstration in the name of higher values that the socialist experience has overcome. Will the Emperor admit that he is naked?

REFORMS IN YUGOSLAVIA*

by Svetozar Stojanović

1. The Character of the Crisis

As the military dictatorship was being imposed on Poland, Enrico Berlinguer declared: "The model set in motion by the October revolution has run out of steam." I would add: "The Yugoslav model of that archetype (otherwise progressive and meaningful), symbolized by Stalin's break with Tito in 1948 even though it actually began with Tito's break with Stalin a year or two later, ran out of steam in terms of its ability to generate innovation among the people and to motivate and mobilize them as early as the end of the 1960s." Ever since then, the Yugoslav system has been caught in a vicious circle. Once more, in 1972, a way out of the crisis was sought in the abolition of the achievements of the preceding period of liberalization.

No significant innovations, not even ideological ones, are possible any longer, simply by making modifications within the framework of the Yugoslav archetype. It is not

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a question of a system like this being unable to realize its proclaimed long-range historical objectives. Rather, it cannot even accomplish immediate and short term goals, such as the regular supply of consumer goods, to say nothing of the fundamental democratization of the ruling party. But having mentioned this, it is also worth noting that the Yugoslav economy has enormous regenerative capacities. This means that there must be many intelligent, adaptable, and honest people at work in the economy to have prevented its implosion, given the bad political leadership.

As opposed to capitalist society, where the economy is dominant, we have to deal with a social totality where politics dominate. What this means is that the fundamental causes of our crisis and the way out of it ought to be sought precisely in politics. While the most developed world is preparing for the transition to a post-industrial period, we remain incapable of rooting out the fundamental political obstacles to the functioning of a still-developing society. Things are too serious to allow us to continue to speak in euphemisms.

Officials continue to waste time refusing to recognize the full extent and depth of the crisis. They continue with their old game of ideological equivocation and technological camouflage. At first "serious difficulties" were recognized — and this is where we get the "economic *stabilization* program" from. But in the meantime the crisis has already been recognized, so the following problem arises: do we really want to be stabilized in a crisis? The second step in ideological retreat was the identification of an economic crisis at the same time that the existence of a political one was being refuted. From this time we find pronouncements that merit classification in an anthology of political oxymorons: "The economic situation is bad but the political situation is good." Recently we even learned that our *economic system* was in crisis, but in no wise was our political system to blame. It is for this reason that discussion is encouraged on "the *open questions of the functioning* of the political system" even while the questioning of the political system *as such* is condemned. What will our ideologues think of next?

Can we realistically expect the political element to recognize it is in crisis and admit responsibility for it? Most likely, it will continue to equate its planned legal-political construction of the system with the system as it exists. This suggests that our sociopolitical system doesn't really have anything to do with real institutions and the way they actually function, their real relations to each other and their relations to other dimensions of social life. Instead, it deals more on the level of ideals written into political-legal proclamations: integrated self-management, free and associated labor, distribution according to work. . . .

Whatever occurs with any regularity is deemed by our ideology to have come about in spite of and apart from the system. Whatever happens rarely, or even only in exceptional circumstances, is said to have resulted from the system's operation. Thus the success of one conception of social development is ultimately not measured in terms of its actual achievements but by its legal-political declarations and the norms deduced from it — sometimes by nothing more than the mere intentions of their creators. Since the intentions of the leadership are good, and practice is the only criterion for measuring truth, it would appear that the leaders have the right, so long as they live, to revise their previous plans and to test them again in practice — as if there are no plans that can be known in advance to be condemned to fail.

2. The Ideologico-Historical Syndrome

There is no doubt that official ideology almost exclusively determined the portrayal of our recent history, right up to a very short time ago. Several later books and treatises,

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hitting the core of our ideological-historical syndrome, make an important contribution to the formation of a more accurate historical picture, without which it is impossible to understand what is happening now. We have embarked on a period of big surprises for the reading public, accustomed as it is to an ideologically whitewashed version of the past.

From the postulate of its own progressive nature, our ideology deduces the truth of its view of history — as if progressivity could be the criterion of truth. The matter should, of course, be put the other way around: the degree of interest in genuine truth as a social value is the empirical yardstick of the progressiveness of social groups.

In ideologized history, one's own successes are interpreted as the result of the conscious decisions and actions of the actors, while failures are the result of unfavorable circumstances. In this way, several leaders at the time of the break with Stalin gave the following inconsistent explanation: they interpreted the conflict with Stalin as being the result of their own choice and they represented all the Stalinist elements in their politics as the result of the influence of difficult objective conditions. Worse yet: they bitterly refuted and still refute the suggestion that they had ever had anything to do with Stalinism. But if that's so, how and why could they break with Stalin? And what about the testimony of Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo in 1948, on the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (called after 1952 the LCY — the League of Yugoslav Communists): "at a meeting of the leadership, the task of drawing up a Party Statute to be submitted to the Fifth Congress was entrusted to Blagoje Nesković, Mosa Pijade and myself. We finished the job quickly because we had agreed at the first meeting to adopt the Statute of the Bolshevik Party as a basis and to adapt it to our circumstances. This was in line with our position to create the same type of socialism that existed in the Soviet Union and to build a party like the Bolshevik Party."

Our Bolsheviks do not dare recognize that the political pluralism that existed at the war's end and for a short time afterward was only a tactical mask in the overall strategy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to establish a monopoly on power. This so-called "bashful Bolshevism" even went so far as to seriously assert that our system was not a single-party system. In any language other than the ideological one, this would mean that in Yugoslavia there existed more than one party or, possibly, that there were no parties at all.

Yugoslav ideology is characterized by the simultaneous rejection of the multi-party system in socialism and the support of the Eurocommunist pluralistic orientation. But these two things can only be squared if and when the democratic transformation of Communists in the West is implicitly understood as a tactic and as one of the roads that lead to socialism where one party has a monopoly of power. In no way is it suggested that we are not mature enough for political pluralism. Rather, it is a question only, say, of Italy finding itself obliged to start maturing towards political monism. If anyone objects, saying that true socialism can only accommodate a *partyless* democracy, then it is not clear why moves to establish socialism that go through a multi-party system continue to be rejected as a matter of principle and why it is not simply admitted that Yugoslavia cannot allow itself such a luxury.

1. Cf. *The Ongoing Revolution* (Belgrade, Serbocroatian), Vol. 2, p. 93. In its development, Yugoslav ideology described an arc from confident to bashful Bolshevism. The formula for a confident Bolshevism is summed up in the following definition of Lenin of the dictatorship of the proletariat: it is "a rule based directly upon force and unrestricted by any laws." Cf. "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," in *The Lenin Anthology*, ed. R.C. Turner (New York, Norton), p. 466.

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Ideology is incapable of respecting the difference between evaluations, explanations or understandings, and, finally, facts — all these things are not only mixed up but also ranked in precisely this order. Our officials believe that only one interpretation (theirs) and one understanding may be drawn from the positive evaluation of the Yugoslav National Liberation War and revolution, and that only one factual picture (theirs) may be drawn from this interpretation and understanding — as if anything at odds with their rosy picture somehow cannot be factual. This is not surprising: ideologized political culture is inversely proportional to logical culture, which thrives only where there is complete freedom of communication and discussion.

In the name of revolution, Yugoslav ideology dismisses parliamentary democracy almost out of hand. But a proper criticism of parliamentary democracy differentiates between its unquestioned superiority on the level of world history and civilization and its real ability to survive at the end of a terrible civil, religious, national liberation and revolutionary war in an undeveloped and devastated country. Only against this concrete background does it become clear how *fragile* parliamentary democracy can be, compared with revolutionary dictatorship.

Democratic critics of Bolshevism long ago pointed to the naiveté of its anthropological premises, namely, its perception of power that sees the only and sufficient guarantee of human qualities in the benevolence of the revolutionary avantgarde. This is, without doubt, pure moralism. A comparison springs to mind: the founders of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, starting from a pessimistic anthropology of power, wisely invented a whole series of institutional checks and balances.

Now, consider one striking contradiction in the liberal democratic position in Yugoslavia in 1944-45. The anthropological basis of the liberal democratic doctrine and tradition was just as *realistic* as some parliamentary democrats in Yugosavia were naive in expecting that the victors of a terrible war and revolution would, nevertheless, be willing to expose their newly established authority to the risk of parliamentary democracy (elections). In any case, what moral right did those who left the country in 1941 — i.e., those who did not share the sacrifices of the victors — have in wanting now to share power with them?

However, there were also democrats, including some socialists, who remained in the country and who fought side by side with the communists. Only when we insert them into the center of our analysis and evaluation will we discover the real *internal* limits of revolutionary and post-revolutionary democracy. This is why I consider the alternative of a *one-party revolutionary dictatorship or a revolutionary dictatorship with a dominant party* to be decisive both from the hermeneutic and from the judgmental point of view.

A human drama also developed as many partisans who, as allies, were used by communists, were then discarded. Some were even harshly persecuted after the Cominform attack in order to prove that the CPY had not "merged with the Popular Front." The real reason for this treatment was not any need for the new authorities to feel secure — since those being persecuted could not have posed any threat to their security even had they wanted to. Rather, behind this was the fundamental arrogance of new authorities and their incapability of accepting anyone else as a partner, even as a second-rate partner.

Those who think that a one-party revolutionary dictatorship can be justified by invoking some kind of metaphysics of the "logic of history" or "the communist party in the great historical sense," are mistaken. For an appraisal the decisive question is: what were the real consequences of opting for a straight one-party dictatorship instead of for

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the preservation and gradual expansion of the elements of pluralism that existed in the framework of the revolutionary authorities with a hegemonic party at the head? And I think the consequences were incomparably more negative than positive: the foundations of a system were laid that still needs to solve the difficult problem — not of whether parliamentary democracy should be introduced (that isjust sour grapes for us) but of how to bring about the liberalization and democratization of the post-revolutionary dictatorship. In Eastern Europe, every similar effort has been doomed to fail because of external military control. Real *internal* obstacles to such an undertaking can only be seen in Yugoslavia because we are independent.

3. Comparison with "Real Socialism"

There is no doubt that self-management would have had the best chance had it come about by the transcendence of the internal limits of bourgeois democracy. In Yugoslavia, however, self-management originated as a modification of the etatist system. Because of the linkup of contradictory concepts — above all, those of the dictatorship of the proletariat and self-management — there is great confusion in Yugoslav ideology. Thus we have acquired an ideological corpus that any good student of social science could call into question by means of a simple logical analysis. Not even the ideology of "the pluralism of self-management interests" is an exception. Much of the responsibility for this must be placed on Yugoslavia's ideologue politicians as well as its ideologue intellectuals.

Yugoslavia is a decentralized and somewhat liberal etatist system in which self-management is, in reality, restricted to the work place and to non-political questions. "Self-managed" institutions above this level are nothing other than transmission belts of the party-state. Yugoslavia, thus viewed, may be a vital indication of the future way in which Eastern Europe will develop. Perhaps the ruling class there will learn how to introduce market competition and allow its citizens to travel and work abroad. Perhaps it will learn also how the etatist system can, to some extent, be decentralized and liberalized while retaining a firm grip on the reins of power. (Eastern Europe will not, of course, be in a position to conduct an independent foreign policy, which has been Yugoslavia's great achievement.) But as long as this does not happen, the Yugoslav system will be capable of legitimating itself as *really existing self-managed socialism*, as opposed to *really existing socialism.*

This latter had for many decades been in an *ideal-logical* phase, and, as such, had invoked principally the ideals of Communist society. Towards the end of the 1960s, the ruling ideology was forced to transform itself into a kind of *real-logy.* In its attempt to find a new socialist justification for itself, that social reality began tautologically to fall back on itself. But such a vicious circle cannot resume the ideology of "really existing socialism." Although it no longer depends on a kind of slave-owning etatism (the Gulag system), the question may still be asked: what kind of socialism is this when a whole really existing workers' movement rises up against it and is then subjugated by the open militarization of the system? In the case of Poland this ideology has entered its last phase of decadence: from a distorted to a false to a mendacious consciousness.

What lessons can Yugoslavs learn from the attempts at social change in Eastern Europe? The first was witnessed in 1956, in the shape of a revolution in Hungary. But there is no basis or need for anything similar to this in Yugoslavia. Again in Poland, there was a major confrontation between virtually the whole population, on the one hand, and the party and the military-police apparatus on the other. It is very unlikely that such a confrontation could occur in Yugoslavia, but it would be wise to ensure that a deepening of the crisis does not lead to this. Perhaps the key difference between

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Yugoslavia and Poland is that, in the eyes of the people, the Yugoslav Communist Party is the bearer and guarantor of national and state independence. That is why anti-Communism does not have mass support in Yugoslavia: if someone is said to be a member of the Communist Party in Poland, this suggests *a priori* something negative, whereas in Yugoslavia, the nature of such a judgment always depends on the individual.

What would correspond best to our circumstances would be something similar to what happened in Czechoslavia in 1967-68. At that time, the pressure of the crisis and the masses brought about a sharp conflict between the reform and the anti-reform wings of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. All indications are that the reformists would have won a definitive victory had there not been foreign intervention. There the analogy stops, however, because Yugoslavia is a foreign country — which does not, of course, mean that we can ignore geo-political realities.

Yugoslav ideology criticizes original etatist ideology because in it the ideals of Communist society are shifted to the unforeseeable future. Yugoslav ideology is based on the idea that the realization of Communist ideals — the withering away of the state, the creation of a classless society, etc. — should begin *now*. However, nothing like this is on the agenda. The best we can hope for is the further liberalization and the possible democratization of the post-revolutionary dictatorship. There is no chance of implementing any sort of revolutionary political program. At best, we can hope for a democratic-socialist evolution and a reformist program.

4. Reform of Socio-Political Organizations

Democratic socialism, in my opinion, implies not only political pluralism but its institutionalization. But it is much easier to describe an abstract model of socialist democracy than it is to construct a realistic conception of the liberalization and democratization of a post-revolutionary single-party system. In Yugoslavia today, it is not possible to create new parties, above all because the ruling party would not allow it. But even if it could be done, it would not be good politics, owing to the adverse consequences that probably would result. The brief social experience of the multi-party system in pre-war Yugoslavia and the national conflicts in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, especially over the last 15 years, indicate that the parties in Yugoslavia would still most probably be based on national and confessional lines. With a political pluralism of this kind, the much older and stronger state would break up. Apart from this, the geo-strategic position of Yugoslavia is still such that a multi-party system would allow for the legal activity of those groups who at a favorable moment might become the fifth column for foreign intervention.

For the time being, therefore, it is better to try to liberalize and democratize the existing one-party system. As things now stand, that system represents the main cause of the crisis in which Yugoslavia finds itself and the biggest obstacle to finding a solution to it.

The official criticism of etatism in Yugoslavia is completely superficial because it overlooks its real nature — i.e., that it is a party-type of etatism. Ours is a party state, so there can be no hope of a successful criticism of etatism unless the starting point of that criticism comes from somewhere other than the core of etatism, i.e., the party.

If we want to identify the real center of power, then, we have to imagine disbanding the Socialist League, the Trade Union and the women's, students' and youth organizations. What would happen? Nothing. But if the League of Communists were to be disbanded, then the consequences would be serious indeed. For 30 years, there has been talk of the need for democratization in the LCY, but even today there are no real

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debates in that body, let alone free and meaningful elections. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia cannot base its "leading ideo-political position" on past, though clearly true, achievements: the National Liberation War and the revolution, the break with Stalin, the introduction of self-management at the work place, etc. Unless it radically democratizes itself and allows democratization generally, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia will not be able to maintain its leading role by the consent of the majority of the people, but will be compelled to retain it by the use of force.

The post-war life of Yugoslavia has been characterized by clear political cycles in which periods of reform have alternated with periods of anti-reform. Unfortunately, the entire decade of the 1970s was lost as a result of a switch to anti-reform, although by the end of the 1960s many knew that no more half-reforms would help. At present there is a political paralysis partly due to the stalemate between the pro- and anti-reform wings of the LCY. The LCY is not only the *de facto* ruling party but it has given itself this characteristic in the Constitution of the state. It is impossible, then, for Yugoslav society to take even one step forward without radically democratizing the LCY. This is the minimum without which a start cannot be made toward general political and social reforms.

In order to overcome the paralysis in the LCY, the state and society, it is essential that an extraordinary Congress of the LCY be convened as soon as possible. All delegates to the Congress would be chosen from among a number of candidates, by secret and direct ballot — and the Congress would not be allowed afterward to confer delegate status on anyone. Before the Congress there would be a completely free and wide-ranging debate on the party and other matters, then individuals, groups, organizations and forums would submit draft resolutions and other documents to the Congress. The most fundamental of these would have to be a program of *action* and a *new statute*. The 1958 LCY Program is insufficient because it is abstract and too much like a proclamation, apart from being pretentious: it is a program of the withering away of the state, although we have arrived only at the point where all that is possible is the liberalization and democratization of the post-revolutionary dictatorship. Apart from this, from the beginning there has been a contradiction between the Program and the Statute: the first is too full of democratic ideals and the second too full of undemocratic stipulations for the organizational and institutional structures. The Program of the LCY to a large extent has an ideal-logical character. The Statute is an incomparably more reliable indicator of real political will and aspirations.

Life has taught us that we can effectively protect ourselves from these whims of power only if it is shared. In a one-party system one must begin with the division of power at the top of the ruling party. So the extraordinary Congress should elect *independent organs answerable only to the Congress*. I propose four: an executive body, a watchdog agency, an informational-educational organ, and an advisory organ. Each of these would, of course, take decisions in its own domain and would bring out its own report and suggestions before the next Congress met.

Since the advisory board to the LCY would be the one really new organ, I should elaborate on it. Its members would be elected from among the most distinguished members of the LCY. They would not be allowed to have any other party, state, managing or otherwise leading function. They could take part in meetings of all the organizations and forums of the LCY, but only in an advisory capacity. The next Congress would also have on its agenda the advisory board's independent report on the situation in the party and in society. In this way, the experience of former leaders as well, some of whom are more respected and capable than many present-day leading politicians, would be given expression.

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The real political environment for the functioning of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia would be a *new* League of Socialists as well as the existing Trade Union, if it is really democratized. The League of Socialists would be composed of voluntarily associated individuals and groups favoring the construction of democratic socialism in Yugoslavia. The program of the LSY should be based on the following principles: integral self-management, social ownership of the *strategic* means of production, transport and finance, complete national equality, a federal-state structure, and an independent and non-aligned foreign policy. The new organization of socialists would accept the leading role of the LCY *if* it democratizes itself and shows a readiness for free and critical communication.

The Democratic-Communist tendency is significantly broader than the reformist wing of the LCY: there are many former — disappointed or marginalized — members of the party who would support thought-out and progressive social changes. Members of the Confederation of Trade Unions, providing that it too radically democratizes itself at the base, would also awaken from lethargy. In the League of Socialists, the party-organized Communists would learn, above all, *democratic tolerance* while the socialists would learn *political realism,* recognizing the leading role of the LCY and the fundamental values set down in its Program of 1958. Those democratic Communists who, for whatever reason, would not want to return or join the LCY, even if it were to undergo a fundamental democratization, should be able to feel at home in the League of Socialists.

5. Reform of the Federation

The League of Communists, the League of Socialists and the Trade Union would support Yugoslavia's remaining a federation, decentralized both administratively and culturally (although there is, by the way, no reason why Belgrade should not be the center of all federal institutions). But Yugoslavia has no chance of surviving and progressing unless it creates a unified and integrated market-planned economy. Only in this way will we be able to build a modern socialist civil society.

However, existing relations between the republics and provinces (provinces would no longer be allowed to be crypto-republics), on the one hand, and the federal organs on the other, lead irresistibly to the creation of "national" economies that are anachronisms in the modern world and only feed separatism. For this reason, a reform of the federation is essential and it, too, should be preceded by an open, calm and democratic debate. I believe that federal organs ought to be constructed on the basis of three mutually opposing and balancing principles of representation: citizen, national and one based on the work place. A common state cannot function efficiently with the *hypertrophied* principle of complete agreement on all questions. So it is worth defining precisely the number — small, but essential for the preservation of national equality — of questions that must continue to be solved with the full agreement of the democratically elected representatives of all federal units. This is a sufficient guarantee that a majority will not ride rough-shod over a minority, particularly if we insist also that the presidencies (of the state, Parliament, the LCY, LSY, and the Trade Union) be composed of equal numbers of representatives from each federal unit. All other questions would be decided by majority vote, whether this be a simple or a two-thirds majority. But there is no reason to fear that the ethnic composition of the majority would be set once and for all, thus harming the interests of the smaller nationalities. All indications are that, most likely, the ethnic composition of the majority would change from issue to issue.

The League of Socialists and the Trade Union would organize direct elections, the

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first for citizen and republican representatives and the second for a system of representation based on the work place. The task of slate-making would fall to groups of citizens or employees. The League of Socialists and the Trade Union would, however, have the right to bring a legal challenge to a person's candidacy if the candidate could be proved to have a chauvinistic or generally anti-humanistic stance.

If Yugoslav Communists want to maintain their special political position in the state and society with the consent of the people, then they would have to put forward truly distinguished candidates to be directly elected by secret ballot at all levels. Only under such leaders will our people perhaps be willing to bear patiently the great and lasting sacrifices without which there can be no social change, especially of an economic nature.

6. Instead of a Conclusion

Those who say that my proposal for political pluralism does not go very far are right, but can they suggest anything more radical that doesn't fall into the realm of make-believe? How can we arrive at real political pluralism if we do not pass through transitional stages? Only if we count on the possibility of sudden and revolutionary changes — but there is no basis to think that could happen. The political tone of changes in Yugoslavia in the next ten years will be set by younger, but still war-time, communists — very few of whom, it should be noted, are real Eurocommunists.

Of course, one must always be on guard against pretentiousness when drawing up a program of social change. Otherwise, it will succumb to the same kind of illusions that have characterized official politics in Yugoslavia for too long a time. Until recently, Yugoslavia's own problems have been too confining to attract the ambitions of our leaders, with the result that, for the most part, they have concerned themselves with world problems. Yet even many intellectuals have been surprised for some time that what has been officially promised and proposed several times still has not been realized. It is well known, however, that the concrete, full and real meaning of ideas is revealed by the agents themselves in the practical application of those ideas. As long as we do not know how a political idea is to be carried out, we do not know exactly what it means. An abstract decision to build a self-managing society cannot be brought to life alongside existing types of organizations and institutions.

Serious reforms certainly do not come about by the good will of those in power, but by pressure on them. To hope otherwise is the mark of an extremely naive anthropology of power. Political officials remind us of this again these days when they nominate one another, from their closed circle, asl candidates for the highest positions — and this again with no kind of opposing candidate, not even a pretend one.

For these reasons do I direct my draft program of political reforms not to them, but to all those citizens who support democratic socialism in Yugoslavia.

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ECOLIBERALISM LIVES*

by Claus Leggewie and Brice Lalonde

This is no election-year manifesto for those who vacillate between right and left to try to usurp the liberal terrain lying between Englehard and Borm, Hoppe and Schiller, who present themselves under venerable — indeed, already worn-out — labels. What concerns us is a middle-class radicalism stemming from a respectable democratic tradition. In the not-too-distant future this traditional "radicalism" will be in the majority. We are not concerned with the Greens and other colored Alternatives, so long as they keep claiming that new social movements must depend on some far-eastern or western school of irrationalism, or that they must be an escape from politics or a "new experiment." Our concern is the potential "Red-Green" majority.

"Eco-liberalism" was born in France when, following the rise to power of the united left-wing parties, it became clear that neither etatism nor the usual social-democratic means of confronting crises, nor an "alternative" economic and social policy (e.g., rose-colored leftist Keynesianism) could lead us out of the morass produced by the "market economy." The logic of state-planned technology is no better than the logic of profits — only different. That has been demonstrated a hundred times. Yet, contrary to better judgment and for lack of alternatives, reformist forces constantly fall back on the standard solution of increasing state administration. The French experience, though it serves as an example, would be better if it had not happened at all.

What has happened in France? The Giscard-Barre administration, with its carrot-and-stick combination of "progressive liberalism" and the "security state" was decreasingly well-received by the French middle class. Between 1974 and 1981, some noteworthy liberal reforms (in the best sense) were indeed enacted: e.g., the legalization of abortion, fought for by Simone Weil, the reduction of the voting age, and the bringing of government closer to the people. In other respects, however, citizens' rights were forcefully curtailed and a political mafia filled every free space in the state apparatus. But the Giscard-Barre administration was toppled for other reasons. It foundered because of the efficiency of its own economic austerity policy, which restored the market's self-regulating powers and because it conducted painful attacks against traditionally entrenched patronage and welfare sectors. Hopelessly obsolete factories and whole branches of the economy were exposed to withering world market

* This note appeared in the German journal *links,* whose editors called it an explicit "provocation." It was published in December 1983, before its co-author, Brice Lalonde, who had been the ecological candidate for the presidency of France in 1981, became involved in what proved to be an abortive campaign at the time of the June 1984 European elections to create a center-left party in France. This attempt, apparently manipulated from the Elysée, and aimed at testing the ground for a 1986 center-left coalition excluding the Communists, failed to receive the required 5 percent of the votes that would have brought it into the European Parliament. Whatever one may think of that opportunism, of which the authors speak explicitly in their text, the ideas expressed here, in a Franco-German context, are at least symptomatic of some of the confusion and some of the hope riding with the present confused political scene. The editors of *links* added four recent French books as suggested supplementary reading — Gorz's *Les chemins du paradis* (English translation forthcoming from South End Press), Cannac's *Le juste pouvoir*, de Closets' *Toujours plus!,* and Minc's *L'après crise est commencée.*

English translation by George E. Hearthway.

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competition and old socio-economic privileges were withdrawn. The hitherto omnipotent administration was limited by privatization and measured by criteria of economic success. The expansion of state sectors was halted for both economic and doctrinaire reasons. All of this was offensive to the new middle classes who already in 1974 had almost boosted Mitterrand to power. In short, the old political elite favored the logic of the market up to May 1981.

After the May 1981 election, this "logic" was not abrogated, but it was penetrated and cloaked by another bureaucratic one. At first, the expanding state emptied its cornucopia into all possible social groups (not only the underprivileged!). This generated an unprecedented mountain of debts that could be partly liquidated by forced loans and tax increases that would not only overcome the temporary effects of the first mass expenditures but also could be used in other ways. One important policy pillar of the left government, the nationalization of banks and large-scale firms, is an area where the same symbolic act is available to the Red-Greens in West Germany if they really want to convince the natural-food buffs and organic romantics that they are serious. The result was that state banks provided state credits to state firms and otherwise bottled up economic initiatives, higher employment, and decentralization. In the present depressed conditions, the expanded state sector is now a "privileged area" developing from workplace and living standard safeguards for their own constituency at the expense of unprotected citizens. Thus, the fragmentation and segmentation is not limited but encouraged. In this context, an anachronistic cultural struggle was undertaken against the "free schools" seen as strongholds of Catholic reaction. Yet, in fact, most users of these *écoles libres* actually select them only because they think they are better for their children, i.e., a purely consumer decision. Another illustration is the statist logic that has pervaded the mass media. The free radio stations accepted with so much self-congratulation by the Socialists were subject to all kinds of encumbrances and the spontaneously flourishing video market dried up as a result of ultra-protectionist measures, and a centrally controlled installation of cable communication was introduced all over the republic. The ultimate symbol of unbroken state omnipotence is the energy policy, where the government kept its pre-1981 promises neither in the form of local referenda on nuclear electricity generation nor by introducing decentralized technology. Although everyone knows that France will soon drown in the flood of expensive nuclear power development, a leftist corporatist cartel composed of management, unions and industrial politicians stubbornly oversees the well-regulated and expanded construction of one or two nuclear power plants a year.

We do not want to gloss over this administration's positive features. It has begun working toward the shortening of the work week, it has sought important legal reforms, and has experimented with co-determination in the work place (thereby going beyond the old romanticism of self-management). But even that was done carefully, unassumingly, and paternalistically. In short, without calling on the participation of those concerned.

We are not appealing for market solutions to the crisis. The old critique of economic liberalism remains valid, even though it was often only the fig leaf for a lack of left overall strategy. But the logic of profits was at least transparent. In the instance of etatism and bureaucratization, there is a rhetorical veil resulting in occluded and uncontrollable interactions between the individual components of the state bureaucracy. On the other side there is our idea of eco-liberalism. The "plan" is no less externally determining and alienating than the "market," for both are ultimately opposed to an economical and free society. In the worst sense, the dichotomy is dogmatic and

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fruitless. Significant factions of the ecology movement, even the members of the Red-Green majority, a certain "union faction," and other crackpots accept this alternative, as if nothing has happened, because they want to remain within the old left-right scheme of things and take a seat on the left side of parliament. They insist on social surgery when acupuncture may be sufficient.

What then? The phasing out of the state? Yes, but not quite in the way rightists from France's Chirac to Germany's Geissler understand it. Their confidence in the neutral and self-regulating efficiency of the capitalist state, which still shows vitality in the highly mobile expansion strategies of multi-national corporations does not mitigate the needs of welfare recipients and expendable workers by raising their hope for additional subsidies, thereby raising (always temporarily and for the last time!) the vast public debt. We refuse to fight the effects of economic rationalization by hoodwinking the exploited.

Politically, eco-liberalism is linked to the anti-authoritarian tradition of May 1968. There was no liberal party in France. The concept of "liberalism" has less impact there than in Germany, where it appeals to specific political actors. In France, political culture is characterized by the bipolarity "Gaullism/communism": it designates a hostile fraternity who in fact agree on the key issues of nationalism, productivism and etatism. The loss of credibility of these values set off the cultural upheaval of May 1968, whose guiding ideas were internationalism, regionalism, and the self-development of civil society. Ecologists, consumer groups and the civil rights movements were its most progressive expression. Today, the socialists as well as the Giscardians have absorbed some of these elements, while remaining fascinated by the Gaullist-communist orthodoxy of their partners. The governing socialists have pushed aside the elements learned from the social movements and pursue today an authoritarian and hierarchical conception of politics. They are disappointeld when the people withhold support and refuse to be mobilized, such as at the time of the anti-Nazi popular front. The socialists would rather prefer the election of a new people. . . .

What is needed is a real civil rights movement that stands up for the values of autonomy and tolerance against this statist arrogance and intolerance. In West Germany, there were noteworthy attempts in this direction under a rightist administration. Examples are the resistance to the census, to the new personal identification cards, to the erosion of data protection and asylum rights. This resistance is broader and more resolute than resistance against mass unemployment and economic crisis. Since May 1981, in France there have been few signs, apart from certain efforts by the Justice Minister Badinter, indicating that the left of center administration is willing to grant the citizenry more autonomy and self-government. The traditions of the Sun King and Jacobinism fatefully cooperate with the tradition of the voluntary delegation of power to the elected. Instead of chasing all princes into the arms of the devil or museums, on May 10th, the people elected new princes and thereby disempowered themselves.

Sociologically, the new middle class is the basis of eco-liberalism. Interclassicism" is its best hope. Defining a social movement by classes and characteristics of social strata alone is outdated. Political preferences manifested in modern republicanism as well as post-materialistic attitudes to work, lifestyle and ecology are equally important. We should stop blaming ourselves for this "bourgeois" tradition; the electoral and sociological picture in France and West Germany speaks unambiguously. When the ecologists in France achieved their best results (in the 1977 communal elections) their support was located in areas where *middle-class citizens* lived in relative security but with

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much greater uncertainty and desire for change. The ecological movement is overwhelmingly bourgeois asnd we do not know why anyone ought to shed crocodile tears over this fact so long as the "proletarian" and rural population remain under the strict control of their union representatives and bosses. The implication is that this middle-ground currently occupied by "centralism" in France and "Genscher-liberalism" in West Germany needs to be conquered. We are speaking of a "republican bourgeoisie" that is plagued by doubt concerning the constitutional state, its own professional and extra-occupational competences and interests and, last but not least, its environment. In France, this is the terrain of the non-communist left best represented by the phenomenon of the "second left" (leftist technocratic modernizers, ex-Catholics, socially free professionals, organic intellectuals) and what is quickly becoming the biggest union, the CFDT. After 1981, these forces have bound themselves to a pink-red pact of political caution instead of raising the stakes against the customary statism of the governing left. If the French majority had the institutional influence that was denied to the traditional left in the system of authoritarian presidential democracy, then this political current would receive an even greater political importance. For the moment, it must endure and persevere in district parliaments, energy commissions and committees and avoid drifting into extremism and radical opposition. Even in West Germany, where the Greens have considerably more media influence, their survival is still not absolutely assured.

Economically, eco-liberalism re-invigorates the autonomy of individuals and groups. When representatives of the *Amis de la Terre* presented their viewpoint in preparation for the IX plan, they opposed two magical and inviolable slogans of the governing left: *creation of work places* and the *maintenance of purchasing power.* This has been the administration's policy since 1981, but it has not helped much in the struggle against mass unemployment. This is why we do not give priority to employment and why even curtailing purchasing power seems acceptable under certain conditions. The unlimited creation of new work is neither possible nor desirable; a quantitative growth of employment is not the best solution to mass unemployment. This orientation treats us as exchangeable zombies and automata in the division of labor: rather than repair our bicycles we take them to the repair shop; rather than wash the car, we drive it through a wash lane; rather than cook, we warm up frozen food; rather than organize our own travels, we commission a travel agency. Rather than raise our own children, we hire a baby sitter or send them to day-care centers. Rather than discuss things among friends, we join therapy groups — soon they will not make love any longer but (like Woody Allen) enter into a ten-second orgasm machine. Were we to have less work time, our capacity for *our own work* would climb while our servility to constantly climbing purchasing power diminishes. It is not the task of the economy to create jobs that deaden the spirit, but to *provide for needs*, especially those needs that do not appear in official economic accounts. How are we to carry on free work when living on the 14th floor in the second building of the blue block in a suburban settlement? Instead of promoting personal work, industrial society condemns it as "black work."

The economic and industrial policy of the French left is focused on growth and the competitiveness of the international sectors that it tries to maintain at any price. Since such a policy must almost inevitably fail in the present world market, the statists' appetite again grows. It proposes hyper-protectionist measures — the other face of authoritarian states and moreover a senseless action that will not extricate the economy from the mess.

Eco-liberalism is based on four leading ideas: 1) producing useful things; 2) work-

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sharing; 3) strengthening "life power" instead of purchasing power; and 4) promoting a liberating technology. The scope of these ideas embraces the systematic advancement and inclusion of consumer organizations and the creation of industrial norms (durability, maintenance service, standardization of components, recycling, reduced energy use, reduces stress on the environment, etc.). That leads to a shortening of work time *à la carte*, leaving working individuals the greatest amount of freedom for the determination of working hours without compromising their interests. This must not be linked with wage compensation if stagnation of purchasing power is to be accompanied by an increase in life quality and autonomy while private work and the "cooperative sectors" are given a fair hearing. This "second" sector must not, by the way, be limited to a little garden work or do-it-yourself repair jobs; it must be capable of joining highly modern decentralized technologies of communication, biology and energy. It presupposes the availability of means collectively and locally supplied. The "second sector" thus strengthens in a paradoxical and unexpected way other industrial markets. That is why there is no dichotomy between a hyper-industrial world of automation and a bucolic idyll of "alternative" economies. On the contrary, a harmonious interdependence between a highly technologized open-market industry in which work and income are shared and extensive economic democracy prevails, and a second autonomous sector, strictly self-governing, draws considerably closer again in life and work.

In France those who have had enough of the bureaucratic formalism and the omnipresent welfare of the state machine call themselves "liberal-libertarians." They are the custodians of the legacy of the May revolt. Their self-critical and ironic distance from the moralistic dogma of Gauchism whose caricature has reappeared in the ecological movement separates them from ecological fundamentalists. Morality and politics are not necessarily the same thing. Ecology is first of all morality, and as such it is a radical, passionate and, in a certain respect, intolerant fury. The desire to keep moral concern unsullied while entering the sphere of institutional politics is mistaken. What counts in that sphere is — *nolens volens* — pragmatism, readiness to compromise and reformism. Politics must be de-dramatized; the political passions must give way to the subtle manipulation of the rules of the game and to the equally subtle violation of them. All the secular-religious elements that are now so intense in the ecology and peace movement should disappear or at least stop coming on in the onanistic form paraded by the so-called "fundamental opposition." "Eco-liberalism" gives up the idea that politics must create the happiness of all mankind and censure the "false needs" of the citizen. The anti-authoritarian attitude has consequences for the ecology movement that must deny fundamentalism, whether religious-spiritualistic or communist. This implies the endorsement of reformist work on a small scale, looking for institutional inroads into a political structure still encrusted and corrupt; it means entering into alliances even with conseratives, whenever this serves ecological politics. The Greens themselves do not need to become a party, at least not in the classical sense. They can get along without a program since the plurality and originality of the Green movement is program enough. They need no mass membership with its quasi-military organization, since they are already sufficiently strong as a movement of personalities. Personalities does not mean "names," however. The hysterical fear of the Green "champions" is laughable; it squanders resources that could be used to gain mass influence and ideological hegemony. The "radicals" in Italy, groups like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, certain consumer and environmental protection movements, are better "models" than the classical political party. One finds in them an

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abundance of ideas, competence and goal-directed action. The recruitment of "professionals" (e.g., attorneys, architects, doctors, judges) can bring political influence in concrete cases and campaigns. On the other hand, the more the ecologists become a party in the classical sense, the more strongly does the "iron law of oligarchy" apply to them: they will carry on a pure policy of self-preservation as is abundantly documented in the history of left-wing parties. The most extreme recent case of this has been the French Communist Party's refusal to assume political responsibility for concrete reforms following the left electoral victory, in order to avoid losing its "identity" as the vanguard of the French working class. This is a classic leftist attitude coming out of the same bad tradition of the workers' movement that today manifests itself in Green "fundamentalism." How beautiful it is to remain ideologically clean, to be able to reproach others for their "betrayal," and to pretend to be a stern taskmaster to those degrading and offensive ones. How lovely the position of total and pure opposition. And yet — we could achieve much more.

THE HUNGARIAN INDEPENDENT PEACE MOVEMENT

by Miklos Haraszti

The Initiative

In November 1981 two unusual suggestions were put forward at the Budapest Parliament of Students. The first was to organize an independent peace demonstration. At the time, this caused less controversy than a second initiative: an attempt to gain independent student-representation. As to the latter, it soon became obvious that it was half-hearted and lacked the strength to break away from the round of officially organized discussions. At that time no one could predict that the other idea that of the demonstration would later lead to the setting up of the first independent youth movement. The sponsors of the original initiative had not dared to propose this even as a future step.

Despite repeated public encouragements from KISZ (Communist Youth Organization) and the so-called National Peace Council (NPC) who have a wealth of experience as far as demonstrations are concerned, the initiators preferred to try and go straight to the police to apply for official demonstration permits. But, even in Hungary, the police did not wish to be associated with the peace movement. The appeal was therefore sent back to the National Peace Council and KISZ: it was left to them to digest the unwelcome by-products of their own propaganda.

The official organizations reached for a well-worn remedy. Of course, there was going to be a demonstration: a huge peace conference in the Sport Stadium with pop-groups and hot-dogs. There were vague promises too that a peace club would be set up at the university. The conference did take place in December according to plan but without the initiators who withdrew.

It seemed as if the trouble-makers had been successfully silenced. But the original group of students nurturing the idea stayed together and busily studied the documents

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of peace-movements in the West, reading all politico-scientific literature available abroad under the broad heading of "Peace Research." They themselves produced papers concerning issues like East-West dialogue and the possibilities of disarmament. The political theory they became acquainted with supported their own beliefs, namely that there was a need for a serious independent peace-movement in the East, and that a broad dialogue should be maintained between East and West in order to reduce tension between the two power-blocs, and generally to counter nuclear threat and militarism.

A few of them, including Ferenc Köszegi, Ferenc Ruzsa, István Szent-Iványi and János Slászkí published articles about the necessity of an independent Hungarian peace-movement in left wing magazines in the West. In June 1982 the dialogue began. A meeting was held at a private house in Budapest to discuss the formation of a peace-organization. Apart from the fourteen participants also invited were a representative of the NPC, a tutor on Marxism, the sociologist András Hegedüs and the philosopher Sándor Radnóti. In July that year, with a report about the meeting, the group participated — without official sanction but merely as tourists — at the Nuclear Disarmament Convention in Brussels and they received an invitation to the Youth Peace Festival held in Vienna a month later.

The Ideology Behind the Initiative

It was at this point that the group again approached the NPC, applying for a subsidy towards their travel costs. They entered into negotiations concerning a club, a newspaper, a joint platform and joint actions. The NPC put them to the test: it promised to support their independent participation in Vienna but sent an official delegation without them to the event. The activists swallowed the bitter pill: they have been prepared the difficult collaboration with the authorities. And in doing so they were not simply acquiescing to events but acting out of well-focused considerations. In their articles and negotiations certain basic principles had emerged quite clearly though perhaps not always comprehensively. These principles governed the policies which they followed without interference until the Summer of 1983 when the Government made it quite clear — with the help of the police — that it had finally had enough of them.

The pressures put to the new peace-movement were two-fold: on the one hand it had to be independent. But in order to survive, it had to be endorsed by the State. There is of course nothing new in this compromise. In another form it has long been a recurring dream of the Kadar-era intelligentsia. But so far everyone has had to choose between official recognition and guidance or the independence of the outlaw. The new peace-movement assumed — that a realistic compromise was attainable in its case, despite discouraging precedents.

One of their hypothetical arguments was the apparently obvious interest of the Government. If the Hungarian Peace Council could have come to an agreement with an independent peace movement that is also recognized in the West (provided that it gave guarantee of not becoming an anti-government force) the government's gain would be manyfold. The compromise — or so it was envisaged — would also put the stamp of independence on subcommittees of the NPC and, with this, the Hungarian peace-movement could come to resemble the more pluralistic Western peace-movements and could perhaps act as an intermediary between the Soviet Union and the West. With this, the Hungarian Peace Council could do Moscow irreplaceable services beyond merely increasing the volume of Soviet propaganda. At the same time a new-style compromise would be an unmistakable sign of political liberalization,

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however small the group involved might be. This step would enhance the Government's credibility both at home and in the West, whereas in the East it would be the well-worked-out political caveats and guarantees that would put party sceptic's minds at rest.

The founding members of Dialogue had hoped that there would be influential politicians among the leadership who could not remain insensitive in the face of so many advantages. The group assumed that these politicians would go at least as far as to maintain a dialogue with the independent peace-movement thus, *de facto* recognizing it. They did not rule out the possibility that this would be done with the ulterior motif bringing about the end of the movement by watering down its principles. Despite this, they judged the compromise to be worthwhile and were determined to defend their independence.

The founding members also rightly assumed that they could count on the support of at least one tendency of the Western peace-movement (which I shall refer to as the 'All-Europeans') since this is the only tendency showing any practical interest in either the official or the unofficial peace-campaigners in the East. The other factions generally divert most of their energies into acrimonious political wrangles around the issues of unilateralism. The 'All-Europeans' have been urging for some time now that Warsaw-pact members must prove their tolerance of serious peace-movements. This faction is much more orientated towards connecting peace issues with those of human rights than any other while their overall goal is to dismantle the Iron Curtain and to achieve a broad 'detente.' For them the opening up of the Iron Curtain is not only an ideological but also a political aim. They are aware of the fact that without an independent partner in the East, the Western peace-movement must sooner or later lose public credibility and become vulnerable to criticism from those in favor of rearmament. According to this critism, the Western peace-movement can in fact only help the Soviet Union and achieve at best a unilateral disarmament of the West. Although the 'All-Europeans' equally criticise both military blocs, it is they who have become the counterpart of state-controlled peace councils. This is how we have reached the ambiguous situation whereby the 'western connections' can be used by both state-controlled peace-organizations and independent movements, each aiming to consolidate its own position as well as to keep the rival organization in check.

This has resulted in the possibility of genuine solidarity among peace-movements, but also in a system of subtly applied blackmails. Hungarian Government officials could gain increased Western recognition, provided they were prepared to tolerate their independent partner at home. In return, they would demand from the West a full recognition of the sovereignty of Hungarian authorities along with positive encouragements to young Hungarians to do the same. It is perhaps surprising that neither the heady compromise at home nor the unprecendented participation in the international peace-movement should have led the enthusiastic and youthful Hungarian members of the peace movement to commit any rush or unacceptable acts. This arrangement could have been upset at any time by changing circumstances since it left no significant role for party members to play. How could the party accept the sudden competition not only for the official peace-movement but also the Young Communist Organization? Moscow's reaction was also unpredictable. What if the peace movement did not succeed in halting NATO's rearmament and the Soviet Union would no longer feel constrained by the West's sensitivity towards its methods of dealing with peace groups in the East?

The movement adopted the obvious and often repeated demands: gradual nuclear

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disarmament and the abolition of military demands: gradual nuclear disarmament and the abolition of military blocs. As to the question of the origins of the arms-race they did not wish to take sides: they declared the cold war to be the *equal* responsibility of the two superpowers. A broader development was envisaged in which people would accept *personal* responsibility independent of political adherence and country of origin.

In accordance with this, Dialogue did not demand the withdrawal of troops, nor did they demand public discussion of the arms-budget. Their political demands were simply aimed at securing the right for everyone to express a desire for peace, and the right to be in unrestricted contact with any other peace group in Europe. As with their previous suggestions, none of this was formulated in such a way as to criticize any specific part of the legal or constitutional framework. There was one exception, however: they did join the campaign for a civilian alternative to military service.

According to Western organizations supporting the independent peace movement, its aims are inevitably linked with the struggle for civil rights, since its basic goals are to subordinate governments and the machinery of war to democratic control. Despite this, the founding members of Dialogue agreed to take a less radical position. They were not prepared to regard civil rights as a guarantee of peace. "The slogan 'Peace and Freedom' is valid but not in the sense of political opposition. What we mean by freedom in this context is to be free merchants of our destiny against the chance of a nuclear disaster," wrote Ferenc Köszegi in his article "The Making of the New Peace Movement in Hungary," published in an END broshure in autumn 1982.

At the same time, it was perfectly clear to the founding members that their middle of the road slogans alone would not put the authorities' minds to rest about the movement's basic aims. In order to gain more tolerance they had to provide yet more guarantees: that they would not become a destabilising factor. To prove this, they submitted unlimited information about thier organisational methods. They excluded all techniques reminiscent of political opposition or of rebellion, such as the creation of an independent press, distribution of leaflets or mass-actions. They decided to be in contact only with "peace-movements" in the West, and although they would give interviews when approached, they themselves would not seek publicity. Much later the group repeatedly declared that they had held their meetings in private houses purely out of necessity. They added that they had not distributed large numbers of their bulletin but had merely typed out 20 to 30 copies of it only for distribution within the movement, and that every issue had been sent ot NPC for approval. Furthermore, the group pbulicly declared their "policy of alliance" saying that although they were anxious to preserve their independence from the government and the political opposition, they sought co-operation with the former and not with the latter.

The Movement

From this account, it appears that Dialogue's activists were essentially cool-headed strategists. In reality, however, it was an idealistic movement. Furthermore, Dialogue was not the only peace movement in Hungary in 1982. Thus, there was AND based among secondary school students, who, after a couple of months, managed to go as far as issuing membership cards. At this point their leaders after initial warnings by the police — ran to the NPC for protection and agreed to protest against American militarism only. What actually remained was no more than an AND banner which they were allowed to erect at official demonstrations.

INDIGO, a group of artists, chose a different path. Their major aim was to "stretch the limitations of creativity." With their anti-nuclear 'happennings' they were out to

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prove the strength of creative energy inherent in the idividual and in spontaneous communities. A member of this same group, Dániel Erdélyi designed Dialogue's symbol which became well-known all over Europe. Religious pacifism also gained new impetus. Members of a faction of Catholic based communities, namely the followers of György Bulányi, repeatedly refused military service, even despite imprisonment. Drawn by the ideas of Dealogue were primarily those students and young skilled workers who believed in the possibility of humanitarian politics. Their passions were basically raised against the fact that powers beyond their control decide over their very lives. Characteristic of many of them were interests far beyond the Hungarian horizon — knowledge of languages, receptiveness to theory, anti-authoritarianism, a strong anti-militarism and a desire to live in new, antonomously run communities; the search for more meaningful relations. It is therefore not difficult to understand why they favored the independent movement rather than the NPC. Dialogue evolved a certain distinctive style fairly quickly and this had perhaps even a greater attraction than the actual aims of the movement. These young people were experiencing something that had been unknown in Hungary: in communication without competition or aggression they were forming an effective community, based on respect for the individual. They shared the belief with many of their Western contemporaries that without communication of this nature another form of oppression of the individual would be the only result. After the well attended initial meetings, Dialogue shifted smaller groups activities based on friendship-networks. The Visegrad Conference of April 1983 passed the motion that every local group should be represented on the executive. The co-ordinating committee was not to act at any point without reference to the groups. Each group devised its own actions and theories, and it was left to them to inform and involve other groups in their activities. Special attention was paid to the groups based in the provinces: people often travelled to visit them and there was a fair amount of correspondence.

Dialogue was never short of foreign visitors — and not those who preferred to lodge in hotels -- they stayed with members, discussing and planning the future, appreciating the mutual benefit to be gained from one another. In this serene atmosphere the necessity for tactical maneuvering was a disturbing factor. To avoid manipulations it was decided that anyone could join the delegations sent to the authorities. Dialogue's bulletin served as a medium to publicize reports of the negotiations and it is unlikely that the NPC was at all pleased about this deviation from the usual 'secret diplomacy.' But the constant uncertainty and tension caused by ever-present threats to the continued existence of Dialogue must undoubtedly have given the functionaries cause for satisfaction.

Surprising as it may sound, especially of young people, the majority always voted for the more moderate approach during discussions. The keynote was not radicalism but caution. "We must not give then any reasons to accuse us of being in opposition and we must not give up our independence," "The NPC presents impossible preconditions concerning co-operation — we must find a compromise between a clean break and total submission." "The police have warned our most active members in advance to stay away from official peace demonstrations — but can we let them get away with wrapping their militarism in the peace movement? We must not subject our people to danger — and yet we must be there." These overanxious dilemmas were however, not forced upon Dialogue only be force of circumstance. They did not even derive from lack of experience in politics either, but merely foreshadowed the political ethos of a new geneation, which promised new concepts and moderate but firm political efforts.

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And before members of the radical opposition would pass judgement on this new political temperament and style, saying that it was no more than the tepidity of the children of the Kádár-era as opposed to the hard-line of the children of the Rákosi-era, they have to consider: Dialogue was not just *another* movement, but a movement that had never existed before in any form. Dialogue's members were undoubtedly prone to see ghosts even where there were none and it is obviously due to the legacy of the Kádár-era that many useful initiatives were strangled and watered down. And yet: Dialogue was the very first group to offer a movement to young people who craved independence and a spiritual way of life.

The Golden Age of Dialogue

The formation of Dialogue was formally announced September 2, 1982 in a private flat. By December they counted fifty active organizers and a few hundred followers who wore Dialogue's badge. In the beginnings the group regarded itself merely as a working group to co-ordinate contacts: they corresponded with Western movements, hosted visitors, informed themselves and others, led negotiations with other groups and the NPC. But as it grew, the group realised that it was not there to offer some sort of intellectual service towards a movement that was being guided from elsewhere, but that they themselves were the independent peace movement. In November groups were also established in the provinces.

Negotiations for official recognitions hardly progressed, but they did not break up. In the meantime, Dialogue made its presence more and more evidently felt. Posters were displayed for the first time at the end of September 1982 publicising E.P. Thompson's impending visit. The historian and END speaker did not, however, receive permission to speak at the university. Eighty out of the scattered audience went to György Konrád's house to listen to what E.P Thompson had to say. Surprisingly, he was greeted with great respect at the NPC where he conducted negotiations as a guest of Dialogue.

To prove the expectations of Dialogue, two months later Mary Kaldor from England and Mient-Jan Faber, the leader of the Dutch peace movement, did not have to be squeezed into a private flat but were able to deliver a joint speech at the assembly hall of the NPC where they were seated together with dialogue's representative at the table of the Presidium. The first tri-partite negotiation took place between the NPC, the Western visitors and Dialogue.

Dialogue was able to enter into negotiations with increasingly more powerful organizations at home. The NPC is officially a member of the Patriotic People's Front, Dialogue therefore applied to the representative of the People's Front for recognition, a club and a newspaper. At the beginning of November Dialogue asked for a meeting with György Aczél, which was granted. The Secretary of the Central Committee urged the representatives of Dialogue to make a distinction between Soviet and American weapons. Insofar as nuclear weapons were concerned, they could not promise to do this, was the reply, but they might be willing to comply on questions of conventional weapons. Dialogue also stressed that they would avoid political confrontation. Instead of negotiations concerning Hungary's resignation from the Warsaw pact they would support, in accordance with the official Soviet endeavors, negotiations concerning the abolition of both military issues as internal affairs). In other words, Dialogue would respect the Hungarian constitution. What Dialogue claimed was the right to unrestricted communication, assembly and the citizen's right to submit proposals to the Government.

The majority of the activities and actions undertaken coincided with the expansion of

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the organization. Activists openly participated at every demonstration and debate concerning peace as members of Dialogue, explicitly stressing that they are in solidarity with Western peace movements. They have declared symbolic solidarity with the international Hunger strike surrounding the cruise missile base in Comiso. Contacts were also made with some of the peace-groups in the GDR although there were no practical results.

In December and January 1983 the situation changed. The press campaign against the opposition — and the series of house searches which proved that the gloves were off — threatened to introduce a new era for Dialogue. The group asked once again for a meeting at the Central Committee and they were received now not be György Aczél himself but by his assistant who repeated the demand which by now sounded more or less like an ultimatum: a distinction had to be made between peaceful missiles and war-like missiles. At the Party ideological conference in January the independent peace movement was quite openly criticized.

Yet, despite these unfavorable signs, the movement was expanding. In December a declaration was published: "We want Dialogue!" This was aimed at the general public although it was only distributed in limited numbers. In January the first edition of their bulletin appeared. All in all, there were eight editions published until the Summer crisis.

Preparations were under way for their Visegrad Conference and preparations to attend Congresses in West Berlin and Prague. Negotiations started about Dialogue's representation on the NPC's forthcoming new sub-committee, the Youth Committee; this would have meant no less than the NPC's official recognition of Dialogue. Two of the conditions which Dialogue asked for were first for a joint formulations of the basic constitution and, second, for agreement that decisions of the committee in respect of any joint actions or slogans could be made not by majority but only by unanimous vote. Without this precaution the commitee could have taken steps that would have been unacceptable for Dialogue, as the majority of the committee was made up of members of the youth organizations of the NPC itself. Unfortunately, Dialogue was informed about the formation of the NPC's new youth committee only through the newpapers. They were left out without conlcuding negotiations. In March something happened behind the scenes. The group could only sense the consequences and could only guess the reasons.

End of the Dialogue — Dialogue's Crisis

On May 7th 1983 for the last time the European press could report on Dialogue without reforming to prosecution or harassment. On that date they reported about successes: the willingness expressed by the State to come to an agreement. At the very tail of a peace march organized by the KISZ and the NPC Dialogue wished to march as a *separate* group under its own slogans. After long negotiations, a compromise was reached: Dialogue could not carry its name on a separate banner, but an enlarged copy of the symbol could be raised and members could wear badges. (For this occasion KISZ produced a special badge that could be distinguished from that of Dialogue's only from a small distance). The official demonstrators received pre-printed banners: "Peace is our Future." Dialogue had to submit their slogans for approval. Permission was granted for "Trust instead of Security!"and "All nuclear weapons out of Europe!" but slogans like "We do not want to be protected by nuclear weapons!" did not slip through the censor's net. (The spontaneous slogans of Dialogue members could not, of course, be censored). From among the 10-15 thousand demonstrators the 4-500 strong Dialogue contingent distinguished itself not only by its slogans, by the more

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colorful general impression they have created and by its prominent position at the end of the march, but by the hordes of secret police camouflaged as civilians constantly cruising around them — using their walky-talkies exchanging running reports and clicking diligently with cameras built into small, fashionable male handbags. The march went from Széna Square to Margaret Island where members of the secret police surrounded the members Dialogue now relaxing on the lawn, and with provocative openness they collected the last mug-shots. There will be smiling faces stored in the archives as this last self-confident moment was captured on film.

Dialogue was allowed to hold one more public lecture at the teacher's training college in Szombathely (Northwest Hungary) and that was the end of the authorities' patience. In actual fact, the wheedling had started already by April. Members were summoned to heads of departments at universities, to party-secretaries at offices and factories and they were given a "good talking to." Many parents were warned that it would do no good for their own future prospects if they allowed their children to be part of such a dubious organization. Dialogue first ascribed the change of climate to the arguments surrounding the All-European Peace Convention held in West Berlin. It became known that Zhukow, leader of the Soviet Peace Council, had sent a letter to the preparatory committee, condemning the theory of equal responsibility of the superpowers and threatening the "unity-breakers" with "unpleasant consequences." He did live up to his threat. The East's Peace Councils were not allowed to participate until after the Prague World Congress held some weeks later. The Hungarian Peace Council would have been hit quite badly by this enforced boycott as there would have been Hungarian representatives in Berlin without the NPC's participation. But this was not to be.

At the Visegrad Conference in April, Dialogue briefed Ferenc Ruzsa, their chosen representative, to regard gaining the recognition of Dialogue's existence at home his first priority during the Berlin Conference. As it happened, Ruzsa was visited by the police and his passport confiscated. He could send his message through official channels only: in it he drew the Western peace movement's attention to the importance of working with the NPC! But gestures did no good any longer. In June Dialogue members decided to go to Komárom (just across the border in Czechoslovakia) to attend a peace march. The Hungarian border-police searched their belongings and sent them back home where they were subject to strict warnings by the police. Their delegates participating at the Prague World Congress were stopped by the Czech police who used tear-gas and arrests to prevent them from entering the "Youth Village." Later they were deported, and not surprisingly the NPC delegates refused to support them.

Finally, and more aggressively than ever before, the police stepped in. Preparations for Dialogue's international Summer Camp had been under way since December. The NCP did not object, but the camping sites that Dialogue approached for accomodation cancelled all reservations. On July 4th foreign visitors arriving at the East Railway Station and approximately twenty Dialogue members were arrested. They were released shortly thereafter, but the authorities deported fifteen foreign visitors in the following days and regularly disrupted the camp's disintegrating programs. Soon a full scale witch hunt was under way. The NPC and the central offices of the Party did not respond to phone calls asking for assistance. It was almost as if they were seeking negative foreign publicity. They refused visas to four Greenham-Common women, despite the fact that these women were daily heroines of the Hungarian official press. The four women reported in *The Guardian* on their return and the press of the Western peace movement received this news of unexpected Hungarian support for NATO bases with

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great concern.

Many members felt that was the end. At the meeting called in a great hurry it was spelled out that this was the end of the dialogue. But what was going to happen to Dialogue? The group agreed that the independent peace movement should seek new methods. Some suggested a formal winding up of the organization to allow those who did not wich to accept subsequent dangers to leave without loss of face. Many groups — among them the one from Szeged (South East Hungary) — declared that they would carry on using the name Dialogue even if the others were ready to let it go. Those assembled — with the consent of the majority of the Dialogue group — wrote a letter to members of the Central Committee and Parliament in which they listed the harassments, thus passing on the blame for the discontinuation of Dialogue to the authorities. There is no talk in the letter of self-dissolution. They made it caler that the independent peace movement must go on.

This crisis around the concept of Dialogue led to the loss of one of its founding members. Following the change of attitude by the authorities, Ferenc Köszegi remained true to his belief that without official consent there could be no point at all in experimenting with an independent peace movement. He resigned from the executive committee in April and as soon as the police started to interfere he left the movement. Later, in autumn 1983, he wrote a personal declaration which he sent to the NPC, the END in London and to Dialogue. In it he accuses Dialogue of being a conspiratorial, illegal and oppositional group. At present, Köszegi runs the Youth Club of the NPC. In July the NPC arranged a basis for tri-partite negotiations with its Dutch counterparts and Dialogue, and to put their minds at rest, it assured them that its willingness for cooperation was unchanged. Perhaps they forgot to inform the police about their willingness as the latter were around to check during several Dialogue activities.

How can the Politburo make so many enemies?

If the highest level of political power was in the habit of making its decisions public, Dialogue would have had the chance to prepare itself better for the new era. It was not before the end of 1983 that the Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party dated the 29th of March 1983 became public knowledge thanks to the samizdat publication *Alulnézet*. Despite the flowery words, the message of the Report and the Resolution is fairly simple. It would be a mistake to think that this had been the Party opinion all along. The Report admits merely that there had been two opinions as how to evaluate the peace movement and therefore "there is a need to re-define the Politboro's position in order to reach a united political attitude." In reality, the Report projects the expected decision of the Politburo back to the past, ignoring the interim period of negotiations and mutual agreements. In this sense, the document is truly Orwellian: one must assume that its authors were out to fool only themselves as it was not prepared for public consumption. The Report has hardly anything else to say about Dialogue except to insist that it is a puppet of Imperialism and of the political opposition.

The true endeavors of Dialogue are dealt with simply with the words that "it distanced itself formally" from the opposition. Even Dialogue's *independence* was now a proof of its "oppositional" nature, although this was stressed by Dialogue time and time again for the very reason that it should *not* be identified with the opposition. The final proof: "they publicized their views on independence through duplicated literature." So the Party was not impressed by the fact that Dialogue was ready to give up the symbol of its independence, its own press, since the report refers to the typed bulletin that was distributed among members only, as 'duplicated.'

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In political language this means that the report denies the possibility of a compromise between pro-government and anti-government endeavors both in terms of organization and information. And the Resolution spells it out too: one may support only the policy endorsed by the Soviet Union. Every activity is to be regarded as unlawful that oversteps the framework of official debates, and administrative means must be applied against all those who — even those with good intentions — question the Party's and the Government's peace policy. And what it boils down to: "The Hungarian peace movement must be united and adhere to the guidance of the National Peace Council; movements outside this framework may not be legalized." The Government got over the fact of having flirted for a while with a new type of political formula, to return to the safe and traditional theory of a Communist structure of society: society must equal the state, and if society does not think so, then the police will help change its mind.

Two members of Dialogue in Szeged were reprimanded in the Summer for breaking the press law when, during a house search, copies of the appeal were found which called for a symbolic renunciation of nuclear weapons by Hungary. This position was taken by Dialogue when the Soviet Union made public its intention of planting new nuclear weapons in its allied countries. The first part of Dialogue's response was to *place small white flags all over the Vérmezö (historic grounds in the city of Budapest)*. The price: three detentions and one fine of 800 Florins for illegal bill-posting. This was repeated a few times. The campaign died, however, when it turned out that no nuclear installations were planned in Hungary yet. At present Dialogue members are circulating a petition for a civil rights initiative (started by Kiszely) appealing for a civilian alternative to military service for conscientious objectors, as well as the right to keep up contracts with peace movements in the West.

In December, dressed as Santa Claus on roller skates, they appealed to shoppers on Nagykörút (the largest shopping street in Budapest) for bilateral disarmament and a nuclear free Christmas — on the occasion of the 4th anniversary of NATO's disarmament decision, this was Dialogue's way of joining demonstrators in the West. It seemed as if there were no policemen around, although some members had been visited earlier and warned not to proceed with this action. Later one "Santa Claus" was summoned for a 'chat' at his work place and an employee of the State Security Department of the police happened to be present. Absentmindedly, he sat picking bits out of a colorful paper bird, just like the ones Dialogue had distributed in the street.

Dialogue asked their foreign visitors to arrange short courses before coming to Hungary as how to avoid confrontation between peaceful activists and provocative policemen. At the moment, Dialogue is in search of a new identity knowing that it can no longer be its old self. It has affiliated groups in the provinces; in Budapest 50-80 of them meet fairly regularly. Half their members are new people. Their badge is worn by many. They still do not wish to be part of the political opposition, rather they are hanging on, waiting for the dialogue to be taken up again, battling against hopelessness.

Dialogue's most significant undertaking since the Summer crisis is a *real* newspaper, the first issue of which appeared in March 1984. The title, *Mir-Peace* ("Mir" is Russian for peace) stresses their affiliation to a truly international peace movement. A few hundred copies are printed with reports on the peace movements in the West and lists of pen pals abroad. Reports taken from the Hungarian press about Dutch peace marches sound ironic even without comment, especially as they are then followed by news of harassment at home. Dialogue's own action and fiascos are reported not heroically, but rather with considerable self-irony. This youthful voice is a unique product within the Hungarian independent press.

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BELIEVERS IN THE USSR: SOME DATA AND TRENDS

by Gábor Rittersporn

Instead of concentrating on teachings and customs, in the effort to arrive at an accurate picture of the milieux of believers in the Soviet Union, my primary concern is to grasp some of the social and political phenomena reproducing religious and quasi-religious faith, and to see whether they have a tendency to diminish the flocks practicing religion. Given the large Soviet sociological literature on contemporary religion it is reasonable to assume that the enlargement of this body of literature since the mid-1960s is one of the surest signs of the Party-state's preoccupation with the problem.

Notwithstanding the regime's hostility and even harassment, all churches and denominations have profited from the provisions of the first Soviet Russian Constitution granting freedom for religious propaganda.[1] So far as the main religious groups were concerned, in the 29 largest provinces of the Russian Federation the number of registered parishes, congregations and organizations increased between 9 percent and 19 percent during the first ten months of 1925 alone. By the end of the 1920s official estimates held that about 80 percent of the country's population were believers. As for absolute numbers, the estimates are uncertain. For example, the number of Orthodox Old Believers was estimated to be between 9 million and 25 million by different authors.[2] Calculations were not helped by the fact that many of the religious groups were unregistered. In 1971, for example, one Old Believer, eight Baptist and 48 Orthodox communities were registered in the Voronezh Region, although 14 Old Believer, 97 Baptist and 482 Orthodox congregations were known to be gathering without registration.[3]

Characteristic of the religious ferment of the 1920s is the followship of Pentecostals. They arrived in the Ukraine in 1922, and by 1930 had a membership of 17,000 in some 350 different communities.[4] Some of the religious groups participated in the social experiments of the time: several sects were trying to create their own cooperatives.[5] But the collectivization drive put an end to this more or less peaceful coexistence with the régime. A 1929 decree restricted the believers' rights and forbade any proselytizing, or even social and economic activity[6] — a decree that in many respects still holds today. This explains why the Orthodox splinter groups opposed to any accommodation between the system and the Church have made resistance to collectivization one of their main rallying cries.[7]

Even though most church organizations refrained from this kind of political activism, their grip on their flocks did not weaken. Seven years after the 1929 restrictions, a confidential letter circulated among the regional Party leadership deplored the fact that

1. *Istoriia sovetskoi konstitutsii v dokumentakh 1917-1956,* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 145, 530.
2. *Ateizm, religiia, sovremennost',* (Leningrad, 1973), pp. 119-120, and p. 128.
3. M.K. Tepliakov, *Problemy ateisticheskogo vospitaniia v praktike partiinoi raboty,* (Voronezh, 1972), p. 169.
4. A.V. Belov, *Sekty, sektantstvo, sektanty,*)Moscow, 1978), p. 51.
5. A.I. Klibanov, *Religioznoe sektantstvo v proshlom i nastoiaschem,* (Moscow, 1973), p. 151.
6. G. Simon, *Die Kirchen in Russland,* (Munich, 1970), pp. 63-64.
7. *Voprosy istorii religii i ateizma,* vol. IX, (Moscow, 1961), p. 168.

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the Smolensk area's 852 churches and synagogues and more than 6000 known sects had had more success in preaching than had all the atheist propaganda.[8] The authorities became alarmed towards the mid-1930s when they discovered that believers turned to religion as a protest against the forced delivery of agricultural produce to the state or the Stakhanov movement, asserting that confessional teaching was as popular and proletarian as the official ideology.[9] In 1937, when the population of many localities proposed to elect patriarchs and mullahs to the Supreme Soviet, the central authorities disapproved. Not only were the proposed slates objectionable in themselves, but they also drew out a tactless opposition from their local representatives, which risked aggravating the conflicts between the régime and the believers.[10].

This awareness of popular feelings was behind the Party-state's reconciliation with the Orthodox Church and its remarkable tolerance of the Church during the war years, which were followed by a period when religious organizations experienced less restrictions than in the 1930s. This period lasted until the early 1950s.[11] Only 4.3 percent of a sample of more than 10,000 former believers became atheists during the war, while 13.3 percent of the members of a representative group of Belorussian Baptist congregations joined up between 1941 and 1945 and 35.7 percent during the first half of the post-war decade.[12] The renewed attacks on religion slowed recruitment to 16.7 percent of membership during the first half of the 1950s, but the following period of relative tolerance was certainly responsible for a 21.4 percent membership increase between 1956 and 1960. The years between 1959 and 1964, however, saw a radical and often openly repressive campaign against religion.[13] This was also the time when the authorities began to encourage social scientists to analyze the state of affairs in the camp of their adversaries.

Soviet researchers of contemporary religion are caught in a contradiction. They are supposed to collect as much information as possible to help the Party-state in its anti-church campaign. On the other hand, their work must itself be part of the atheist propaganda, so that they cannot really publish any data that would harm the régime's efforts to curb religious influence and they have to prove that it is vanishing. This is why their writings deserve critical analysis and why also their findings are much more reliable when they deal with local phenomena and problems and less trustworthy when they concern issues examined at the level of the .Republic, and even more, the national level.

Given this, research indicating that in the 1960s and 1970s the proportion of believers was between 22 percent and 30 percent of the population of the European USSR and between 30 percent and 47 percent in some places of the Caucasus and Central Asia[14] must be treated with a good deal of caution, all the more so since certain

8. *Smolensk Archives,* WKP 499, pp. 295-297.

9. Bol'shevik, 1937, No. 4, p. 34; No. 20, pp. 38, 41; *Vlast' sovetov,* 1937, No. 8, p. 15; No. 14, pp. 24-25; A Kosarev, Antireligioznaia propaganda . . .,*Pravda,* April 15, 1937, p. 2; I. Verkhovtsev, Ne udeliaiut vnimaniia . . .,*ibid.,* December 7, 1937, p. 3.

10. *Bol'shevik,* 1937, No. 16, pp. 38-43; *Vlast' sovetov,* 1937, No. 14, p. 26, No. 19, pp. 22-23; E. Iaroslavskii, Tserkov' i gosudarstvo, *Pravda,* September 15, 1937, p. 2; editorial, *ibid.,* October 25, 1937, p. 1.

11. Simon, *op. cit.,* J.S. Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917-1950,* (Cloucester, Mass., 1965), pp. 300-311; G.D. Embree, *The Soviet Union between the 19th and 20th Party Congresses,* (The Hague, 1959), pp. 98-106.

12. Tepliakov, *op. cit.,* p. 133; *Baptizm i baptisty,* (Minsk, 1969), p. 42; see also Klibanov, *op. cit.,* pp. 157, 191.

13. Simon, *op. cit.,* pp. 67-84.

14. Tepliakov, *op.cit.,* p. 121; *Prichiny sushchestvovaniia puti preodoleniia religioznykh perezhitkov*

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authors are inclined to treat people hesitating between religion and a somewhat indifferent attitude toward it as nonreligious. Information about huge crowds at open air religious ceremonies or disclosures that 60 120-bed hospitals could be built from the sums collected between 1947 and 1967 by Orthodox believers of the Voronezh Region alone[15] seem to push these figures upward. So do data assembled at the start of the 1970s in the Perm Region, according to which 61.5 percent of a representative sample of schoolchildren had relatives who were believers, 19.2 percent had at least one believer parent and 47.5 percent of them had been baptized.[16]

In those regions where belonging to a religious community identifies one as member of an ethnic group, participation in religious activities is often inseparable from other manifestations of the national feeling. The Estonians' attachment of Lutheranism, the Lithuanians' Catholicism and the Germans' fidelity to their churches and denominations are closely related to the defense of their national traditions.[17] There is, however, also one important case where religious identification is likely to transcend ethnic boundaries, that of Islam, whose Soviet followers seem to consider their religious customs and lifestyle and even their cultural heritage as part of a supranational Muslim identity.[18] The conviction that some Caucasian and Central Asian ethnic groups are constructing a kind of Islamic Communism is reportedly strong among the local élites.[19] While higher Party organs severely condemn the regular participation of Turkmen Communists in religious ceremonies, the case of one of them seems typical: he got away with a light reprimand of the local committee after having been for long years simultaneously school director and mullah.[20]

Soviet researchers emphasize that more than twice as many believers live in the country as opposed to the city.[21] They stress that women make up 70 percent or more of most congregations' membership.[22] They find that less qualified and unskilled workers are more likely to have a positive attitude toward religion (59.7 percent of one sample of them and 27 percent in another one against 4 percent of their highly qualified colleagues) and that the education of the bulk of believers did not go beyond primary school.[23] And they underscore the fact that the majority of believers are elder-

(Minsk, 1965), p. 173; P.K. Kurochkin, *Evoliutsiia sovremennogo russkogo pravoslaviia,* (Moscow, 1971), p. 93; *Sotsiologiia, ateizm, religiia,* (Groznyi, 1972), p. 32; V.G. Pivovarov, *Na etapakh sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia,* (Groznyi, 1974), p. 158; B.N. Konovalov, *Ateisticheskoe vospitanie na sovremennom etape,* (Moscow, 1977), p. 16.

15. Tepliakov, *op. cit.,* pp. 167-168; See also *Der Spiegel,* No. 43/1982, p. 183 where 1400 members of a German Catholic parrish are quoted who spent about one month's income each, in order to build a church.

16. M.F. Kalashnikov, *Molodoe pokolenie i religiia,* (Perm', 1977), p. 62. 18.3 percent of the children could not answer at the question whether they were baptized.

17. *Der Spiegel, art. cit.,* pp. 183, 185; H. Carrère d'Encausse, *L'Empire éclaté,* (Paris 1978), pp. 226-232.

18. Carrère d'Encausse, *op. cit.,* pp. 233-253, 260-269. For a similar phenomenon within Yugoslavia's Muslim Minority see S. Fischer-Galati, ed., *Eastern Europe in the 1980s,* (Boulder, Col. 1981), pp. 14-15.

19. A.A. Bennigsen-S.E. Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union,* (Chicago, 1979), pp. 100-101.

20. S. Narmetov, Nash glavnyi printsip, *Pravda,* March 27, 1979, p. 2; A. Grachev, Slovo stareishiny, *ibid.,* July 22, 1980, p. 2; Grachev e.a., Preobrazhaia zemliiu, *ibid.,* January 19, 1981, p. 2.

21. A.A. Lebedev, *Konkretnye sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia v ateisti heskoi rabote,* (Moscow, 1976), p. 41; E. Duluman, e.a., *Sovremennyi veruiushchii,* (Moscow, 1970), p. 33.

22. Suluman, *op. cit.,* p. 37; *Baptizm . . ., op. cit.,* p. 41, *Konkretnye issledovania sovermennykh religiouznykh verovanii* (Moscow, 1976), p. 77; Klivanov, *op. cit.,* p. 173.

23. Lebedev, *op. cit.,* pp. 36, 44; Kurochkin, *op. cit.,* p. 103; *Baptizm . . ., op. cit.,* p. 43, Duluman,

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ly: in most of cases, people 50 years and older constitute 70 percent or 80 percent of the parishes' and congregations' membership.[24] The implication of these frequently quoted data is that with urban growth, increasing equality of women, rising educational level and with the passing away of old generations, religion is bound to disappear.

Even granting some of these factors, the social conditions they define is far from withering away. In fact, villagers, women, unskilled manpower lacking regular education and aged people sticking to old tradition belong to the least mobile elements of Soviet society. Most of them have virtually no hope of rising in the world and can feel free not to observe the norms the régime imposes on those who would hope to advance their careers. Their outsider status means they must look outside the régime's institutions if they want to belong to a community they can feel as their own.

Only 5 percent of simple peasants, 9 percent of workers, 5.2 percent of people having less than a secondary education and 3.7 percent of women are Party members.[25] Of working-age Soviet citizens, 46 percent had less than eight years of education in 1972: even in the Russian Republic, only 88.4 percent of schoolchildren reach the eigth grade, while in the Perm Region, which is nevertheless highly urbanized and industrialized, more then one-fifth of the pupils drop out before the eighth grade.[26] Auxiliary workers constitute about 49 percent of Soviet industrial labor force, 43.1 percent of which is performing work by hand.[27] Women constitute between 66 percent and 89.9 percent of workers of the lowest skill-grades in the machine building industry, but only 13 to 16 percent of people in managerial positions.[28] While urbanization and increased education is not going to come to a standstill, there is no reason to think that they will eliminate mobility-related factors of religious influence in the foreseeable future.

The high proportion of women among believers is explained, among other things, by the peculiar demographics of the Soviet Union. After the heavy losses of the early 1930s and especially of the war years, the ratio was 78.3 percent to 100 families in 1950, which only climbed to 85.5 per 100 in 1970. As for specific age groups, for each 100 women between 27 and 45 years of age, there were about 65 males of the same age in the 1950s, and even in 1970, the ratio of people in their forties was only somewhat more than 75 to 100.[29] In the Voronezh Region, some 32 percent of the believers are widows or widowers, about 15 percent are divorced and 29 percent single mothers. On the national level the annual divorce rate is one-third of the number of registered marriages, and the number of unmarried mothers seems to increase.[30] Because most

op. cit., p. 36; V.A. Tcherniak, *Formirovanie nauchno-ateisticheskogo mirovozreniia*, (Alma-Ata, 1969), p. 124.

24. *Ateizm . . ., op. cit.*, p. 128; *Baptizm . . ., op. cit.*, p. 42; Tepliakov, *op. cit.*, . *126; I.A. Galitskaia, Molodezh, religiia, ateizm* (Moscow, 1978), p. 40; R.G. Baltanov, *Sotsiologi cheskie problemy v sisteme nauchno-ateisticheskogo vospitania*, (Kazan', 1973), pp. 140-141.

25. M. Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, (London, 1972), pp. 220, 223; J.F. Hough in P. Cocks e.a., ed, *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics*, (Cambridge, Mass.), 1976, pp. 121-122.

26. Kalashnikov, *op. cit.*, p. 128; D.W. Carey in *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, Joint Economic Committee, (Washington D.C., 1973), p. 623.

27. M Feshbach in A. Kahan e.a., *Industrial Labor in the USSR*, (New York, 1979), p. 8.

28. G.W. Lapidus, *ibid.*, p. 242; G.W. Lapidus, *Women in Soviet Society*, (Berkeley, 1978), p. 184.

29. F.A. Leedy in *Soviet Economic Prospects . . ., op. cit.*, pp. 433-434. The 'normal' ratio is 95-99 males per 100 females.

30. Tepliakov, *op.cit.*, p. 127; Lapidus, *op.cit.*, pp. 258-259; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo USSR za 60 let* (Moscow, 1977), p. 74.

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schoolchildren are influenced by their mother and schoolgirls are more inclined to be religious than boys of their age group,[31] nothing indicates that there will be no replacement for the aging generations of believers, especially among women.

The fact that most of surveys on believers are carried out in the countryside may account for the high proportion of elderly people found among the members of the congregations, since young people drift away from the villages.[32] But it is significant that many old-age pensioners seem to turn toward religion after retiring from active life,[33] although almost all of them had been raised and educated under the Soviet régime. It is interesting, however, that Baptists in Kazakhstan, whose population is relatively young, are younger and better educated than their religious brethren in the European USSR.[34]

According to the most frequently quoted official data, some 2 or 3 percent of young people under 20 years of age and 6 to 8 percent of those between 21 and 30 years can be considered religious.[35] But on the basis of a representative survey in the Perm Region, we can estimate that about 5.2 percent of European Russian teen-agers between 12 and 17 years are believers. This proportion must be considerably higher in ethnic areas where adherence to religious groups is part of national identity. The same survey shows that young people in their late teens and early twenties, 7.7 percent of the pupils of vocational schools, 13.9 percent of workers and employees and 18 percent of peasants are believers. As for students of graduate age, 7.25 percent of them belong to this category,[36] notwithstanding the fact that they constitute a group with relatively good outlook for upward social mobility.

The author of this survey did not count those believers whom he found "indifferent" (though not atheist at all) or "superstitious." Nevertheless, according to his observations, "indifferent" people represent a great proportion of participants at religious ceremonies: they give a substantial moral and material support to churches and denominations, and may become believers one day.[37] They constitute 20.4 percent of adolescents between 12 and 17 years of age, 25.3 percent of apprentices, workers, employees and peasants in their late teens and early twenties and 6.5 percent of students around 24 years of age. As for "superstitious" young people, their share is 15.6 percent among adolescents and about 23.5 percent among the older groups, notwithstanding differences in education and status. Students, young blue and white-collar workers and peasants who are "superstitious" have a faith in the power of destiny, dreams, songs, talismans and even in fortune-telling.[38] Although more than one-third of "superstitious" students express contempt for religion, it seems highly uncertain whether their beliefs represent an unambiguous rupture with religion. All the more so, since, typically, the majority of young believers of this sample are either wavering between religion and "indifference" or "superstition," or have their faith in a supernatural force other than in a personified god.

It is a well documented fact that since the 1960s believers of all ages are less and less inclined to an anthropomorphic representation of god, especially followers of the Orthodox Church who constitute the overwhelming majority of religious people in

31. Kalashnikov, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-126, 204.
32. Matthews, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-205.
33. *Konkretnye . . ., op. cit.*, p. 219; G. Mal'tsev, *Spasaia 'korabl' very'*, (Novosibirsk, 1981), p. 42.
34. *Konkretnye . . ., op. cit.*, p. 213.
35. P. Kurochkin e.a. in *Pravda*, March 30, 1979, p. 2; see also Galitskaia, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
36. Kalashnikov, *op. cit.*, pp. 74, 78, 88.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 94.

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the European USSR and among whom less than one-third hold to this kind of traditional imagery.[39] As for belief in life beyond the grave, 43.5 percent of members of the Orthodox Church and 33.3 percent of Old Believers of the Omsk Region adhere to it unconditionally, although only 16.7 percent and 6.7 percent of them expect resurrection. This contrasts with the Mennonites and Baptists of the same area of whom 84.3 percent and 96.2 percent place their faith in eternal life and 75 percent and 89.3 percent in resurrection.[40] Some 12.2 percent of Ukranian followers of Orthodoxy accept the idea that man was not created, but only 0.6 percent of Belorussian Baptists have some doubts about the authenticity of the Biblical account of man's origin.[41]

Youth hesitating between possible attitudes toward religion have two basic and polarized choices in the non-ethnic areas of the country. Those whom specialists describe as inclined to turn to religion not under the influence of concrete confessional teachings but in search for pantheistic and deistic responses to questions on ultimate facts of nature and existence[42] have every chance to opt for less dogmatic church communities if they want to break with "indifference" or "superstition." Paradoxically, it is archaic, hierarchically centralized and heavily rite-oriented Orthodoxy that seems the most likely choice for most of them, despite or because of its long record of rather peaceful coexistence with the Old Régime[43] as well as with the present one, and its relatively weak appeal for political activism.

"Indifferent" or "superstitious" young people who are ready to express their beliefs through traditional religious teachings and practices have no difficulty joining the doctrine-oriented Protestant denominations. Indeed, there appears a marked prefence even among former members of the increasingly "de-dogmatized" Orthodox Church for fundamentalist groups. This is seen in the fact that between one and two-thirds of these sects' disciples are former Orthodoxy believers[44] for whom the Protestant denominations came to represent the main strongholds of religion in the traditional sense of the word. Beyond the intellectual and emotional comfort of customary creeds, one of the most important factors of the sects' attractiveness is the communal life of their members. Most sectarians admit that religion is the main solace for them and it is obvious, even for some Soviet researchers, that their communites are fulfilling vital compensatory and communicative functions[45] that believers are apparently unable to find "within the régime." In many cases sects are the only possible refuge from problems for which the system has hardly any remedy, such as divorce or alcoholism: they have the merit of proposing a kind of group therapy or the services of their healers for members lacking confidence in contemporary medicine.[46]

While disciples of un-dogmatic religion have difficulty finding institutions other than the rather authoritatively ruled and pompous Orthodox Church, traditional believers must content themselves with highly decentralized and virtually self-

39. Duluman, *op.cit.*, p. 126; N.P. Andrianov *et al.*, *Osobennosti sovremennogo religioznogo soznania* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 60-62.

40. V.V. Pavliuk, *Psikhologiia sovremennykh veruiushchikh i ateisticheskoe vospitanie*, (L'vov, 1976), p. 31.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 25: *Baptizm . . ., op. cit.*, p. 56.

42. *Galitskaia . . ., op. cit.*, pp. 78-79; Kalashnikov, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

43. R. Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime*, (New York, 1974), pp. 221-245.

44. *Konkretnye . . ., op. cit.*, p. 140; *Baptizm . . ., op. cit.*, pp. 48, 236, 238; Klibanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 205, 226, 241-242; A.T Moskalenko e.a., *Mikrosreda veruiushchego i ateisticheskoe vospitanie*, (Novosibirsk, 1979), p. 192.

45. *Baptizm . . ., op. cit.*, pp. 203-204, 212-213; Moskalenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 168, 170, 174-175.

46. *Konkretnye . . ., op. cit.*, pp. 177-182.

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governed denominations functioning more often than not without priest (or with one elected from within the congregation whose canonized rituals are kept to the bare minimum). The attraction these groups have for former adherents of Orthodoxy and the modest social status of their members indicate an unmistakeable desire for simplicity and egalitarianism by the underprivileged in a system whose strict hierarchy and ritualistic discourse and practices remind one that some of its roots are in old Muscovy.

There are no leading figures of the dissident movement who are sectarians, although many of them are converts to Orthodoxy. It seems reasonable to assume that, among other things, their choice was determined as much by the 'worldliness' of their political convictions and ambitions as by their social status: the case of intellectuals with very strong Bolshevik sympathies in the past, like Evgeniia Ginzburg or Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, seems typical in this respect. In fact, Russian or Russianized people in a relatively favorable social position or with some hope of upward mobility do not necessarily feel forced to seek consolation and compensation for the lack of status-related self-assertion and activities in the intimacy of small groups, and they need not inevitably seek a religious community in order to manifest their national identity. They can conceive of their eventual faith as part of a broad set of convictions and aspirations whose affirmation, defense and realization transcend religious institutions and practices.

Nevertheless, some recent trends indicate that even members of apparently well-integrated groups can feel compelled to flee the Soviet system through religious identification. The case of Jews, many of whom are turning to Judaism in the wake of the movement to emigrate from the USSR, is instructive in this respect, nothwithstanding the fact that only 9 percent of them declare themselves religious.[47] In 1970, when the movement began and before the régime's most vigorous attempts at establishing a *numerus clausus,* 105,800 Jewish students were enrolled in higher education institutions, i.e , 4.9 percent of the whole Jewish population, against 2,729,000 Russians representing 2.1 percent of their ethnic community.[48] Even in 1976, 294,774 Jews — 13.7 percent of their minority — were Party members, while the 9,481,536 Russian Communists constituted no more than 7.4 percent of all Russians.[49] But if more than 70 percent of high school graduates had a chance to go on to higher education in the early 1960s, less than 25 percent of them could do so by the second half of the 1970s.[50] The increasing saturation of relatively favored status groups, intensifying competition and slowing mobility, aggravated unofficial and official anti-Semitism and forced a considerable number of Jews to emigrate[51] even though the social position most members

47. J. Rubenstein, *Soviet Dissidents,* (Boston, 1980), pp. 153-185; Z. Gitelman in *Soviet Studies,* 1977, No. 4, p 549.

48. *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v. SSSR* (Moscow, 1971), p. 196; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1979 g.,* (Moscow, 1980), p. 28. 2.3 percent of the students were Jews at that time and 59.4 percent Russians. 0.9 percent of the Soviet citizens were Jews in 1970 and 53.4 percent Russians.

49. Carrère d'Encausse, *op. cit.,* p. 213; *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika,* 17th ed., (Moscow, 1977), p. 453. Jews made out 1.9 percent of the CPUS membership in 1976 and the Russian's share was 60.6 percent.

50. S.N. Soskin, *Sotsial 'naiia struktura sela i narodnoie obrazovaniie,* (Alma-Ata, 1979), p. 246; E.V. Klopov, *Sotsial'naiia dinamika rabochego klassa USSR* (Moscow, 1980), p. 47.

51. V. Zaslavsky in *Telos,* No. 40, 1979, pp. 17-18; V. Zaslavsky-P. Piccone, *ibid.,* No. 50, 1981-82, pp. 10-11. Mobility-related factors appear obvious behind the fact that 50 percent of the emigrants are under 30 years of age, whilst this age group constitute only 26 percent Jewish population of the Russian Republic (Carrère d'Encausse, *op.cit.,* p. 297). For the "over-production' of formally-educated specialists. See Matthews, *op. cit.,* pp. 388ff.

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of their community could expect to attain in the not-too-distant future was far from marginal.

The overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens belonging to other nationalities have no possibility to emigrate *en masse*. It is highly probable, therefore, that the growing difficulties they face in their social ascent and in their attempts to influence decision-making may well point many of them toward religion. It is possible, too, that the strong Slavophile and Russophile tendencies that dominated some literary and artistic circles by the late 1960s[52] represent a first step in this direction. All the more so, since they emanate from well-educated and relatively privileged intellectuals, at a time when 32.2 percent of those leaving school had to go directly to work although only 7.6 percent of them originally intended to do so.[53] It is worth noting that of 93 percent of those from urban white-collar families wished to continue full-time study and after leaving school 82 percent actually succeeded in doing so, while the corresponding figures were 83 percent and 61 percent for children of industrial workers' families, 82 percent and 45 percent for those from families of transport and communication workers, and 76 percent and 10 percent for those whose parents were employed on state and collective farms.[54]

More study will be needed to obtain a clear picture of the religious bearings of Soviet youth. Still, it will be not surprising if many of the new generation find their way to those fundamentalist groups whose strict adherence to confessional teachings and rigorous observance of religious rules increasingly tend to pit their disciples against other denominations and, especially, against the Party-state. Already, the membership in these groups is younger and better educated than that of the more law-abiding congregations.[55] The proselytizing activity of these groups provokes the wrath of the authorities, but also the commitment of their disciples to educate their children in a strictly religious spirit.[56] At a time when the need to perfect "military-patriotic education" and to eliminate "pacifist nuances" from official propaganda is vehemently stressed, it is probable that the opposition of some of these sects to compulsory military service[57] only makes them all the more attractive.

It would be an exaggeration to expect that religious movements could do more than diversify the ideological landscape of the USSR. But it would be just as wrong to suppose that their influence is any more alienating than that of the official ideology. The attitude of sectarians praying to the founders of their denominations or enshrining their portraits[58] does not differ fundamentally from the mentality that is supposed to be inculcated by the state-sponsored 'personality cult' or iconolatry. Certain religious terms have characterized the official discourse ever since the 1920s. Delegates of the 22nd Party Congress did not seem at all astonished in 1961, when an Old Bolshevik declared that Lenin had appeared to her asking for the removal of Stalin's remnants

52. A Berelowitch in *Revue des Etudes Slaves,* 1981, No. 2, pp. 233-244.

53. V.N. Shubkin, *Sotsiologicheskie opyty,* (Moscow, 1970), 206. The survey was made in the Novosibirsk Region where there is no lack of educational facilities and at a time when incomparably more school-leavers had an opportunity to enter higher education than today.

54. V.N. Shubkin in *Voprosy filosofii,* 1956, No. 5, p. 65.

55. Belov, *op. cit.,* pp. 29-33, 48-49, 58; Klibanov, *op. cit.,* pp. 162-163, 221, 223-226; *Baptizm . . ., op. cit.,* pp. 146-151, 188.

56. Belov, *op. cit.,* pp. 94-95; Klibanov, *op. cit.,* p. 162; *Baptizm . . ., op. cit.,* pp. 148-149; Galitskaia, *op. cit.,* pp. 65-67.

57. D. Ustinov, Uroki velikoi pobedy, *Pravda,* May 9, 1981, p. 2; editorial, *ibid.,* October 10, 1981, p. 1; Povyshchat' uroven'raboty v massakh, *ibid.,* November 30, 1981, p. 3; Klibanov, *op.cit.,* p. 164; *Baptizm . . ., op. cit.,* p. 186.

58. *Konkretnye . . ., op. cit.,* pp. 181, 183, 185; Belov, *op. cit.,* p. 85; Klibanov, *op. cit.,* p. 126.

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from his mausoleum and telling her that he could not rest in such company.[59] Nowadays, this type of devotion is hardly typical among Party members. But it does explain something of the conversion of many disappointed Communists of the old generations. It also helps explain the fact that contemporary devotees of great causes and principles do not find their place in the increasingly businesslike Party life and turn toward other ideals — including religious ones.

59. M. Lewin in *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales,* No. 43, 1982, p. 79; *XXII. S'ezd KPSS,* (Moscow, 1962), vol. 3, p. 121.

COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY AND DESIRE

by Roy Boyne and Scott Lash

Over the past three years or so, *Telos* and *New German Critique* have opened a debate in which Habermas's theory of communicative rationality has been counterposed to the 'aesthetic-sensual forms of subjectivity' advocated by certain French theorists, who have come to be known as the 'post-structuralists'. Among the latter, the most significant figures are Michel Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. This confrontation between theories of desire and theories of communicative rationality is perhaps only just beginning, but already it has made a creative contribution to the development of social theory, and more importantly, it has helped — in conjunction with the new social movements (feminism, the peace movement, the ecology movement) — to clarify some *practical* issues involved in the task of building a new political culture. It is in this general context that we should like to intervene in the 'postmodernity controversy' in order to show that the positions of Habermas and the post-structuralists are not as antithetical as is commonly conceived. At the same time, we feel that it is necessary to make some critical points with respect to the account of the work of Deleuze and Guattari, provided by Manfred Frank in his recent article.[1] It is not our intention to provide a full scale exegesis of Deleuze and Guattari's work, but given the quite critical status of their *Anti-Oedipus*, its significance, in other words, for understanding the post-structuralist theories of desire and the body, the more important of Frank's misconceptions will be corrected as we proceed to examine the compatability or otherwise of the standpoints of desire and communicative rationality.

When comparing Habermas and the post-structuralists, three kinds of affinity can be discerned. In the firt place, there are shared characteristics, both positive and negative; next, there are compatabilites such that although the theoretical constructs may differ they are far from mutually antagonistic; lastly, their politically significant audience is identical, and so we may speak of them as sharing certain principles, and as being able to operate within the same delimited cultural field. Let us expand on these three levels.

Habermas and the French theorists owe a common debt to Hegel's formulation of

1. Manfred Frank, "The World as Will and Representation: Deleuze and Guattari's Critique of Capitalism as Schizo-Analysis and Schizo-Discourse," *Telos*, 57 (Fall 1983), pp. 166-176.

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the master-slave dialectic. Habermas, of course, has conceived master and slave to be connected through *both* labor and language. The post-structuralists, however, reject the Marxist connection through work, to focus only on the Nietzschean one through language. The radical heritage of the master-slave conception is taken up on both sides: emancipation from the tyranny of work is paralleled with emancipation from the tyranny of language. Furthermore, the master-slave dialectic figurs as a point of theoretical departure for both camps; this hardly needs demonstrating in the case of Habermas, but it may be less obvious for the French theorists, in which respect, as Wilden has pointed out, the ubiquitous opposition of the Same and the Other is based on Hegel's master and slave.[2] Two examples of this theoretical lineage come to mind straight away: Lacan's presentation of the relation between the conscious and unconscious mind, and Foucault's account of that between words and things. A word of warning is, however, in order here: an awareness of the post-structuralist debt to Hegel may be thought to warrant the inclusion of Derrida and the deconstructionists within the post-structuralist category, a move which Frank makes in referring to Deleuze as a practitioner of deconstruction. But such an assimilation would be misleading, because the deconstructionists locate themselves within the domain of the text, while the post-structuralist enterprise is defined in opposition to such textual incorporation of the body and desire. The point to be made, then, is that while Habermas and the post-structuralists share a link to Hegel, this is only theoretically significant as part of a whole ensemble of relations between them. One further comment should be made, before we leave the topic of Hegel, and this relates to the question of subjectivity. If the influence of Hegel is important, then we would expect both Habermas and the post-structuralists to be elaborating a theory of the subject. Clearly, in Habermas's case, such a theory is being developed through the interanimation of the ideas of communicative rationality and those of moral identity. But Frank has suggested that two central figures in the post-structuralist camp, namely Deleuze and Guattari, do not contribute anything to a theory of subjectivity. Now, if this is right, any assertion of a significant connection between Hegel and the post-structuralists is thrown into considerable doubt. But it is not right; whether or not it is felt that they succeeded to any extent, there can be little doubt that Deleuze and Guattari, in *Anti-Oedipus*, were seeking to theorise a different, 'nomadic' notion of subjectivity in contradistinction to the normalised and hierarchic forms of subjectivity which have been contituted through territorialisation and the commodity form.[3]

2. Anthony Wilden, "Lacan and the Discourse of the Other," in Jacques Lacan, *The Language of the Self* (New York, 1975); see also Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1980), especially chapter five.

3. This point is reinforced upon consideration of the notion of subjectivity developed in Deleuze and Guattari's critique of Lacanian structuralism. Frank misses this critique which is so central to *Anti-Oedipus*. This is evident from his understanding of desire in terms of 'wish.' Lacan's rendering of desire as wish and hence as *lack* is strongly challenged by Deleuze and Guattari (and by Lyotard) who want to reconceive desire as 'libido.' Deleuze and Guattari's overall claim is that desire becomes constituted as lack (as wish) *because* of the Oedipus. They see the Oedipus complex as creating a situation in which the investment of sexual energy in partial objects, or in significant other persons, becomes the *symbolic* investment of libido in the 'mommy-daddy-me.' This, then, is the cathexis of absent objects; it is desire as wish or lack. The Oedipus as phallic signifier, product of Lacan's mastery, structures the unconscious as the symbolic, like a language. These types of ideas, in which the symbolic investment of sexual energy imparts form to the unconscious, are prominent in Freud and Lacan, and it is precisely the accompanying negativity of desire that Deleuze and Guattari wish to oppose. They want to see the cathexis of significant others as *real* investment of libido, and not as symbolic investment in the mother, father or phallus. Their view of subjectivity and desire is cast as a critique of Lacan's structuralism of the symbolic.

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A second feature, shared by Habermas and the post-structuralists, concerns their dismissal of the working class as the main agent of emancipatory social change. The visibility within the field of theory over the last few years, on both sides of the Atlantic, of Habermas and the French neo-Nietzscheans, is partly a result of the quiet removal from center-stage of Marxism and theories of class struggle. For all the faults of Marxist fundamentalism, this reaction may well have been excessive. A neglect of class stratification is politically reprehensible in these times of increased unemployment and political reaction, and it is intellectually unjustifiable in the absence of an empirically informed theoretical demonstration that the working classes do not still remain a highly important force for social change. This criticism of both Habermas and the post-structuralists does not, however, mean that we can agree with Frank's association of post-structuralism and the neo-fascist right; Deleuze's libertarian and anti-hierarchical appeal to the activists of the new social movements, his arguments against racist interpretations of Nietzsche, and his role in the public debate on the question of the silence of the left-intellectuals,[4] all show Frank's suggestion to be irresponsible.

The third shared characteristic is the featuring of agency over structure. Rationality is a concept primarily applicable to agents, whether individual or collective; it is the pivotal notion for Habermas's project, and defines it as action-theoretic. This is, of course, the conventional understanding of the matter. The point here is that the work of Deleuze, Lyotard and the later Foucault is also action-theoretic; that is to say, the theory of desire and the body stands in basic contradiction to the derivative nature of the social actor in *all* structuralisms, whether of mode of production, of *langue,* text or *ecriture.*

A typically action-theoretic reticence with regard to postulating either contractual fictions or transcendental constraints may partly explain why neither Critical Theory II, nor post-structuralism has sought to formulate a theory of rights, especially moral or natural rights. Most guilty on this count are the post-structuralists, and Rorty, among others, has already taken them to task on this. But the same accusation can be made against Habermas, who accepts the irreducible centrality of constitutional guarantees won in the bourgeois revolutions, and who speaks of communicative rationality and of substantive rationality, but who rarely speaks of substantive rights. The action-theoretic form in Habermas leads to the situation where the implicit right for the actor is the right to language, whereas for the post-structuralists, it is the right to desire. In each case, and in opposition to the spirit of both enterprises, an implicit reliance on a formal right is paralleled with a disregard for the question of substantive rights. It cannot be emphasised enough that both projects urgently need to develop a vocabulary for the discussion of such topics as rights to welfare, safe working conditions, education, and a thousand other things. Of course, the individual theorists make statements and hold opinions on these sorts of questions; but the important thing is to try and integrate the theme of substantive rights into the respective theoretical machinery. The radical projects of both the post-structuralist theory of desire and Habermas's communicative rationality would be strengthened if the advice of G.A. Cohen were to be followed. He points out that neo-conservatism has made considerable cultural capital out of notions of individual autonomy and individual rights. Two examples which illustrate this nicely are Margaret Thatcher's use of individual-rights language to legitimate a whole range of economic and social policies, and the use by jurists, at the European Court of Human Rights, of individual-rights arguments in order to diminish effectively the possibility of union protection for workers. Cohen

4. See the various articles in *Le Monde* during July 1983.

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argues that this weapon must be taken from the Right and made to serve other ends. emphasising that the discourse of rights is invested with considerable meaning for contemporary society.[5]

The lacuna represented in this discussion of rights might seem to support a view of post-structuralism as morally relativistic. Indeed, Manfred Frank makes exactly this claim with respect to the work of Deleuze and Guattari. There may be something in this, but the position is very much more complex than Frank allows, since he considers only one side of the matter. To assess the position more adequately, we need not only to consider the lack of substantive ethical considerations, but also we must take account of the post-structuralist hositility to the formal relativisms of modernism and structuralism. In explaining this a little more fully, we will be able to demonstrate a further shared feature of Habermas and the post-structuralists, for Habermas, too, is hostile to the modish relativisms of the immediate past.

There are many definitions of the modern and of the post-modern, but one quite conventional usage is the one adopted by both Barthes and Foucault, and which differs little from the definition of aesthetic modernism found in many standard texts. Here the modern begins toward the end of the nineteenth century and is characterised by a break with the aesthetics of representation. This departure from the mimesis of the 'classical' epoch is coeval with the repudiation of the previously dominant 'mirror-of-nature' theories of knowledge, which now come to be opposed by the sociologistic epistemologies of Durkeim, Weber and Nietzsche. Post-mimetic aesthetics and epistemology are marked by a certain autonomy *vis-à-vis* the 'real', and this issues in expressions of relativism, subjectivism, self-referentiality, and, in general, a pervasive formalism. Postmodernity begins at the point of emergence out of this immensely self-confident combinatory, whose subversive figures, like Artaud and Dali, had to wait for their time until the 1960s. In the worlds of theory, art, literature, architecture and music, there is at this time a turn from the formalisms of the modernist period toward new 'essentialisms' from which the old mimesis is not totally absent. Consider, for instance, the avant-garde's emphasis on art with an unconscious or bodily content, whose aim is the decoding of libido in the audience. The affiliation of post-structuralist theories of desire with such postmodern curents is perfectly apparent. In ethics, there is a clear discontinuity between the relativism of analytic philosophy, for example, and the burgeoning of theories of rights, exemplified by the writings of Rawls and Dworkin, and the rediscovery of Leo Strauss in the United States and Germany. Although, as we have indicated, Habermas diverges in certain respects from natural rights theory, the centrality of a rational ethics and substantive rationality in his work makes him, arguably, a part of this anti-relativist grouping which succeeds the relatives of modernist ethics. Do not, for example, his attacks on 'decisionism' stand in much the same political relationship to Carl Schmitt as Leo Strauss's offensive against legal positivism stands to Kelsen's arguments for the existence of legality in the Third Reich? The post-structuralists, like Habermas, oppose a sort of normative foundationalism to such formalist relativisms: this receptivity to the 'ethical' is recognized in Lyotard's notion of 'libidinal metaphysics',[6] a construct which bears comparison with Marcuse's thesis regarding the fundamental status of the instincts for any metaphysic of morals. Although Habermas cannot honestly be presented as Marcuse's

5. G.A. Cohen, "Freedom, Justice and Capitalism," *New Left Review,* No. 126 (March-April 1981).

6. Jean-François Lyotard, *Des Dispositifs pulsionnels* (Paris, 1980).

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unalloyed supporter in regard to the foundational role allotted to the instincts,[7] it is nevertheless instructive to hold in mind the relation between Habermas and Marcuse, when attempting to assess judiciously the debate between Critical Theory II and post-structuralism.

Both Habermas and the post-structuralists, then, are in a position of fundamental mutation in regard to the self-referential relativisms of the modern. Although Manfred Frank seems at points to grasp that it is these new anti-relativisms, essentialisms and universalisms which separate post-structuralism from the relativist structuralism which accords primacy to writing and the signifier, he is fundamentally wrong to assert that the concept of desire in *Anti-Dedipus* is duplication of Lacan's thematisation of lack. The post-structuralist concept of desire is not relativistic. That is the whole point of their work, and in this they are in fundamental harmony with Habermas.

If we now turn to the question of compatability, the question to be put is this: what is the nature of the inconsistency between the advocacy of communicative rationality and the valuation of the sensual-aesthetic realm? The first thing to note is that the post-structuralist turn to the body, desire and the aesthetic does not arise from a pessimism that would abandon the world of the social to the power-plays of whatever masters happened to be in control. On the contrary, and against Frank's suggestion that the 'new philosophers' and the post-structualists share similar orientations (presumably a cosmic pessimism regarding the improvement of the social condition, leading to an inner-directed mysticism — for this is what Levy, Glucksmann, Clavel, *et al* purveyed), the reclaiming of the body, desire, the subject, from the Oedipal operations of the social machine is just a first step against the prevailing forms of domination. And further steps are possible, as soon as it is understood that the social order of capitalism is only one of a myriad possibilities, and that its cohesive force is present everywhere as the manifestation of constrained and twisted desiring machines. Now, it must be admitted that Habermas does not share this vision of a polymorphous future. But the point is that Habermas does have a vision of the future which, as with Deleuze, Guattari and Lyotard (Foucault has always been extremely circumspect with regard to the future), is understood as a release from the past.

To develop this further, it is worth recalling Habermas's discussion of the ecology movement and other 'defensive groupings,' which, he suggested, favoured communicative structures.[8] In this discussion, Habermas endorsed 'the creation of subculturally protected communication groups which further the search for personal and collective identity' and which 'promote the revitalization of buried possibilities for expression and communication.' He suggested that the core of this new 'conflict potential' be understood as 'resistance to tendencies to colonise the life-world,' and as resistance to 'developments that visibly attack the organic foundations of the life-world and make one drastically conscious . . . of inflexible limits to the deprivation of sensual-aesthetic background needs.' It is clear, then, that Habermas and the post-structuralists share a concern for the future of the sensual-aesthetic within the life-world. Now, in the case of the post-structuralists, this concern is the one that defines their theoretical task. But, in Habermas's case, the concern has recently manifested itself in disquisitions against post-modernism. This attack on the over-valuation of untrammeled aestheticism in post-modernism has been received as a strong implicit critique of post-structuralist theorising. But this reception has been, in certain respects, hasty. A

7. Jürgen Habermas, "Psychic Thermidor and the Rebirth of Rebellious Subjectivity," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, No. 25 (1980).

8. Jürgen Habermas, "New Social Movements," *Telos*, 49 (Fall 1981).

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concern for some sense of balance between the historico-theoretical and the sensual-aesthetic led Habermas to make rather peremptory remarks about young conservatives, and *this same concern* has led to a somewhat over-respectful treatment of Habermas's case, which although raising an absolutely critical question (what combination of forces — political, theoretical and aesthetic — should support the move toward establishing autonomous individuals within a sane world?) was not based on an especially rigorous consideration of post-structuralist theory. In short, the critical nature of Habermas's statement that: "The *Young Conservatives* recapitulate the basic experience of aesthetic modernity. They claim as their own the revelations of a decentered subjectivity, emancipated from the imperatives of work and usefulness, and with this experience they step outside the modern world. On the basis of modernistic attitudes, they justify an irreconcilable anti-modernism. They remove into the sphere of the far away and the archaic the spontaneous powers of imagination, of self-experience and of emotionality. To instrumental reason, they juxtapose in manichean fashion a principle only accessible through evocation, be it the will to power or sovereignty, Being or the dionysiac force of the poetical. In France this line leads from Bataille via Foucault to Derida."[9] has served to obscure a potential complementarity, based on shared concerns, between the theory of desire in post-structuralism and the aspiration toward substantive rationality presented in Habermas's work.

If we now turn to the question of the audience for both Critical Theory II and the theory of desire, it is significant that that the ethic of communicative rationality and that of 'bodily autonomy' correspond to the two main themes characterising the 'new' opposition since the middle sixties. The counter-culture of the late sixties, with its drug-induced normativity and its hazily-formulated philosophy of desire, displays a pronounced affinity with some of the themes of the post-structuralists,[10] while the democratic new left, particularly the SDS of the Port Huron statement, and the mass democratic movement which existed until sectarian schisms closed the decade, would have affinities with the thesis of communicative rationality. Critical Theory II and post-structuralism have a similar relevance to today's peace, ecology, feminist and homosexual movements and also to the *Bürgerinitiativen* of the 1980s. The writings of Habermas and the post-structuralists are meaningful because comparatively broad sections of the public have *already* highly valuated both 'radical-rational democracy' and 'bodily autonomy'; the new social movements are comprised very largely of those who have been shaped by an expanding and often critical higher education, and these individuals are not infrequently familiar with the latest theoretical formulations, if only through the publications and newsletters of the various movements. The point is this: while Habermas equates post-structuralism with irrationalist reaction, and Lyotard, discussing Habermas in *The Postmodern Condition,* speaks of the conservative implications of a univocally-consensual iron cage of rationality, both theories have the potential to figure as doctrinal bases of a possible political culture for the new social movements. In other words, both theories confront the possibility of practically achieving their own falsely assumed precondition: the fading away of class relations.

9. Jürgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," *New German Critique,* 22 (Winter 1981), p. 13.

10. The 'back-to-nature' component of this culture is not, however, consonant with post-structuralist thinking: Frank is incorrect to see Deleuze and Guattari in Spenglerian terms, because capitalism, with its 'decodification' of desire, represents an advance over earlier social forms that were 'over-coded.'

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We accept that there are basic differences between Habermas and the post-structuralists. We do not call for some theoretical integration. We do maintain, however, that the shared properties which we have identified mean that both are part of a theoretical culture that succeeds the modern. Doubtless there are both left-and right-political expressions within the postmodern domain. But it would seem to be the case that Critical Theory II and the theory of desire occupy different places at the radical end of the postmodern spectrum. The creative tension between them is to be valued.

RECOLLECTIONS OF THEODOR W. ADORNO*

by Leo Löwenthal

I am in a difficult situation, being asked as a survivor to talk about people who are no longer with us, for survival always poses the problem of whether we have to deal with an event of a purely biological nature or one that, considered from an intellectual standpoint, is not merely arbitrary. Goethe frequently grappled with exactly this problem — if I may, for a moment, appeal to such a great standard.

A second personal remark: when one has lived as long as I have and belonged to a group that has gained such historical significance, one is constantly considered a kind of historical fragment. And, indeed, in the course of recent years I have experienced first hand how history is actually written. And without wanting to cast any suspicion on historians I must say that I am filled with increasing skepticism. Only recently have I experienced how a portrait of Adorno and me could have arisen on the basis of passages from letters, a portrait less true to the relationship as a whole than the one I am going to sketch tonight also on the basis of letters. And this has led me to reflect on the question of documentation. One may (now I don't want to succumb to Foucauldian or other structuralist or poststructuralist philosophy, concerning which I am not especially competent anyway) reconstruct history from documents, one may also rely on one's own memory; and, finally, there is something which I have the great fortune to possess: documents *and* a memory, both of which correct each other. And this leads to a third personal problem: I am supposed to say something about my recollections of Teddie — it will be difficult to speak of 'Adorno' the entire evening, since he is someone I knew since he graduated from high school; however, when I speak of my recollections of Adorno, I certainly want to avoid the intrusion of a narcissistic tone. Yet, it is unfortunately impossible for Leo Löwenthal to remember Adorno without here and there mentioning a word (or two) about myself and my work.

I would like to bring to the fore, essentially through letters, several aspects about the life we shared; the twenties, the thirties, the forties, and the fifties will be touched on. Obviously, this selection has a fragmentary character for the simple reason that there were so many years we lived together: in Frankfurt, in New York, now and then in California. The accidental, however, is not merely accidental.

* A speech given on the occasion of the Adorno conference in Frankfurt, September 1983. Translated by Sabin Wilke.

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I was introduced to Adorno when he was 18 years old by Siegfried Kracauer who played a major role in our friendship — a friendship with all the positive and ambivalent traits such relationships have.

I start with a letter from December 4, 1921, which I have already published, in which Kracauer conveys the following impression of Teddie: "Something incomparable makes him hold a favorable position over both of us [Kracauer and me], an admirable material existence [note a slight ambivalence: Adorno was a very spoiled young gentleman from a well-to-do family] and a wonderfully self-confident character [here now the positive]. He truly is a beautiful specimen of a human being; even if I am not without some skeptical thoughts concerning his future, I am surely delighted by him in the present."

Anyway, the Adorno of these years was a delicate, slender young man. Indeed, the classical image of a poet, he had a delicate way of moving and talking one would hardly find nowadays. We met either at a coffee house, mostly at the famous Café Westend, at the opera where intellectual *enfants terribles* met, or at our parents' place. Naturally, I know Adorno's parents well, also his aunt Agathe. And it was an existence you just had to love if you were not dying of jealousy of this protected beautiful life where Adorno had gained the confidence which never left him. For a short period of time, however, my relation to his parents was disturbed by a dissonance perhaps not uncharacteristic for the history of assimilated German Jews. When I accepted my first paying job in 1923 — I had just received my PhD, a year before Teddie — bearing the overrated title of "director of the counseling center for Eastern European Jewish refugees," Oskar Wiesengrund told his son that Leo Löwenthal was not welcome in his house as long as he had something to do with Eastern European Jews.

There is a remarkable irony in the fact that Adorno asked me many years later to give the eulogy at his father's funeral, he himself being ill in Los Angeles. A certain knowledge of the mentality of the German-Jewish middle class and particularly upper middle class is required to entirely understand the atmosphere. This might also account for the fact — this is how I explain it to myself — why Adorno had such an incredibly hard time (we had to drag him almost physically) in finally leaving Germany; he just could not believe that to him, son of Oskar Wiesengrund, nephew of aunt Agathe, and son of Maria, anything might ever happen, for it was absolutely clear that the bourgeoisie would soon be fed up with Hitler. And this kind of naive unfamiliarity with the real world — particularly the world of Germany and the complicated relations of Christians and Jews, and finally the not any longer complicated relations of non-Jews and Jews in Germany — is something one should bear in mind in order to fully understand Adorno's personal history.

For the moment, I would like to return to several experiences from an early period when Teddie was approximately 20 years old and thereby make use of some passages from letters, to which recollections can so superbly be related. Several examples: Adorno and Kracauer tell me about their reading of Bloch and Plessner; about Bloch they have yet very little negative to say; Plessner, however, is said to write in an awful jargon, but nevertheless view many problems correctly. Soon they rake Benjamin over the coals; I, too, am chided because at that time I identified strongly with apocalyptical and messianic motifs. I had just finished writing a (today hardly readable) 'master work' *On The Demoniac: Project of a Negative Philosophy of Religion* — I hardly understand a word of it now — and, shortly thereafter, a dissertation on Franz von Baader, both composed in an expressionist style, and this served as an opportunity for my friends to constantly poke fun at me. For example, on April 24, 1922, from Amorbach during a

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hot summer: "It would be a pleasure to take a bath [Bad], which doesn't mean that you have to plunge right into Baaderlake." And they also wrote to me that I was a professional apocalyptist and for professional apocalyptists unfortunately there was no vacancy in Amorbach; but for the sake of a meeting they would be willing to try and find a room in the next town. That was the tone in which we talked to one another; yet, openly friendly sentences, like this one, for example, from a letter from August 11, 1923, were heard as well: "Although you are constantly with us in our thoughts, it would naturally be nice to have your empirical person around also."

1923 is the time when Adorno and Kracauer engaged in a common reading of Goethe's *Elective Affinities* and subsequently of the first draft of Benjamin's essay on the same work. On August 22, 1923, I was told: "So pleasantly tired that I don't even want to get down to *Elective Affinities*." But they are still reading Franz Rosenzweig's *Star of Redemption* about which Teddie made the following comment when Kracauer told him about it: "These are linguistic philosophemes I would not even understand if I understood them;" he adds (I am getting personal again): "We certainly would have the real chance to recover" — he writes in August 1923 — "if we would not have to fear that the mightly dollar will put a premature ending to our idyll." That was about six weeks before the upward evaluation of the dollar, and I understood that only too well. When the dollar had not yet risen I was, for the first time in my life, in Brenner's Parkhotel in Baden-Baden, which back then was still called Hotel Stephanie (we were always bonvivants — in the Hotel Abyss, as Lukács says); but only for a day! The next day the dollar was stabilized and I had to clear out of the hotel and take the train back to Frankfurt — third class. Kracauer and Teddie had similar experiences at the same time.

However, back to more serious talk: Kracauer writes on August 31, 1923, again about Rosenzweig: "As a thinker [he] is and remains an idealist [. . .] and even his star won't redeem him from that — just as I don't believe that his book will have great success some time in the future, in spite of Scholem and his brother Benjamin." And Teddie adds: "I've finished reading *Elective Affinities* and agree with Friedel [Kracauer] on its interpretation." Now follows a sentence that will surprise you: "but definitely less with that of Benjamin, who, in fact, reads into the text rather than extrapolating from it and essentially doesn't grasp the meaning of Goethe's existence." That's how impertinent we were at that time!

Now, to give you another example of the combination of intellectual wit, seriousness, and concern for each other's private life, I would like to read from a letter written by Kracauer and Teddie together, which will conclude my selection from the twenties. On December 8, 1923, Teddie writes on the occasion of my marriage: "I wish you and Golde [my wife] luck, at the same time [I wish] myself that — as a quiet bourgeois husband — you are less abducted by mail, telegraph, and train from the protected sphere of productive conversations than it has been your habit thus far."

Kracauer, however, comments in the same letter on Teddie's phrase: "Such a pseudophilosophical, noble rhetoric Teddie regards as naive and prefers to make use of it in small talk, that is to say in letters, seminars, discussions with young ladies. His own literary style is — as you probably know — of such a quality to [. . .] make Benjamin's [. . .] scurrilous language sound like [. . .] baby talk. However, the young philosopher wants it no other way and, I guess, we will just have to let him have his way." And now Kracauer makes another lovely remark: "If Teddie one day makes a real declaration of his love and gives up his perfectly sinful bachelor status [we never did it with anybody less than Fichte] in exchange for the equally hypocritical state of

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marriage, his declaration of love will undoubtedly take such a difficult form that the young lady in question will have to have read the whole of Kierkegaard [. . .] to understand Teddie at all or to misunderstand him and to reject him, because there will definitely be something about a 'leap' and about 'belief through the absurd', since she certainly believes that Teddie, the philosopher, considers her to be absurd which results in the worst delusions." I am sorry that Gretel cannot listen to this prophesy today which, in the end, had a different outcome. And Teddie had an extraordinarily witty response to this in the same letter, alluding to Benjamin's famous last sentence in his *Elective Affinities* essay and criticizing Kracauer in the following way: "you know him; for me hope remains only for the sake of those without hope, but it is still such a long time till then."

To conclude my account of the twenties I would like to tell you that this letter of congratulations arrived in Königsberg in a beautifully calligraphed envelope — Kracauer, the architect, was very good at these things. By the way, this reminds me again of another one of those episodes very characteristic of German Jews: my first wife was from Königsberg in Prussia. My father, an old Frankfurt resident who had gone to school in Frankfurt like Kracauer, Teddie, and me, refused to accompany my mother to my wedding and had told me, when I had announced my wedding plans with a young lady from Königsberg: "You are crazy! Königsberg, that's practically in Russia!" As early as 1923 he had already anticipated the course of world history and was not second to Teddie's father in his aversion towards the East. Anyway, this letter of congratulations came in an envelope decorated by Kracauer and with the return address: "General Headquarters of the Welfare Bureau for the Transcendentally Homeless"; and below, again in Teddie's handwriting: "Kracauer and Wiesengrund, Agents of the Transcendentally-Homeless. General Management at Frankfurt Oberrad." That, of course, is an allusion — as you all know — to Lukács' *Theory of the Novel*, but at the same time it is an anticipation of what my friend Martin Jay has emphasized: the being-nowhere-at-home, the homelessness, the existential exile — all this being already preformulated in this humorous envelope. I thought that this envelope was so important that I took a copy of it, which I now give as a present to our friend Unseld.

I now turn to the thirties which are especially characterized by resettlement in the United States, also by the founding of *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* and by extenuating, ultimately successful attempts to get Adorno to come to the United States. One of the most essential issues which kept us in contact — all of us carrying a collective responsibility for the journal and me being largely responsible for its management — were the innumerable and extremely stimulating suggestions constantly coming to us from Adorno in Oxford — partly, I suppose, to Horkheimer, yet, partly to me as well about articles we should do or contributions he himself was planning. I will give you an interesting example; in a letter dated August 19, 1937, he writes to me: "Personally, it matters a great deal to me not to function as a specialist for music, for example, but to be open to a broad range of themes; for this reason I would highly appreciate its publication." In question was an essay on Karl Mannheim to which I will soon return. "For in principle I represent the antispecialist attitude and in this vein encouraged Horkheimer in his decision to write something about Raffael [the French Marxist] and about Sade, as I would like you perhaps to write something on mass culture in monopoly capitalism. [. . .] Specialization, indeed, has its dangers, particularly in the isolated situation we find ourselves."

He, thus, not only divined the specific intellectual interests of each of us with an extremely subtle sympathetic understanding, but encouraged us and identified with

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them. He was successful ultimately; the essay on Sade in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* is essentially Horkheimer's work, and Suhrkamp published my book on *Literature, Popular Culture and Society* as the first volume of my collected works.

Here I come to an important point concerning the thirties. Previously — and obviously in vain — I strove to destroy a legend about whose background no one is better informed than I, since the other parties concerned are no longer alive: that we had forced Walter Benjamin through financial means to comply with our editorial requests concerning his articles for *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* and at times forego their publication. It might be news to you that Teddie's contributions were subject to the same 'censorship' without our ever, however, having denied him or Benjamin a penny. The essay on Mannheim he mentioned from London on August 19, 1937, was not accepted. In addition, an essay on Husserl was not printed. In several reviews we made decisive changes. Thus, I write to him, for example, on September 21, 1937: "I've had your reviews copied now and in a form reflecting the consequence of my above accounts with which, by the way, Marcuse agrees. [. . .] If you approve of the abridged versions I would like to ask you to hand in the manuscripts [. . .] so that they can be prepared for type-setting." Then Teddie writes to me October 31: "That's how it is with my scribbling; it is, fortunately or unfortunately, formed in a certain way, so that ridiculously minor changes can, under certain circumstances, mess up the whole thing. [. . .] I ask you to take up my suggestion in only this way and not as an expression of pedantic self-righteousness. I believe that they can be executed without ignoring the slightest intention of your suggestions for changes. Only the deletions on page 7 and page 9 have major implications. The essay in its current form is already, as you know, the outcome of a rigorous abridgment [. . .] On the other hand I understand very well the [. . .] considerations which have motivated you to make these deletions. Maybe you can insert a sentence containing the idea of what has been deleted without being offensive. Let me conclude by saying that God will reward you for your effort in such cases."

That's how it really was. After all, we negotiated our texts with one another. Two of my own essays as well were originally not published. Like everything else they finally appeared in print by way of our message in the bottle.[1] For example, there was a long study of naturalism [not published] because Meyer Shapiro thought that it was superficial and distorted. Well, I told myself, if that's the way it is, forget it; and another longer essay on the German biography by Emil Ludwig and others [rejected], because we did not want to offend German Jews in exile. Nevertheless, we offended them later anyway! Such negotiations — like several other things — led, of course, to arguments and disputes; when you do not have arguments with each other, then you better get a divorce. But finally, however, it is not the malicious remarks people on occasion make about each other that count but the remaining opus.

From the correspondence of the thirties I would like to pick out something else, because it illustrates what Teddie meant to me and, I guess, also to Horkheimer who himself told me: "One learns so much from Teddie." Whatever I now know about music, particularly modern music, I learned from him. Thus, I told him from New York in October 1937 that the Kolisch-Quartet in a very clever way performed a concert with Beethoven music — his late quartets — Schönberg's, together on four consecutive nights, so that you really learned to interpret Beethoven through Schönberg and Schönberg through Beethoven. Teddie responded to this: "I am glad that you also

1. Editor's note: critical theory's efforts have often been described as a "Flaschenpost" or a "message in a bottle" thrown out in the open ocean.

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liked the first quartet of Schönberg so much. I think that it is most useful as an introduction to the mature Schönberg, along with the two major works from the same period, the chamber symphonies and the second quartet. [. . .] I am of the opinion (and Berg, by the way, was too) that once you have experienced the first quartet, not even the latest and strangest things of Schönberg remain totally unintelligible. I would like to do nothing better than soon demonstrate to you such things *in concreto."* And he meant it that way. Adorno was an extremely generous person concerning all these things. There was no "I do not have time for that"; when you turned to him for help he gave you his attention.

Now a couple of words on the forties. This is the time in which Adorno joins Horkheimer's exodus from the East to the West coast to live in Santa Monica near Los Angeles. That is a time in which an extremely intense scholarly correspondence took place between us. This is the time in which Horkheimer wrote *The Eclipse of Reason;* Adorno as well as Pollock and I in part contributing to its composition; it really was a kind of collective effort. Only between Adorno and me was there, however, a correspondence in which changes were discussed — Horkheimer and I talked about it on the phone. The forties are also the time in which *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* originated. Having had the chance to witness the two of them coin every phrase together on the occasion of my frequent visits to Adorno's apartment in Southern California remains an unforgettable experience for me; a singular experience — the production of a truly collective work where each sentence originated in joint effort. I myself had the satisfaction to be able to contribute to some of the "Theses on Antisemitism." There was an atmosphere of serenity, calmness, and kindness — Gretel also was there quite often — not to mention hospitality that in retrospect was experienced as a bit of utopia; in any case, that is how I experience it today. The collective works and discussions on various studies on antisemitism fall in the same period as well. I myself took part in the planning of *Authoritarian Personality,* occasionally mediating between Teddie and his colleagues, American professors, because I frequently had to play the role of the appeasing diplomat who does not take seriously the quarrels of others. I quieted Teddie, telling him that what the empiricists wanted was not so bad, you just had to be patient with them and make them familiar with what we understood as theory. Then everything would come out all right.

An interesting personal reminiscence: Teddie writes to me on December 6, 1942, probably remembering his former illusions in German domestic policy: "I do not want to finish without once having stated that Hitler will be defeated!" This phrase is remarkable insofar as not all the core members of the Institut shared his confidence. Thank God, Teddie was right.

A correspondence originated in the same year on the occasion of the death of my father, for which he offers thoughtful condolences. I would like to point out only one thing from this epistolary exchange since it reminds me of Teddie's generosity. I was in the process of writing a book on popular culture; I had certain ideas for this topic and wrote Teddie on February 23, 1948: "Whatever thought you have about how to organize something like this would be of immeasurable assistance to me. Do you still remember your extemporaneous reflections" — I remember that as if it were yesterday — "when we drove down Sunset Boulevard on a Sunday in thick fog and you conjectured how you would organize a lecture on the sociology of literature? That is exactly the model I have in mind for my present study." Such was the nature of intellectual solidarity whose imprint was so strong that one could live from it for quite some time.

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Finally, a few words about the fifties, when Adorno had returned to Frankfurt. First, again some personal remarks; he writes to me August 5, 1959: "In about ten days we hope to move into our own apartment, Kettenhofweg 123 [still Gretel's address], very close to the University and where the Institut will be located. Right now, they are removing, in a frightful din, the rubble from the lot on which the Institut will be constructed." I read to you from this seemingly unimportant passage because it is intimately personal and therefore expresses something of the well-nigh symbiotic form of life we maintained even over a great distance.

Another very nice communiqué from the fifties: on January 8, 1955, Teddie wrote me: "The publication plans are fairly extensive. The first draft of the long study on industry is finished and turned in. Instead of Osmer there is now a Herr von Friedeburg who really seems to be a great improvement." And when I view the conference and Ludwig's [von Friedeburg] part in its organization I must say that Teddie's judgment of thirty years ago proved excellent.

Teddie came back to Frankfurt for the first time in 1948, full of deep longing but also with a certain anxiety of having to teach German students again, and he told me about it on January 3, 1949: "At least I cannot keep secret from you that I was happily overwhelmed by the European experience from the first moment in Brittany [that's where he had spent his vacation] and that working with students excels everything you would expect — even before 1933 — in intensity and rapport. And the contention that the quality of the students has sunk, that they are ignorant or pragmatically oriented, is mere nonsense. Instead, much suggests that in isolation and estranged from politics they had plummeted in the spirit with an unequalled fanaticism. The decisively negative factor you can trace everywhere is the fact that the Germans (and all Europe, in fact) are no longer political subjects, nor do they any longer feel themselves to be political subjects; hence, a ghostlike, unreal quality pervades their spirit. My seminar is like a Talmud school — I wrote to Los Angeles that it is as if the spirits of the murdered Jewish intellectuals had descended into the German students. Quite uncanny. But for that very reason, at the same time, infinitely canny in the authentic Freudian sense."

In order not to exhaust your patience I shall limit myself to only one more remark. Teddie writes to me December 2, 1954 — sorry to be slightly narcissistic again — on the occasion of my previously mentioned essay on the genre of biography which was so popular prior to Hitler and which now could be published because we no longer have to show consideration for formerly exiled Jews. It was originally planned as a contribution to an attempted revival of *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* in the fifties. This plan came to nothing, and instead a series of sociological studies published by the Institute arose: its first volume was the Festschrift for Max Horkheimer's sixtieth birthday, in which my essay finally appeared.

"Concerning the study on biography," writes Teddie on December 2, 1954, "I am of the firm opinion that it should be published. Not only because I think that it is necessary that you make an *acte de présence* in the first issue, but because I also believe that the topic has the same relevance today as before. The genre is inexterminable, the love of the German people for Stefan Zweig and Emil Ludwig has undoubtedly survived the Jews, and the biographical essays inundating illustrated magazines (often still featuring Nazi celebrities) in a large measure derive from this kind of writing, the dregs of the dregs. Your arguments are so striking that we should not do without it. And your work has methodological significance as well, insofar as it represents a very legitimate parody of the official practice of *content analysis*. To enumerate sentences of the sort: "Never before has a woman loved like . . ." [I had put together innumerable

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phrases in which each person states about everybody else and everything that he, she, it is the greatest thing that ever happened in the world], is quantification rightly conceived." And now I turn to the passage for the sake of which I selected this letter in conclusion: "Finally," Teddie continues, "I would like to say that I fundamentally do not adhere to the conviction that our works will become outdated for external or thematic reasons a couple years after they are written; for the emphasis of what we are doing lies, I would think, in a theory of society and not in ephemeral material." I have the same response to some of the criticisms about the agenda of classical Critical Theory that allegedly is no longer relevant today. Instead, I agree with Teddie, who continues his letter: "We, at least, should not pursue the kind of modernity which consists in making abstract chronology the standard for relevance and which thus represents the exact opposite of the truly progressive. You might want to read my piece 'Consecutio temporium' in *Minima Moralia* in this connection [. . . .] " I would like to add here, with a certain hope and without aggressiveness, that I have heard at the same time a theme which may resonate longer than our critics would like to concede.

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BOOK REVIEWS:

Edward Topol and Fridrikh Nezhnansky, *Red Square*. Quartet Books, 1982. 188 pages. $15.95.

Attentive readers of Bakhtin are familiar with the importance he attributed to "semi-literary" or folkloristic genres and art works. Bakhtin came to the interesting conclusion that emerging and historically representative, types of literary works often build from semi-literary blocks. These blocks may be fragmented and incomplete, purely raw materials from the aesthetic viewpoint. Nonetheless, they are harbingers of the emergence of a significant literary form. This is the case with *Red Square*, apparently a thriller written by two Soviet defectors, Edward Topol and Fridrikh Neznasky, in reality a significant, albeit semi-literary, historical novel in the style of Walter Scott. All constituents analyzed by Lukács in his famous description of Scott's historical novels are present. The protagonist is a typical "medium" hero, both as far as the "weight" of his personality and his short-term social significance is concerned. This is why he can easily mediate between the summits of social hierarchy and the depths of social base even in such a morbidly segregated society as the Soviet Union. The so-called "great historical personalisties" appear only for moments (although for revealing ones), the reader's interest is captivated by the odyssey of historical institutions in a process of change, not by the psychology of fascinating personalities. This "Soviet thriller" which so conspicuously lacks in portraying talent, but which so dramatically resurrects *present* history is, in fact, a semi-literary (or pre-literary) *Quentin Durward* with an extremely unhappy ending.

Conspiracy

Red Square is a story about conspiracy which is in part fiction, in part interpretation, certainly not a document, however, interpretation of a kind whose ultimate "historical truth claim," although cannot be confirmed, can be very strongly supported by scholarly works of "Kremlinology."[1]

The plot, but not its deeper implications, can be summed up in a laconic manner. On 19 January, 1982 Semyon Kuzmich Tsvigun, General and First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Brezhnev's brother-in-law (Tsvigun's wife and Viktoria Brezhneva are sisters), the Secretary General's personal watchdog around the overambitious Andropov-Fouché, dies at the age of 64. Although his obituary released by the Tass agency mentioned a "long-lasting illness" as the cause of death, the leaders, so the novel suggests, were fully aware, and in fact the Western press surmised that, to all appearances, Tsvigun died a violent death, albeit by his own hands. An ususually wide anti-corruption compaign, code-named Operation Cascade was parallelly under way, this is how Nezhnansky and Topol account for their case, significantly one which had been instigated by the Central Committee Secretary and the second man of the Soviet oligarchy, Suslov, but *not* by the whole of the *Politburo*. (This is, to repeat, part of the narrative, not a documented historical fact.). As a result of this campaign, approximately 1500 leading Soviet functionaries and underground economy dealer-wheelers were arrested on the very first day. In the novel, all evidence seemed to point to Tsvigun, as the main protector of, and chief profiteer from, a vast network of corruption (termed the "underground economy"). Tsvigun seemed to have committed suicide, after a violent showdown with the "purist" Suslov, in a KGB "safe apartment,"

1. One such reconstruction of Brezhnev's final days can be found in Ilya Zemtsov, *Andropov* (IRICS editions, Jerusalem, 1983), which is nightmarishly similar to that in *Red Square*. In addition, almost all fragments and details of the story surfaced in the Western press in an incoherent and often self-contradictory form.

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to avoid legal consequences. Apparently, Brezhnev accepted the bitter facts. The Politburo instructed the legal authorities and the press that, "in the interest of the party," the compromising fact of the second-highest KGB functionary's involvement in corruption and blackmarketeering, as well as his subsequent suicide, should not be publicized. However, and this could not escape the attention of Russia-watchers, Brezhnev did not sign the obituary of his brother-in-law (nor did, of course, Suslov). This circumstance further corroborated the assumption that Brezhnev accepted the KGB version of Tsvigun's death, although he had very good reason for doubt: there were unmistakable indications that "Operation Cascade" had been undertaken against him. Despite Brezhnev's apparent resignation, the novel starts with the surprising mission assigned to Igor Shamrayev, a middle-aged and middle-placed legal bureaucrat, a senior investigator from the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, to investigate Tsvigun's death and its *genuine* circumstances. Shamrayev was curtly ordered back from a frosty, but long-awaited holiday in the Crimea by instructions sent him via secret army telecommunication channels. This could only mean that, although no one questioned the KGB-version openly, Brezhnev smelled conspiracy.

But does this whole plot make sense to anyone with an elementary knowledge of Soviet reality? Does the all-powerful Secretary General, the head, if only a *primus inter pares* of a tremendous power machine need a non-entity to "investigate" a political case, in a society where the "legal" or "illegal" character of criminal cases is defined, not uncovered, by the state? What can a Sharayev find out that Brezhnev cannot, by simply issuing a few orders through his habitual channels? In fact, Brezhnev, who is in this novel an almost perfect copy of the cornered, shrewd and ruthless Louis XI in *Quentin Durward*, was perfectly aware, despite delusions on all sides, that Tsvigun had not committed suicide at all, rather that he had fallen victim to a KGB ambush, However, for reasons which will gradually become clear to the reader, at the given moment he was simply not in the position to order wholesale arrests and fathom the mystery. Further, he had to find out who (meaning which of the rival security organizations) liquidated Tsvigun, and, above all, to what extent they had penetrated Tsvigun's secrets.

The confused political situation in early 1982 unleashed a bitter struggle of rival power centers. "Operation Cascade" means "KGB versus KGB" (Andropov against Tsvigun), but it also means the Suslov-backed KGB-leadership's bid for the position of the Secretary General (Andropov versus Brezhnev). For the time being, the arch-rivals, the KGB and the MVD (the latter is an equivalent to what is called Ministry of the Interior in Western countries with, of course, imcomparably wider powers) forget about their usual inter-departmental clashes. They combine forces to fight the "Brezhnev clan" with Suslov's political support, and whereas Suslov dies during the course of the plot, Andropov-Fouché, the new candidate for supreme power, emerges from the background silently, ominously and unperturbed by the momentary fiasco. Further, the combined KGB-MVD forces have some of their customary skirmishes with another investigating and prosecuting organization, the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, a largely ineffective and nominal body which, although it has armies of special investigators and possesses wide formal powers, is in fact totally dependent on the Central Committee or the KGB or both. On his part, Brezhnev, for the moment not controlling either the KGB or the MVD, his usual power instruments, fights back with the tremendous reserves of the army in his double capacity of "Marshall" and "Head of the Defense Council of the USSR."[2] Whenever Brezhnev needs something,

2. This is an extremely illuminating example of how the Soviet Union is ruled, not governed.

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he uses the army communication system, the army personnel (to which at a certain crucial point of the plot he even gives the order to *crush* an eventual KGB-MVD resistance with arms, if need be), the army intelligence network (to have the protagonist, Shamrayev murdered, once the work so crucial for Brezhnev has been done). The second weapon Brezhnev uses is less definable, even in Soviet terms. There is a network at his disposal which can only be called "The Secretary General's personal guard and apparatus," an organization which certainly does not have an even semi-legal standing in any Soviet government and party charter. His chief bodyguard, General Zharov, a fairly unsophisticated but shred giant, commands a contingent of armed men (who eventually disarm an MVD surveillance team and dismantle their electronic equipment spying on Shamrayev). There is no telling to what authority, if not to Brezhnev personally, these people belong or are accountable for. Further, there is Brezhnev's "personal office" which issues binding orders to all levels of authorities (army commanders, the Main Directorate of all camps and prisons of the USSR, passport office heads and the like), and which constitutes his "private estate." In perfect imitation of Scott's absolute rulers, Breshnev gives a written mandate (as kings used to give their seals to their confidants which carried their authority) to instruct every private person and state official to obey unconditionally the insignificant Special Investigator, Igor Shamrayev, then badly needed by the ruler, but already marked for violent death.

But, one might ask, is the nonsensical issue of "whodunnit" the cause of all this paraphernalia? Does Brezhnev have such a sentimental heart to seek personal revenge over the murderer of his brother-in-law, and if so, is he lacking the means of doing so other than a Soviet James Bond? Of course, Brezhnev could not care less about the personal aspect of the story. It is also true that there are simpler ways in the Soviet regime to establish responsibility. In an outburst of what is for the moment an impotent rage,[3] Brezhnev yells "Let's have the whole MVD Intelligence Section arrested! We shall soon find out whose orders they were carrying out!" (p. 342). To repeat, unlike "normal" cases in Soviet government procedures, this time Brezhnev is only boasting. A Politburo meeting is convened for the 4th of February on which, and Brezhnev knows this all too well, his enemies plan to produce *material* evidence that not just his totally corrupt family, but Brezhnev himself is a seriously compromising factor for the regime. Until the meeting, his powers are limited, and if he loses on February 4, he will have lost all.

The paradox of Soviet law comes to the surface on this basis. On the one hand, the

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For organizations like the Defense Council are simply undefinable in legal terms. Usually, but not "constitutionally" (whatever the word means in the given context) the title of being the head of this Council goes with being the President of the USSR. However, again practically and not constitutionally, being the President derives from being the Secretary General. (But, as the first months of Andropov's short rule demonstrated, even this is not automatic.) Another example given by *Red Square* is the following. Initially, the KGB was meant to be a simple investigating body (which, of course, was never the case in practice), subjected to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and personally to the Prime Minister. When, however, Kosygin became a nuisance for Brezhnev, the latter simply rebaptized the powerful body "KGB USSR," and subjected it directly to himself, as *Party Secretary General.*

3. The game Brezhnev is playing in this important scene resembles the tricks of Louis XI, in a desperate game abandoned to the mercy (and the faulty intelligence) of his dangerous rival, Charles the Bold, Arch-Duke of Burgundy. Not for the first time, as he cynically admits to Shamrayev, Brezhnev begins serious symptoms of a terminal disease (heart troubles, faintings, pronunciation difficulties). This postpones his enemies' action and allows him to act swiftly and ruthlessly, in the borrowed time.

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period of Lenin and Stalin, that of Tchekist *troikas* (three Tchkeists "sitting in court," establishing "evidence," spelling out sentences and occasionally executing them personally) is over. Over and done with the "heroic age" of Soviet jurisprurdence in which vast terrains of social life were not covered by legal regulations at all, as, firstly, law was anyhow a "bourgeois formality," and, secondly, such formalization of rights and duties would have been a waste of time in context where people disappeared by the millions at a hint of the supreme ruler (or minor rulers). Since Khrushchev, this has gradually changed. There is now a vast body of Soviet legislation, laws and decrees formulated in a manner which is technically not very unlike the legislation of Western countries. There are learned Soviet lawyers and investigators who are well-versed in their profession, capable forensic experts equipped with the most modern gadgets. But what is the function of all this? Simply to serve arbitrary and tyrannical actions, authorities and persons who are totally impervious to such niceties as "the truth of the matter," "legal facts," "evidence" and the like. Just a few examples will suffice here. Pirozhkov, Deputy Chairman of the KGB, plainly tells Shamrayev, in reply to the latter's annoying queries about the *real* causes of Tsvigun's death: "The press announcement about General Tsvigun's illness was a decision of the Politburo" (p. 37), and, in Soviet terms, this is a *legally satisfactory* explanation. The *binding orders* issued by Brezhnev's office are *personal* decrees of a sovereign which have no legal standing even in terms of Soviet legality, but which are the expression of the will of a sovereign.

The genuine and in no way romantic need for a shrewd investigator, who otherwise is a political non-entity, is the following. One of Tsvigun's cronies and go-betweens in the shady deals, a young Georgian, had installed a secret and very sound-sensitive tape-recorder in Brezhnev's family dacha, partly because he was infantile enough not to know with what kind of fire he was playing, partly to take a personal revenge on Tsvigun. The tapes recorded Brezhnev's totally cynical conversations about his own regime, in a tone of utter contempt, which , except for the "purists," seems to be the prevailing tenor of the apparatus about their externally much advertised society. If the tapes reached Brezhnev's enemies, they would constitute material evidence of his "unworthiness" to be the head of the Soviet state and as the Party. And since the enemies believed that the tapes were in Tsvigun's apartment, they had him murdered. Brezhnev is then not involved in any kind of sentimental puzzle-solving concerning Tsvigun's death. In the mirror of this popular fiction, he appears as the paragon of shrewd and ruthless sovereign ruler. Had he had his own way, he would have whole sections of the Soviet intelligence organizations arrested, for the only question bothering him is their loyalty or disloyalty to him. Anyhow, his myrmidons would eventually find the person who was, in a physical sense, the murderer of Tsvigun, and if not, the General would be just added to the hecatombes on which Brezhnev, and Tsvigun himself, ascended to power. *But the tapes have to be found and destroyed;* this weapon has to be extorted from the hands of his enemies. Therefore, in this unique case, Brezhnev is interested *in facts,* and he needs a skillful and experienced investigator. This is why the historical novel *à la Walter Scott* dons the guise of a thriller.

What is the *social content and function* of the conspiracy (beyond the usual frictions and jockeying for more power between leading figures of a totalitarian apparatus)? The authors invent an extremely important document, the so-called "Program of the New Course Government" which was found in Suslov's writing desk right after his death and which. in all probability, is the common work of Suslov and Andropov. I am going to quote this important and lengthy document in full not, of course, because I believe in its authenticity but because I regard it as the *best intepretation* of what Andropov's rule was destined to be. The unique document reads as follows:

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Points for February 4

1. Report: "Evils of L.I. Brezhnev's cult of the leader"

a. Defeats in foreign policy:
— failure of peaceful occupation of Afghanistan in 1978, feet-dragging in active Sovietization of Afghanistan today;
— delayed reaction to outbreak of anti-Soviet trade-union movement in Poland, prolonged liberalism towards Solidarity leaders;
— indecisiveness over expanding Soviet spheres of influence in Middle East, leading to weakening of our bargaining positions for an outlet to the Persian Gulf and loss of control over Arab oil.

b. In internal policy:
— liberalism (afraid of the West) over anti-Soviet dissident movement. Solzhenytsin. Sakharov; permitting Jewish, Armenian and German emigrations, which has led to re-emergence in Union Republics of nationalistic aspirations directed towards secession from USSR;
— collapse of planned economy and emergence of "unofficial" economy (figures and materials from Cascade);
— members of Brezhnev's family involved in bribery and corruption (Cascade materials);
— result of above points — weakening of ideological education of workers, destruction of Soviet people faith in Communist ideals, critical attitude of people to existing authority.

2. Decisions of Politburo meeting:

a. Suggest Brezhnev retire. In case of agreement by him, not publish report "Evils of the cult of the leader," see Brezhnev off with honor, awards, etc. In case of refusal, remove from Politburo, publish report "Evils of the cult of the leader" to May Central Committee plenary meetings;

b. form "New Course Government" to ensure following measures as soon as possible.
In foreign policy:
— immediate total Sovietization of Afghanistan;
— final destruction of Solidarity forces in Poland;
— take decisive advantage of West's inability to oppose active moves by Soviet Union, as indicated by events in Afghanistan and Poland. Therefore, maximum military support for pro-Communist popular movements in Middle East countries, including direct military intervention to secure control within next one to two years of Persian Gulf and Arab oil;
— extend military and other support for Communist and anti-Imperialist forces in countries of Latin-America and Africa;
— take advantage of growing rift between NATO-countries, widen it, and bring about isolation of USA in Capitalist world.
— Successful realization of these points within a concrete timespan (1-2 years) will be final stage in preparation for Sovietization of Europe, Middle East, and American continent.
In internal policy:
— harsh eradication of dissident movements, religious and spiritual sects, cessation of all forms of emigration;
census of population capable of working and mandatory attachment of workers to enterprises, collective and Soviet farms. This will guarantee sharp improvement of

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economy and permit supply of food products through network of industrial distributors exclusively to working population;
— eradication of all forms of "unofficial economy" and other manifestations of anti-Soviet and Capitalist aspirations. For this purpose conduct series of exemplary trials with public execution of captial punishment;
— in connection with new foreign and internal policy tasks, increase numerical strength of Soviet Army by increasing compulsory service period from 2 to 5 years in land forces and from 3 to 7 years in Navy." (pp. 258-260)

Later I will return to the social and political problems involved in the "New Course Government Program." At this point, the relevant questions are as follows. Does a historical novel based on, and dealing exclusively with, conspiracy suggest *conspiracy theory as a universal explanation of history?* And, further, is conspiracy theory an adequate explanatory framework for a rational understanding of the word? To answer the *second* question first, it will suffice to glance at the categories with which conspiracy theory operates. In terms of this theory, each and every phenomenon is but "the tip of the iceberg." Nothing is identical with its social appearance, rather, it is an essential feature of social phenomena that they *are* something radically different from what they *appear:* in short, that they are mysteries. Nor is any actor that which he or she appears to be, rather, people are the exact opposite of their appearance. The sharper this contrast, the better it suits conspiracy theory. The latter, in fact, implies the secret worldview of suspense thrillers: in principle, each and every deed may belong to each and every person. However, this "egalitarianism in slandering human nature" is only apparent. There is always secretly, as conspiracy behind conspiracy, a collective force, a target group, which, in the final analysis, is responsible for everything. Conspiracy theory thus implies an agnostic theory of knowledge, a misanthropic, moreover, outright slanderous, view of "human nature" for an anthropology, a yearning for a *Führer* who fathoms the mysteries which remain hidden for us, *les autres mortels*, and, in result of all this, a latent, but always mobilizable, spirit of witchhunt.

More important than the criticism is the question of the *historical origin* and the *social functions* of "conspiracy theory as a universal explanatory framework." Interestingly, the *ancien régime* never used conspiracy theory,[4] albeit royal courts always swarmed with plots and counterplots. For there are three preconditions for conspiracy theory to emerge as a universal explanatory framework. The first is the existence of a *general public sphere* in which, in particular in its early and extremely optimistic phase, all social affairs were meant to be public. It was not just an often naively optimistic period, but a highly unstable one as well. On the one hand, a widespread will to a generally public character of life had already appeared, and its partisans watched with unmitigated suspicion the rulers of yesteryear. On the other hand, there were still social forces whose aim was to restore the former state of affairs but who were no longer in a position to do so publicly. Therefore, they hatched plots. The second precondition is the universal claim to a rational understanding of "History," including the present as history, but under circumstances which, for one reason or another, block this rational understanding of the world around us. The third precondition was the general acceptance of the "Trojan horse policy" as a legitimate means of introducing a new type of sovereignty.[5]

4. Perhaps the first conservative treatise which describes Enlightenment as one coherent and gigantic global conspiracy, the book by Abbé M. Baruel, *Mémoires pour servir a Jacobinisme* (1797, new edition 1973, Paris) is written *post festum,* after the collapse of the ancien regime when it had to borrow the means of the adversary in order to understand the world.

5. This only happened, and roughly at the same time, in the 20th century. Mussolini's

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In view of these three preconditions, it is almost natural to see the Great French Revolution as the classic *locus* and time of conspiracy theories (although, as already mentioned, the third precondition was still missing). Nowadays it is well known that the royal family was indeed conspiring against the new order as they no longer had either the power or the inner confidence to present publicly their claim to restore the *ancien régime.* Marat's pathological genius is vindicated precisely by his universal suspiciousness, which was first extended only to the aristocracy, but later to everyone. Without a shred of evidence, he assumed, and ultimately always found, genuine conspirators everywhere because, with this strange combination of a paranoid and bloodthirsty mind and a lucid sociological insight, he departed from the assumption that people would not release once enjoyed prerogatives. Thus, they would only plot for their restoration, if they could not act overtly. Departing from this premiss, Jacobinism proceeded to withdraw the great Enlightenment message: the rational and critical understanding of history. Jacobins progressively substituted conspiracies and conspirators for the objective analysis of social problems and the sober understanding of social actors.[6]

The Russian Revolution was a diligent student and an imitator or as well as an innovator in the abundant use of conspiracy theories in the French Revolution, but not under Lenin. The greatest of Russian Jacobins still sought a clear sociological understanding of his enemies. At any rate, during the civil war, the antagonists were so easily identified that conspiracy theory was unnecessary.

It was Stalin's rule that brought conspiracy theory to full bloom as a universal world explanation. All social preconditions for the universalization of this fetishistic explanatory device appeared then. While the existence of a free and universal public sphere was a sacrosanct dogma whose questioning meant a free trip to the GULAG, in fact, the public sphere was totally abolished. People could only guess what was going to happen to them. Belief in the omnipresence of old-time and more recent "conspirators" against the new order was required by everyone. All problems were blamed on these conspirators, and a rational understanding of the new society was replaced by a totally mystifying indoctrination. Finally, Stalin extended the thesis of the "Trojan horse" to his own society. The spirit of witchhunt, thus released, reached its peak with the Moscow Trails.

Whatever one's view of Khrushchev, he did what he could to eliminate the omnipresence of conspiracy theory. His so-called "secret speech" made it sufficiently clear that whatever one's thought of the defendants, conspirators they were not. His first, very reluctant, steps to unravel the famous case that had triggered the avalanche, namely the murder of Kirov, proved that probably one single conspirator may have been responsible: Stalin himself. Further, whenever genuine conspiracies did take place (as in the case of Beria, in 1953, or in that of his unrepentantly Stalinist colleagues in April, 1957), he made these events public. And, finally, he made efforts to deprive

statements, preceding and following *la marcia su Roma*, Hitler's conclusions about the causes of the fiasco of the beerhall *putsch* and the new methods to be used afterwards, and the tactical principles for "bolshevizing" Western communism were parallel phenomena. The credit for coining the term is due to Dimitrov in his speech on the VIIth ("Popular Front") congress of the Comintern.

6. Today, if one reads Mathiez's remarkable book, *Danton et la paix,* this anticipation of the bestseller of the Vyshinsky era, Sayers-Kahn's *The Great Conspiracy* which, after unparallelled documentary efforts, concludes that Danton was a paid agent of the British cabinet assigned to destroy the French Revolution from within, one will see in the work of the greatest Robespierrist historian, how the Jacobin mind operated and how conspiracy theory replaced sociological analysis.

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the "Trojan horse strategy" (to which he, of course, remained a subscriber) of some of its most mystified forms. He put bluntly to a stupefied Kennedy in Vienna in 1962 that the USSR simply lives up to a task flowing organically from its social nature when it supports so-called liberation movements.

The advent to power of the collective body of the Soviet oligarchy represented a *spectacular return to conspiracy,* but not as a theory, rather as the normal form of power struggles at the top. To start with, the very rule of the oligarchy was established in a *formal coup* against Khrushchev, in October, 1964. Secondly, while the public sphere remained even more consistently suppressed than it used to be under the Great Improviser, *the power centers have been to some extent separated* in order to prevent any one man from becoming dictator over a whole social stratum which runs a totalitarian dictatorship. However, this separation of power centers only opened a period of constant conspiracies as the unacknowledged course of Soviet policy-making. Conspiracies invariably aim at re-distributing power positions already occupied by other individuals and groups. Thus, it is proper to approach major political changes of Soviet society as an uninterrupted series of conspiracies. For this reason, *Red Square*, a story about conspiracy, is a full-blooded historical novel, rather than just a "Soviet thriller."

The Underground Economy

In terms of the novel, the overt goal of "Operation Cascade" was the liquidation of the "underground economy" which exists in reality, not just in this fiction, and which is a complex network of heterogeneous but, as far as Soviet law is concerned, equally illegal, activities. The volume of these "underground economic activities," (according to the Anti-Fraud Group and the Chief Public Prosecutor's office), as estimated by the novel, can be put somewhere around 20-30 billion dollars, a staggering figure (if, of course, one accepts the official ruble-dollar parity). The agglomerate of these operations consists of disparate activities, such as common fraud, embezzlement of state funds, bribery from individuals and from collective economic units (factories, kolkhozes and the like) in exchange for such "favors" as admission in tertiary education institutions, release of prisoners from camps, state allocation of better flats, etc. Andropov even casually mentions to his fellow conspirator, Scholokov, the minister of the interior, that, to his knowledge, in Azerbaidzhan even the position of a district party secretary has a fixed price: 120,000 rubles (p. 324). A more dangerous but far from unusual form of underground economic activity is the smuggling of precious Soviet raw materials, canned goods and agricultural products out of the country to the West, disguised as cheap commodities. This, for instance, is how the best Russian caviar was continuously smuggled out in tins wearing the label of a very ordinary sort of fish. The profiteers, among them the All-Union Minister of Fisheriess, who was later executed for such transactions, sold the precious goods for huge profits, which they either kept in numbered Swiss bank accounts or, eventually, they smuggled back to the country, which was yet another violation of Soviet law. Other underground economic practices are, however, in terms of business ethics, beyond reproach. They are regarded as illegal only under prevailing conditions of Soviet irrationality. Transactions of this kind are, for example, the forbidden marketing of fresh vegetables and flowers from Georgia grown on small household plots.[7] Dealings in hard currency, as well as

7. Inevitably, there are certain illegal aspects even in these transactions so beneficial for the Soviet consumer. For example, Aeroflot pilots have to be bribed to transport the goods from Georgia to Moscow. But who, if not the "omnipotent planners" of the regime are responsible for this "illegal," although extremely beneficial, activity?

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in all sorts of Western consumer goods, make up an integral part of this unofficial network. However, one important feature of this aspect is to be found precisely in the fact that it cannot be pursued, given the strict state surveillance over tourists, without KGB officials being themselves on the take. Yet another sector of the underground economy strives to produce certain consumer goods in the USSR (naturally, outside the framework of state-planned operations), which are either unavailable for the consumer or available only to those members of the *nomenklatura* who have access to closed shops.

What is the explanation for the emergence of this vast network of illegal economic activities? The authors' answer is simple but convincing: Soviet society's *total technological dependence* on the West. *Red Square* is a mini-encyclopedia documenting the presence of Western goods in Soviet life. Consider the following few examples from an endless catalogue. Karakos, head of the Investigation Department of the Chief Public Prosecutor's office, "was invariably dressed in a smart general's uniform made of fine English wool, bought in a special foreign-currency shop, although the fashionable shirts and stylish French ties which he sported were out of keeping with it" (p. 45). In the murdered Tsvigun's "safe apartment" (which also served as a "love nest" for his permanent lover and the hard currency prostitutes she procured for him), "All rooms were decorated with vinyl wallpaper imported from Finland and embossed with a pleasant design — wallpaper that would have been the dream of many a Moscow housewife" (p. 71). The noiseless elevator that brings the protagonist to Malenina's office in the Anti-Fraud Squad bears the inscription: Made in Germany. She only smokes Marlboro cigarettes and the gadget with which she bugs Galina Brezhneva's love-making scene with her "Gypsy lover" is American (pp. 100-105). The files the KGB uses are "not made in our country"; an arrested prostitute who was watching smart apartments for a gang of thieves to which she belongs remarks about the apartment of a Foreign Trade Ministry functionary: in his flat, which they robbed, "even the tiles in the lavatory are foreign, and there is a pink wash-basin marked 'Made in Sweden' " (p. 207). The wives and relatives of those arrested in Operation Cascade bring to the Butyrka, the famous Moscow prison, "French cosmetics that mingled with the aroma of . . . Finnish brisket, Dutch cheese, Arabian fruits . . . — all foreign produce" (p. 227).

Whatever the reason for the underground economy's emergence, the visible result is *an ever wider social inequality.* On the one hand, "all Moscow knows that fresh bread made from pure wheat flour can only be bought in four places" (p. 152), all of which are near the areas where the *nomenklatura* lives. Everyday life for an average Soviet citizen is spent in an incessant standing in line as well as begging for the most insignificant favors in the most humiliating ways (including permission to be buried with one's loved ones, a remarkable scene in this realm of "realized freedom"). Petty scarcity extends even to the paper used to wrap the high-quality fish the investigators of the Chief Public Prosecutor's office get from the Special Supply Depot (in itself a social prerogative). Thus, sometimes they end up having to wrap the fish in official documents — even sometimes top-secret ones. The protagonist, Shamrayev, lives in such a rundown one-room apartment that the first thing General Zharov, Brezhnev's *garde-decorps*, offers him for his services is a brand new one which has perhaps two rooms (p. 145). On the other hand, the apartments of Kosygin's and Podgorny's daughters (in the same building as Tsvigun's "safe apartment") are equipped with indoor swimming pools. Mrs. Mzhavanadze, the wife of the ex-First Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia (a crony of Brezhnev who, nevertheless, had to be demoted because his shady dealings had become embarrassingly public knowledge in the USSR) is the patron

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saint and main profit-taker of the diamond black mariet. At the same time, she is a pal of Galina Brezhneva. The leaders of the worst types of underground economic activities (themselves members of the *nomenklatura* or persons closely associated with them) have *personal fortunes* that amount to millions.[8]

There is a wide and heterogeneous range of assessments of the underground economy in *Red Square* (and, obviously, in Soviet society as well). The proverbial "man in the street" regards the czars of the underground economy (including the Brezhnev clan) as common, albeit successful, thieves. The purists, partisans of the "New Course Government," have an equally straightforward view — although one that stems from different motives — of this network of economic relations. Baklanov, Shamrayev's colleague and the main conspirator in the Chief Public Prosecutor's office, gives a laconic summary of the purist position: "The people are used to stealing. In one Georgian film this man says quite openly to his neighbor: 'How do you survive? There is nothing to steal at your factory except compressed air!' And even if you jail three million of them it will not help because the rot starts at the top . . . this ruling family has created a vast unofficial industry in the country, a *second New Economic Policy* . . . but we need to unite . . . and bring the country back to health. So that we have people in power with clean hands" (p. 247). This position contains undeniable elements of truth and has the appeal of speaking out against corruption. But the program for which Baklanov engages in conspiracy prescribes "mandatory attachment of workers to enterprises, collective and Soviet farms" which in plain language means serfdom. Furthermore, Baklanov's main objection is that all this represents a new NEP, i.e., a social and economic "loosening of the screws." This is why his conversation partner, Shamrayev, calls it, rightly, a policy of "clean fists," not of "clean hands." While corruption at least allows for a certain perverted indulgence, in the complete absence of public liberties all trends that aim at social purification generate a cycle of reprisals resulting in a world worse than the one it replaces. This kind of dynamic can only end up in one of Stalin's "revolutions from above."

There is another view of the underground economy — one that is tolerant, albeit skeptical. This is set forth in a remarkable scene involving Brezhnev's policy advisers in a confrontation with Shamrayev that resembles a chapter out of Konrad and Szelenyi's *Towards a Class Power of Intellectuals.* All constitutive elements of the book are there: the intellectuals' craving for power; the naive and complacent belief that Brezhnev, the ruler, is in fact dependent on them, and that he can only choose among the alternatives they recommend (whereas in fact the *only* thing Brezhnev learns from them is faking illness whenever his enemies are too strong); the hope that they only need one or two more years and then, miraculously, a wholesale rationalization of Soviet society will spring out of the will of the "good" czar.

Of course, the Brezhnev faction is not entirely amateurish, nor are they "messianic politicians." Rather, an unsavory atmosphere of the cynicism of the "inner circle" reigns supreme among them. They have serious, positive or negative arguments, although usually the negative ones are the stronger. One of them paraphrases the paradox that Besançon has formulated as follows: corruption in the USSR is the embryonic form of the struggle for emancipation of a brutally oppressed civil so-

8. Should anyone point to the Tanaka case, and the Lockheed-scandal in general, by way of a rejoinder, two remarks would be appropriate. First, societies in which instances of this kind of corruption happen do not call themselves socialist and have a public admiration for wealth coming from "honest" sources. Second, one can sometimes, far from always, read something about such dealings in the press. Most importantly, no one is executed for embezzlement in Western countries.

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ciety.[9] The advisor tries to convince Shamrayev: "A word about the 'unofficial economy.' What is it? A chance phenomenon? A cancer on the body of socialism? Or the consequence of the fact that the collective farms have not justified themselves and our planned light industry is totally useless? And so the 'unofficial' economy appears to compensate for the shortcomings of the official one: it meets seventeen percent of the population's needs in food and industry today . . . If we remain in power we shall have to take the final step — legalize a certain amount of private enterprise." (p. 267). What is important, and grotesque, is not that all this day-dreaming takes place in the ante-chamber of Brezhnev whose exclusive parallel preoccupation is planning how to liquidate his enemies (and some of his rescuers.) The genuine weakness of such day-dreaming, which constantly takes place in "socialist reality," not just in novels about it, is the one-sided idealization of underground economy as *productive*, a view just as biased as that of their opponents who only see its corrupting effects. However, the negative argument of the advisor is valid beyond any doubt: the New Course Government would introduce serfdom, if gradually.

The struggle between the two positions ends in a stalemate that is an almost prophetic anticipation of the stalemate between the Brezhnev and Andropov factions under Chernenko, many years after the novel was written. On a deeper level, these are but two typical reactions to the fundamental feature of Soviet socio-economic life: *the simultaneous production of scarcity and waste*.[10] Although the New Course document concentrates on the staggering dimensions of waste, everyone with an elementary knowledge of these societies can assess the prospects of predictions about "the sharp improvement of the Soviet economy" that this unique document contains. However, their critical argument about waste remains valid. The Brezhnev faction represents orthodox Marxism in the sense that its members despise the petty shopkeeper's philosophy according to which frugality breeds wealth. In a way, this is the *second* phase of the "economic debate" on the economic nature of "socialism in the USSR." In the first phase, during Stalin's last years, Yaroshenko, a naive young economist, spelled out the secret of "socialist growth." The secret formula, according to Yaroshenko, was Ricardo's axiom: production for rpoduction's sake. Paradoxically, in that situation it was Stalin himself, of all people, who had to vindicate, against Yaroshenko, *the primacy of needs* in economic considerations. In this second stage, the Brezhnev faction deliberately recommends *the production of waste*. It sees this as the only way of breaking out of the prevailing economic irrationality and alleviating the most urgent scarcity: private consumption. This is somewhat illusory, but in many ways it is a courageous new approach to old social ills.

Culture

It would be redundant to belabor the obvious in *Red Square:* the total corruption of Soviet intellectual life and the truly barbaric need structure of the *nomenklatura*. The more interesting question raised by the book is the culture crisis of the "Soviet way of life" and its cheap domestic palliatives.[11] The main dilemma is *social sanity* versus the *illness* of the social body.

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9. See his "Preface" to the book by I Zemstov, *La corruption en l'URSS*, (Paris. 1982).

10. We have analyzed this phenomenon in our book, Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller and György Markus, *Dictatorship Over Needs*, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1983).

11. In his *Neo-Stalinist State*, (Sharpe; New York, 1982), Victor Zaslavsky analyzed the social conditions presupposed and implied by the seemingly neutral substitution of the slogan "the Soviet way of life" for "the construction of communism" in vogue under Khurshchev. In short, it shows the ineffectiveness of the dominant Marxism-Lineinism and the rise of chauvinism.

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To repeat, the purists have their point: a world whose "culture" is based on drinking bouts, black market operations with gold and diamonds, orgies with male or female prostitutes, with hoodlums involved in all of these transactions, cannot be a sane society. But who are the advocates of social sanity? First, the various Suslovs and Andropovs, not just politicians responsible for war crimes, but also sick, misanthropic old men jealous of all pleasures their healthier and younger colleagues can enjoy. Misanthropy and envy are guardians of social sanity in a society from which joy is banned, motives are kept strictly under the surveillance, and the rebellious will is "scientifically" crushed. This is the sanity of serfdom. Another form of "social sanity" is represented by the perfectly healthy body coupled with the spiritual make-up of a *Lager Blockführerin.* I am speaking here of Malenina, the head of the Anti-Fraud Squad, an earlier Master of Socialist Sport in gymnastics. Malenina is indeed the burial product of a "civilizing process" with its roots in the GULAG. Like those talented folk artists in Bergen-Belsen who made pretty lampshades from human skin, she is beyond morality. After drinking heavily and listening with Scholokov and other KGB and MVD generals, in Galina Brezhneva's copulation scene with the "Gypsy," she is so aroused by the exacting task of "protecting socialist achievements" that she uncerimoniously lays the hero in her enormous study, after the following unhypocritical introduction: "I'll be honest with you. I am a bit drunk. We've just been doing an old bird, listening — you know, there is this American gadget, it can hear you screwing your girl in the bathroom a kilometer away . . . And can you imagine — this old cunt was at it forty minutes and could not come. And the man, he was terrific, kept banging away. It quite took my breath. I got really worked up . . ." (p. 105). True enough, no electronic surveillance experts of any secret service are likely to assess their findings in the language of Santa Teresa. But Malenina's habitual "fuck your mother" style, tacitly accepted by her superiors, is the routine language of an otherwise hypocritically *macho* culture. And here the tolerance displayed toward her linguistic excesses suggests the same sort of indulgence which *Blockführerinnen* enjoyed in the camps in exchange for the "burdens" of their "heavy task." For, in the final analysis, Ilse Koch's pastimes were not part of the public image of German artists even under Hitler. Furthermore, Malenina is not a rebel against hypocritical morality. She simply does not believe in the boring social game called morality, but in a culture where performance is the only value. This is why she appreciates the "terrific" Gypsy and despises Galina Brezhneva. Yet, despite the esteem for the good performer, the "Gypsy" was eventually found hanged in a Butyrka cell. The Master of Socialist Sport is a passionate subscriber to the iron fist and to ultimate, unquestionable authority. But precisely for this reason, her symbolic figure tells everything about the predicament of the New Course activists. Although the New Course Program complains about the public disappearance of both conscience and the sense of shame, can it really believe in restoring either one with the Maleninas whose intemperate bestiality is so badly needed by the conspiracy?

Precisely because of this unfulfillable need, the other *need for self-glorification* is inherent in the "culture" of the *nomenklatura*. The biggest hit on Soviet TV is the series *The Seventen Moments of Spring* — a story about the "holy Tchekist" disguised as a Gestapo agent who accepts the ultimate sacrifice: that of his conscience. Hand in hand with a lifestyle including orgies with hard-currency prostitutes, black-marketeering and dealings in stolen goods, and corruption, the Tsviguns' life also include "literary" and "film-making" activities. Both man and wife are passionate producers of self-glorifying trash about their "heroic past." It would be simplistic to reduce this yearning for self-glorification to mere neo-Victorian hypocrisy, when the Tsviguns accept to remain

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anonymous, as writers of their memoirs, when they send all of their honorary to war-stricken Vietnamese children, when this type of "creative activity" remains the only bond in a dissolved marriage, when, finally, seeing their next movie about heroic Tchekists on the screen becomes a veritable obsession with Vera Tsviguna, all this is much more than mere acting. The oligarchy's main cult figure is the sentimental and dilettantish poet, who was at the same time a narrow-minded and ruthless Great Inquisitor: Feliks Dzherzhynsky, the founding father of the Tcheka who constantly yearned for saints but invariably trained mobsters. It is symbolic that Malenina, another good performer who climaxes quickly, perhaps in record time, stands stark naked after copulation under Dzherzhynsky's portrait (which decorates all rooms in the security services) and silently ponders ways of deporting Soviet Jews.

Red Square, this alleged "Soviet thriller," is indeed a traumatic message from a god-forsaken world. A society where conscience as a regulatory mechanism never worked for *historical* and *political* reasons, to now has also lost shame as a regulatory agency to the extent that it has become a social handicap even for those who have consciously created this situation. This hysterical craving for a *regulative authority* by those who always went beyond all limits and regulations, and are ready to do so again, shows the fatal consequences of the new Soviet oligarchy's lifestyle. The weakening of the leader's power, a subsequent separation of powers and the like, were all social preconditions of the semi-liberties the oligarchy now enjoys. But the price for it is that now there is no real or imaginary authority left in their world. This world is godforsaken precisely in this sense. For in a society which is fundamentally, rigidly and unquestioningly authoritarian but which, simultaneously, lives in a state of constant conspiracies, *all authorities must eventually collapse*, and they indeed do. Brezhnev is regarded in the public consensus, as the head of a clan of thieves and an imbecile, the only mistake about this being that in actual historical fact he was indeed a Godfather, but also a very shrewd operator and power-broker. Suslov is called a Fascist in the novel both by the liberalizing Brezhnev-advisors and the arch-Tchekist Tsviguna; Scholokov, a partner in conspiracy suspects Andropov-Fouché of Jewish descent, which means questioning his authority before he ascended to power.

Anti-semitism, which plays such an important role in this novel, *is the negative teology of a godforsaken world.* The phenomenon is coextensive with Soviet society; from Brezhnev to the head of the local bakery, alsmost everyone is *publicly* anti-Semitic. The charming atmosphere of Zarist Russia has returned to full bloom. The difference between the two parties, the Brezhnevite and the "purists," is only one of degrees. To start with, in case of a full victory of the New Course Program, Jews ought to prepare for progroms and perhaps for deportation. It is the symbolic figure of Malenina once again who reveals the genuine objective. In making love with Shamrayev, she fulfils a "political assignment": the conspirators want to seduce, one way or another, Brezhnev's emissary. But there is also an element perversion in the story so well-known for those who have read Julius Streicher's *Stürmer:* Malenina — *Blocktührerin* has an obsessive curiosity for circumcised men which, however, remains unsatisfied after making love to Shamrayev. Immediately after her climax, she remarks: "What are we to do with your lot?" And to Shamrayev's surprised question as to the meaning of her question, she cryptically answers: "Well, I don't mean you. You are like us. You are not even circumcised." (p. 106) The answer, however, loses its cryptic quality if we recall her angry outburst against one of her (obviously Jewish) subordinates, one scene earlier, during the listening in Brezhneva's love-making with the "Gypsy": "We are going to drive those dirty Jews out of the security services, Comrade Minister, we are going to drive

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them out." (p. 102) And perhaps it is not just the security services from which the purists want to drive out those dirty Jews. Malenina's remark entail *formalized* racial discrimination which is always the prelude to segregation or coercive population transfer — simply put: deportation.[12]

The functions of this "socialist anti-Semitism" are manifold. First, problems of a practical nature emerge with the awakening of the Jews' collective consciousness. They emerged, and here the New Course Program is correct, as a result of Brezhnev's tinkering with détente. Second, this problem is not just an internal one, but it involves foreign policy as well. Tolerance towards "Zionists" hardly mashes with the ideological and political requirements of many of the USSR's allies. However, I am convinced of the mainly *projective* character of Soviet anti-Semitism. Various forms of racisms are emerging within the Soviet Union, and the best way of manipulating them, whenever coercion is not sufficient, is to find a *common demon* towards which all hatreds can be projected. Further, negative teleology needs a visible incubus. There are no authorities in this society, not even man-made ones. All authority evaporated from it, although society itself is as authoritarian as it can be. It does not have positive principles, not even in the form of widely shared ideological delusions. It is no longer possible to blame the regime's self-generated problems on readily available collective subjects (Trotskyites, kulaks, etc.). But a *collective demonology* can do the job. The struggle with the mythical agent of genuine social malaise intensifies *hatred*, the only antidote against total moral decay — an antidote which, in turn, calls for an authority with an iron fist.

It is on the margin on this society that the only hope, the only authority that commands respect, appears here and there: simple, non-ideological, directly personal *love*. Its only bearers, in the best tradition of Russian literature, are *women:* Nina, the circus

12. The deportation of the Jews in the USSR, a country whose official ideology is the counterpoint *sui generis* of racism, seems to be impossible even for those who condemn the regime in the strongest terms. Recently, Victor Zaslavsky has voiced his scepticism about such a perspective. But let me quote Zaslavsky against Zaslavsky. In his new book on *Soviet-Jewish Emigration and Soviet Nationality Policy* (London-New York, 1984), he describes (p. 71) the typical case of a Soviet Jewish engineer who, up until 1974, had never even thought in terms of Jewish identity. Then he had to attend a so-called "closed lecture" held by an emissary of the central authorities who argued that: " . . . just as *we had to deport our Volga Germans to Siberia during the Great Patriotic War* . . . so we have to be careful of the Zionists among us now." Everyone familiar with Soviet reality knows that no emissary of the Centre, in 1974, would dare to air options which are not also under consideration in the "upper circles." Therefore, deportation does not seem so impossible even in Zaslavsky's own book. Historically, W. Korey convincingly demonstrated in his book, *The Iron Cage* convincingly that in 1953, during the hysterical weeks of the so-called "doctors' plot," there had been far-reaching preparations for a "protective" mass deportation of Jews against "popular fury." Among other things, a petition of Soviet Jewish intellectuals was submitted to the Soviet Government (obtained by the usual threats) in which they requested, in the name of the Jews endangered by an ever increasing atmosphere of pogroms, triggered by that same government, to guarantee their safety by transferring them to some distant and preferably unpopulated areas of the USSR. And the regime's ideological character was more emphatic under Stalin than under any of his successors. Technically, the whole matter is simply exercise in terminology: eventually, they would not deport Jews, but "Zionists." The counter-argument, which makes this option a weak one, is the fact that any mass deportation in the post-Stalinist-era would cause such an internal turbulence that the Soviet leadership would consider it carefully before implementing it. Thus, I regard the deportation of Jews in the USSR as an implicit danger but one that actualization of which is highly unlikely and connected with one particular social alternative: a new version of one of Stalin's "revolutions from above." But the perspective being analyzed on the basis of *Red Square*, — a work of fiction and interpretation, not a document — is precisely such a "revolution from above." Andropov's short rule must be seen precisely in such terms, and similar attempts cannot be ruled out in the future.

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artist, Shamrayev's lover who is brutally murdered by the conspirators, and Anna Finshtein, the Jewish girl, whose indefatigable love for the imprisoned young Georgian triggers the whole plot. However, tragically but not uncharacteristically, these affections find relatively unworthy subjects, particularly in the case of Anna. The message of this historical novel is therefore bitter and resigned. It reads as follows: in order to find gratification in real love one has to leave this world of hatred and corruption. But even if one succeeds (Anna does, Nina does not), it remains an open question whether it was worth the efforts. Is there a more discouraging view of the state of affairs in the Soviet Union?

Ferenc Feher

Barbara Ehrenreicht. *The Hearts of Men. American Dreams and the Flight from Commitment.* Anchor: Garden City, N.Y., 1984.

Ask any of your single female friends — and some of your married ones — about men, and they will likely complain that the men they meet avoid commitment like rats avoid electric shock. Although the therapists of these women may say that they *choose* men who avoid commitment, a recent television show on being single in America treated millions of viewers to scenarios one hears women repeat a thousand times: a man comes onto a woman like she's water in the desert, smothers her in the first few weeks with flowers, balloon-o-grams, phone calls, and professions of love, says he's never felt so wonderful with a woman in his over-thirty life, and then, as quickly and suddenly as he came on, he disappears. Although the TV show used a conservative '80s variant of "Herpes scare tactics" — its message being that women get the shaft because they are too "easy" sexually — it yet provided support for the nearly universal female complaint against male lack of commitment. A male on the show, when questioned about his disappearing act, said, sure, he had sent flowers and had said he loved the woman, but he had never intended to *marry* her. Why should he, when women are like candy in a candy store and he hadn't yet sampled the nonpareils or the butter creams?

Thus did a shoddy, superficial media event allow women all over the country to go into their therapists' office the next week and proudly proclaim that their problem wasn't that they chose men who wouldn't commit themselves, but that men more generally were not interested in commitment. Small solace.

In *The Hearts of Men,* Barbara Ehrenreich provides validation and an explanation for the complaints of middle-class women against middle-class men. Her book can be read as both a challenge to and a fleshing out of one of Lasch's theses on contemporary life: the shift from a production to a consumption society has led to new character types and an intensified war between the sexes that threatens to destroy the American family.[1] Ehrenreich challenges Lasch and neo-conservative anti-feminists by tracing the breakdown of the family not to a changing character structure and, more important, not to women and their unfulfillable feminist demands for intimacy, but to normal men and their changing role in a consumer society. In discussing some of the

1. See Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World* (New York: Basic Books, 1977) and *The Culture of Narcissism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979).

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effects of consumer society on men, women, and their relationships, Ehrenreich differs significantly from Lasch in her sociological explanation of how fathers came to be "absent" and mothers "clinging."

Ehrenreich examines the origins and collapse over the past 30 years of what she calls the breadwinner ethic. She argues that its demise preceded "second wave" feminism and was prepared not by the capitalist class but by the "knowledge producers," the professional-managerial class (p. 13). Ehrenreich traces male revolt from the 1950s to the present and the tale she tells, affirming Lasch's and others' views of the "therapeutic society," will make today's suffering females want to wring the necks not of men in general, but of psychologists, doctors, and Hugh Hefner.

The breadwinner ethic itself was at one time supported wholeheartedly by the therapeutic establishment. In the 1950s, they still defined the "mature" male as the husband who supported a family. Any deviation from the status quo was "immature," which bore overtones of "homosexual." The first rebels against this ethic were what Ehrenreich calls the gray flannel dissidents. Reisman's "other-directed" man (as Ehrenreich points out, women were always considered other-directed), the corporate conformist, had replaced the rugged individualist of the past; men had become "feminized." Condemning sociologists such as Reisman and Bell, who could discover no visible power oppressing the discontented white-collar worker, Ehrenreich argues that women became the visible enemies, the nagging dominators who kept their husbands working so they could keep up with the proverbial Joneses.

But the gray flannel dissidents were not real rebels. They seemed comfortable with condemning conformity and remaining just where they were — sitting in the suburbs with their martinis, while the little woman took care of the kiddies. The first real attack on the breadwinner ethic came from *Playboy* magazine, the self-avowed "Bible of the beleaguered male" (Myron Brenton, cited on page 43). *Playboy* attacked the notion that women's sphere was the home and men's the workplace; the magazine counseled males to reclaim the indoors from women. As Ehrenreich points out, *Playboy* never undermined the vision of the male as worker, but it went a long way in supporting the right of men to spend as much money on themselves as did their wives: "at the macroeconomic level, nothing could have been more in conformity with the drift of American culture than to advocate a life of pleasurable consumption" (p. 44). Most important, in attacking psychologists' assertions that only husbands were real men, the magazine gave status to the single man.

Not all real men, married or single, were content to eat quiche, however. While *Playboy* launched the attack on marriage, the Beats reclaimed rugged individualism by trashing work as well as marriage. Although the recent book by Joyce Johnson, *Minor Characters* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1984), significantly demystifies the macho image of Kerouac and other Beat males, Ehrenreich argues that the Beat contribution to the male rebellion against the breadwinner ethic was "to establish a vantage point from which the 'normal' could be judged, assessed and labeled — square" (67).

Enter the medical establishment, about which Ehrenreich knows quite a bit.[2] Cardiologists pulled the plug on the breadwinner ethic when they publicized the connection between stress and heart attacks. In the experts' view, it was men's very role as sole

2. See Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English, *Complaints and Disorders; the Sexual Politics of Sickness* (Old Westbury, N.Y.: Feminist Press, 1972) and Ehrenreich and English, *For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Women* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978).

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support of the family that had put them "at risk." To all this, add one dash of Fritz Perls and the human potential psychology movement, and you have a population of males and females looking for self-actualization by doing their own thing and going their own way.

One outgrowth of this new ethic was second wave feminism, but Ehrenreich convincingly writes that by the time feminism appeared, the breadwinner ethic had already been seriously devalued. Thus, in the penultimate chapter on the "anti-feminist assault on men," she explains that anti-ERA forces are wrong to think that feminists are the culprits who gave men the idea that they do not have a natural duty to support women. Further, Ehrenreich claims that if one looks closely at anti-feminist rhetoric, one finds that they are motivated more by their mistrust of men than by anything else; behind this movement is the view that women are actually stronger than men but have to con the latter into supporting them. If they fail to do so, the men will take off and threaten the stability of society by indulging their crude impulses (review of George Gilder, pp. 165-168).

Ehrenreich has a tendency to reductionism, which, despite disclaimers, is clear from the outset. In her introduction, she explains that women had traditionally married because they were economically dependent, and the family wage system, that is, the assumption that the man's salary would be enough for the whole family, kept women dependent. No place for romantic love here.

At the end of the book, in a chapter dedicated to females, she returns to the now-defunct notion of the family wage and outlines the impact of the change in men's roles on women. As Ehrenreich says, whether you call it a childish flight from responsibility, an accommodation to consumer culture, or men's liberation, a main effect of the collapse of the breadwinner ethic has been the increasing "feminization of poverty" (172). Noting that "the fastest-growing group among America's female poor are single mothers" (*ibid.*) and that two out of three adults who fit government criteria for poverty in 1980 were women (*ibid.*), Ehrenreich ends her book with a plea that women be given the right to earn a family wage and that the government provide the necessary social supports to enable women to work and/or care for their families. Those who decry government intervention as paternalism should be aware, she writes, that the reliance on an individual male was no less paternalistic and a lot riskier. But Ehrenreich herself is not quite ready to give up on men, so she still writes that women today are facing the fact of male absence, which has already led to altered living arrangements and friendship patterns among women.

Ehrenreich's book provides an important corrective to the irrationalities of recent anti-feminist attacks, and yet another perspective on the changes wrought by the consumer-oriented, therapeutic society. But something is missing from her account and, at the risk of sounding therapeutic, I would say that what is missing is a finer appreciation of the complexities of male psychology. When you ask your single female friends about their problems with men, they will probably tell you that the happy-go-lucky uncommitted male exists, but that he is in the minority. Most stories in fact feature a conflicted man who both seeks and flees commitment. Perhaps the ideologies of the past 30 years have helped him live more comfortably in his unmarried or uncommitted state (e.g., now he knows that he can cook for himself and will therefore not starve if he remains unmarried), but he does seem to crave intimacy and closeness, too. And yet, when he finds it, he flees.

The missing psychological component does not contradict Ehrenreich's account but rather complements it. There are at least two contemporary lines of thought on

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these problems that one could draw on to add to Ehrenreich's sociological argument. One is represented by feminist writers such as Dorothy Dinnerstein, author of *The Mermaid and the Minotaur. Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), and Jessica Benjamin, who wrote "The Oedipal Riddle: Authority, Autonomy, and the New Narcissism," which appeared in *The Problem of Authority in America*, edited by John P. Diggins and Mark E. Kann (Temple University Press: Philadelphia, 1981). Both argue that male flight from the female (both within him and without) is a product of our child-rearing arrangements. Benjamin, arguing against Lasch's implicit support for the Oedipal family, finds that the male model of autonomy, the outcome of the Oedipal struggle, is founded on domination and repudiation of the mother. Thus, male flight would begin at the latest at age six, before *Playboy* has been read or Fritz Perls grokked.

Benjamin, as well as Lasch, takes a longer view on the phenomena under discussion than does Ehrenreich. Lasch repeatedly accuses social critics of historical amnesia; to Ehrenreich, he would likely retort that male flight from commitment was a feature of the twenties and thirties as well (see *Haven in a Heartless World,* pp. 56-57). Given her longer view, Benjamin's argument attempts to explain the psychological origins of bourgeois patriarchy, and it would thus not explain the specific changes of the past thirty years that concern Ehrenreich. Indeed, following Benjamin's model, it might well have been the feminist revolt that sent contemporary men flying, for it is clear that the liberated female could only stir panic in the heart of someone whose emotional stability rests on female submission.

An alternate view comes from Lasch and contemporary psychoanalytic theory. Lasch has argued that the very bureaucratic, consumerist, therapeutic culture Ehrenreich describes has fostered a narcissistic personality structure. The flight from commitment that I described as more prevalent — an approach-avoidance conflict — is typical of such a personality structure, where the desire for merger with an idealized other gives way to fears of engulfment and self-annihilation. The narcissistic personality cannot tolerate ambivalence and needs to see intimate others as either all good or all bad. If the idealized other demands to be seen as a separate entity, the narcissist feels threatened and will devaluate the very person he previously adored (who is really not Other at all but an extension of the self needed to maintain the self's cohesiveness). Fright leads to flight, and the narcissistic lover who sent flowers yesterday may already have changed his phone number today. But those who flee are conflicted — relieved, perhaps, to have escaped with their selves intact, but nonetheless empty and still craving intimacy.

Beyond the conflict, there is other evidence of pathology here, for the women from whom one hears complaints about male fright/flight are often rather independent women with no intention or desire to engulf or destroy. When confronted with male projections of "all-devouring women," they are surprised and indignant; the battle of the sexes intensifies.

Given this conflictual view of the male flight from commitment, something more must have been going on in the fifties than the founding of *Playboy* or the blatherings of cardiologists. Lasch's view of what this was has tended to enrage feminists, and it is not surprising that his views have not found their way into Ehrenreich's work.

Lasch's thesis in *Haven in a Heartless World* and *The Culture of Narcissism* is that parental indifference and conflict avoidance create the infantile dependence that gives rise to a narcissistic personality.[3] He draws on research with schizophrenic families to

3. Although Lasch's general view is that a widespread abdication from parenting has taken

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support his contention that in "normal" families, over-solicitous mothers who seem caring but are really cold are the cause of narcissistically dependent children. Lasch describes these mothers as follows: As for "Momism" — the psychological dominance of the mother in the modern middle-class family — this condition arises not because the father is always "absent" at his work, as the Parsonians would have it, but because he is weak and acquiescent at home. In the schizophrenic family, moreover — which in many ways appears to represent an exaggerated version of the "normal" family — the mother's power does not originate in her effective management of the household in the husband's absence, in her emergence as the principal disciplinarian by default, or in her pressure on the children to achieve — the conditions usually adduced to explain why the American mother had become the dominant parent. It originates in the imposition of her own madness on everybody else. The other members of the family defer to her not because of the authority that goes with her commanding position in the daily life of the group, but rather because arbitrary, unpredictable, and contradictory actions are often intimidating and because refusal to examine their meaning is the easiest way to keep a precarious peace. (*Haven*, 156) Lasch provides no cogent analysis of where such mothers come from, but their effect on men yields his answer to Ehrenreich: According to a popular theory, echoes of which survive in much of the sociological description of the contemporary family, women have somehow gained the upper hand in the sex war, either because men are too busy or too exhausted by their work to fight back. A better hypothesis would be that men fear the dangers of close personal intercourse and prefer acquiescence to intimacy, rationalizing passivity in the form of an ideology of nonbinding commitments. (*Haven*, 157).

Lasch asserts that narcissistic dependence is the result of a failure to internalize parental (read "male") authority, which he further traces to "a dangerous world" (*Haven*, 165), marked by "invasion of the family by the marketplace and the street, the crumbling of the walls that once provided a protected space in which to raise children, and the perversion of the most intimate relationships by the calculating, manipulative spirit that has long been ascendant in business life" (*Haven*, 166). This world, it seems, creates insane women and passive men.

The disparity between Lasch's view of what happens to women and what happens to men in this dangerous world no doubt motivates the feminist attacks to which his work has been subject. Lasch's "long view" of the battle between the sexes leads him to vague assertions and accusations regarding etiology. If there is any validity to Ehrenreich's argument, one must look to the past thirty years for etiological explanations of male conflict regarding commitment.

One area to explore might be the effect on women of post-war role redefinitions. After World War II, women were pushed back into the home and expected unambivalently to fulfill the role of happy housewife and mother. The same forces that wrote for or against the breadwinner ethic proclaimed this role as woman's natural duty and sole means of fulfillment. War-time day care centers were shut down and social workers told women that they had better stay at home if they didn't want juvenile delinquents on their hands. Add to this the hard-working and therefore absent father and what you have is probably a great deal of unacknowledged and unacknowledgeable

place (with the experts stepping in to fill the gap), he contradicts this view in his discussion of educated women of the forties and fifties, who "approached marriage, householding, and parenthood as a fine art . . . Meanwhile, the educated housewife and her husband gave a great deal of attention to their children . . ." *Haven*, 134-135. This is but one of the many contradictions and confusions in Lasch's work, for it would have to have been precisely these parents who produced the narcissists of the past few decades.

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parental ambivalence toward children, perhaps a back-and-forth between smothering affection and uninterested coldness. These would be prime conditions for the emergence of a narcissistic personality, and, although Ehrenreich rejects therapeutic explanations, such conditions may well have worked alongside the forces she discusses to produce the contemporary flight from commitment.[4]

Whatever the psychological roots of the problem may be, we must clearly address both the approach and the avoidance side of the conflict over commitment and intimacy if we are truly to gain insight into the hearts of men.

Lynne Layton

4. Differences in male and female responses to these conditions might be explored by drawing on the work of Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), or the more recent "Feminism and Difference: Gender, Relation, and Difference in Psychoanalytic Perspective," *Socialist Review*, no. 46 (July-Aug. 1979), 51-69.

Peter Bürger, *Theory of the Avant-Garde.* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1894. 134 pages.

Last Spring two important German books on aesthetics finally appeared in English: Adorno's unfinished *Aesthetic Theory,*[1] intended to summarize his philosophy and sociology of modern culture, and Büger's *Theory of the Avant-Garde,*[2] in many ways a dialogue with Adorno and critical theory.

Peter Bürger, a professor of French and comparative literature at the university of Bremen, has published extensively on a broad spectrum of classical to avant-garde literature, generally trying to combine an outline of a sociology of culture with detailed socio-historical anaylses of specific works.[3] Bürger sees himself as a mediator between hermeneutics and critical theory. He is an avowed disciple of the Frankfurt School in that the recognizes the cognitive and potentially moral function of art, bound up with art's necessary aloofness from practice in bourgeois society. Nevertheless, he problematizes the aesthetics of autonomy, stressing that in the current cultural crisis it is of paramount importance to understand the change of function that art and literature have undergone. The clarification of this function can only be a hermeneutical process. Art and literature, like religion and philosophy, have become institutionalized and

1. T.W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory,* (Routledge and Kegan Paul; London, 1984).

2. Cited below as *T.A.* It is the translation of *Theorie der Avant-garde,* (Suhrkamp; Frankfurt [1974], 1980), augmented by two chapters from P. Bürger, *Vermittlung-Rezeption-Funktion,* (Suhrkamp; Frankfurt, 1979). The English translation has a very well informed preface by Jochen Schulte-Sasse, pp. vii-lv.

3. Peter Bürger was introduced to the American public in *New German Critique* 10 and 11. His publications in West Germany include: *Der französische Surrealismus,* (Suhrkamp; Frankfurt, 1971); *Aktualität und Geschichtlichkeit,* (Suhrkamp; Frankfurt, 1977); P. Büger (ed.) *Zum Funktionswandel der Literatur,* (Suhrkamp; Frankfurt, 1983); he edited together with Christa Bürger and Jochen Schulte-Sasse *Zur Dichotomisierung von hoher und niederer Literatur* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt, 1982).

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their objective role is to maintain intact the ideological framework of this society. Bürger intends to develop a "critical hermeneutics" which would allow aesthetic theory to become a "critique of ideology" and thus lay the foundations of a new sociological aesthetics. (*T.A.*, pp. 5f)

Bürger's critical hermeneutics seeks to overcome the theoretical stalemate resulting from both Gadamer's passive concept of tradition and the Frankfurt School's notion of the necessary autonomy of artistic production, for both perspectives are unable to grasp profound changes in bourgeois culture. *Theory of the Avant-Garde* holds a key position in Bürger's writing:[4] it sets out to testify to the aesthetic and social importance of the avant-garde rupture with the bourgeois tradition. The historic importance of the classical avant-garde [primarily . . . Dadaism and early Surrealism but also and equally . . . the Russian avant-garde after the October Revolution" (*T.A.*, p. 109, note 40] for the development of art in bourgeois society lies, in Bürger's view, in the intention to destroy autonomous art and to reintegrate it into social life. The book pursues a double aim: to find a new vantage point for the analysis of contemporary art and to reassess the avant-garde as a total rupture with the cultural tradition. This singles out Bürger's from other theories of the avant-garde, notably from Renato Poggioli, Irving Howe, or from contemporary French criticism.[5] These other theories understand the avant-garde as part of an ongoing linguistic revolution dating back to some point in the 19th century. In their view Dadaism, Expressionism, Surrealism, the theater of the Absurd, appear as integral elements of modernism.

Bürger does not deny that modernism is a gradual process and recognizes the achievements of Flaubert, Baudelaire, Lautréamont and Valéry. Yet, he sees the uniqueness of the historical avant-garde movements in their socio-aesthetic claim "to destroy art as an institution" and "to revolutionize life by returning art to its praxis" (*T.A.*, p. 72). This ambitious project failed: the avant-garde revolution remained restricted to art alone. But although it has become integrated into the powerful institution of bourgeois art it leaves us with the legacy of a revolutionary onslaught on the autonomy of art, the unfulfilled promise of a reunion of art and social praxis. Hence the need to grasp the historical character of avant-garde intentions.

In Bürger's view, the violent attack Dada and Surrealism directed against art in bourgeois society made it possible, for the first time, to clearly perceive art as an institution with its own ideological role. (*T.A.*, p. 57) Indeed, pointing to the necessity of aesthetic autonomy — as do Adorno and Habermas — in order to save the redemptive function of art in a society that negates authentic values is a misguided, defensive attitude. Bürger stresses the other side of esthetic autonomy: its emasculation of all artistic protest against social reality, its streamlining of aesthetic innovation within a humanist tradition. Bürger's concept of an "institution of art" is designed to grasp the omnipotent, repressive role of this tradition. "Art as an institution" is said to "refer to the productive and distributive apparatus and also to the ideas about art that prevail at a given time and that determine the reception of works." (*T.A.*, p. 22) Bürger holds that neither work-intention nor the social status of the public play a decisive role in matters of reception: in the last resort it is the institution of art that determines the meaning and

4. Upon its publication in West-Germany the book gained an immediate notoriety. Some of the controversy it provoked is echoed in W. Martin Lüdke (Ed.) *Theorie der Avant-garde. Antworten auf Peter Bürgers Theorie der Avantgarde.*, (Suhrkamp; Frankfurt, 1976).

5. Renato Poggioli, *The Theory of the Avant-Garde,* (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., 1968). Irving Howe, *Decline of the New,* (New York, 1970). Cf. Roland Barthes, *Le Degré Zero de l'Ecriture,* (Editions du Seuil; Paris, 1953), or Julia Kristeva, *La Révolution du Langage Poètique* (Editions du Seuil: Paris, 1974).

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thus the social effect a work can have. Only when art as an institution is put into question does a free reception become possible.

Bürger makes it clear that neither hermeneutics, which stresses the continuing reception of tradition, nor ciritical theory, which places meaning within a certain type of production, provide a theoretical vantage point that would critically account for the cultural tradition of bourgeois art, and at the same time grasp the avant-garde as the disruption of this tradition. Though he accepts Gadamer's concepts of prejudice and application as preconditions for inquiry, he criticizes, with Habermas, the missing mediation by labor and domination which ultimately equates hermeneutic understanding with the "placing of oneself into the process of tradition." (*T.A.*, pp. 5ff)

On the other hand, whereas Habermas analyzes the impact of domination in the "life-world," he does not extend his analysis to the aesthetic domain. Habermas holds on to the Weberian idea of a tripartite cultural realm consisting of the autonomous spheres of science, morality and aesthetic, each following its own logical development. The aesthetic is thus identified as a domain above the social struggle, where residual human needs find the expression that the rationalized, impoverished life-world denies them. In Habermas' thought, modernism, defined as aesthetic-expressive rationality, is part of the still unfulfilled Enlightenment project according to which each of the three cultural spheres must strive to contribute to the ultimate aim: the sensible organization of society. From this point of view ruptures of the modernist tradition — like the avant-garde — must appear as irrational and thus threatening to the authentic concern of art.[6]

In his search for a critical concept of the dominant cultural tradition Bürger turns to Marcuse's essay on "The Affirmative Character of Culture."[7] There Marcuse elaborates the contradictory character of art. As the bearer of "forgotten truths," Art protests against a reality in which these truths have no validity. Yet these truths, couched in the medium of "aesthetic semblance" (Schein), are detached from reality and have no bearing on it. Therefore, "art stabilizes the very social conditions against which it protests." (*T.A.*, p. 11)

It is from Marcuse's exposure of the contradictory status of art that Bürger draws his concept of the "institution of art." It is a model that "does not relate to individual works but to their status as objects that are set apart from the struggle of everyday existence." The institution of art is, then, the pivot of the hinge connecting art works and society; it is "the manner which regulates the commerce with works of this kind" (*T.A.*, p. 12). Like Marcuse, who in his essay stressed the stabilizing character of art rather than its upsetting aspects, Bürger characterizes the specific function of art as being the "neutralization of impulses to change society" (*T.A.*, p. 13), a neutralization that is bound up with the purely aesthetic, non-political character of art.

This last point is crucial for the understanding of Bürger's theory. Like Jauss, he decries "aestheticist" aesthetics as purely bourgeois and strives to introduce a political dimension into aesthetic theory. He therefore takes issue with the humanism of both Lukács and the Frankfurt School. The critique that Bürger addresses to Lukács and Adorno is that while they analyze the ideological content of individual works and determine their particular role in society, they cannot seize the social function of bourgeois art as a whole because, despite their differences, they are both convinced

6. See Jürgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," *New German Critique*, 22, (Winter 1981), pp. 3-14, and Peter Bürger's reply: "Avant-Garde and Contemporary Aesthetics: A reply to Jürgen Habermas," id., pp. 19-22.

7. (1937), in H. Marcuse, *Negations* (Boston, 1968), pp. 88-133.

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that the autonomy and the resulting "functionlessness" of art are the only guarantees for preserving humanist values in a reified society. While Adorno holds that genuine art *must* not have an immediate social impact, Bürger explains that it *should* and moreover *could* have one, if the institution of art would not neutralize the critical impulse of art.[8]

To break both the continuity of the humanist tradition and the philosophical overdetermination of the aesthetic, Bürger interprets the avant-garde as the fruit of contradictions inherent within the institution of art itself. Referring to the Marxian tenet that previous historical periods can only be fully understood when the present period is on the verge of disintegration, Bürger contends that the avantgarde is to be understood as the "self-criticism of the social subsystem, art" (*T.A.*, p. 22).[9] According to him, a basic tension within bourgeois, autonomous art has always existed between a potentially explosive content and the closed aesthetic form. From the mid-19th century on, after the bourgeoisie had firmly established itself, the form-content tension became increasingly resolved in favor of form. In other words, in the developing aestheticism, realism was suppressed and the preoccupation with form gradually became the sole content of art. When the tension inherent within bourgeois art — being released of social responsibility while bearing social protest — was resolved by the elimination of protest altogether, when art had retreated into formalistic self-reflection, the avant-garde attacked the uselessness of art, its autonomous status, demanding that art be relevant again for society.

Bürger draws the conclusion that even though the autonomous status of art has not been shattered in the end, it is nevertheless "in the realm of art" that the avant-garde has had a "revolutionary effect" (*T.A.*, p. 59). This revolution takes on the form of a suspension of history: with the appearance of the avant-garde, "the entire tradition of art is negated" (*T.A.*, p. 60). The liberation of art from tradition means its liberation from the periodization of styles that are now all at the free disposal of the artist: "Through the avant-garde movements the historical succession of techniques and styles has been transformed into a simultaneity of the radically disparate" (*T.A.*, p. 63). Not only has the avant-garde freed the artist from the constraints of production within a particular style, but it developed a new concept of the work. If realism — in the Lukácsian definition: the subjectively created, organic work, a whole, the parts of which relate meaningfully to each other — dominated artistic styles since the Enlightenment, the avant-garde ushers in the age of the non-organic, fragmentary work, an assembly of parts independent from one another. Its structure is no longer "syntagmatic" but "paradigmatic" and meaning, no longer flowing from the coherent whole, has to be arrived at via the construction principle: "Posited" meaning supposes the active participation of the public, rendering passive reception obsolete and opening up a work for future interpretations (*T.A.*, p. 79).[10]

Bürger's project is ambitions: to show that the possibility for the *Aufhebung* of aesthetic autonomy is given within the very development of bourgeois art itself. This way avant-garde art would appear as the logical historical successor to the bourgeois tradition and Gadamer's concept of tradition would have to be enlarged in order to include it. At the same time, critical hermeneutics is used to question the Frankfurt School's insistence on an art separate from society. Bürger points out that Adorno, pre-

8. Cf. *T.A.*, Chapter 5,1. The Debate between Adorno and Lukács, pp. 83-92.

9. Cf. *T.A.* Chapter 2, 2. The Avant-Garde as the Self-Criticism of Art in Bourgeois Society, pp. 20-27.

10. Cf. the whole of Chapter 4, "The Avant-Gardiste Work of Art," pp. 55-82.

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cisely because he valued art mainly for its resistance against ongoing reification, could not appreciate the avant-garde as the fundamentally different, but saw it only as the continually changing, the steadily new, an expression of mimesis to conditions under capitalism, where art, too, in order to escape integration, has to keep changing (*T.A.*, pp. 59-63).

Nevertheless, instead of laying the foundations for a new aesthetic, Bürger's critical hermeneutics returns to historicism and evolutionism. We are left with a linear development of humanist aesthetic theory from Kant and Schiller to Lukács and Adorno, against which is set an amalgam of avant-garde tenets on the destruction of traditional art and on social renewal. Bürger opposes two ideal types of the aesthetic as the supposed evolution of art since the Enlightenment.

In this binary opposition: bourgeois art/avant-garde art, not only is the actual production of art and literature assimilated to the theories about them and their diversity is thus destroyed, but also art is explained in terms of ideology and its specific character is denied. Art in bourgeois society actually becomes bourgeois art, i.e., the art of the bourgeois class, expressing bourgeois class consciousness; it is the legitimate art of the bourgeois age. But the fact is that even at its peak, bourgeois culture experienced difficulties legitimizing all current artistic production, hard as it may have tried. Flaubert, Baudelaire, the Impressionists are good cases in point. In Bürger's theory, then, avant-garde art legitimized the breaking up of the realist traditions. The avant-garde movements mixed all hitherto created styles and "liquidated the possibility of a period style" (*T.A.*, p. 18). There is no style anymore. To Bürger, this means that no contemporary art movement can be called "historically more advanced *as art* than any other" (*T.A.*, p. 63).

These remarks testify to a rampant historicism in Bürger's theory.[11] Pre-avant-garde art is assigned to closed periods, to a solid past that will not change any more. On the other hand, post-avant-garde art creates nothing new, it just rearranges past stylistic achievements — a viewpoint that has become intellectually fashionable with French post-modernism. Given these premises, Bürger cannot account for stylistic counter-traditions that continue to persist under the solidity of official period styles; they are a crucial element for any explanation of stylistic change, as Mikhail Bakhtin made clear by tracing the history of dialogic writing.[12]

Making the avant-garde the inevitable final stage of bourgeois aesthetics, ascribing to it the role of critical consciousness, not only means that it can itself not be evaluated any more, but it is also a construction where the aesthetic appears as a cultural domain sealed off from the rest of culture and where the part that social and cultural history played in its coming into existence is totally disregarded.

This explains Bürger's criticizing Benjamin for his supposedly deterministic explanation of the avant-garde as resulting from the loss of aura through technical reproduction — mainly the development of photography and film. Although Benjamin may have overstressed the technological side in his argument, it is nevertheless incorrect to claim that in his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction"[13] the development of art in bourgeois society is "traced monocausally to

11. See also Bürger's remarks on the debate between Adorno and Lukács, where he argues that it has become unimportant whose standpoint was finally 'correct' or erroneous, as both Lukács' and Adorno's positions are now 'historical,' i.e., beyond evaluation and accessible only to understanding.

12. Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,* (Ann Arbor, 1973), and *The Dialogic Imagination,* (University of Texas Press; Austin and London, 1981).

13. Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in W. Benjamin, *Illuminations,* (Schocken; New York, 1969), pp. 217-251.

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the development of technical reproduction techniques" (*T.A.*, p. 32). Bürger overlooks Benjamin's important point that together with technology, the masses have become a decisive factor in art production and reception. Not only did access to traditional culture become possible for social strata that were formerly excluded from it, and that brought a different viewpoint to bear on art, but also the subject matter of literature and art changed to include mundane everyday life and the ordinary man. At the same time a more critical, less contemplative public was born. Benjamin was undoubtedly mistaken in his expectations for a collective art under capitalism and Soviet communism, but his point is important as against the hackneyed concepts of mass society and of the stalemate of culture to which Bürger apparently adheres.

Bürger views cultural hegemony as a closed, uniform, and oppressive entity. Yet it has been plausibly argued that with the growth of civil society, hegemony becomes an infinitely precarious equilibrium, depending much more on consensus in the present day than in the 19th century. With democratic institutions, cultural diversity increases: resilient traditions and new cultural forms and trends intermingle and exist side by side. There is clearly no authority capable of simply repressing them; these tendencies have developed alongside, within and in spite of a more or less inane popular culture.[14]

Bürger attempts to develop a concept of the avant-garde grounded within the aesthetic alone, in order to avoid sociological positivism. But it seems that the idea of a cultural movement carried by an inherent rationality secretly asserting itself forecloses an understanding of the specificity of this very movement. For once, Dadaism and early Surrealism cannot alone be credited with the intention to break down the barriers between art and practical life. Ever since the Romantics deplored the split between culture and prosaic everyday life, there have been movements trying to bridge the gap, either at the expense of industry or with the help of it. William Morris, the Vienna Secession, Jugendstil, the Werkbund, Arts Décoratifs, though born of diverse inspirations, were expressions of an ongoing search for the re-introduction of art into everyday life. Not to mention the Bauhaus, founded in 1919, and which, carrying on the Werkbund program, set out for the first time to design art objects for industrial manufacturing on a large scale. Its intention was to radically improve living conditions and to change the face of society.

Not only are all of these movements unthinkable without massive urbanization, but the political impulse behind Dada, the Bauhaus, Expressionism and Surrealism is incomprehensible without World War I and the ideas of social revolution and reform then fermenting in European societies. It seems important not only to grasp the diversely motivated intentions to change society by the force of art and architecture (can the Futurists, Constructivists, Dadaists, Surrealists, the Bauhaus people, etc., really be treated indistinctly as "the avant-garde"?), but at the same time to determine the romantic, anarchic, or even didactic-rationalistic stance within these movements, and to see to what extent it affected their theories and their output. All this is missing in Bürger's explanation of the avant-garde as the result of purposive historical rationality, the ruse of cultural history, so to speak.

Bürger defines the avant-garde as a whole, taking at face value the avant-gardists' intentions and assuming they were coherent. In his discussion of Surrealism he speaks of "the theoreticians of the avant-garde" (*T.A.*, p. 66), probably referring to Breton's manifestos and Aragon's programmatic writings in *Le Paysan de Paris*. In this vein, he identifies the replacement of rational logic with the concept of objective chance as one of the important contributions Surrealism made to avant-garde aesthetics.

14. Alan Swingewood, *The Myth of Mass Culture*, (Macmillan; London, 1977).

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Bürger is correct, of course, to state that the Surrealist objective chance — *hasard objectif* — is, like the Dada concept of randomization, directed against means-ends rationality. Dada first came into existence as an outcry against what the Dadaists understood as the rationalized craze of World War I and the culture they saw in the service of a ruling class that profited from the war. Whereas Dada existed more in the style of different protest groups[15] in Zürich, Paris, Cologne and Berlin, Surrealism was a more consciously structured movement. Profoundly anti-rational, Dadaist and Surrealist work stresses chance and the realm of the unconscious as domains that would still allow for poetic activity unchecked and unadulterated by reason. Tristan Tzara's newspaper article cut up and reassembled by chance into a poem, the "bag poem," and Surrealist automatic writing are questioning an understanding of literature as creation decipherable in terms of logic and purposiveness. Exploring deliberately odd places, people, and professions uninteresting to bourgeois social and economic concerns, the Surrealists set out to discover a hidden truth behind ordinary, neglected, "useless" reality. Chance constellations of objects or events provide the inner logic of early Surrealist fiction, intended to replace the deterministic logic that — in the Surrealist view — rules novelistic writing.[16] Thus, the Surrealists intended to undercut a reception that appropriates literature as something "useful."

Acknowledging this intention, Bürger nevertheless rejects the unconditional abstractness of the concept of chance as used by the Surrealists. He criticizes the "ideological" character of the concept, as it depends on a *total* opposition to means-ends rationality and thus to technology and social organization as such. Bürger concludes that the intent "to see in chance something like an objective meaning" places meaning outside human communication and transforms society into nature. At this price only can chance become "a symbol of freedom" (*T.A.*, p. 66).

Having made these accurate observations, however, Bürger then refrains from linking the concept of chance to Surrealist aesthetics; instead he tries to save the concept *as such* as a means to undercut aesthetic realism. He takes great pains to work out a distinction between the Surrealist objective chance and the neo-avant-gardist "manufactured chance" — as present in the techniques of tachism and action painting — which he rejects as leading not into "freedom of creation but into arbitrariness" (*T.A.*, p. 67). Yet these neo-avant-gardist techniques are in fact nothing else than old Dadaist forms of randomization.

It seems that Bürger, adopting the Surrealist conviction that modern capitalist society is indeed governed by means-ends rationality, is in sympathy with the category of objective chance, though he criticizes its absolute character that turns society into a natural thing. This, in Bürger's view, has to do with "the attitude of abstract protest characteristic of the early phase of the Surrealist movement." He goes on to explain that it is nevertheless necessary to deal with the category the way the Surrealists viewed it so as "to understand the intention of the movement but simultaneously . . . to criticize it" (*T.A.*, p. 66).

However, criticize it is exactly what Bürger does not really do. As with other categories that distinguish avant-garde work, e.g., that of the open work, Bürger would

15. Dada has been described as a "moment" rather than a movement by Jeff Halley, "The Politics of Style: Dada and the Radical Work of Art," *Artworkers News,* Vol. 11, n. 4, Dec. 1981/Jan. 1982.

16. For a critique of the novel as realist and psychological see André Breton, *Manifestes du surréalisme,* (Gallimard, Paris, 1969), pp. 14-18. Key texts for the selfunderstanding of the Surrealists are, apart from the manifestoes, Breton's novel *Nadja* (1928) and Aragon's *Le paysan de Paris* (1936).

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like to see the category of chance tempered, relativized. In fact, what seems important to him is to demonstrate that the concepts developed by the avant-garde are on the whole too abstract and totalistic, and then to measure against them post-avant-garde art as more tempered, more realistic. In order to criticize the category of chance, it would have to be set in the context of Surrealist thought and that is what Bürger avoids. Obviously, he fears that then he would historicize it, i.e., explain it as determined by the context of its origins and thus obsolete for us today. Still, it is a fact that chance was devised as a system by the Surrealists, with its objective laws, those of a modern mythology, that were to permit the initiated to encounter it, in "sacred places."

Deifying imagination, highly idiosyncratic, addressing itself to a small group of initiates, the Surrealist revolution is anti-bourgeois in a particular way, but not anti-bourgeois *per se*. The Surrealists, especially in the early phase of the movement, opted for a program the exact opposite of everything that is conventionally considered bourgeois, which gives their writings the character of youthful, defiant revolt. In his interesting essay on Surrealism, Walter Benjamin,[17] like Bürger, does indeed identify the Surrealists as revolutionaries, but as bourgeois intellectuals turned artists and literati, and of whom the Surrealist adventure provides a last brief episode, a "snapshot." Like Bürger, Benjamin believes in the coming of a collective art, and he sees the Surrealists en route towards the new era. He recognizes the programmatic character of the early movement, calling the Surrealists "experimenters" rather than artists, and he characterizes their writings not as literature but as "demonstrations, watchwords, documents, bluffs, forgeries. . ., but at any rate not literature."[18]

Benjamin describes Breton's *Nadja* and Aragon's *Le Paysan de Paris* as exercises in an esoterism which he terms "profane illumination,"[19] a new quasi-mystical state of mind, which should provide insights into the essence of reality while abstracting from concrete sensual experience. The Surrealists' systematizing of chance would fit in here. Seeking a coherent explanation of the inexplicable in order to master it, the Surrealists destroyed the reasons for their erstwhile revolt: they gradually re-established a fixed frame wherein thought and imagination were to develop. In their conflicting relation with social and cultural phenomena, the Surrealist writers tended towards an abstract reversal rather than towards a subtle investigation in the form of dialogue.[20] Their fierce fight against French rationalism and Catholicism finds expression in a glorification of evil, the amoral and the criminal; of dream-reality as the enigmatic alternative; of an idea of love that takes shape either in a romanticized prostitution (Aragon), or in a mystic, telepathic bond, excluding sensuality (Breton).

These traits disclose the new perception of society the Surrealists had in mind and its effects on language and style. The Surrealists' writings are not just revolutionary literature *per se,* but part of an aesthetics with deep roots in the past. Benjamin convincingly links them up with Lautréamont and Baudelaire saying "that their positive function derives entirely from a feeling of obligation, not to the Revolution but to traditional culture."[21]

What is problematic in Bürger's theory is not that he summarizes avant-garde

17. "Surrealism" (1929) in W. Benjamin *Reflections,* (Harcourt, Brace, Janovich; New York, 1979), pp. 177-192.
18. *ibid.,* p. 179.
19. ibid., p. 180ff.
20. Celebrating the freedom of imagination as a *sine qua non* of Surrealist writing, Breton rejects dialogue — as hampering self-expression -- in favor of soliloquy. *Manifestes du Surréalisme, op. cit.,* p. 49.
21. "Surrealism," *op. cit.,* p. 186.

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techniques and political implications linked to them, but that he sets out to categorize some elements within them into a coherent counterideology. The montage technique belongs to these elements. Bürger takes up Benjamin's concepts of allegory and melancholy, developed in the study on German baroque drama,[22] to describe the avant-gardist attitude towards art. The melancholy gaze of the allegorist dislocates certain fragments from their original environment and thus prepares them for an reinsertion into another context. Bürger rediscovers this long vanished procedure in the Surrealist *ennui* which makes life fade out of objects, disposes them to be reassembled within a new context, and so to change function (*T.A.*, pp. 68-71). Whereas allegory describe the procedure of assembled art as such, montage further defines it for contemporary society as it "presupposes the fragmentation of reality and describes the phase of the constitution of the work." (*T.A.*, p. 73).

Montage, a technique systematically used for the first time by the Cubists, is seen by Bürger as a device of deconstruction, laying bare the construction principle of a work and thus destroying aesthetic semblance, the artistic illusion of the natural wholeness of the work. In Cubism, reality unfashioned by the artist is inserted within the work, which means "the destruction of the unity of the painting as a whole" (*T.A.*, p. 77). According to Bürger, the avant-garde work does no longer rest on the holistic construction principle where meaning flows from the organic relation between the whole and the parts that constitute it. It follows that if hermeneutic understanding is the type of reception that corresponds to the organic work, then the avant-garde work, being composed of "enigmatic forms" that resist a determination of meaning, promotes a new type of reception, no longer mediated by a work's "constituent elements," but by its "principle of construction" (*T.A.*, p. 81).

Art, then, is the perfect mimesis of society: to the traditional class society corresponds the realist, closed aesthetic form, the meaning of which can be hermeneutically consumed; whereas contemporary atomised society is represented by the paradigmatic work, resting not on the central but on the linear organization of its material, thus provoking puzzlement and shock in its recipients.

Several problems arise from this rigid dichotomy, one of them being the underlying assumption that montage, as the hallmark of the truly avant-garde work, incorporates the promise of an open construction and an open, non-determined reception, where provocative form and content would not become stunted but be preserved in all their liveliness. It must be said that Bürger himself points out that the procedure of montage in itself cannot carry a "political significance," a "fixed meaning" (*T.A.*, p. 78), as both the Italian Futurists and the Russian avant-gardists used this technique to support very different political ends. Yet he contradicts himself when he follows Adorno and sees in montage "the negation of synthesis as a negation of meaning" (*T.A.*, p. 79).

It is perhaps in his remarks on Cubism that the mechanical aspect of Bürger's theory becomes most evident. Bürger is of course aware of the Cubists' vital contribution to modern art: the destruction of the linear perspective that had dominated European painting since the Renaissance. But the conclusion he draws from this is that the Cubists are the inventors of montage, demolishing the organic work. Besides, it is typical for Bürger that he sees Cubism as a movement *en route* to the real avant-garde, for although introducing unprocessed material into painting and thus creating the montage technique, Cubism still aimed at the aesthetic work, while Dada, the real avant-garde, set out to destroy it (*T.A.*, p. 109).

Cubism perhaps marks the greatest revolution in painting since the invention of the

22. *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels*, (Frankfurt, 1963).

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persepctive in the Renaissance. It is revolutionary not only in terms of artistic means or choice of subject, but above all because it combines them in a new way of perceiving that is both dynamic and complex. As John Berger points out in his book on Picasso, Cubism developed techniques that allow to "reveal visually the interlocking of phenomena," to show "processes instead of static states of being." The transformation of all forms into similar structures — cubes, facets, planes, cylinders — enables the painter to concentrate on what links these forms to one another and to space. Cubism is "entirely concerned with . . . the interaction between different aspects: . . .between structure and movement; . . . between solids and the space around them; . . . between the unambiguous signs made on the surface of the picture and the changing reality which they stand for. It is an art of dynamic liberation from all static categories."[23]

The newness of Cubism resides in the fantastic achievement of combining materialism and dialectical dynamics, (already present but separate in Courbet's and Cezanne's later paintings). The accent is on the equality of all elements involved in a picture, their inexhaustible manysidedness, as becomes evident in the dynamic relationship of these elements to one another. Montage, as understood by Bürger (the bursting of the inner coherence of a work via the introduction of elements external to it), cannot be made the essential trait of Cubism. His description seems formalistic in its oblivion of the qualitative side of the montage relation. Material introduced into painting by montage got there in the first place to respond to the rest of the elements in the work and vice versa. On this dialogic relationship hinges the possibility to organize the material autonomously and thus to escape the arbitrariness of the artist's interference with it.

The argument that Mikhail Bakhtin brought against the Formalist distinction between poetic and practical language applies to Bürger's opposition between reality and the aesthetic, between "raw" material and the artistically fashioned material. Bakhtin remarked that language is social evaluation, and that the idea of "reality" being introduced into "poetry" is abstract, as it supposes a reality as such and a literary world as such. "The material of poetry is language, language as a system of social evaluation, not as the aggregate of linguistic possibilities."[24] Language is selected from literature itself as well as from practical social intercourse, according to a writer's aesthetic design. It is language couched within a specific aesthetic image that makes for a specific type of work, the open or closed form. In his analysis of Dostoevsky's novels Bakhtin introduced the concepts of monological and dialogical writing to describe the closed and open novel form.[25] In a dialogical novel and the author and his characters are engaged in open-ended dialogue, and meaning flows from the irreducible, diverging consciousnesses active in the work. There is not a formal equality between indifferent characters existing side by side like monads, but one resulting from an unfinished relation between the different "voices" seeking response in the other, without ever being incorporated by the other. With respect to this definition montage would then appear as just one device that could be employed in the service of the dialogic vision but which does not necessarily result in an open work. Material assembled in an avant-garde painting is context-bound, oriented towards the other elements in the painting, and in

23. John Berger, *The Success and Failure of Picasso,* (1965 Pantheon Books; New York, 1980) p. 59f.

24. P.N. Medvedev/ M. Bakhtin, *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship,* (Baltimore, 1978) p. 122.

25. See especially, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, op. cit.,* Chapter 1, "The Polyphonic Novel."

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this relationship develops freely its possibilities of meaning, unless, of course, meaning is imposed upon it by the direct interference of the artist. This distinguishes Picasso's Cubism from de Chirico's Surrealism. Stylistic means such as randomization, chance, automatic writing, the stringing of sequences, still need the integration into a vision that puts author, protagonists and reader on a level of equality. This is the difference between Joyce's open *Ulysses* and Breton's *Nadja,* heavily compromised by the device of objective chance.

When Bürger suggests that post-avant-garde art must strive to integrate realism and the avant-garde, in order to be evaluated both hermeneutically and formally, he has not yet solved the qualitative question of the open work. This becomes evident in his discussion of Brecht, whose achievements are evaluated against the absolute model of the avant-garde as a negation of tradition. Bürger clearly sees Brecht close to the avant-garde's aim to revolutionize life praxis. But Brecht, instead of wanting to destroy art, "sticks to what is concretely achievable," and only operated a "change of function" (*T.A.,* p. 89). The non-organic type of work, developed by the avant-garde, made it possible for Brecht to juxtapose, in the same piece of writing, direct political commitment and purely aesthetic passages. Before the avant-garde, when a single "organizing principle" was required, commitment either dominated the whole work, thus jeopardizing its aesthetic form, or else it became practically ineffective, subjugated by the dictates of the closed form. In a non-organic work, however, political contents no longer need to permeate the whole work. "Their effect is not necessarily mediated through the whole of the work but to be thought of as standing on its own . . . The recipient is free to respond to the individual sign as an important statement concerning the praxis of life, or as political instruction" (*T.A.,* p. 90).

The coming into being of the inorganic work, the social intention linked to it, and above all the potential for a political art are then, in Bürger's eyes, the lasting contribution of the avant-garde to 20th century art. But didactic theater, as Bürger himself suggests, addresses its political content *directly* to the audience, undercutting mediation. This content enjoys a particular privilege in many of Brecht's plays: instead of being developed out of a situation, it functions as an imposed message, administered by means of shock and estrangement, and thus by-passing both the protagonists and the public. All this suggests a closed rather than an open aesthetic form.

Bürger's book is born out of the experience of the 1960s, and its defensive tone bears the mark of the defeated revival of marxist theory and the crushed hope for substantial social change. Cultural production is understood as a closed circuit from which there is no escape: on the one hand we have the institution of art, ambiguously encouraging the hope for a better human community and yet emasculating the practical potential of art. The rest belongs to the popular arts and to entertainment that further an integration of society and art under false premises. Bürger urges us "to understand popular literature and commodity aesthetics as forms of a false sublation of art as an institution" (*T.A.,* p. 54). Unlike Adorno, Bürger cannot see any resistance value in the neo-avant-garde art of the 1950s and 60s. The failure of the historical avant-garde to make art part of life praxis again devalues and makes historically obsolete the artistic means by which the calssical avant-gardists attempted to achieve their aim. Thus Warhol, Rauschenberg, Lichtenstein, etc., by working with shock-effects, happenings, ready-mades, only helped to transform the first avant-garde into an established art-movement (*T.A.,* p. 57f, p. 61). Bürger comes to the conclusion that the preservation of the autonomous status of art might after all be desirable in late capitalism in order to maintain the distance necessary to create genuinely alternative art (*T.A.,* p. 54). With this statement, Bürger comes, full circle, back to Adorno.

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Bürger's is a serious attempt to overcome the problems inherent in the aesthetic theory of the Frankfurt School: namely that, steeped in Enlightenment philosophy, it cannot account for the irrational in art in other than apologetic terms. In other words, the avant-garde is acceptable when grasped as a set of artistic practices protesting against prevailing social conditions, but which cannot be valued in themselves, as part of the deepest nature of art. Bürger has tried to solve the problem by making the irrational the inevitable counterpart and successor to bourgeois realism, to Enlightenment aesthetics. But with this sharp opposition he has enclosed avant-garde art in a formalistic frame, which means in the end only restating the Frankfurt School problem: how can the avant-garde be saved as an enlightening, progressive contribution to culture.

As an alternative, we can take up Bakhtin's definition of the dialogic, first of all to avoid abstract dichotomies between closed and open form, realism and avant-garde, etc., but also in order to retrieve a cultural countertradition to the closed realist concept, active within it, and which, though subdued during the 19th century, has never been completely lost. It is only in relation to the dialogic tradition as it became manifest in literature, art and music that each of these domains can be evaluated in its own terms and in its relation to cultural history. Bürger's attempt to come to grips with these problems is marked by the fear that art and literature might in the end become "purely aesthetic," develop freely, and escape the control of an ideology of progress. But that is precisely what good art was always about.

Daglind Sonolet

Enver Hoxha, *The Titoites* (IMLSCC: Tirana, 1982).

The year is 1777, and the action takes place in Crimea. He is the son of the Grand Vizier, she a beautiful rayah. The young prince falls in love with the girl and begins to court her — the citizens begin to gossip. In vain the Grand Vizier tries to dissuade his son from wooing the maiden. In the meantime the Khan of Crimea has discovered that his vizier, during a diplomatic trip to Paris, has paid a secret visit to Diderot. The Khan suspects his vizier to be contaminated by republican ideas. And when he learns that the vizier's son intends to marry the rayah girl, he has the vizier arrested as an agent of the Encyclopédie. The evidence of his high treason: the projected marriage of his son to the despicable rayah. The morganatic marriage would open the door to infiltration of republican and atheist ideas that will corrupt the youth, thus undermining the Khanate's social and religious order and eventually bringing the abhorrent rayahs to power.

This is not exactly what Hoxha relates in the epilogue of his latest book, *The Titoites. Historical Notes* (1982). In that part of his book, he accuses his Premier, Mehmet Shehu, of having conspired to split the Party of Labour of Albania (PLA) and to kill him. Shehu's plan for splitting the Party was to have one of his sons marry a woman of a declassed family. His plan failed because the Party acted promptly and the engagement was broken off. As a result, Shehu shot himself to death while one of his sons, an engineer, electrocuted himself.[1] Shehu's wife and another of his sons were arrested.

1. This must be the son whom Hoxha accuses of having installed a radio broadcasting mechanism at Shehu's home. A third son who happened to be in Europe when his father committed suicide now lives in Sweden.

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Their imprisonment was followed by that of two other Shehu relatives: the former Minister of the Interior and the former Minister of Defense. Later two other ministers as well as other high-ranking officials were arrested.

The story of Shehu's suicide is the subject of the volume's last chapter,"In Open Struggle with the Titoites." The previous chapters deal with the period 1941-1948, i.e., from the foundation of the Communist Party of Albania under the close supervision of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia until the CPA broke loose from the CPY. The last chapter begins with a review of "the 35 years that have passed from the time when the Titoite betrayal was publicly denounced and unmasked" (567) and then focuses on the Shehu episode. The volume was apparently written when Shehu committed suicide (December 17, 1981). A last moment addition, in fact an appendage, the chapter functions as an epilogue.

Yugoslav leaders, Albanian nationalists and even purged Albanian communists[2] have stated that the CPA is a creation of the CPY. Hoxha begins his work by refuting that thesis. What he writes, however, is convincing only in small part. Not only was the CPA founded with the leading assistance of the CPY, but it grew and consolidated itself under the elder party's tutorship, to the point of becoming, after Albania's liberation from the Nazi troops, a mere appendage of the CPY. This Hoxha is at pains to admit. Since he was during that period the General Secretary of the Party and Commander-in-Chief of the Army (and designated Premier of Albania already before the country's liberation), he tries to justify his capitulation by laying the blame with influential comrades in the Political Bureau. He accuses them of plotting to dethrone him. To this effect, they became "secret agents" of Tito and his regime, who viewed Hoxha as their main obstacle for achieving their sinister plan, the annexation of Albania as the seventh republic of the Yugoslav Federation.

The Titoites intends to be a narrative, based on memories and occasional notes, of Hoxha's unrelenting struggle against the Yugoslav representatives in the CPA and the Albanian government, working together with their Albanian "stooges" to enslave Albania under Tito's rule. The list of the Yugoslav representatives is long. It begins with Dušan Mugoša and Miladin Popović, the CPY delegates who were instrumental in founding the CPA while also acting as *de facto* members of its Central Committee for almost two years. Hoxha admits that at this time the Albanian communists "lacked experience" (17) in organizational matters and suffered from an "inadequate ideo-political level" (355). Yet he denies the Yugoslavs' decisive role in the CPA's leadership. Except for Popović, Hoxha's mentor, whom he praises as a real friend of Albania and a true internationalist, all the others were enemies, most of them Great-Serbian chauvinists with an endemic hatred for everything Albanian. Such were Blažo Jovanović, the official Yugoslav delegate at the CC of the PCA, and especially Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, Tito's "roving ambassador," intent upon creating a Balkan Federation. Colonel Velimir Stojnić, chief of the Yugoslav Military Mission, organized the first plot against Hoxha at the Party's 2nd Plenum (The Berat Plenum, November 1944). Two Yugoslav representatives after the liberation, the "cunning" "diplomat of Albanian origin" Josip Djerdja and the "ill-famed" Slavo Zlatić, were responsible for the second and major plot intended to liquidate not only Hoxha but Albania as well. Zlatić was assisted by Sergej Krajger, the person in charge of operating the "economic

2. Tuk Jakova, Organizational Secretary of the Party during the period 1948-51, was removed from his position for maintaining, among other things, that "it was they [the Yugoslavs] who had created the Communist Party of Albania" (*History of the Party of Labour of Albania,* IMLSCC, Albanian 2nd) edition, 1982, p. 287).

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union" between the two countries. General Kuprešanin pressed hard on the Albanian military chiefs to let a Yugoslav division be stationed in the Korçë district, allegedly to defend the Albanian border from an impending attack by the Greek army. The move was tantamount to a Yugoslavian military occupation of Albania. At the same time Koča Popović, the Chief of the Yugoslav General Staff, and Vukmanović-Tempo, its Political Director, were eagerly working for the creation of a joint Yugoslav-Albanian military command, thus eliminating Hoxha as Commander-in-Chief of the Albanian army. Backed by Mehmet Shehu, then the Chief of the Albanian General Staff, Hoxha managed to foil the Yugoslav manoeuver by writing to Stalin, who disapproved of it. As a result, Hoxha survived, whereas Shehu was dismissed for his "anti-yugoslavism" (439). This does not preclude Hoxha from branding Shehu, at the end of the volume, as the chief Titoist agent and even an imperialist "superagent," the one who presided over the tripartite — cultural, military, economic — revisionistic conspiracy during the period 1973-75. Eventually Shehu tried to liquidate his ally, with whom he had been guiding Albania on the socialist road, first as Minister of the Interior (1948-54) and then as Prime Minister (1954-81), a period of no less than thirty-three years.

This is the content of the book. The narrative is spiced with anecdotes that add to the portrayal of the characters. Hoxha has gotten a knack for colorful epithets and idiomatic expressions. The Yugoslavs are recipients of a great deal of muckracking, which is principally directed, however, at Albanian opponents and rivals. As rivals Hoxha deigns to consider only three: Sejfulla Malëshova, Nako Spiru, and Koçi Xoxe. But while with the first two Hoxha exercises some restraint (they were, after all, intellectuals like himself), he has utter contempt for the proletarian Xoxe, a "you might say illiterate" (158) tinsmith, "swarthy, short, podgy, with bulging eyes like those of a frog" (449) — "his pseudonym was Trashi [the Fat], our ex-quartermaster at [the village of] Panarit" (458). Hoxha calls him, according to the circumstances, a "gawk" (347), a "tragicomic clown" (370), a "plucked rooster" (556), and portrays him "drinking with the Yugoslav comrades until four in the morning [—] but he had lasted to the end like a man and had not disgraced us" (318).

Ismail Kadare has made a name for himself by writing historical novels in which historical truth relates to fiction in the same way as starch to the jelly it helps to solidify. Hoxha does not have to bother even that much about historical truth, he being the one who makes history, and who can therefore act as both writer and underwriter — *vetë shkruaj vetë vulos,* as the Albanian saying goes.

Here is Hoxha's necrology of his longtime friend and collaborator: "From the investigations following the suicide of Mehmet Shehu and from the documents in the possession of the Party, it results that Mehmet Shehu was an agent recruited by the Americans from the time he attended Fultz's school [the American Vocational School] in Tirana[3] [from which Shehu graduated in 1932]. On Fultz's orders, Mehmet Shehu went to study in a military school in Italy, on the orders of the American secret service he was sent to Spain to penetrate into the ranks of the International Brigades. The aim of the American secret service was to provide its agent with the 'aura' of an 'internationalist fighter' so he could be used for long-term aims in Albania later. After the defeat of the anti-fascist war in Spain, Mehmet Shehu went to a refugee camp in France

3. Harry Fultz was Director of the American Vocational School when Shehu graduated from it. Fultz was a member of the American Delegation after Albania's liberation. The delegation, accused of espionage against the Albanian government, left in 1946. See Joan Fultz Kontos, *Red Cross, Black Eagle, A Biography of Albania's American School.* East European Monographs LXXV, Boulder, 1981.

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where he stayed for three years, at a time when many of his comrades escaped from it. In the camp he was recruited as an agent of the British Intelligence Service also. He was taken out of the camp by an officer of the German Gestapo and one of the Italian SIM [Italian Secret Service], passed through Italy, where he was held two months and was then handed over in Durrës to the Albanian notorious spy in the pay of the Italian secret service Man Kukaleshi, who released him after 20 days, and Mehmet Shehu went to Mallakstra and linked up with the organization of our Party there. During the National Liberation War, Mehmet Shehu and his wife Fiqret Sanxhaktari were recruited as agents of the Yugoslavs, too, by Dušan Mugoša" (pp. 596-97).

It was Shehu's wife who visited various capitals of Europe to consult CIA representatives about Shehu's plans to physically liquidate Hoxha. Having obtained their approval, Shehu was to have gone about implementing his plan in this way: "In this context Mehmet Shehu arranged the engagement of his son to the daughter of a family in the circle of which there were 6 or 7 war criminals, including the notorious agent of the CIA Arshi Pipa. Such an engagement could not fail to attract the attention of the public. And it was done precisely with the aim of attracting public attention and causing a sensation. If it were accepted by the Party, it would lead to splits and liberalism among others, too, in the Party, the Youth Organization, etc. If it were not accepted by the Party, measures would be taken against Mehmet Shehu, not imprisonment, of course, but demotion, removal from his position or even expulsion from the Party. This would cause a sensation and the Yugoslavs would use it, as they needed it for propaganda purposes to discredit the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania and especially Enver Hoxha, who, as they have repeated over and over again, is 'eliminating' his collaborators, as Stalin did" (p. 624).

Let us now look at the paragraph cited above. Based on an engagement that would naturally lead to marriage, the sentiments of the paragraph are structured around the concept of mixed marriage. The son of a communist leader wedded to the daughter of a declassed family is a case of miscegenation, class here substituting for race. This miscegenation will "lead to splits and liberalism" in the Party. How so? The polluted blood of the bride will first infect that of her husband and then the two together will pollute the Party's collective body, which will eventually fall apart and disintegrate. And the remedy? Electrocution (fire is known to be cathartic) as well as quarantine of the whole family and family circle, the *pater familias'* suicide only proving that the disease had already affected his brain.

Hoxha's concept of liberalism takes its lead from the metaphor of contagious diseases:[4] plague, leprosy, syphilis. *Syphilis sive morbus gallicus* fits the picture better. A venereal disease, it is usually transmitted through sexual contact, and it decomposes the tissues of the body, eventually reaching the brain. Apparently, waves of the sexual frenzy flooding the West have been washing up on the shores of Albania. A representative work of Albanian literature is much more specific.

In Kadare's novel, *The Great Winter,*[5] the main character, a journalist and a candidate for membership in the party, is engaged to a girl who is the daughter of a vice-minister. But whereas the young man is a Party hard-liner, his fiancée is more interested in buying dresses for the forthcoming wedding and furnishings for the anticipated home. The journalist, who knows Russian well, accompanies, as interpreter, the Albanian

4. Disease as an attribute of revisionism (the *genus* of liberalism) is spelled out in the following sentence: "What is the explanation for this custom of revisionists? Do they all copy each other, or does their disease drive them to find the same cause?" (p. 498).

5. *Dimri i madh* (The Great Winter). Tirana, 1981 (3rd ed.) Citations are from this edition.

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delegation, headed by Hoxha, which attends the 1960 meeting in Moscow of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties. It was at that meeting that Hoxha gave the memorable speech that marks the break of Albania with the Soviet Union. The journalist was an ocular witness to what happened. But he dares not say a word before the Political Bureau decides to announce the break. His muteness has deleterious effects on his fiancée, as she suspects that he has become enamored of a Russian girl. Worrying about her daughter's depression, the girl's mother visits the journalist's boss and tells him that her prospective son-in-law intends to break off the engagement. In the meeting of the local Party organization that follows, the Party secretary requests an explanation for the journalist's changed attitude toward his financée. He refuses angrily, on the grounds that his relation with her is his own business. But since "a communist cannot hide anything from his organization" (p. 358), his application for full membership in the Party is shelved. Meanwhile, his fianceé has taken to drink. In a moment of laxity, she gives herself to her teacher of French, the son of a "declassed" family. Two negative examples in Party ethics on the part of the novel's main characters is much too much for Albanian socialist realism to take. Kadare saves the situation with a redeeming episode. The novel ends with a chapter in which the journalist's younger brother, a teenager who has been indulging in dating girls as well as attending dancing and drinking parties, is rid of these bourgeois symptoms as he joins the army.

Hoxha's account of the engagement in the epilogue of his book presents striking affinities with the engagement episode in the novel. He must have read Kadare's epic, which is an apotheosis of Hoxha (the episode where the Albanian leader confronts Soviet leaders, inflicting on Krushchev a stinging defeat, is central to the novel). It was first published in 1973, the year when the Party conducted its offensive against "liberalism" in literature and the arts, which resulted in a sweeping purge. Kadare surreptitiously transfers the novel's temporal frame and cultural habitat to the Krushchev era, implicitly laying the blame there.

A reading of *The Great Winter* as a social document portraying the life style of the Albanian society at the time when the novel was written and rewritten (the revised edition of 1977 appeared after the liquidation of two more revisionistic trends, one in the army in 1974, and the other in the economic sector of the government in 1975) confirms that the "liberalism" Hoxha imputes to Shehu's intentions was a rather widespread phenomenon in the PLA in the seventies. The levelheaded Party members must have been turning a deaf ear to the virulent bombast against all sorts of revisionim from the mouth of one who believed himself to be the very incarnation of Marxism-Leninism. Party members who had read Lenin's *Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disease,* must have realized that Hoxha's ultra-leftism showed symptoms of the polar opposite of infantilism. In this context it seems reasonable to think of Shehu as leading an opposition in the Party, not for a more liberal policy entailing a weakening of the Party's role, as Hoxha would like us to believe, but for a reactivation of Albania's international politics. The country's total isolation, a phenomenon unique on the globe, in which Albania found itself after the break with China, made imperative a reassessment of its foreign policy. It fell upon Shehu, as head of the Albanian government, to cope with that problem. We do not know how he approached it. What we know is that, in the past, Shehu had been, on a par with Hoxha, champion of an Albanian brand of socialism distinct from all other varieties. The downfall of Koçi Xoxe, marking the end of Yugoslav hegemony in the CPA, was mostly due to Shehu. And he was, in his capacity as Premier of Albania, no less adamant than Hoxha about freeing the country from

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Soviet control. Yet such evidence, to be found in many a book by Hoxha,[6] does not prevent him from branding Shehu as agent of both the Yugoslav UDB and the Soviet KGB. *Was ist daran zu lesen?* A tentative rapprochement with the Soviet Union and, via the latter, with Titoist Yugoslavia? Enough for the paranoiac leader to fulminate his Premier as a traitor. Hence the venomous logorrhea. As the "superagent" Shehu was, he had been able to make a fool of everyone in the Party, including its First Secretary, for a period of almost forty years. The diabolic aim of this former student of Fultz was to liberalize and split the Party, which is tantamount to destroying it, a liberalized and split Marxist-Leninist party necessarily leading to its own demise.[7] Shehu's strategy to that effect was to have one of his sons marry a woman of a bourgeois origin and related to war criminals. The marriage would have led to the *embourgeoisement* of the Party and, as a consequence, to the reinstatement of the class system in socialist Albania.

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6. The following are some excerpts, in chronological order, from letters that Hoxha sent to Shehu (and his wife) as well as from various speeches. Letter of April 14, 1944 to Mehmet Shehu: "You should not . . . endanger your life at any moment, like an ordinary partisan. You are not permitted, except at extremely critical moments . . . to expose yourself to danger" (*Enver Hoxha. Selected Works [EHSW]*. The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA. Tirana, 1974, vol. I. p. 269). Letter of April 22, 1944 to Fiqret Sanxhaktari (Shehu): "Following your work, help, and guidance there has been an obvious improvement in the situation in the brigade [the First Brigade, commanded by Shehu, with Sanxhaktari as Commissar] from every point of view, especially as regards the level of cadres" (*EHSW* I, p. 271). Report to the Tirana Party activists on the 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA, October 4, 1948: "Comrade Mehmet Shehu deserved neither the accusations brought against him nor the condemnation he received [by Xoxe and his faction] . . Comrade Mehmet Shehu is a comrade who has fought well. We say this, for in the analysis of the 8th Plenum efforts were made to obscure this very positive aspect of his. Mehmet has military ability, and has made a valuable contribution to the struggle, and to the organization and modernizing of our army. Comrade Mehmet Shehu has defended both the general line of the Party and our correct line in the army with determination worthy of a member of the Central Committee" (*EHSW* I, p. 802). Speech at the 17th Plenum of the CC of the PLA, July 11, 1960: ". . . Mikoyan wanted to see me the next morning to discuss some important questions. "Agreed," I told him, "but I shall take Comrade Mehmet [Shehu] with me, too." He replied, "They told me only you," but I said that Mehmet had to come too." ". . . Fifteen days before the counter-revolution took place in Hungary, Mehmet and I, at a meeting with Suslov in Moscow . . ." (Enver Hoxha, *Albania Challenges Khrushchev Revisionism [ACKR]*. Gamma Publishing Co., New York, 1976, p. 32, and p. 38). Closing Speech at the 17th Plenum, July 12, 1960: "As all of you have stated, and as Comrade Mehmet [Shehu] correctly expressed the view of the whole Party, in a Marxist-Leninist way . . . (*ACKR*, p. 46). Radiogram to Shehu in New York, September 28, 1960: "We liked your speech very much" (*ACKR*, p. 117). Speech at the Chinese Embassy, September 30, 1960: "As is known, the regular session of the United Nations Organization has opened in New York and its proceedings are continuing. There, the Chairman of the Government of the People's Republic and Albania, Comrade Mehmet Shehu, expressed the will of the Albanian people, of our Party and our Government for the preservation of peace in the world. He condemned colonialism. Comrade Mehmet Shehu defended China and insistently demanded that it be admitted to the United Nations Organization and the Chiang Kai-Shek puppet regime be ousted . . ." (*ACKR*, p. 126). Radiogram to Shehu in New York: "Fiqret and the children are well. I embrace you and we are eagerly awaiting your return" (*ACKR*, p. 142). Radiogram to Shehu in New York, October 6, 1960: "I called on your mother again today and gave her the news of your return" (*ACKR*, p. 143). In *Kur lindi Partia* (When the Party Was Born) (IMLSCC, Tirana, 1981, p. 426), Hoxha writes that he cried when he heard that Shehu's mother had died.

7. That a split and liberal Marxist-Leninist party ceases to exist as such is made clear by Hoxha himself: "The Marxist-Leninist party . . . is not a party of words, but a party of revolutionary action. If its members are not engaged in concrete actions and struggle it will not be a genuine Marxist-Leninist party, but a Marxist-Leninist party only in name. At given moments such a party will certainly be split into different factions, will have many lines which will coexist, and it will be turned into a liberal opportunist and revisionist party" (E. Hoxha, *Eurocommunism is Anticommunism*. IMLSCC, Tirana, 1980, p. 258).

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What is class, according to Marxism? It is a basically economic concept, defined by the possession of the means of production and the human relations resulting therefrom. Capitalism is a social system in which the means of production are owned by a class, the bourgeoisie, which exploits the rest of the society. Socialism abolishes the bourgeois system by expropriating capitalists and constituting itself into a proletarian state in the form of a dictatorship. This has in fact occurred in Albania, where the means of production are owned and supervised by a state that is entirely controlled by the Party. Such being the situation, does it make sense to maintain, as Hoxha does, that an engagement can become a propellant for reversing a historical process that has long taken place? It is more than a third of a century since the Party wiped out all possible opposition from the privileged classes and groups of old. These people may well resent the Party for having expropriated and humiliated them. Yet in the 99.99% police nation that is Albania today (as measured by poll statistics), they cannot even express their resentment, except perhaps in their dreams. Raising the ghost of their return to power will fool no one. For ever since they were liquidated, the opponents have been dissident Party members. The splits in the Party have all occurred because of a power struggle among Party leaders. The official *History of the Party of Labour of Albania* presents that power struggle in the guise of ideological conflicts between Hoxha's pure Marxism-Leninism and the deviationism-revisionism of his opponents. Yet nowhere in that text, which could not have been written without the approval of the First Secretary of the Party, does one come across a single case in which family relations concerning Party leaders caused crises such as the one Hoxha portrays in his book. His argument is indeed an offense to the Party. For only a rotten party can be split by an engagement, albeit the engagement of a communist prince to a modern Cinderella. Hoxha's saying qualifies for a collection of proverbial jokes.

The French edition of the *History of the Party of Labour of Albania* contains a chapter on Hoxha as a theoretician of Marxism. The authors analyze various revisionistic outgrowths — Titoism, Soviet social-imperialism, Maoism, Euro-communism — as described by Hoxha in his works. Yet Hoxha never defines his own brand of socialism, except negatively, i.e., by rejecting all other existing variants. He lumps them together under the common denominator of revisionism, while remaining silent about his own revisionism for good reason: his isolationist and utterly nationalistic Marxism-Leninism is in flagrant contradiction to two main tenets of Marxism, socialist solidarity and proletarian internationalism. He was in the process of writing *The Titoites* when the French edition of the *History* of the Party appeared.[8] I shall supply my own analysis of Hoxha's latest work, limiting myself to its epilogue, where theory comes out strongest.

Hoxha has enriched Marxism-Leninism with a most original and indeed very modern doctrine concerning strategy. The author's thesis is that Shehu wanted to split and liberalize the Party by having his son marry a woman of a declassed family related to war criminals. Shehu's first move was to "arrange" their engagement, which was bound to "cause a sensation." And this, in turn, "would lead to splits and liberalism" in the Party, if accepted by it. If not, Shehu's political career would be doomed. But this would still "cause a sensation," which the Yugoslavs would then use to discredit the PLA and especially Hoxha for his Stalinists methods.

The either/or argument revolves around the concept of sensation. If Shehu succeeded, this would be because of his ability to "attract the attention of the public" by means of an engagement "causing a sensation." If he failed, this would be because of

8. *Histoire du Parti du Travail de l'Albanie.* Institut des Études Marxistes-Léninistes près le Comité Central du Parti du Travail d'Albanie Tirana, 1982.

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the Party's action to forestall his planned sensation, leaving him with the surrogate satisfaction of seeing his failure made into a sensation by his patrons. Sensation works both ways within a conceptual frame that can be described as causative attraction. In the first alternative, we are faced with a chain reaction set in motion by an engagement endowed with magic. The chain is composed of several links: engagement attracting public attention causing sensation leading to Party splits involving liberalism resulting in Party liquidation. Is the reader getting dizzy from the chain reaction? Let me explain how the theory works in practice.

A young and beautiful couple are naturally attractive, though not necessarily sensational. "To attract the attention of the public," the couple need a striking setting. A picture advertising a new brand of car with a young couple in bathing suits can serve as an illustration. Such a picture per se is not particularly striking and can hardly "cause a sensation." For the latter to occur, the persons in the picture must be unusual: he might be a well-known public figure, and she, a beauty queen. Now, have this picture published in a prestigious magazine. It certainly will cause a sensation and many people will rush to buy the car. This, of course, is capitalist practice. Hoxha is applying to the PLA a capitalist pattern, which he traces back to Shehu's capitalist mind. Shehu's stratagem to have his son marry a woman carrying in her blood the degenerate genes of war criminals become U.S. citizens bears, of course, a CIA stamp. The moment the picture of the newly-weds would appear in Albanian magazines (Shehu would see to that) the radiance of the couple would reflect upon him, thus bringing to an end Hoxha's long monopoly as a public and publicity figure.[9] The newspapers and magazines of the capitalist world, including, of course, Yugoslavia, would widely publicize the picture, thus helping their agent obfuscate the figure of his rival.

The trouble with Hoxha's theoretical jewel is that it contradicts the narrative in which it is set. He does not tell when the engagement took place and when it was broken off. But even if it did not last long, due to the prompt intervention of the Party, it occurred anyway. The question arises: How it is that such a sensational event was not even mentioned in the capitalist press, which thrives, as is well known, on sensations? Hoxha himself tells us that "Shehu arranged the engagement . . . with the aim of attracting public attention and causing a sensation." If so, one would expect Shehu to have communicated the sensational news to his patrons, the CIA and the UDB, which would have been only too glad to spread it. The news could have been easily transmitted by Shehu's wife, Fiqret Shehu, who, Hoxha writes, consulted various CIA representatives during her European trip. He also writes that Feçor Shehu, Minister of the Interior, was in close touch with the Yugoslav Embassy in Tirana. Was it not in the interest of the Yugoslavs to let the world know that Hoxha and Shehu had clashed on a question directly regarding Shehu's family? Hoxha himself states that the Yugoslavs "would use" the sensational news of Shehu's political disgrace, "as they needed it for their propaganda purposes to discredit the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania and especially Enver Hoxha." In the same way they would, one thinks, use the split caused by the engagement, featuring, say, a one-act play on the wranglings in the Politburo about that paramount ideological issue, with Hoxha riding the horse of his causative attraction theory and Shehu responding with a volley of darts.

9. Chapter 2 of Kadare's *The Great Winter* contains an episode that illustrates Hoxha's role as a publicity figure. The editor-in-chief of the journal for which the journalists works, dissatisfied with a series of pictures figuring Hoxha among women workers, has the head of the photography laboratory look for another picture that is to be printed in the journal. The head wonders why, the development of the film having been faultless. The journalist provides the answer: "Perhaps we should look for a shot where Comrade Hoxha is seen somewhat smiling" (p. 32).

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If anything stands out clearly in what Hoxha tells us in his narrative, it is the exact opposite of what he writes, i.e., that Shehu did not want to attract public attention and cause a sensation. It is Hoxha himself who, with a spectacular piece of news about a plot against him under the cover of a romantic engagement, has managed to attract public attention and cause a sensation through reports in the international press.

What the author has to say in his memoirs is certainly more credible as fiction. Perhaps he should write fiction to be credible at all. From memoirs such as his to historical novels such as Kadare's the distance is short. Yet Hoxha's real vocation seems to be writing detective stories. The epilogue in question reads well as such; witness the following excerpts (pp. 625-27): "On the eve of the meeting of the Political Bureau, at which the grave political mistake [the engagement] was to be discussed, the Yugoslav Embassy in Tirana, acting on orders which it had received from Belgrade, sent its agent and contact man Feçor Shehu to Mehmet Shehu to transmit the "ultimatum" of the UDB that "Enver Hoxha must be killed at all costs, even in the meeting, even if Mehmet Shehu himself is killed." So hard-pressured were the UDB, the Great-Serb and Titoite clique with the situation in Kosova, so gloomy seemed the future, that they decided to "destroy" their trump card, their superagent, provided only that something spectacular would occur which would shake socialist Albania and the Party of Labor of Albania to their foundations"! At ten o'clock at night, on December 16, 1981, Feçor Shehu went to Mehmet Shehu's home and transmitted the order of their secret center. On December 17, the discussion commenced in the meeting of the Political Bureau. All comrades, old and new, took part in the discussion, and resolutely condemned Mehmut Shehu's act of engaging his son to a girl in whose family there were 6 or 7 war criminals . . . At the end of the discussion on the first day, I said to Mehmet Shehu: "Reflect deeply all night and tomorrow tell us in the Political Bureau from what motives you have proceeded. Your alibi for the engagement does not hold water, something else has impelled you in this reprehensible act." What I said alarmed Mehmet Shehu, he suspected that the crime he was preparing might have been discovered . . . Apparently he judged matters in this way: "I am as good as dead, the best thing is to save what I can," and he decided to act like his friend Nako Spiru, to kill himself, thinking the Party would bury this 'statesman,' this 'legendary leader,' this 'partisan and fighter in Spain' with honours . . . Together with his wife he flushed the poison down the WC . . . Fiqret Shehu, as the agent she was (she who trembled and wept over nothing), agreed to the suicide of her husband cooly and cynically, provided only that their 'historic' past and she and her sons were saved. However, they had reckoned their account without the innkeeper. As soon as they informed me about Mehmet Shehu's final act, within moments I proposed that his suicide be condemned, that he had acted as an enemy, and the Political Bureau expressed its unanimous condemnation of the act of this enemy . . . He was buried like a dog."[10]

I shall spare the reader comments on this diatribe, the language of a mind run amok with insatiable revenge. A trial following the unprecedented purge might reveal more details such as those just read, but not the truth of what happened. The bolshevik leaders who were publicly tried by Stalin in the thirties confessed of having been traitors to the Party and even agents of imperialist countries. They did so to spare themselves further torture and to save their families. Saving her sons is a phrase Hoxha attributes to Fiqret Shehu in the cited excerpts. Family ties continue to be strong in socialist Albania, despite the Party's efforts to have family cohesion superseded by

10. This sentence, expunged from the English edition, is found in the Albanian edition of the volume: *"u fut në dhe si qen . . . (Titistët.* IMLSCC, Tirana, 1982, p. 578).

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Party loyalty. Because of family ties, when a person commits a Party crime, his or her family shares the consequences. The sins of the fathers are visited on their children, as in biblical times. Persecution that reaches this point takes on a tribal character, similar to the vendetta once practiced by North-Albanian tribes. First exercised against reactionary and declassed families, revenge, grown into a habit, shifted over to comrades and their families. A case in point is Hoxha's revenge against Shehu. The dictator's rage does not stop at his target, but from an individual extends to his family and from his family to his kinfolk, constrictor-like. Such emphasis laid on kinship in matters regarding the Party degrades the latter — one is reminded of Engels' words about "the decisive role that kinship plays in the social order of all peoples in the state of savagery and barbarism."[11]

One must add, to be fair to savages and barbarians, that their vendetta is less cruel by far than a Stalinist vendetta. They kill, but they do not torture. In a Stalinist regime, invidious revenge tends to nestle in that sector of the Party which performs police functions, the Security apparatus. When Albania recovered its independence, the dreadful Albanian Security became the fief of Koçi Xoxe, Organizational Secretary of the Party and Minister of the Interior. After Xoxe's demise, the Minister of the Interior became Mehmet Shehu. Under his leadership, the Security apparatus was instrumental in ruthlessly enforcing the Party's collectivization policy. When Shehu moved to the Premiership, the previous position was assumed by Kadri Hazbiu, his brother-in-law. And when Hazbiu became Minister of Defense, the key position was occupied by Feçor Shehu, Mehmet's nephew. Now, in record time, the clan has been purged by methods similar to those used by Stalin. Hoxha eliminated Malëshova in alliance with Xoxe, and sold out Spiru to Xoxe when the latter controlled the Party, demanding Spiru's head. And when the break between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union occurred, Hoxha allied himself with Shehu to purge Xoxe. The subsequent Party purges were carried out for Hoxha by Shehu, and later by Shehu's man, Hazbiu. Now the eliminators have been eliminated, the "innkeeper" need no longer fear a rival, Albania is all his, he shares power with none. Just like Stalin.

From 1948, when Xoxe fell from power, until 1982, when Hoxha clashed with Shehu, the two together ruled socialist Albania. But, whereas Shehu concentrated his efforts on consolidating his grip on the state machine through the Security network, the more clever Hoxha devoted his energies to building a cult around his person. He achieved that aim through his charisma, his oratorial skill, his French manners, and last but not least, his photogenic looks. Opportunistic and servile writers and artists helped create a halo around his figure. In his old age, he has produced a corpus of literary works in which he appears as historian of the PLA, a memorialist, and chief ideologist of Albanian Marxism-Leninism. His ambition is to secure a seat in the Pantheon of Marxism-Leninism, alongside Stalin and Mao. He certainly will be remembered, and not only for his theory of causative attraction.

Arshi Pipa

11. *Origin of Family, Private Property and State,* chapter on "The Family" (2nd paragraph).

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Helmut Dubiel, *Theory and Politics,* translated by Benjamin Gregg (MIT Press: Boston, 1984).

Despite numerous obituaries to the contrary, Critical Theory, now half a century old, is still very much alive. The historical context in which the Frankfurt Circle worked has of course changed radically, as have forms of philosophy and social science. Hence no one can be surprised to find that the classical Frankfurt texts no longer shed direct light on contemporary society. Yet the various reconstructions of this tradition's potential for new social theory save it from the fate proclaimed for it by the necrologists. *Theory and Politics* exemplifies this most recent type of scholarship. It neither consigns the Frankfurt tradition to a past of questionable relevance, nor reverently celebrates it in an overly selective interpretation. Precisely by taking account of Critical Theory's breadth and internal complexity, *Theory and Politics* seeks to renew the tradition it represents so as to win from it new perspectives and methodologies for the analysis of modern western society.

This tradition began in the 1930s as a direct response to what it diagnosed as the twin crises of 'bourgeois' and Marxist science. Its program for an "interdisciplinary materialism" was nothing less than the ambitious attempt to resolve both. The first crisis referred to the apparently splintered state of modern scholarship, to the existence of a multiplicity of isolated disciplines. The recent history of science confirms this view; this history has seen the continual, ever more rapid differentiation of new, more specialized fields out of existing ones. As scholarship becomes increasingly differentiated it also becomes increasingly independent, in terms of identity and standards, from such other constitutive spheres of society as the economy, law, the life-world-and politics. The political autonomy of modern scholarship is ambivalent. While tending to free the process of science's development from foreign elements, autonomy equally makes possible scholarship's external instrumentalization as a blind but useful consultant to politics. Conscious of this, early Critical Theory called for a more socially oriented form of scholarship, for resistance to the political mobilization of research results and scholars' social recognition. It appealed for an explicit and independent stand on political and social issues of the day, and envisaged scholarship as a progressive moment within the consciousness of the very society it studied.

The crisis of Marxist scholarship referred to what was seen as orthodox Marxism's objectivist one-dimensionality, in other words its inadequate appreciation of the more subjective determinants of social reality. Early Critical Theory sought to refine materialist political economy by introducing into it a psychoanalytic dimension. An analytically oriented, materialistically based social psychology, by according appreciably greater significance than orthodox theory to the super-structure, would thereby relativize Marx' thesis of the primacy of the economic base and the superstructure's one-way dependence upon it. The project for a social psychology formed the paradigmatic core of early Critical Theory and offered potential for answering a great number of interdisciplinary questions — even in subject matters only remotely related to psychology.

The history of the reception of the Frankfurt tradition reflects this tension between the two fundamental questions of early Critical Theory — of the realtion of theory to politics and of philosophy to social science. Critical Theory initially sought their enlightened mediation, but by the 1940s politics for the Furnkfurt Circle had disappeared behind theory just as social science had disappeared behind philosophy. Nearly thirty years later early Critical Theory was perceived as a call for and perhaps even a guide to emancipation from the ills of late-capitalist mass-society. A decade

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thereafter it has survived only as the splintered fragments of a de-historicized whole, with this or that sliver being appropriated by the various disciplines.

In the 1930s and '40s Critical Theory was understood as a necessarily esoteric theory whose wisdom could be decoded only be a few isolated individuals. Ironically, it achieved a certain popularity in the '60s and '70s in the wake of several different phases of reception. The German student movement re-discovered the lost continent of the *Zeitschrift für Socialforschung* (the theoretical organ of the Institute for Social Research), and introduced early Critical Theory into contemporary social consciousness. Its fate in the hands of the students reflected the consequences of young West German intellectuals' belated need to come to terms with Germany's National Socialist past, repressed for twenty years through the silence of parents and schools. They read Critical Theory with hunger, raised it to a myth, and then, not finding in it a practical guide for direct political action, rejected it outright. The subsequent path from Marcuse to Marx lost itself in a no-man's-land of endlessly sectarian Marx exegeses, but by the mid '70s a new and more sober interest in Critical Theory had established itself. Curiously, this re-orientation began not so much in West Germany as far beyond its borders, in the USA where, thirty years earlier, the Frankfurt Institute had sought refuge from the Nazis.

The new intellectual Left in America, long searching for its own theoretical identity, has been incapable of recovering and elaborating the critical potential of its native tradition. Since the early 1970s it has been occupied with critical, West European Marxist thought, either with phenomenological Marxism or the Frankfurt tradition. This, together with the theoretical dead-end route taken by much of the European student movement, explains in part why the first, semi-official history of the Frankfurt School appeared in the USA,[1] as did the first attempt to sketch out the systematic unity of Habermas' thought and to provide a comprehensive overview of his theory-in-progress.[2] Critical Theory has always been read differently in America than in Europe. In a country whose culture, daily life and everyday consciousness in less politicized (or perhaps: less marked by a political consciousness) than Europe's, the tendency to consider the political perspectives implied by a given theory, or to adopt the political sensibilities of the context in which a particular theory first developed, is slighter. The tendency to understand theories in purely immanent terms is conversely, greater. Thus when Jay's history was re-imported to Germany its translators remarked that, whereas the American author could read such Frankfurt texts as *Autoritärer Staat* or *Dämmerung* 'simply' as perspectives on the Fascist past, the contemporary German reader would be reminded of various politically repressive developments in the Federal Republic.[3]

The subsequent reception of Critical Theory on both sides of the Atlantic, while no longer colored by the strong passions of the student movement, was nonetheless overly selective and thematically constricted. Either the theory's philosophical base was considered without regard to its application in various social sciences, or else the material studies were taken in isolation from the philosophical foundation which unified them. This necessarily precluded any appreciation of Critical Theory's original project as formulated by Horkheimer: a systematic analysis of contemporary society

1. Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination. A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950.* (Boston, 1973).

2. Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978).

3. Hanne Herkommer and Bodo von Greiff, "Die Aktualität der Geschichte der Frankfurter Schule," in: Martin Jay, *Dialektische Phantasie.* (Frankfurt, a.M., 1976).

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based in social philosophy and practiced in interdisciplinary research. It equally precluded renewed efforts to develop a truly interdisciplinary social science. Critical Theory, thus divorced from the social, historical and cultural context of its origins and robbed of its systematic perspective, dissolved once again into its disiecta membra of *Kulturkritik* and social science. Either it has survived as a recent curiosity in philosophy and literary criticism or else it has found a fragmented, rather faceless presence in sociology and political science. Early Critical Theory diagnosed the crisis of scholarship as a chronically narrow, single-discipline analysis incapable of appreciating the whole of the phenomenon to be studied. Ironically, nearly half a century later that same sickness afflicted the very theory which claimed to be the remedy.

It is against this background that Dubiel's book must be seen. His was the first among several studies to effect a significant turn in the examination and reconstruction of Critical Theory.[4] This turn ushered in an appreciable improvement in research on the Frankfurt tradition, as scholars began to distinguish between early and later Critical Theory, and to focus increased attention on the previously neglected early phase of the 1930s. Critical debates on the Frankfurt tradition have since been undertaken with a greater view to programmatic and systematic considerations. An extensive literature has developed giving a comprehensive overview of the traditions's political context *as well as* of its great disciplinary breadth, shedding light on the Circle's research practices *and* on the political motivation behind many of the twists and turns in the theory's evolution. *Theory and Politics* paved the way for these developments.

Yet the multiple controversies in the interpretation of Critical Theory have hardly been resolved. If anything, interpretations have become polarized around two broad lines of reception. On the one hand we have the project for an "interdisciplinary materialism," for the reconstruction of Critical Thoery's original program: the integration of the fragmented ensemble of social sciences. This project seeks to save Marxism by making it more 'scientific,' by revising it in light of developments in various relevant disciplines. Such faith in the possibility of an ambitious new methodology is countered by an equally influential, thoroughly pessimistic line of reception. It is nothing less than a full-bodied renaissance of the negativistic *Geschichtsphilosophie* which Critical Theory had become by the early 1940s. The optimism characterizing the first line of reception, convinced of the possibility of progress through scientific research and the application of human reason, is here abandoned in favor of an anti-modernist, culturally pessimistic critique of rationality. It picks up on the scepticism which in recent years has become manifest in parts of society toward science and scholarship in general, a scepticism which questions not simply the value of particular theories but casts doubt on the emancipatory claim of rationality in general. Yet the roots of this critique are older; it is based on a re-discovery of Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment.* Written in American exile in the 1940s, the *Dialectic* traces Fascism back to man's domination of nature since time primordial and decries reason as essentially instrumental. Wholly oriented toward the subject, this second line of current interpretation claims to draw its cognitive force from individual suffering, its emancipatory potential from aesthetic experience. Certain motifs of later Critical Theory reveal here a surprising if not unsettling proximity to Nietzsche and to such poststructuralists as Michel Foucault.

4. Most notably: David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory. Horkheimer to Habermas.* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980). Susan Buck-Morss, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and The Frankfurt Institute* (Hassocks, Sussex, 1977). Gillian Rose, *The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno,* (London, 1978). Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, eds., *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader.* (Oxford, 1978).

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These two lines cannot be played off against each other as though they were completely incompatible. In a sense they reflect the two 'halves' of the original Critical program. Whereas the project for an "interdisciplinary materialism" reaffirms the original solution to the crisis of Marxist scholarship, the negativistic *Geschichtsphilosophie* proclaims the impossibility of the solution proposed for the crisis of 'bourgeois' science. Insofar as it reproduces this dichotomy, *Theory and Politics* reflects the current state of affairs; it is not so much one book as two case-studies wholly different in method and matter. Concerned with the effects of a scholar's political experiences on his research, the first study traces the *historical* as well as the theory-immanent fate of an interdisciplinary porject for a new social analysis. The second study reconstructs the *methodology* upon which this project was based. Each study complements the other.

Theory and Politics, in addressing the present dilemma of Critical Theory, may be read as something of a prolegomenon for research in the 1980s. For the aporetic nature of Critical Theory's journey itself demonstrates the necessity of returning to the tradition's original project. The on-going attempts to devlop a new social paradigm, having returned to this project, is then faced by the task of overcoming its substantial deficiencies.

In the first essay, *Integration of the Proletariat and the Loneliness of the Intelligentsia,* Dubiel contends that certain contemporary historical and political events constitutively influenced Critical Theory's evolution between 1930 and 1945. He reads the *historical* continuity of the tradition's development precisely in terms of the theorists' social and political experiences. Their impact upon their work was so significant that the twists and turns in the theory's development may be viewed as the consequences of the theorists' reflections on their successive historical venues: the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich (and, vicariously, Stalinist Russia), American exile. Critical Theory has as much a political biography as the men who evolved it. Dubiel also contends that the theory's composition itself indicates that each of its various contributors worked interdependently. Conclusion: the story of Critical Theory cannot be told in terms of the fates of individual men, but only as the fate of a collective subject — the Institute for Social Research. Dubiel thereby contradicts the atomistic pattern of the standard Frankfurt Circle interpretation, the assumption, namely, that the Critical Theory tradition is coherent solely in terms of the respective biographies of each of the various individuals involved. No procedure is without its price, and Dubiel's must forfeit certain sensibilities. For example, whereas the early Horkheimer's thought was thoroughly methodical, Adorno's was always vehemently anti-systematic; yet in Dubiel this tension tends to disappear behind Horkheimer's program.

This holistic perspective allows two fundamental characteristics of the program to emerge: its eclecticism, and the deeply historical nature of its conclusions. Dubiel, true to Critical Theory's own materialist spirit of viewing ideas historically and in terms of their social context, approaches the material from the historian's distancing perspective. A distancing procedure is the mark of self-reflexive scholarship. In other words, by distinguishing its own aims and self-understanding from the qualities and self-understanding of its object, such scholarship may avoid the danger of either hypostatizing its object or of projecting onto it external concerns and perspectives. By not assuming any immanent standpoint, Dubiel reveals diverse themes, theories and methods of the tradition to be the fragments of a somewhat eclectically assembled theoretical whole. Precisely this eclecticism implies a certain inadequacy in the Institute's interdisciplinary methodology, to the extent that these diverse parts failed to form the intended systematic building-blocks of a self-correcting social theory. The sought-after organic interdisciplinarity was never really achieved. As we will presently

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consider, perhaps it never could have been.

The second characteristic has more the quality of human drama. If, as Dubiel maintains, the Critical Theorists consistently took their social and political experiences into account as they formulated and revised their theory, then the altogether pessimistic conclusions untimately reached reflect not so much theoretical findings as historical contingencies. This is the tale of scholars attempting (at least within the realm of theory) to answer the Enlightenment's call for humankind to make its own history with will and consciousness, yet increasingly convinced that they are in fact not the conscious makers of history but, as ever, its passive objects and victims. While theory may call for emancipation, experience would seem to teach the impossibility of heeding the call.

Dubiel's method in this first essay is unreserved systematization. He is willing to go to the point of heuristic exaggeration in order to achieve what in Germany today is known as 'stylization.' This methodology 'stylizes' research matter in the sense of so arranging it as to achieve a specific configuration, to suggest a certain interpretation which comprehends the mass of material in a particular, coherent and meaningful whole. Any given configuration is always understood as one alternative among others. In this sense stylization represents trial or experiment, asking: what may be won from arranging research material in one particular constellation instead of another? The author's aims are clear, yet without claiming any positivist or objectivist legitimation for them. It is not his intention to speak the last word on early Critical Theory but to suggest a particular arrangement useful for understanding certain aspects of this tradition.

He co-ordinates a mass of philosophical, political and historical material, drawn from the years 1930 to 1945, in two directions: in the horizontal dimension of time (roughly three periods) and the vertical one of subject matter (nine areas). The resulting image formed by this mosaic is that of a negativistic *Geschichtsphilosophie.* This is the negativism of a radical rejection of the special sciences, of political philosophy, indeed of discursive thought; it is the flight into esoteria where late Critical Theory sought what it took to be the few remaining embers of reason. This is a philosophy born not only of theoretical speculation but also and substantially of historical experience: of the proletariat's complete integration into capitalist domination; the failure of Soviet socialism; the continuum between Weimar's late-capitalism and Hitler's state-capitalism; emancipatory theory's loss of addressee, carrier and traditional identity; the seeming victory of irrationalism over reason and of mysticism over scholarship; the apparent futility of praxis. Although differing significantly from each other, the individual positions reached by the various critical theorists by 1940 were equally disastrous for social research, as no scholar can live with the aporia of a self-negating philosophy. In other words, research is not possible on the basis of a philosophy which claims that all scholarship, indeed rational thought in general, is, at least under current social and historical conditions, thoroughly and unavoidably ideological. We find that Critical Theory by 1940 can no longer base itself on any kind of empirical, or even simply discursive analysis of society. The *Dialectic of Enlightenment* demonstrates the necessity of going behind the dialectic of enlightenment. To do this is to return to Critical Theory's original idea, one animated by a conviction in the real possibility of emancipation — to the project for an "interdisciplinary materialism."[5]

In his second essay, *Theory of Dialectical Representation and Interdisciplinary Research,* Dubiel does precisely this. To be properly appreciated as an example of a current

5. Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Frankfurt a.M., 1981), Vol. 2, 554 ff.

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genre of literature on Critical Theory, it must be viewed in the context of contemporary research by some of the 'third generation' of Critical Theorists. These men and women, born after World War Two and coming of scholarly age in the '70s, are now re-examining the Frankfurt Institute's early social research program, seeking to identify and exploit its potential for a new interdisciplinary methodology. Here they are joined in part by Jürgen Habermas, clearly the most significant member of Critical Theory's second generation. In his recently published *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* Habermas situates his communicative-action-theory of the modern era within the context of "interdisciplinary materialism."

The heart of the matter is Horkheimer's program for 'materialist' social research on the basis of what he termed 'dialectical representation.' It represents his response to what he diagnosed as modern scholarship's three most serious defects. First: extreme specialization, the differentiation of new fields out of existing ones, and a strict division between disciplines — i.e., the crisis of 'bourgeois' scholarship discussed earlier — has lead to the unmediated co-existence of philosophical theory and empirical science.[6] Since philosophy alone can give to analytic research-results the larger, cultural meaning which guides the human interest in knowledge and understanding, and since it can provide the political orientation which science lacks, empirical science without philosophy is in this sense blind. The second deficiency derives from the fact that each discipline has a research perspective and approach peculiar to itself. This implies the constraining selectivity of any given special science which, a priori, must circumscribe the explanatory power of each. Third, analytic theory-construction assumes that complex phenomena are merely the relations between serially organized details. It therefore arranges the results of the various disciplines merely additively, in terms of a pre-defined perspective external to these disciplines and their results, Yet for Horkheimer complex phenomena are organically related to each other; in interdisciplinary scholarship the research results of the disciplines must be immanently and integrally brought together.

The theory of dialectical representation, which formed the organizational basis for the Institute's collective efforts, was designed to meet these problems. Based on a reconstruction of Marxist and Hegelian dialectics, "dialectical representation" synthesizes the research results of the special sciences into an integrated picture of social reality. According to the epistemological principle of "concrete totality" an object is not adequately perceivd if perceived as an isolated object. Rather, it must be seen in terms of the totality given, at least latently, together with the object. Hence society is to be grasped as the totality of social relations in all their contradictions, yet nonetheless as a coherent whole. This perspective should lend a representational and orienting value to analytical concepts and empirical findings which they by themselves do not possess.

"Dialectical representation" is based on the Marxist thesis of the dialectic of research and 'representation' *(Darstellung)*. Marxism sees this dialectic as the relation between analysis in the disciplines and philosophical construction, i.e. between detailed differentiations of aspects of the research object, on the one hand, and a concern with

6. 'Philosophy' here meant Historical Materialism, understood as Marx' theory of the necessary course of history and taking as its paradigm and normative foundation Marx' critique of political economy; 'empirical science' meant above all social psychology, economics and history. Horkheimer's program does not itself furnish the criteria governing the choice of the particular social-scientific disciplines to be synthesized with one another and with philosophy. They would seem to follow from a certain combination of Freud and Marx which, broadly speaking, "interdisciplinary materialism" may be seen to represent.

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the whole of the object and its context, on the other. A problem is first broken down into partial analyses (according to a variety of disciplines) to be developed by persons performing research roles. Several elements of the ensemble of partial analyses are then synthesized into an integrated perspective (in terms of which new questions are formulated) by people performing the role of 'representation.' Third, this integrating perspective is re-connected with the research methods and techniques of the special sciences (so as to guarantee that the new, interdisciplinary perspective does not make itself autonomous vis-à-vis the special sciences, that it does not become philosophically independent of these disciplines. These steps are repeated until a highly complex theoretical structure emerges.

Dubiel's study, in working out some of the project's central problems, offers a useful point of departure for reconstructing Critical Theory's original paradigm. For this paradigm may be productively recovered and further developed only when its immanent aporia have been identified and resolved. Dubiel spells out the logic of "interdisciplinary materialism" even more precisely than Horkheimer had, yet this is still insufficient to clear up the fatal vagueness of central aspects of Horkheimer's program. Dubiel notes that the relevant texts by Horkheimer provide no answer as to the 'how' of dialectical construction, or as to the 'how' of 'representation' of empirical research-findings. He points out the obscurity in the programmatic mediation between a given problem's philosophical formulation and its restatement in terms of empirical science. And he shows that the Circle's research methodology — totality as an operative category — was at most implicit in the individual studies, but not constitutive, and that the studies were integrated by means of just external labeling.

We may add three further problems to those identified by Dubiel. First, Horkheimer's methodology was itself guilty of what was described as a major defect of 'bourgeois' interdisciplinarity: the mere additive arrangement of the various empirical results. Horkheimer's sythesis of disciplines boils down to nothing more than a merely external integration: scholars of different disciplines, working communally, yet each within the methodology of his particular discipline — working within a common orientation, yet one given from a perspective external to the particular disciplines. This was scarcely the organic integration sought by dialectical synthesis. Hence the supra-methodology represented by "interdisciplinary materialism" could never transcend the particular methodologies of the various assembled disciplines.

Second, Horkheimer's methodology could not overcome the immanent shortcomings of these special-scientific methodologies. Although he maintained that any particular discipline suffered from its own constricting method (constraining vis-à-vis the totality of the phenomenon to be studied), his own use of these disciplines suggests that, in practice, he considered them not as deficient tools but as value-free, neutral instruments which as such could not infect the supposed 'materialist' quality of the alleged alternative methodology. His naive assumption would seem to have been that methodologies, once placed within an interdisciplinary research-process, are somehow changed, their inadequacies somehow overcome. Yet if each of the particular methodologies are themselves overly selective, then their collection into a group would hardly render any one of them less so.

Finally, Horkheimer's program could not achieve the sought-after reciprocity between philosophy and empirical research. Dubiel points out that in the case of the *Studies on Authority and Family* — the single study in a narrower sense in which the program of integrating philosophical theory and empirical research was actually tested in a collective project — the degree to which empirical research was influenced by theory

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(in terms of organization and evaluation technique) was far greater than the degree to which theoretical consequences were drawn from the empirical findings. He further observes that the empirical information provided by individual studies and by reports on the current literature were not systematically integrated into theory-construction beyond the consideration given in the theoretical section to specific points. This suggests that even in the Frankfurt Circle's interdisciplinary phase — i.e. even before the totalization of ideology critique and complete rejection of social science — the philosophical side of the joint-venture enjoyed a built-in prerogative vis-à-vis the social-scientific side. (To this extent, at least, the claim to a materialist status was not satisfied.) Such authority easily follows from philosophy's function in the Frankfurt Institute as a kind of court of highest appeals. In a Kantian manner, philosophy began the research process by selecting and defining the problem, and it culminated and closed each study by integrating or synthesizing the results of the various social-scientific investigations. But the prerogative may also have to do with the empirical fact that, although related to each other as mutually influencing stages of a process, research and 'representation' merely separated in actual procedure as roles assumed by different individuals within a division of labor. Moreover Horkheimer, who exercised something of a constitutional dictatorship over the Institute, claimed the role of 'representation' for himself, while his colleagues were assigned the research role of providing material from various disciplines. And the 'representation' role, it will be recalled, was the task of the philosopher.

This quite optimistic program for a new social analysis ran into difficulties in practical research and was silently abandoned at the end of the 1930s. Hence it never really got beyond the project-state. This was due in part to *institutional* shortcomings — for example the Director's failure to realize that theoretical developments in the special sciences were no longer initiated by philosophy, but by the various disciplines themselves; in part to disruptive *historical* contingencies, such as the traumatic experiences of National Socialism, anti-semitism and exile; and in part to *immanent* epistemological and methodological difficulties. Dubiel's book, in outlining these problems and nevertheless advocating a return to the original methodology, raises many constructive issues: Does Critical Theory's first phase indeed offer greater potential than the later period for the on-going project for a new social paradigm? What possibility does this initial period offer for realizing the political claims of the early years — the claims of a theory developed with an explicitly practical intent (as aspect downplayed by Dubiel)? Can the sociological and philosophical 'deficits' of the initial period be resolved and, if at all, within the boundaries of the same tradition? Is it possible to continue in this paradigm without closing horizons? *Theory and Politics* provokes significant questions about the meaning and possibility of returning to the original program for a critical theory of society, questions which remain to be answered.

Benjamin Gregg

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Yvette Biró, *Profane Mythology: The Savage Mind of the Cinema.*, translated from the Hungarian by Imre Goldstein, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982.

As work on the subject proliferates, it becomes increasingly apparent that little of theoretical value will be produced until cineastes abandon their defensive posture over this "bastard child" of the arts. Despite the expectations of early film theorists, film has retained much of its early stigma. Yet, attempts to legitimate the medium are prone to assert its status for serious consideration by claiming for it qualities and powers that no technical medium nor art form can have. Consequently, we are left with too little understanding of the film and its relation to those enchanted by it.

The seventies produced much theory in the "guilty pleasures" category. Film lovers acknowledged the seductive power of film and attempted to distance themselves from it, frequently prescribing ways that film could be made a valuable political tool by being stripped of its emotional aura and so, in a more rationalized manner, laid at the service of knowledge production. To her credit, Biró is a more wholehearted lover of cinema. Yet, just as we partly construct our human love objects and project all manner of special attributes and qualities upon the, so Biró does with her own shadowy love object, the cinema.

Profane Mythology abounds with mistakes and confusions but its importance for a contemporary sociology of film is great. Following earlier neglected contributors to film theory like Balázs,[1] and Münsterberg,[2] Biró revives for consideration questions of film and *naturalism,* argues that the film receiver is *actively* involved in films and, in the most important part of the book. links film to the *need for modern mytholoy.*

The Onion, the Lily and the Soul

For Biró, an essential ingredient of film is its "elemental magic." In the film medium, we are immediately confronted with a paradox: the "magical" nature of the profane. We become fascinated by what the camera reveals in everyday surroundings. The true originality of film, she says, "is that it is *not* an art form": "it is more and also less than art" (p. 3).

Sontag's observation that photography is not an art in itself, but rather "a medium in which works of art (among other things) are made,"[3] is also applicable to film. But such a statement does not take us far enough. Biró's claim has its basis in the uniqueness of

1. B. Balázs, *Theory of the Film: Character and Growth of a New Art*, (Dover Publications: New York, 1970). Besides producing the first systematic and formal theory of cinema published in 1924, *Der sichtbare Mensch oder Die Kultur des Films (The Visible Man, or Film Culture)*, the Hungarian-born Balázs wrote plays, poems, novels and the libreti for Bartok's opera, *Duke Bluebeard's Castle* (1911), and the ballet, *The Prince Carved out of Wood* (1914-16). Working in the early German film industry, he wrote scenarios for *The Adventures of a Ten-Mark Note* (1926), *Narcosis* (1929), and in collaboration with others, worked on Pabst's *Threepenny Opera* (1931). As well as other practical film-work, after the introduction of sound film he wrote *Der Geist des Films (The Spirit of Film)*, published in 1930, and taught film art in various Eastern bloc countries. The present Dover edition of *Theory of the Film* is a republication of the first English edition (1954), translated from the Hungarian of 1948.

2. H. Münsterberg, *The Film: A Psychological Study. The Silent Photoplay in 1916*, (Dover Publications: New York, 1970). The edition cited here is a republication of Münsterberg's *The Photoplay: A Psychological Study*, first published in 1916. For biographical details see Richard Griffith's *Foreward* to the present edition. Here I will only note that having studied under Wundt in Leipzig, Münsterberg eventually worked with James at Harvard. Historically, it is interesting to consider that Münsterberg's little book appeared the same year as D.W. Griffith's *Intolerance* — at the very early stage in the growth of film art.

3. Susan Sontag, *On Photography*, (Penguin Books: New York, 1980), p. 148.

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the new forms of representation opened up through developments in technology. Sontag, after Benjamin, noted the aestheticization of photographs, whatever their subject. We need to confront the same process in film — the seeming "magical" nature of representation of actual people on film screens which can evoke in us such an intense response.[4] Biró opts for the "rawness" of film for an explanation of its power. Her case for film's importance rests largely on the claim that its *naturalism* is its essential strength. And this naturalism, for Biró, goes along with film's *universality*.

"Why is it that in the cinema one cries all the time, or rather bawls like a servant girl?" Thomas Mann asks. "This is raw material, unprocessed, warm and moving, and it affects us like the onion or the lily" (p. 1). Mann's statement encapsulates what for many was a fear about film: that it could powerfully draw out the same very basic emotional or visceral responses in all audiences, reducing viewers to the same level. Others whose approach was more egalitarian viewed this "universalizing" power of film more optimistically, despite some fears about its seductive potential.

When Biró today, however, agrees that film speaks to us "with the unequivocal tones of 'the lily and the onion' " (p.57), she avoids the difficult question of *stylization* in film. This avoidance involves theoretical neglect of both authors and spectators. Though Mann and the servant girl might be affected in the same way by film, this would not always be the case. We come here to the heart of the difficulty in theorizing film reception. Film messages might have the illusion and indeed the potential for being more universal than those of other art forms but they are not necessarily so. We cannot deny stylization in films whether we are speaking of B grade Westerns or Antonioni's very self-conscious works. The *illusion* of unmediated reception may be strongly evoked by many films but this tells us more about film's very particular realtionship to the "illusory" than it does about reception, which is always mediated.

After discussing some presumed effects of Buñuel's *The Exterminating Angel,* Biró invokes Lévi-Strauss: "In the parlance of Lévi-Strauss, processing, the 'well-cooked' state, and creative transformation are ensured here by the exceptionally articulated and aggressive sensory appeal of the 'raw materials'." (p. 111). Sensory appeals, however, ensure nothing. Even if we consider, as opposed to the work of a Buñuel, a seemingly "unmannered" film like Ozu's *Tokyo Story* we encounter problems. *Tokyo Story* has the decidedly "universal" theme of the encounter of elderly parents from the country with the city and their adult children, busy living separate, professional lives in the city. It deals with the joys and tragedy of inevitable proceses of aging, death and separation and other relations which are not inevitable but are negotiated during the course of the drama. Yet, the mode of representation of contact and conflict between family members, where Ozu tries to prevent the selective identification most audiences expect, together with the slow pacing and other forms of coding, often means that his "universal story" does not reach certain audiences. Many viewers are used to entirely different cultural and cinematic conventions.

Some of Biró's arguments on behalf of the film medium are prefigured by Balázs, whose theory of film was a radical humanist one. In *Der sichtbare Mensch,* he had argued for film's ability to make men visible to one another once again. The silent film he hailed as a turning point in our cultural history. Years later, he argued that his work on the silent film was still relevant since, despite the regression which occurred with the coming of sound, the achievements of the silent era would be rediscovered and the *pic-*

4. For a more detailed discussion, see Sontag, *ibid.*, and Walter Benjamin "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations*, Collins/Fontana: London, 1973).

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ture still remained the essence of film.[5] Balázs' claims for film art/technology are always dialectically linked to losses and achievements *in wider social life and history.* Part of his thesis in *Der sichtbare Mensch* is that the discovery of printing gradually rendered illegible the faces of men. Ironically, in the "epoch of word culture the soul learnt to speak but had grown almost invisible."[6] With the advent of film, man became visible again. We would re-learn expressive movement, subtler means of expression. The gesturing of primitive peoples, he noted, was frequently "more varied and expressive than that of the educated European whose vocabulary is infinitely richer."

Neglect of the body as a means of expression meant more than the loss of corporal power of expression. It meant that "that which was to have been expressed was also narrowed down by this neglect."[7] For Balázs, film promised no less than that the "inner man" would now become visible. He was, nevertheless, careful: "But let no one think that I want to bring back the culture of movement and gesture in place of a culture of words, for neither can be a substitute for the other. Without a rational, conceptual culture and the scientific development that goes with it there can be no social and hence no human progress. The connecting tissue of modern society is the word spoken and written, without which all organization and planning would be impossible."[8]

Like Balázs, Biró wishes to resurrect the value of the *whole person.* She is arguing the *validity of the sensuous nature of human communication which conceptual thinking cannot render superfluous.* Like Balázs, and in contrast to some recent theorists who have produced a kind of "ascetic rationalist" strain of left-wing film theory, she wants to argue the importance of the physical and the prosaic as a part of human social life and suggest that film is especially well equipped to communicate in a "sensuous" way. She argues for the unity of different modes of cognition, for "their interdependent and complementary functions" (p. 12), objecting to what she describes as the rigid hierarchy at the top of which conceptual-theoretical thinking is placed while all other mental activity seems to be seen as transitional. She seems to argue against the separation of the emotions and the intellect against the breaking of a unity posited long ago by gestalt theorists.

Unfortunately, Biró herself becomes muddled in her attempt to rescue our "devalued" capacities. She rightly stresses that perception is not a passive process. She then goes on from speaking of "perception" to defend "sensory thought" and "sensory intelligence" in the face of the more highly valued conceptual thought. Borrowing a category from the psychologist Mérei, she introduces the notion of "experience-thought," a mode of thinking not divested of its emotional colouring and not to be regarded as a prelude to logical thinking, but rather as constitutive of adult thinking, having been developed in conjunction with physical actions and capacities as we mature from childhood. She immediately compares this category of human thought to *cinematic expression* and then produces a category of *"film-thought"* (see pp. 14-16). Claims for the complexity of human perception and human thought (though Biró does not distinguish these) are transferred to claims about cinema's "sensory expression" and the *capacities of human consciousness are bestowed upon the film medium.* Biró's "film-thought" is, in fact, our thought and she is posing a false homology between the

5. See particularly chapters 16, 17 and 18 of Balázs, *op. cit.* for his consideration of the problems and possibilities the development of sound film introduced. His prime criticism was of the reversion, through scripted dialogue, to photographed theatre. The triviality of the film actors' audible words could overlay "the human depths of their glances and gestures" (p. 225).

6. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

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cinema's "mind" and that of the receiver. We begin to see things attributed to film (here "thought," later an "avid curiosity," penetrating "intelligence" and an "impersonal attitude") which are attributes of the spectator.

At this point, conflating the spectator's consciousness, perception and thinking, Biró unwittingly enters the old debate between art and theory. In this debate she is on the defensive. For example, she suggests that in cinema, allusion, "reminiscent of mythical or experience-thought" is the most productive and frequently used form of symbolism.

It can be argued, however, that the receiver who experiences the sensuous nature of filmic representations can simultaneously employ the so-called "drier," formal category of thinking. We can think *about* as well as *through* films. When Biró notes that in Bresson's *Une Femme douce,* the emotional colouring is inseparable from the message, she is surely remarking on something about the nature of art and human consciousness, rather than something intrinsic to film.

While the way Biró has formulated the oppositions of different modes of cognition is questionable, it should be noted that she recognizes the potential dangers entailed in her own propaganda on behalf of films — her claims for film in a discussion of Eisenstein are instructive. Such claims are at the centre of present problems in film theory. Eisenstein, she says, ". . . is looking for a mode of depiction that, instead of developing gradually, would reveal the whole of what is to be communicated by means of *sensory recognition*, of sudden exposure. He wants to *produce abstraction out of crude images and simple events.* But every picture-event is a dual-nature. On the one hand, it is extremely 'primitive,' *locking meaning into a single action;* on the other hand, the suggestive and lucid arrangement of the picture-events conveys meanings to us — almost with brutal force — *as a wide, unbroken whole*" (p. 25, my emphasis). Significantly, Biró is referring to some of Eisenstein's plans for filming *Das Kapital.* It was to be expected that Eisenstein was taken up with such fervor by Althusserian film theorists. The notion of film's potential for knowledge production is completely congruent with a film theory which focussed on the production of *meaning* in a way which neglected the *relation* of the product to the receiver, the *viewing dialectic,* and instead tried to "read off" effects from film "texts" themselves.

Long before Eisenstein's recent theoretical disciples turned their attention to him, Balázs, as an admirer, had written: "Eisenstein, who was perhaps the greatest master of sensuous picture effects that transcended the sphere of reason, unfortunately often fell a victim to the mistaken idea that the world of purely conceptual thinking could also be conquered by film art."[9] Biró duplicates the error. Her mistakes are typical of semiotic approaches to film — she too often assumes our understanding of new *images* can be assured. In her discussion of "visual concepts," for example, the visual is inflated into something *in itself* which it cannot be. Any object, she argues, may be "abstract" as long as it is "capable of representing a content beyond itself or expressing something by way of substitution" (p. 46). The abstraction process, however, depends upon relations other than those internal to the film. The capacity to abstract from an object depends upon Biró's active receiver, and objects and cues carefully presented by filmmakers are often more ambiguous than she allows.

In her discussion of "seeing," Biró resurrects important points first raised by theorists of the silent cinema. Seeing, she stresses, is not passive, but a creative and active process. Like so many of our "biological" functions, "seeing" is always cultural, and this fact has important implications for the consideration of the relation of film and variously differentiated viewers.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 128, 129.

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By implication, Biró challenges the Lacanian model of the inscription of the film viewer, stressing the *contextualized* viewing dialectic. "Besides the intensity of light, perception is influenced by a great number of other factors; needs, former experiences, habits, attitudes and prejudices. All these play a role in shaping the final image. We cannot look at a flea or a full moon with pure objectivity any more than we can look at our enemy or a person we love. Perception is not simply a snapshot of the external world but a *composite* image that each of us forms based on *all* the available *inside* and *outside* information" (p. 41). Perception means, she argues, not only the admission of information but its interpretation. Prior knowledge, emotions and needs, rather than exerting a selective influence subsequently, take an active part in the process of perception. Thus perception is also purposeful. These factors must be taken into account when we consider her suggestion: "If the camera is the extension of our eyes, the broadening of our vision, then it is also an *extension of our intellect.* Through the camera not only seeing but also congition has become more *sensitive* and acquired a far wider range. The camera's abilities, therefore, cannot be relegated to the narrow category of technical miracles. Cinema's earliest pioneers understood well that the *film-eye = film-truth;* in other words, the camera — with its boundless appetite, curiosity, and mobility reaching heaven and earth, far and near, inside and outside of everything — not only gathers data of human activity but, out of the sum of the reference points, fragments and signs, creates a world-image, a coherent view. This view is at once a component of and the result of our collective consciousness; its wisdom urges us to think." (p. 39, my emphasis). There are several critical points here. The broadening of our vision by any mechanical medium is possible, but does not necessarily mean an extension of our intellect. For seeing and thinking to be persuasive or enlightening there thas first to be a suitable context for reception. The kind of intellectual work which might result from exposure to film cannot be chartered or guaranteed. Neither film, nor anything else can automatically fulfill such expectations.

I have argued that effects cannot be read off a medium. Cavell[10] rightly notes that a *technical description* of film will *not* give us a *phenomenological account of reception*. Münsterberg, in an attempt to understand the psychology of film reception made a comparison with music: "If we try to understand and to explain the means by which music exerts its powerful effects, we do not reach our goal by describing the structure of the piano and of the violin, or by explaining the physical laws of sound."[11]

We have then, to return to the feeling and thinking subject who views the film and the fact that films are, albeit under drastically different degrees of restriction or autonomy, the creations of thinking/feeling human subjects. We might contrast some of Balazs' discussion of Vertov and the "cine-eye" to Biró's: ". . . fragments of reality can be collated into whatever 'truth' the director chooses to demonstrate by their means. Here the scissors play the poet in good earnest and say: 'Behold! This is life!' These entirely authentic shots of actual reality are the most subjective of all. They have no story but they do have a central figure, a hero. The hero is invisible because his is the one who sees it all out of his 'cine-eye.' . . . [The filmmaker's] subjective self is the constructing principle on which the film is built. However faithfully he has taken his photographs, they are a deliberate selection, a selected world and this world is his own. Such factual films are the most subjective of all films."[12] While this is not the place to

10. Stanley Cavell, *The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film*, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1979).
11. *Op. cit.*, p. 19.
12. *Op. cit.*, pp. 164, 165.

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examine the notion of authorship and film, we can note that Biró refers almost always to the films of "auteurs" and does at one point state that both the narrative and image structure of films are the results of personal selection, "reflections of a subjective articulation of viewpoints" (p. 33). At the same time she can say, in structuralist fashion, that the "elementary fact is the smallest analyzable unit of cinematic expression. Film structure is nothing but a series of elementary facts." (p. 17)

It might be fruitful to keep in mind Balázs' radically humanistic theory of film art to think more about the relation between human subjects and film representations. Biró quotes Kracauer's "Film is the discovery of the miraculous in everyday life" (p. 54). She stresses that "everydayness" is so inevitable a base for film, that even films that seek to deny or surpass it, nevertheless have to start from it. Man and nature tend inevitably to be part of film's raw and processed material. A "barbaric," but important characteristic of film, she argues, is that it "cannot honor the usual hierarchy established between sublime spiritual and more earthly attributes" (p. 55). Unfortunately, she again makes too mechanical a link between everyday life and cinema, which does something (although we are not sure what) with it: she suggests that "true parallels abound between the structure of everyday life and the new medium" (p. 54).

But a little later, in an illuminating key passage, Biró implies the necessity of a more dialectical way of considering the film/viewer relation. Her approach here is fruitful. "Experiencing the various aspects of nature in such abundance has a *near magical effect*: we become aware of the *singularity of things* and realize that the felt occurrence is *never to return again*. Most probably this is the secret of our attraction to the raw and unformed — where we would meet matter *condemned to perish*, and the kind that may not be found in any corner of time, and yet we have managed to capture it, for however short a moment, to touch it, hold it as it is *delayed for a while on the way to its demise*." (p. 55, my emphasis). Consciousness of the finite nature of all vitality, of our always present awareness of decay, mortality and the promise of new life, has a great deal to do with the importance for us of all art. Something special which film does is *to capture actual, but at the time of viewing, not actual* man and nature in this interlude between birth and death. This "achievement" is something the "art" film and the home movie have in common. Says Biró: "One of the secrets of film's magical exactness (Moholy-Nagy) is the captivating authenticity stemming from its unusual proximity to real life." (p. 101) Film can penetrate the "fantastic territory" which lies in our midst in everyday life.

Cavell's reflections on film and film reception are relevant here. Unlike Biró, he deals with the category of "popular" films, many of which were made under the worst possible conditions for producing something we might regard as art. But these films raise some of the same questions as do greater ones. He asks himself why so many of us *care* about films, or parts of films, how such a set-up as a Hollywood factory-type system could still so often have yielded films "worth possessing and questioning."[13] Most importantly, he asks why films "seem naturally to produce their metaphysical outcries, often supported by a mere conjunction of technical details together with a plot outline of roughly the consistency of opera programs."[14] His question is a key one and the abundance of film criticism and programmatics in the "the-task-is-to-break-the-illusion" vein provide some testament to the perceived strength of the seemingly "natural" production of "metaphysical outcries." I have mentioned earlier the notion (which Cavell also puts forward) that film's effects seem *too powerful* to be the effects of art. He is fascinated by this power: ". . . the more we learn . . . of the corruption and stupidities in

13. *Op. cit.*, p. 7.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 12

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the industry that formed to produce those objects, the more we are likely to wonder how the films we care about could ever have been made. This is not a problem of only films you care about are carefully chosen masterpieces: few regimes are so perfectly terrible and efficient that they prevent every drop of originality from leaking through their clutches. But if one's range of care is wider, then how is one to explain the effect of those ordinary instances. . . ? *What is the power of film that it could survive . . . so much neglect and contempt by those in power over it?*"[15] Seeing his task as the thinking out of the causes of his own *consciousness* of film, he asks why memories of films from the past and friends he saw the films with keep on asserting themselves. The nostalgia of old photographs, he suggests, is related to the perception (which Biró referred to) that mortality is at some point to be stopped in its tracks.

We still do not know how to theorize the connection between a photograph and what it is a photograph of, and the case with film is similar. We are not sure what, exactly, we are responding to. We know the live human being is not on the screen, says Cavell, but "a human *something* is, and something unlike anything else we know."[16] Balázs, of course, had spoken of the revealing of the human "soul."

Art constantly deals with certain transhistorical emotions and values, with joys and fears and crucially, with the possibility of virtue. Similarly, it has a metaphysical aspect, pointing to something beyond the present, something better and not perishable. I share, however, Cavell's questionings about these elements in relation to the film medium. Sometimes, parts of mediocre films can activate these same feelings in us. One scene can "save" a film in our memory, as can one "character."

He is right to suggest that in one sense the screen performer is not so much an actor as the *subject* for study. The "individuality" of "stars" was defined by their self identity through repeated incarnations in films. Davis or Cagney meant something to us partly through an accretion process by which we "got to know" them in a given set of films. Such stars embodied a range of qualities and, importantly, ideals. The manner of embodiment would need little discussion if it were not for the fact that the values and virtues placed under question and struggled over within the narrative *mean so much to us, the viewers*. We involve ourselves in films on several levels, but one vital one is our development of an unusual intersubjective relationship, an exploration of ourselves through involvement in the presentation of an "other," placed in situations where they are tested and are found to act well or badly, an "other" who we have gotten to "know," an "other" who is human but in another sense, a ghost, a shadow of another self.

Film and Social Mythology

A key problem with Biró's work is that she cannot really identify and theorize problems which her aesthetic sense allows her to imply. She speaks of new interests and developments in post war philosophy and the arts and a supposed "hunger for things concrete and banal" (p. 72) The latter has been a characteristic of the cinema but it is a characteristic, she argues, not unique to that medium. Film's achievement was to introduce a new element "into the hitherto *natural exchange* between us and the environment: our vision is film directed; it is influenced by infinite movie memories. Perception and interpretation blend into an indivisible whole, since our comprehension is no longer virginal; it no longer contains any *innocent* parts — anything that could be separated from a predetermined meaning." (p. 73, my emphasis). This surpasses all earlier exaggerated claims for the cinema. Here, film becomes *culture*. This "natural," "virginal" state never existed in human societies. But we should note at this point the

15. *Ibid.*, p. 15, my emphasis.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 26

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connection of Biró's work with other recent film theory. To claim film as culture is the *positive* side of a counterfeit coin; the negative claims that film is *ideology*. Althusserian film theory has produced much work in this vein. Culture is too often collapsed into ideology, and ideology becomes so wide as to be meaningless. Out world is now film-mediated, but film mediations have to be examined in their complex relation to social/cultural mediations including ideologies.

Let us now, however, turn to the fruitful questions Biró poses. "In what," she asks, "does the *universality of myth* lie — what sort of *needs* bring it to life?" She gives a Durkheimian definition of myth, seeing it as a system which includes a complete network of ideals and values, taboos, rituals and customs which regulate social intercourse. Thus, it can serve as a *binding* force for a community, developing and maintaining its collective consciousness, prescribing patterns of behavior. Myth, she says, can reach universality by lifting man out of the confinement of his selfishness.

Biró argues that, in contrast to the lives of people in traditional or "primitive" societies, modern peoples' lives and activities force them into disjointedness and isolation. Channels of contact are scarcely accessible to us. Now myth must, she says, above all, "ensure the community of certain experiences — a collective basis in which norms necessary for action can take hold, according to some sort of agreement — and it must also provide a background where these activities may grow and spread. Myth may help man in other ways too. It could serve as a pattern for his uncertain and incomplete definition; *it may be a model for his desired self-portrait.*" (p. 74, my emphasis). Myth seems to fulfill an irreplaceable need. The vitality of myth is related to a profound desire we cannot relinquish — *the desire to go beyond ourselves*. If we can no longer believe in pure ideology, Biró argues, in heavenly or earthly utopias, we try to reach completeness indirectly. Myth tries to bestow a "drop of eternity" on its objects (p. 87). Thus, the film medium, "profanity and mythology are inseparably intertwined" (p. viii). Biró paves the way for their consideration but does not sufficiently recognize and develop some basic problems associated with myth (film myths in this case) and modern life. When she speaks of film's "compelling mythicizing nature" (p. 80), she uses the notion of myth too widely. She sometimes conflates myth and magic, at other times "mythicization" refers to exaggeration, or the "halo-effect" that can be created around everyday images by film techniques. Elsewhere, mythicization means romaticization or ritualization. Her treatment of films (almost exclusively) from the "great" rather than the "popular" tradition is a mistake if we consider seriously all she has said about film and myth. In "popular" films, film mythology in relation to films and receivers becomes more interesting. In films and other mythically proportioned/characterized phenomena *different levels of argument and explanation* (especially, of course, in "talking" films) are presented to and are being interpreted for us and by us. "False" explanations of why and how people act as they do, why and how events occur, are presented along with partially true arguments. We do not know how the parameters for our thinking are set. Myth, Biró says, is "reality raised to the level of celebration, but its festive nature comes from allowances it makes for exaggeration" (p. 78). Clearly, these exaggerations can have their dangers.

In *Myth and Meaning*, Lévi-Strauss stresses that what he tried to show in works like *Totemism* and *The Savage Mind* was "that people whom we usually consider as completely subservient to the need of not starving, of continuing able just to subsist in very harsh conditions, are perfectly capable of disinterested thinking; that is, they are moved by a need or desire to understand the world around them, its nature and their society."[17]

17. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Myth and Meaning*, (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1978), p. 16.

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According to Lévi-Strauss, while this enterprise may not be a "scientific" one it is an *intellectual* endeavor — its aim is *total understanding. Today, he argues, we use less and more of our mental capacity than we did in the past. This idea is congruent with Balázs'* notion of the "atrophy" of certain of our non-verbal, non-literate capacities, which, he hoped, film could help bring back to our lives, in the hope of creating a new, rich and universal culture.

While myth is unsuccessful in giving man more power over the environment, Lévi-Strauss says, it gives him the illusion that he can and does understand the universe. Myth has an "ecological" function. In myth, the self and society strive towards a balance we can personally and collectively experience and make sense of.

Like modern myths, primitive myths, says Lévi-Strauss, are explanations or validations for *present or desired rights.*[18] In *Myth and Meaning* he poses questions about what is really happening in our own "scientific" history. "I am not far from believing that, in our own societies, history has replaced mythology and fulfills the same function, that for societies without writing and without archives the aim of mythology is to *ensure* that as closely as possible . . . the future will remain faithful to the present and to the past. For us, however, *the future should be always different from the present* some differences depending, of course, on our political preferences."[19] Here Lévi-Strauss outlines the paradox about modern mythologies (filmic or otherwise) that Biró cannot formulate.

As cultural beings in a fragmented, atomized society, the security of some kind of cultural continuity is of great importance. At the same time, we want a future based on radically different norms, principles, needs and ideals. We need the *positive* aspects of mythologies, their "tribal" functions, not because of any regressive primitive residue in us but as members of a society who want to make a better one. At the same time, the more *negative* aspects of mythologies, the kind of "explanations" and arguments legitimating various forms of domination accompanying myths in tribal societies, can function in a de-enlightening manner. Biró says at one stage: ". . . it is in the essence of myth that we accept its truths as self-evident, and that it presents itself as an axiomatic system without revealing the basis of its well-articulated value-judgements. If anywhere, it is in the language of film that this continually evaluating arrangement of things and events may remain hidden." (p. 101). Much thinking needs to be done about the extent to which we accept, or negotiate and deny "truths" presented in film mythologies; the relatively hidden or open nature of biases and value judgements is another problematic area in film theory. Cavell rightly notes that a Capra film like *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* "is not explicit about the causes of political corruption; it suggests, populistically, that they are matters of personal greed or other private sins and that they are curable by the individual or mass goodness of the little people."[20] But he is also right to suggest that both within and outside the film there is room for further exploration of problems the film raises. At the same time as virtue and honor are in battle with compromise and corruption, underlying systemic dimensions dealing with monopoly control and the powerlessness of citizens are constitutive of the film as a whole despite the fact that they are not explicitly examined as such. Solutions to corruption are personally arrived at but it can be argued that in such a film the receiver need not take on face value the solution the director, writer, actors, etc. provide.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 43, my emphasis. See W. Wright, *Sixguns and Society: A Structural Study of the Western*, (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975), for arguments against the view that history has replaced mythology. Wright suggests the co-existence of myth and history in relation to popular film.

20. *Op. cit.*, p. 54.

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Biró unfortunately does not deal with issues of this kind, though her important notion of "profane mythology" opens up this particular "Pandora's box." After discussing the need for myth in a positive way, she moves to Barthes' now well-known treatment of modern myth as the registering as natural and self-evident, things that are in fact, historical.[21] She agrees with Barthes that myth-making is neither innocent nor neutral and claims: "The reason for modern myth's pervasiveness and aggressive presence lies precisely in the fact that natural, interpersonal relationships have been replaced by external, institutionalized forms of communication, and these mediators — our modern myths — could not remain innocent." (p. 105). The naivety of such a claim cannot be attributed to Biró alone. The facts that myths have never been innocent and that in society there are no natural relations, are axiomatic to an understanding of *culture*. The lack of appreciation of man as a fundamentally cultural being means, for Biró and Barthes, an inability to formulate a critical problem: in what ways can the need for myth and enlightenment be reconciled?

Biró suggests it might be too harsh to go along completely with Barthes and "consider every manifestation of modern myth as fallacy, simplification and 'consoling lies.' " But she continues: "What is original in Barthes's premise is that he labels as myth everything that falls into the category of *interpretation — only action speaks to us unaided.*" (p. 105, my empasis). This is not original. But it is the kind of mistaken notion frequently taken up in film theory in a kind of romantic absolutism which does not recognize that *culture involves interpretation*. Biró thus invokes Barthes at his worst: The Barthes who inspired so much post'68 French and English film theory.

Barthes had no need to confront the difficulties of examining the relations of tribal myths to those which flourish under and help legitimate capitalism (as part of their function). Rather than examining with any sophistication the agencies at work in myth creation and appropriation, the power relations in which modern mythologizing processes occur in present-day capitalism (and for that matter, Eastern Bloc "socialism"), he resurrected myths like that of the noble (here oppressed) savage whose speech "can only be poor, monotonous, immediate: his destitution is the very yardstick of his language: he has only one, always the same, that of his actions; metalanguage is a luxury, he cannot yet have access to it. The speech of the oppressed is real, like that of the woodcutter; it is a transitive type of speech: it is quasi-unable to lie; lying is a richness, a lie presupposes property, truths and forms to spare."[22] Lévi-Strauss has not, of course, been the only anthropologist to illustrate the foolishness of such notions. Elementary social anthropology texts do it with glee.

Barthes' villain of the piece is also evoked in mythical terms. As myth itself becomes a seemingly self-motivated agent, the "establishment" or the "bourgeoisie" in *Mythologies* are unproblematically posited as the "causes" of the fallen state of myth in which we have all been submerged. Masochistically, Barthes set for himself, the mythologist, the task of total *demythologizing*. Biró implies that we need conceptions of utopia. The core of tomorrow's positivity we can only find partially hidden within what exists and what we desire for tomorrow *today*. Barthes, while exhaustively denouncing the masking of history by myth, relied on basically essentialist and static categories when writing of the relation of a new transformed future to the dark present.

His argument raised questions central to aesthetic modernist projects — many film artists and theorists now see themselves as primarly involved in the task of demythologization, frequently involving the renunciation of all that can be labelled "utopian."

21. Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, (Paladin, 1973).
22. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

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Despite her positive claims for film's naturalism and mythicizing nature, Biró briefly endorses the necessity of a more "negative" modernist project, without seeing the contradictions in her own argument. "In twentieth-century art, as is well known, the role of fragmentation and discontinuity has greatly increased. In the various "isms" — as part of the transvaluation and shock-oriented intensification of associative relationships — this was especially apparent in the astonishing stretching of polarities . . . The seeming break with conventions is . . . deeply motivated; it is fired by the desire to discredit ossified and hollow appearances. To smash what seems so comfortably well arranged,to show up meanings for what they really are, is by no means a matter of mere innovation techniques but is rather the essential and ironic flexibility of a new viewpoint that questions everything." (p. 119). Her lack of distinction between more popular and avant-garde and self-conscious film art (they are not, of course, in any way absolute categories but rather useful ideal types) is telling here. Perhaps she cannot take her contradictory arguments further partly because she is so concerned to argue that film can do all things for all people.

Here, we reach the core of a problem in modernist film practice. While we the viewers live in a reified world, we are, at the same time condemned, as it were, to confer meaning upon it. Even in films whose creators see themselves as showing things as they are in the most "impersonal" way, the artist, because he/she is a human being, *occupies a position* and has reasons for calling particular objects or events to our attention. It is for this reason that we need to insist, with Cavell, on the need for the application of *value* categories in assessing or prescribing film (or any other) art. Cavell gives no quarter to those advocates of "objective" or "scientific" film art and theory. If we are talking about requirements of faithfulness and objectivity he says, ". . . then the questions are *what you are being faithful to or failing to be faithful to; and on behalf of whom,* and *to what is it, you appeal and protest* . . ."[23] The question, as Cavell sees it for the modern artist, is whether you can choose to occupy a position with honor. He takes it for granted that films are "no longer easy in the nests of wish and myth that gave its media their conviction for us . . ."[24] Nor, however, is their modernist fate sealed. Cavell questions the possible emptiness of the notion of self-reference in modern art, that painting is now "about" painting, the novel about the novel and that film in its turn, to acknowledge its status as a constructed cultural artifact has to constantly refer to itself.

A film-maker like Makavejev, Biró would agree, does manage in his black comedies to fulfill Cavell's conditions. While Makavejev shows no illusions about grim actuality (both aspects which could be changed and others which could not), he balances complex analysis with tenderness and humor. In a film like *Love Affair*, "scientific" commentaries alternate throughout the film with a narrative love story. Ultimately, says Biró, Makavejev presents "an invitation to a bittersweet dance, the dance of freedom" (p. 120).

No stranger to modernism, Makavejev is nevertheless estranged from its paralytic alienation. He refuses the tyranny of a rationalistic distancing from his subjects and the separation of the intellect and feelings. The conviction that each whole person is of value and that in political/social/psychological analysis and understanding, the sensuous and emotional character of human communication cannot be bracketed out or suppressed, is central to his project. At the same time, depending on factors such as education, cultural traditions and particular political situations, the rich analytic complexity of his films and his employment of innovative cinematic conventions can mean

23. *Op. cit.*, p. 115, my emphasis.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

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that they may not be accessible to, enjoyed or understood by, popular audiences.

And this is why, in contrast to Biró, we need to stress film's or any other art's *limits*. We have to confront the fact that it is not at the level of aesthetic or technical practices that film can achieve what we would like it to. We cannot speak of automatic effects of film practices. We need instead a full consideration of the *relation* of the film to audience members as individuals and collectivities, and this relation, in turn, must be situated in the wider socio-cultural context.

Biró's "everyday life," which film can potentially illuminate so well has certain universal features for members of our society but is at the same time experienced differently according to class, gender, age, race and subcultures in particular historical conjuctures. What we produce or do not produce and how we do this is intimately related to our self expression and our reception of the artistic expressions or productions with which we are confronted. Biró noted that the first theoreticians of film "were enthralled by the dreamlike quality of cinematic depiction" (p. 21). The malleability of time and space, the possibility of crossing boundaries existing in reality, the freedom of the imagination, are all positive things that film representation can offer us. But they need to be considered in relation to the irreversibility of time, the difficulty of crossing certain existent boundaries (some of which can and should be changed), and the lack of actual freedom to manage our own lives, a freedom which at present often exists to a large extent only in our fantasies.

To the extent that we still have choices in cultural production (and in film the expansive technology is a limiting factor on choices), we must, rather than resign ourselves to the political/aesthetic orthodoxies of the moment, recognize the plurality of modes of deployment film can offer us as a medium. I have argued about the specificity of film, what claims may or may not be made for it, but we need remember that like other cultural forms it can *potentially* and often ambiguously express resistance to prevailing forms of domination.

Something Thompson wrote about the work of William Morris is suggestive of what we would like film to do — to help create a cultural climate, to lay groundwork for change in a way that can be meaningful to popular audiences: "Morris sought in every way to implant, encourage and enlarge new wants in the present, and imbue the socialist movement with an alternative notion of value, *before* the rupture; and he judged that socialist success or failure in this enterprise would affect not only when the revolution came but what form it would take. In any event, Morris saw (although unclearly) that ruptures in values are taking place *all the time*, and not only during moments of strike or rebellion."[25]

Cinema does seem to have a special ability to render before us a phantasm of the world itself. But it is our own fascination with our world and ourselves that makes the film/viewer relation work. We are interested in the cinema because we are interested in ourselves as we are and as we *can* be.

Lorraine Mortnier

25. E.P. Thompson, "Romanticism, Utopianism and Moralism: The Case of William Morris," *New Left Review*, No. 99, Sept.-Oct., 1976, p. 111.

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Yves Cannac, *Le Juste Pouvoir. Essai sur les Deux Chemins de la Démocratie* (J.C. Lattè: Paris, 1982).*

Henri Arvon, *Les Libertariens Américains. De L'Anarchisme Individualiste à L'Anarcho-capitalisme* (Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 1983).

Guy Sorman, *La Révolution Conservative Américaine* (Fagard: Paris, 1983).

There is one book among many that the serious Right has produced recently which best bears witness to the French opposition's difficulties in elaborating a political argument: Cannac's *Le juste pouvoir.*[1] Its author, Yves Cannac, is a high official at the Conseil d'Etat, co-worker of former Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, former assistant to the President Giscard d'Estaing, and the president of the Havas organization from 1978 to 1981. Why did this history teacher who also studied at the ENA decide to present to the public his conception of just government? Because, he explains, he felt it necessary to express his reservations about the State and his confidence in the creativity of society. If you were less than 20 years old in 1968 and that phrase does not remind you of anything, you have not lost out on much because it is returning, although in more a serene tone. If you have never read Rosanvallon or those who formed what the 1970s called the "second left," you will rediscover the thread of History and fill in what you have neglected by reading Cannac.

In fact, is Yves Cannac a rightist? When he criticizes the hegemonic French notion of democracy which idealizes governmental power, and when he opposes to it a civil democracy which "admits that everything is not political" (p. 13), is he on the right or the left? The question is all the more legitimate since Cannac's book claims to criticize both the majority and the opposition, and he insists that "the hegemonic position *is not the left,* it is even the negation of the left" (p. 245). But if so, then from what position does this critic of governmental power speak?

The frameworks which define political positions are perhaps in the process of changing, as Rosanvallon himself notes at the end of an only slightly critical debate with Cannac[2]; but one should be careful about claiming that the right/left distinction is no longer valid. Maybe it is an error to think that the indifference of Cannac to these terms are a form of open-mindedness. "I'm perfectly willing to have my conception of democracy be called *liberal,* even though this term has been used too often to cover things which are hardly liberal. One could also call my view *socialist* because it claims to be on the side of society against the excessive intervention of the governmental power . . . I propose the term *civil.* But the words are not important."[3]

Nonetheless, Cannac cannot hide the fact that he serves in the ranks of the opposition. Why else would he propose that critique of the hegemonic State? Obviously, the

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1. One might mention here also the books of D. Jamet, *Lettre ouverte à la droite la plus mal à droite du monde* (Albin-Michel: Paris, 1982), Alain Peyrefitte, *Quand la rose se fanera* (Plon: Paris, 1982), and the pseudonymous Caton's *De la reconquête* (Fayard: Paris, 1983).

2. "Que faire de l'Etat? Yves Cannac et Pierre Rosanvallon, un échange," in *Le Debat,* No. 26, September 1983, p. 92.

3. *Ibid.,* p. 77. Another sign of this indifference to words is the fact that Cannac has chosen for a motto for his book a sentence from Pierre Clastres, *Le société contre l'Etat.* Unfortunately, the title of Clastres' book, which analyzes particularly the function of the chief in Indian societies, becomes, in Cannac's usage, *La société contre le pouvoir!* It was not necessary for Cannac to read Clastres' book since the phrase he cites is found on the back cover of the book itself!

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left coming to power did not function only, as he says, "to reveal" the nature of hegemonism; its major role, he argues, was to prevent that transfer of responsibility from the political power to civil society that the previous government had the merit of having begun (p. 13). And yet, things do not seem to have become any more difficult in his eyes, as he admits with a certain exaltation: "I have no model of society in my pocket. I have only the conviction that it is for society itself, not for the Governmental Power to invent its model." (JP, 15) As if convictions were sufficient?[4] And as if especially that conviction that people themselves know better than anyone else what is good for them were self-evident. The implication seems to be that it is ok to administer society but not permissible to seek its change. "There is nothing more normal than administrative choices be taken by elected representatives. But the option for change must come, in the last instance, *from the people themselves"* (p. 213). For this reason, Cannac insists, the political thinker must limit himself to the description of what he sees as bad. In doing this, he will not take sadistic pleasure, nor will he hesitate to flatter the recriminations of the masses — although he may "euphemize" the complaints of those whose destiny he refuses to direct. Does Cannac have his own ideas? Only those which translate the discontent of a civil society crushed by the injustices of an excessive governmental power (p. 149).

This being said, to act in favor of "civil choice" naturally leads the man of governmental power — even in semi-retirement — to demagogical arguments. In order to prove that the State smothers the citizens' responsibility and autonomy, Cannac presents an ordered list of the complaints expressed in the milieux of the *Café du commerce* and the *Café de la paix.*

First, Television and the media in general. His point is simply that "independent information is not reconcilable with the public ownership of the means of expression" (p.21).

Next, public services. Cannac is worried about the system of education, whose deplorable results he criticizes in economic terms. On the pretext that education is not business, the Ministry of Education does not give a damn about what its public expects. Cannac proposes — without fear of compromising himself with a tradition usually identified with the CFDT unions, if not with Proudhon — the constitution of "a *third sector,* between state-run and private profit-oriented education, which will be mutualist, associative or cooperative — a cousin of the kind of cooperatives which have proved their success in the spheres of health and insurance" (p. 49). Finally, he suggests the elimination of the baccalaureate examination at the end of high school in order to free educational institutions from the domination of the centralizing state.

The measures that he proposes to eliminate the deficit of the social security fund express a moralizing naiveté which bets once again on the sense of responsibility and the desire for autonomy on the part of the citizenry. It is, of course, true that the healthy and the rich have always criticized the fact that they too have to pay for a non-negotiable level of social protection. There are certainly many among them who will appreciate the idea that "medical insurance can gradually become like automobile insurance, an act expressing the free administration of private life."[5] Is it really risky for

4. This is why the reply by Rosanvallon leaves me cold when he says that "The second left . . . has formulated no clearly articulated program of reform ready to introduce in the state or in the economy." *Le Débat*, p. 92.

5. *Le Débat, op.cit.,* p. 72. See also the debate in the same issue between Simon Nora asnd Edmond Maire. Maire objects to Nora's proposition that private insurance could replace social security by noting that private insurance companies have the right to choose their clients and to make them pay premiums that are proportional to the risks taken. But what, then, about the weak or the sick?

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Cannac to propose an idea that every wage earner is tempted to defend at one or another time? What is the difference between "having ideas" and "coopting the discontent of the masses?" Cannac, who assured us that he would not propose a model for society, does not seem to fear appearing as the author of a popular Breviary of the type "All they need to do is . . ."

This is not the place to go into details concerning what is certainly the Achilles heal of a government which is accused of being hegemonic: namely, the problem of nationalisations. For Cannac, once a firm is nationalized it is no longer competitive because it is forced to include political goals and not simply economic ones in its planning. And, of course, who today is not sensitive to the argument that this is wasteful? Nationalizations appear ruinous for several reasons: because professional competence is made secondary to political criteria, because administration is tied by external considerations — and also because civil democracy suffers when the firm is politicized since this conflates governmental power with the specific powers within the firm, not distinguishing the political from the civil sphere (p. 67). But the solution that Cannac proposes — "civil nationalization, that is to say the making of the French themselves, of all voting age citizens, stockholders and owners of these firms" (p. 68) — is not easily put into practice.

Nonetheless, taxpayers who have become stockholders can still join Cannac in criticizing the fact that the government has not used high unemployment to "strengthen the professional capacities of the individual" (p. 102). They can grumble about the taxation of great wealth which discourages individual initiative (p. 108); and they can complain especially about the fiscal burden which for each of them takes 50% of their revenue and permits the State "to spend our own money for us, in our place" (p.110).

Clearly, Cannac has an audience for these remarks — but, it should be noted, not greater than the one to whom Mitterrand himself appealed on television on September 15, 1983 when he spoke of the need to lighten the fiscal burdens on the citizens. There is a group within the socialist party who insists on the virtues of free trade and individual enrichment; and who argues against the archaic insistence of the CERES on the class struggle and against the asphyxiation of the economy by automatic taxation.

Lacking new ideas, *Le Juste Pouvoir* has at least the virtue of being a serious list of complaints. Written by a member of the opposition, it was of course well-received by the Right. The result is that themes and ideas which did, or could have flourished among the left now take on — for how long? — a right-wing identity. If Rosanvallon spoke of the crisis of the Welfare State,[6] Cannac is the person who dares to say that "one has to put an end to the Welfare State, that the ideal is thus not the generalization of support but its abolition" (pp. 121-22). If this assertion appears somewhat demagogic, it is nonetheless acceptable to the degree that one has persuaded "the people" of the failure of a State which despises them. This is why Cannac flies in the face of the stiff and perhaps embarrassed silence of our thinkers of civil society and cries loudly that the formulation "The government satisfies all my needs" must be replaced by the true motto of a civil democracy,"We can henceforth do without the government."

Even the theme of self-management, which seems to have disappeared quickly from the vocabulary of the socialists since May 1981, can serve the goals of the opposition. Henri Arvon's recent book on *Les Libertariens américains* gives credit to that cooptation by presenting it as natural. The book concludes by a final evocation of Proudhon: "The

6. In a book by the same title, reissued and revised in 1984 by Editions du Seuil.

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fundamental aim of liberalism . . . which wants to establish horizontal relations among equal and sovereign citizens, demands a certain space for the self-management project which presents the means necessary for its realization. When it is incorporated into the liberal system whose principle of freedom it enlarges to the dimension of human life in its entirety; self-management then stops being the chameleon-like and often contradictory concept that its unnatural wedding with socialism has made of it; it becomes the most marvelous manner of awakening a society that seeks to be authentically liberal" (p. 157).

The troubling aspect of these arguments is seen in the fact that, in the debate with Cannac (who expressed his pleasure in their agreement), Rosanvallon spoke of the intellectual and political space of their agreement as defined by the concept "liberal-libertarian." However fluid these concepts are, what is striking is that once the Right thinks against the State, it thinks with the "second Left." Arvon's book, in all events, deserves to be taken seriously for its refined descriptions of that liberal-libertarian space from which the curious consensus among left and right social critics emerges. "All libertarians, whether of the right, the left, or the center, accept that condemnation of the intervention of the state in the economy which is the essence of the neo-liberal critique" (Arvon, p. 122).

Should one join with those who worry that, behind an approach that is, all in all, comforting, pragmatic and sensible,[7] there lies the danger that a hard right would make use of these principles to justify the intervention of naked authority in the name of efficiency? The success of Cannac's book, the more than favorable welcome of ideas whose originality is doubtful, is surely not benign. Even if one does not think that the extreme right would gain anything by basing its appeals on *Le juste pouvoir,* it is nonetheless true that the reception of the book expresses a new sensibility and a movement in the framework within which politics in France is evaluated.

This context explains the importance of another recent literary success, Guy Sorman's *La Revolution conservatrice américaine*. At the time of its appearance, the socialist daily *Le Matin* (July 18) titled its review: "Libertarian conservatism will be either Chirac or Rocard." This was yet another sign of the crisis of political thought from which the opposition is profiting.

The commentators did not err when they analyzed the neo-conservatism that Sorman presented as containing values that more and more will mobilize a citizenry convinced that the source of its problems is too much state. The same public that applauded Cannac is hoping that American neo-conservatism will soon cross the Atlantic. Neo-conservatism means to them a moral renewal that consecrates effort and responsibility; a populism that grants to the people a vision and wisdom far superior to that of the elites; an anti-statism that criticizes the parasitic and paralyzing effects of bureaucracy; and a capitalism that finds in free enterprise the true expression of democratic freedom.[8] There is nothing in this that Cannac could not accept. But in addition, Sorman speaks also to the anti-statist left: "*Libération, Actuel* or *Autrement*, which administer the legacy of May 68, are fascinated by the entrepreneurial spirit and by technology. For them, the future is in Silicon Valley and not in rural communitarian experiments. . . The former actors of May 68 are the capitalists of tomorrow, just as previously Trigano and Essel, former Trotskyists, created the Club Méditerranée and the Fnac." This argument would have surprised and would have been challenged only

7. Cannac insists that he is in favor of a liberalism with a human face and that he opposes all forms of social darwinism (p. 187).

8. See the interview with Guy Sorman in *Le Matin*, July 18, 1983.

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a while ago, and yet the values that most tempt the right today are the very values that formerly were identified with the extreme left. Can one avoid the apparent contradiction by speaking of an "amalgam"?[9] One must realize that the criticism of the state that still motivates the activists of 68 has been joined with the rise of a virtuous corporatism that reminds one of *poujadism.*[10]

There is at least one approval of the phenomenon described by Sorman that does not hide its political identity — that of Yvan Blot and the Club de l'Horloge. This brings us back to the traditional framework: the right acclaims in Cannac the political thinker of the future and in Sorman the prophet of the return of the former majority to power. This reception is symptomatic of the efficacy of the strategy of which Yvan Blot is the instigator and the propagandist: refuse the division of left/right and substitute for it the alternative: socialism or republic. In the last resort, Cannac's support of the separation of political and economic power, his proclamation of respect for the individual against the state machine, and his denunciation of the injustices that accompany the socialist attempt to create social justice fit perfectly the opposition of hegemonism and the republic. And, from the other side, Sorman's description of the popular desire to limit the prerogatives of the state to the mere role of sovereignty and security, his stress on the attachment of the citizens to freedom in economic life, and his revealing of the return of a desire for national roots and regional cultures fit into the same pattern.[11]

Thus, not everyone is involved in the confusion of political identities. Clearly, the definition of a political strategy today demands that one formulate social models that are antithetical to each other. The opposition has taken up this strategy and this is the context in which Cannac's book is a good work. The socialist majority needs to reply quickly.

How can one disprove the dangerous alternative of socialism and the republic? How can one convince the younger generations that, in accepting the arguments with which neo-conservatism encourages self-realization and self-transcendence, they are aiding a project that puts into question the priority of the goal of social justice? Confronted with the mocking impatience with which the younger generation observes the details of party politics, the task will not be easy.

Jean-Michel Besnier

9. Jean-Francois Bizot, the director of *Actuel*, suggested this in a not-too-convincing argument against Sorman. "For us, as opposed to the 'true' capitalists, getting rich is not the goal. The goal is to act, to take hold of the creativity of our generation. One can be on the left and still succeed by means of a different practice. Free enterprise is not the private property of the right." *Le Matin*, July 20, 1983.

10. Pierre Poujade, who says that he voted for Mitterrand, does not hide his interest in the ideas expressed by Sorman. He contests only the linking of *poujadism* to Jacques Chirac. Cf. *Le Matin*, July 20, 1983. Concerning corporatism, note the recent book by Alain Cotta, *Le triomphe des corporations* (Paris: Grasset, 1983), which analyzes the rise of a neo-corporatism that is an alternative both to liberalism and socialism.

11. Speaking of Sorman's book, Yvan Blot writes, "This movement of ideas is entirely in line with the values of our republican tradition. It would thus be more precise to speak of it in our country as a 'neo-republican movement.' " Cf. *Le Matin*, July 18, 1983. See also *Le Monde*, October 10, 1982, for a discussion of this distinction.

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John Walton. *Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of Revolution and Underdevelopment.* New York: Columbia University Press. 230 pages. $27.50 cloth; $10.00 paper.

Victoria E. Bonnell. *Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914.* Berkeley: University of California Press. 560 pages. $38.50 cloth; $10.95 paper.

The Russian Worker: Life and Labor Under the Tsarist Regime, edited by Victoria Bonnell. Berkeley, University of California Press. 216 pp. $32.50 (cloth), $9.95 (paper).

Orthodox academic Marxism used to make revolutions sound something like boxing matches: two fully mobilized classes, locked in irreconcilable conflict, enter the ring and slug it out. To the winner went the crown (almost literally) — class control of the state. Happily, recent studies of revolution have exposed this tired formula as theoretically simplistic and historically inaccurate. The impressive theoretical model-building by some historical sociologists has made it impossible to focus only on class struggle when explaining revolutions. New elements — the position of the state in an international arena of geopolitical competition, the mobilization of classes towards an international labor market, the complex relationships among classes and the state — have added to the structural equation.

At the same time, some historians and anthropologists, always more sensitive to the textures of quotidian existence, have studied how everyday life has inspired popular participation in revolutionary events. Works by E.P. Thompson, Lawrence Goodwyn, John Womack, Eric Hobsbawm, and June Nash convince us that even if people do not make history "just as they please," they do make history, and one way they make it is by participating in social movements that make revolutionary challenges.

Rooted in a structuralist tradition, Victoria Bonnell and John Walton ask what it is about daily life that motivates workers and peasants to participate in revolutionary social movements. Despite the differences in their case studies — Bonnell examines the politics of labor in pre-revolutionary Russia, while Walton looks at land and labor relations in three Third World nations — they arrive at surprisingly similar conclusions. Revolutions are made, they argue, not by those with nothing left to lose, but by those with something to defend, a daily life infused with meaning and community, a sense of personal self-worth and autonomy. Revolutions are, in part, moments of resistance against global capitalism and national state-building, two forces that transform daily life, separating people from one another and tying them instead to the market and to abstract notions of citizenship and patriotism. This is, however, where Bonnell and Walton part company, and where theirs become very different efforts with very different results. For one thing, one succeeds, the other does not.

Roots of Rebellion succeeds because Bonnell's careful and richly documented analysis permits some forceful and convincing theoretical arguments, especially in confronting Lenin's depiction of the Russian revolution. By examining the composition, organization, and ideology of the union movement in pre-revolutionary Russia, Bonnell elegantly refutes the old axioms that increasing emiseration and concentration of the industrial working class lead to revolutionary class consciousness. Instead, Bonnell finds a preponderance of skilled workers and "factory artisans" as the "backbone" of both the union and revolutionary movements. She finds the highest degree of con-

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sciousness among "workers in small, dispersed, and unmechanized work environments" and that since skilled workers and artisans "exerted significant control over the labor process and were more highly urbanized and educated than unskilled workers, their "feelings of mastery, self-respect, and craft-pride" prompted a "clearer conception of themselves as 'workers' and a stronger sense of their status and self-worth." But here is what the newspaper of the tailors' union in Moscow observed in June 1906: "One often hears that it is harder for artisanal workers, since artisanal workers work in groups of two or three in tiny workshops, dispersed all over the city. The brilliant strike of bakers and pastry shop workers in St. Petersberg shows that these obstacles can be overcome through planned and persistent organization" (pp. 306-307).

Bonnell's second argument — that the trade union movement sustained the revolutionary movement during the difficult and contradictory period between the outbreaks of 1905 and 1917 — is also convincing. Hardly the reactionary agents retarding class consciousness that Lenin portrayed, the mutual aid societies, consumer and producer cooperatives, self-improvement and education projects, and a plethora of union newspapers maintained workers' experience of "pride and self-sufficiency" and retained for the trade unions a central place in the revolutionary drama. More than this, even, they embodied a "radical transformative vision of social and political organization in which workers, together with other lower class groups, exercised decisive control over the country's future" (p. 455).

The legalization of trade unions on March 4, 1906, was a wolf in sheep's clothing; by recognizing the unions, the Tsar prohibited their political involvement and restricted their rights to bargain with manufacturers. It was from this contradictory position of political exclusion under the pretense of incorporation that the distinctly revolutionary character of the working class was forged. Here, Bonnell makes an implicit comparison with Western Europe, where trade unions promoted reformist rather than revolutionary solutions to labor problems because the extension of political rights and material improvements in living conditions allowed their incorporation. In Russia, the working class was uniquely revolutionary due to its political exclusion.

This argument, though, suggests that the exogenous organization of the working class by a political party was not a historical imperative. As Bonnell puts it: "The Bolsheviks cannot be credited with having radicalized workers; the disposition to embrace radical solutions arose out of the workers' own experiences with employers and the state. But the party gave tactical and ideological expression to those experiences, calling for the abandonment of a gradualist approach and the adoption instead of revolutionary methods to end the tsarist rule" (p. 437). Despite Lenin's assertions, it would seem that the workers needed the Bolshevik Party about as much as the Bolshevik Party needed the workers.

This is a most impressive work, whose careful empirical research impels serious reevaluation of prevailing orthodoxies. And while in *Roots of Rebellion* Bonnell offers a compelling analytic portrait of the development of working class consciousness, in *The Russian Worker* she allows the workers to explain themselves in their own words. In excerpts from five texts — autobiographies and amateur sociological studies — one can taste the "daily life and mentality" of the pre-revolutionary Russian working class. Ond the one hand, it was a brutal existence, a world of long hours (11 hours a day, six days a week) and difficult conditions; apprentices in retail trades "slept on filthy, smelly, pest-ridden beds" in alcoves that were "small, dark and cold," according to A.M. Gudvan. Women apprentices were sexually abused, and both sexes were beaten "for the slightest error or childish mistake." Alcohol was ubiquitous, with widespread

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drunkenness on the job, institutionalized among garment workers as "Blue Monday," when the "whole workshop gets drunk and work comes to a standstill." (Of course, this was also a form of resistance against such starkly oppressive conditions.)

But on the other hand, working class life was more than the "world of unending profit-mongering, cupidity, servitude, and brutality" decried by Gudvan in his 1925 reminiscences of the sales and retail trade. There was young S.I. Kanatchikov, a coarse village clod who became a self-taught and highly skilled metal worker, who describes how he became "gripped by the poetry of the large metal factory, with its mighty metallic roar, the puffing of its steam-driven machines, its columns of high pipes, its rising clouds of black smoke, which sullied the clear blue sky." (A far cry from Blake's "dark, satanic mills.") Even among the sales and clerical workers, Gudvan noticed that "gradually they were developing a sense of dignity and an awareness of their own self-worth." As Bonnell's analysis makes clear, it was from this emerging self-respect that class consciousness emerged among Russian workers; craft pride and human dignity fused with class rage that impelled the proletariat towards its rendezvous with revolution.

Yet as sensitive as Bonnell is to political and economic struggles, her own analysis shies away from cultural arguments. While she compares working class organization in St. Petersburg and Moscow, Bonnell ignores many of the significant cultural differences between the two cities, so evident in fin-de-siècle Russian literature. Moscow was the Russian heartland — Slavic, rough and unrefined, the epitome of backwardness — while the capital was bathed in a European light, elegant, civil, literate even to the point of mimicking the French (not unlike the contemporaneous difference in Americans' perceptions between Chicago and New York, I suspect). More powerfully, the two cities captured the tragic polarity of development: sacred vs. secular, traditional vs. modern, emotional vs. rationally cognitive, Kremlin vs. Nevsky Prospect. But did the Muscovite and Petersburg unions evince different visions, the latter tuned more to the European experience? What difference did culture make, the painful experience of cultural self-hatred and abnegation that accompanies the political economy of backwardness?

By contrast to Bonnell's brace of volumes, Walton's *Reluctant Rebels* is unsuccessful in part because it tries too hard to present the entire picture. Walton's argument — that revolutionary movements arise in response to the dislocating and disruptive forces of capitalist penetration into the countryside — is sound enough. And so is his emphasis on the centrality of uneven development. Capitalism does not spread evenly over the globe like Sherwin-Williams paints, but heightens pre-existing political and economic tensions between classes, between city and countryside, as well as adding some new ones: "monoculture of export crops . . . emphasis on greater export productivity through commercialized and industrialized agriculture; pressures on the land; effots to eliminate tenants and small holders; land alienation, coerced cash-crop labor, and proletarianization of the rural labor force; monetization of the economy. . . ." Thus, the penetration of global capitalism creates political crises (bringing the state into the countryside) and allows for a revolutionary alliance between peasants and workers.

So far so good, although not very new. Walton's theoretical arguments, though, bracket three case studies of Third World revolutions made by reluctant rebels — three cases, incidentally, that have gone largely unnoticed by social scientists. He looks at the Huk rebellion in the Philippines (1946-1953), an unsuccessful struggle for national liberation against the imposition of the post-war order that left the Philippines prey to global capitalist expansion and top-down national unification. Ultimately, American

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sponsored repression and Raymond Magsaysay's modest reformism — a policy of "all-out force and friendship" towards the Huks — destroyed the revolutionary challenge. La Violencia, a 12-year bloodbath in Colombia (1946-1958) was also, Walton argues, caused ultimately by "unbridled uneven capitalist development" which fused worker militancy and peasant unrest, fueled by incorporation into the world market. This seemingly internecine feuding was really, he claims, a national revolt against state policies, expressing deeply seated class hatred. Finally, the Mau Mau in Kenya (1952-1956) rose against the transformation of labor into a decreasingly valued commodity and the uneven spread of state-sponsored industrialization. The Mau Mau, a "mixed assortment of dispossessed cultivators, impoverished squatters, refugees from overcrowded reserves, lesser political activists . . . and urban wage workers," were modestly successful in promoting the struggle for national independence, although the post-colonial state remains controlled by "an emergent national bourgeoisie based on a one-party political bureaucracy allied with foreign capital."

In the end, though, it does not all add up to what Walton suggests. It is not that these somewhat blandly conventional historical narratives seem grafted onto a highly abstract theoretical aparatus, although the pedantic and academic style (in which long quotations are set in bold-face like a badly planned textbook) does detract. And it is not simply theoretical quibbles with Walton's insistence that peasants "find their natural ally and leader in the urban proletariat" and their alliance is essential for revolutionary success (China?). It is more that historical and theoretical issues are avoided altogether, as Walton collapses analytic categories and crosses historical paths too easily, making the work seem glib and slick, without nuance or subtlety.

For one thing, each empirical movement faced a very different enemy. The Mau Mau challenged a state organized by squatter capitalists while the Huks confronted a colonial state intensifying its efforts at national unification. The ephemeral fragments that composed La Violencia did not challenge the state so much as struggle among themselves for effective political control. If the uneven spread of global capitalism is the ultimate cause of such different movements, it ends up not being very decisive at all.

This problem of vague and tenuous causal chains is exacerbated because Walton does not distinguish between a social movement and a revolution, bletween process and structure. Social movements are set in motion in opposition to state policies, they contend with the state over economic, social, or political issues. Revolutions happen when existing regimes lose effective control over society, when the state collapses and an assortment of class alliances struggle to reconstitute political authority. The Huks and the Mau Mau were important social movements that arose in non-revolutionary situations; La Violencia was neither movement nor revolution, although it contained the possibility of both.

In the end, then, Walton's rech exceeds his grasp; he applies thick paint to a broad canvas, but no pattern emerges with clarity. Bonnell's careful empirical research allows bolder theorizing; she paints a richly detailed portrait of old-regime labor politics in which an entire historical movement is lucidly revealed.

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Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller. *Hungary 1956 Revisited. The Message of a Revolution — A Quarter of a Century After*. London, Boston, Sidney: Allen and Unwin, 1983.

There are two approaches to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956: to view it as a national or as a social affair; a fight for national independence or for a revolutionary transformation of society. The two approaches can be collapsed into a comprehensive one in the name of autonomy, and this is what Feher and Heller did, remaining mindful, however, of the two major and irreducible aspects of the actual events and their motivating forces.

Their main argument is threefold. The people in revolt wanted to establish a "dual system" of a socialist economy and a political pluralism; they wanted a renegotiation of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements; and in the course of the revolution they achieved a national consensus that could actively negotiate a compromise implied by both major aims. The goal was a radical democracy of workers' councils coupled with a multi-party system.

This "dual system," no doubt, is a troublesome idea. At the same time, it is an issue that cannot be avoided. Feher and Heller are right: "in the main, one seems to be entitled to say that the state wage-earners had clung firmly to their property, the units of production, resocialized in the form of direct democracy, but had accepted the existence of a pluralistic political upper structure, the multi-party system and free elections" (p. 106). And they are equally right in emphasizing that Bibó — a non-communist member of the revolutionary government — meant what he wrote in his draft proposal, that "a solution which combined socialist achievement with the guarantees provided by free institutions would set an example which would stimulate imitation" (quoted on p. 13). And Bibó may indeed be considered a spokesman for the revolution.[1]

One of the questions raised by the revolutionary demand of a dual system is how to assess the workers' councils. Feher and Heller discuss two interpretations, that of Castoriadis and that of Hannah Arendt (pp. 113f). This is justifiable, since Castoriadis and Arendt were at one in considering the council system the only radically democratic one and in seeing in the Hungarian revolution the spontaneous re-emergence of the councils. The view of Heller and Feher, however, differs from that of both Arendt and Castoriadis.

Arendt is unequivocal in associating the council system with the "federalist principle," i.e., with political self-governance. This means for her that the councils should not do admnistrative and managerial work, either in politics or in economics.[2]

The councils are policy-making bodies: they cannot and should not be bogged down with the execution of policies. And they are only meaningful if they function within a new system of government. "What the councils challenged was the party system as such, in all its forms," she says, adding that "the one-party dictatorship is only the last stage in the development of the nation-state in general and of the multi-party system in particular."[3]

1. This has been acknowledged by Hungarians. A volume of essays compiled after Bibó's death and circulated in samizdat after an unsuccessfull attempt at publication combined dissidents of a democratic and radical platform, which, roughly speaking, re-established the consensus achieved during the revolution, proving it both valid and active.
2. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 274.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 265 f.

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Castoriadis has a similar tendency to jut the council system against all available political systems: "Modern society can be best characterized as *bureaucratic capitalism.* And its purest, most extreme form has been realized in Russia, China and the other countries presently masquerading as socialist. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was the first and, up to now, the *only total revolution against total bureaucratic capitalism.*"[4] But Castoriadis also considers the economic sphere, attributing the significance of the councils to "(a) the establishment of *direct democracy* (true *political equality*); (b) their rootedness in existing concrete collectivities (including, but not limited to, the factories); and (c) their demands concering *self-management* and the abolition of work norms."[5] Castoriadis is also a socialist, and not just a radical democrat.

Castoriadis, too, speaks out against burdening the councils with managerial-executive work.[6] But he suggests that delegated members doing the executive work be members of the council. In other words, he does not accept Arendt's division: "When I speak about the autonomy of the organization of the masses," Castoriadis writes, "I do so only because and in so far as *they do not accept the established institution of society.* This means in the first place that they do not accept any other source of legitimate power outside themselves; and in the second place, that they abolish, within themselves, the division between those who direct and those who execute."[7]

Now if Feher and Heller are right, the Hungarian revolution did not intend to establish the kind of general council system advocated by either Arendt or Castoriadis. The councils did make politial decisions but on the understanding that the situation would change after elections. And elections *were* to take place. Many people were reluctant to return to a multi-party system but most people expected it to happen. It is, of course, impossible to say what would have actually happened. Feher and Heller repeatedly emphasize that the open phase of the revolution lasted only 13 days. For even if it is true that the councils continued their work for over a month after the second Russian invasion (a point forcefully asserted by Castoriadis), they clearly had no choice but to make all the political as well as the economic decisions which needed to be made. There were, in other words, only a few days when the councils could act freely.

The Hungarian revolution, accordingly, was not as radical as Arendt and Castoriadis saw it and wanted to see it. It did not offer a total alternative to "bureaucratic capitalism" (Castoriadis) or to "the party system as such" (Arendt), i.e., to a *system* construed as an essential identity of apparently heterogeneous formations (one-party system in the USSR, multi-party system in France, two-party system in the U.S., etc.). It offered what was called in Hungary a third road, associated in those days with Nehru's India, though differing from it by radically breaking with state capitalism and substituting it with self-management via workers' councils. What was actually meant was a dual system, and it is the most significant aspect of Feher's and Heller's book that they make this clear.

4. Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Hungarian Source," in *Telos*, 29 (Fall 1976), p. 5.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, p. 17. Castoriadis reduces the problem of the dual system to insignificance in an oddly inconclusive footnote: "It is true that in Hungary there were demands for free elections to designate a new Parliament, and it seems that they had the support of the Councils. But this was an understandable reaction to the previous state of affairs and the bureaucratic dictatorship. Had the Revolution been allowed to develop, the question of the respective roles of Parliament and the Councils would, of course, have remained open. In my view, the uninterrupted development of the power and activities of the Councils would have brought about either a gradual atrophy of the Parliament, or a clash between the two" (p. 16n).

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For the other focus of the revolution was, and still is, the state. Not in the abstract, as sheer bureaucracy, but as the nation-state, an institution tied to sovereignty, independence, and national economy. Now people in revolt, and willing to die, are very practical-minded, however unlikely this may sound. Practical-minded people may have strange beliefs. The peasants who were slaughtered in Münzer's army in 1525 may have been foolhardy to believe that angels were going to come and fight on their side. But they were quite practical-minded in their belief; they knelt down and prayed. The 1956 Hungarians were no less willing to die but they were different. They could not possibly believe that their revolution was going to shatter the nation-states of the world or that they could live in a country among nation-states without themselves having one of their own.

There were some people seeking to introduce a council democracy without political parties. But this was highly impractical and the majority did not advocate it. For one thing, it was, and still is, difficult to see how such a council system can be organized so as to carry out the work demanded by existing and/or necessary institutions. Furthermore, to deny people the right to form parties seemed to contradict the general demand for civil liberties. Free elections and the multi-party system were corollaries. It was impossible (for a people fighting, among others, for national independence) to ignore the existence of the nation-state and (for a people intent on reorganizing society) to conceive of a single institutional framework which would have combined economic, municipal, regional, and national (i.e., countrywide) tasks in terms of internal and external needs. Feher and Heller are strategically correct, therefore, to focus on the dual system.

The renegotiation of the political status quo as established at Yalta and Potsdam, the second major point emphasized by Feher and Heller, could not be raised in the context of the council system. The same is true of the third major point: a compromise based on *national* consensus. Feher and Heller have a number of interesting things to say about this consensus. They contrast "organic nationalism" with "contractual" liberalism (p. 79), and state that "the drive to national consensus that surfaced in the Hungarian revolution was unambiguously organic in nature, which very strongly contradicts its interpretation as a liberal revolution" (p. 80). They speak of a "consensus in the making" (p. 101), raising the issue that there was no ready-made consensus which leading figures, such as Imre Nagy, could have followed. This sounds plausible. But if the demand of a dual system was real, i.e., if Feher's and Heller's main thesis stands up to scrutiny, the national consensus had to be such as to carry that demand.

So considered, the alternatives of "organic" and "contractual" do not help. There is some trouble with the idea of the merely "organic" nature of the society-wide consensus, just as it is confusing to equate the "liberal" with the "contractual." Clearly, the demand for a multi-party system does go against "organic nationalism" (the fascists had been quick to recognize this); and a socialist economy based on workers' councils rather than nationalization certainly is contractual without being liberal.

We are led back, therefore, to the central thesis of the book and the main feature of the revolution. Feher's and Heller's lack of clarity here is due to the thoroughly complex nature of the events. This is the major issue worth thinking about. Whether one thinks in terms of democracy and the nation-state or in terms of socialism and the nation-state, the task still is, as it was in 1956, one of reshaping the institutional network of a society within a nation-state among societies with nation-states. I do not think that Arendt and Castoriadis can be reconciled with one another, or with Bibó. They can be brought together meaningfully because they were at one in their advocacy of radical

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self-governance. Bibó's virtue was that he was more practical-minded than Arendt and Castoriadis; he was closer to the actual revolution with its "consensus in the making."

Hungarians may have wanted the impossible but they were not fools. A revolution in a small Central European country in 1956 seeking the abolution of the nation-state would not have been realistic whereas a revolution seeking to introduce a dual system was. That the revolution was suppressed only proves that it was suppressed. It may have been doomed from the outset, but this is worth fighting against. The nation-state, too, is worth attacking but it is inconceivable at present how it could be abolished under existing economic-political conditions.

A number of consequences follow from this and Feher and Heller argue them at some length. Thus, it is plausible that the Soviet leadership missed a great chance when it gave orders to suppress the Hungarian revolution instead of using it to introduce substantial reforms. Lost chances often survive as forceful arguments. It is, by the same token, useful to see in Kádár a Khrushchevite, so as to remind people of today's subterranean blues. And the revolution, betrayed by Kádár, is a useful indicator of the limitations of Khrushchevian reforms so quickly stifled in the USSR. Finally, the idea that the prime minister of the revolutionary government, Imre Nagy (executed in 1958), was not so much meek and weak but a leader produced by the consensus in the making who did not want to project charismatic gestures may sound strained. But it may not be far off the mark. It may indeed be useful to see him as "a *new type* of socialist radical" (p. 118). If "it is partly the specific message of this study that the Hungarian revolution (of which Imre Nagy was the most visible political manifestation) made decisive steps *forward* towards a new self-understanding of socialism as radical democracy, and *not backward*" (p. 117), we cannot expect a revolutionary leader of the type of Robespierre, Lenin, or Mao.

Feher and Heller write about many other aspects of the revolution and its aftermath. One of the shortcomings of their book is the sheer amount of issues they mention and, inevitably, can only treat cursorily. Another shortcoming is their style. They call their book an essay, but an essay it is not. It is the mixture of an article, a pamphlet, a homily and a confession. The mixture of styles is jarring and the moralistic tone — they often lapse into it — is a liability. They summon their "moral duty" to say this or that; it is "the perfidy" of the West, of the Yugoslavs, etc., that they castigate. This language is at war with the argument they are anxious to make. But they do make it.

András Sándor

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